'The dilemma of councillors': The history of local government in Kenya, c. 1945 - 2010 by MOSS, NATALIE,CHARLOTTE
Durham E-Theses
'The dilemma of councillors': The history of local
government in Kenya, c. 1945 - 2010
MOSS, NATALIE,CHARLOTTE
How to cite:
MOSS, NATALIE,CHARLOTTE (2016) 'The dilemma of councillors': The history of local government in
Kenya, c. 1945 - 2010, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online:
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/11510/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oﬃce, Durham University, University Oﬃce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
2





‘The	  dilemma	  of	  councillors’:	  	  
The	  history	  of	  local	  government	  in	  







Natalie	  Charlotte	  Moss	  	  Thesis	  submitted	  for	  the	  degree	  of	  Doctor	  of	  Philosophy	  Department	  of	  History	  Durham	  University	  	  2016	  	  	   	  
	  	  
ii	  Abstract	  	  This	   thesis	   examines	   the	   history	   of	   local	   government	   in	   Kenya	   from	   the	   late-­‐colonial	   period	   up	   to	   the	   passage	   of	   Kenya’s	   new	   constitution	   in	   2010.	   The	  development	  of	  local	  government	  was	  a	  hallmark	  of	  the	  Colonial	  Office’s	  policy	  for	  Africa	   in	   the	   post-­‐war	   period.	   In	   spite	   of	   this,	   scholarship	   on	   post-­‐colonial	   Kenya	  has	  tended	  to	  overlook	  local	  authorities.	  The	  2010	  constitution	  devolves	  power	  to	  forty-­‐seven	  new	  county	  governments;	  in	  light	  of	  this,	  this	  thesis	  considers	  how	  the	  local	  state	  has	  historically	   functioned	  in	  practice.	   In	  doing	  so,	   it	  contributes	  to	  the	  literature	   on	   decentralisation,	   neo-­‐patrimonialism	   and	   the	   state	   in	   Africa.	  Historiography	   of	   modern	   Kenya	   has	   focused	   on	   elite	   politics	   and	   the	   political	  dynamics	   within	   the	   highly	   centralised	   state.	   The	   prevailing	   narrative	   of	   local	  government	  in	  Kenya	  has	  been	  a	  story	  of	  formal	  decline.	  By	  reading	  the	  narrative	  of	  the	   Kenyan	   state	   from	   the	   bottom	   up,	   this	   thesis	   explores	   the	   development	   of	  competing	  ideas	  of	  government	  in	  Kenya,	  and	  the	  way	  this	  has	  shaped	  the	  practices	  of	   state	   institutions	  and	   those	  who	  hold	   local	   office.	   It	  draws	  on	   three	   case	   study	  councils	  -­‐	  Nakuru	  Municipal,	  Kilifi	  and	  Kakamega	  County	  Councils	  -­‐	  to	  critique	  the	  popular	   depiction	   of	   corrupt	   and	   self-­‐serving	   local	   leaders.	   Contrary	   to	   this,	   the	  moral	   world	   of	   councillors	   is	   presented	   as	   one	   that	   was	   full	   of	   challenging	   and	  competing	  demands	  yet	  was	  not	  devoid	  of	  an	  ethos	  of	  civic	  responsibility.	  Despite	  the	   many	   financial	   and	   institutional	   weaknesses	   of	   local	   authorities,	   councillors	  retained	   a	   level	   of	   legitimacy	   within	   their	   communities	   through	   their	   roles	   as	  patrons	  and	  clients	  in	  local	  and	  national	  political	  networks.	  The	  thesis	  thus	  explores	  the	   interplay	   between	   ‘elite’	   and	   ‘deep’	   politics,	   arguing	   that	   the	   pressure	   on	  politicians	   to	   distribute	   patronage	   and	   provide	   welfare	   support	   was	   particularly	  acute	  for	  councillors.	  By	  examining	  these	  pressures,	  this	  thesis	  studies	  the	  tension	  between	  official	  policy	  and	  the	  everyday	  practices	  of	  local	  government.	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  TNA	  	   The	  National	  Archives	  (UK)	  	  
	  	  
2	  Glossary	  &	  Currency	  	  
	  
KiSwahili	   English	  	  
Askari	  	   Tribal	  policeman,	  guard	  	  
Baraza	  	   Public	  meeting,	  council	  	  
Harambee	   Expression	  meaning	  ‘Let’s	  pull	  together’,	  also	  self-­‐help,	  
fundraising	  event.	  	  
Maendeleo	  	   Development,	  progress	  	  
Maendeleo	  ya	  Wanawake	  	   Development	  for	  Women	  Organisation	  	  
Majimbo/Majimboism	   Regions/regionalism	  	  
Mashinani	  	   Grassroots	  
Mwananchi/Wananchi	  	   Citizen/s	  
Nyayo	  	   Footsteps;	  motto	  of	  President	  Daniel	  arap	  Moi.	  	  
Tembo	  	   Palm	  wine	  	  




	  	  	  	  	  Figure	  1:	  Map	  of	  Kenyan	  local	  government	  areas	  in	  1958.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Source:	  A.	  St	  J.	  J.	  Hannigan,	  What	  is	  Local	  Government?	  (Nairobi,	  1958).	  	   	  
	  	  
4	  
	  Figure	  2:	  Map	  of	  case	  study	  locations	  (Nakuru,	  Kilifi	  and	  Kakamega).	  
	  
	  Source:	  adapted	  from	  David	  Leonard,	  African	  Successes:	  Four	  Public	  Managers	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Kenyan	  Rural	  Development	  (Berkeley,	  1991),	  p.	  xx.	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8	  Introduction	  	  In	   2001,	   Kenya’s	   leading	   newspaper,	   the	  Daily	   Nation	   called	   for	   the	   abolition	   of	  local	  government:	  	  	  From	  Mombasa	   to	  Busia,	  Mandera	   to	  Loitoktok,	   the	  councils…	  are	  a	  study	   in	   failure,	   an	   experiment	   in	   democracy	   that	   went	   miserably	  wrong…If	  something	  is	  not	  working	  for	  forty	  years,	  you	  do	  not	  try	  to	  repair	   it.	   Local	   authorities	   are	   an	   expensive	   experiment	  we	   should	  now	  end.	  As	  those	  bruisers	  brawl	  it	  out	  choosing	  mayors	  -­‐	  how	  else	  could	  they	  have	  an	  election?	  -­‐	  this	  country	  could	  start	  thinking	  how	  it	  could	   do	   itself	   a	   big	   favour.	   It	   could	   get	   rid	   of	   this	   superfluous	   and	  useless	  form	  of	  bureaucracy.	  Put	  the	  councillors	  out	  of	  work.1	  The	  article	  presented	  the	  ‘failure’	  of	  local	  government	  as	  primarily	  the	  fault	  of	  those	  who	   occupied	   local	   office.	   The	   system	   was	   not	   bad;	   the	   councillors	   were.	  ‘Masquerading	  as	  grassroots	  leaders’,	  Kenya’s	  councillors	  were	  not	  ‘public	  servants’,	  but	   ‘thieves,	   miscreants,	   fraudsters	   and	   embezzlers’,	   whose	   only	   ‘claim	   to	   fame’,	  was	   their	   ‘intellectual	   vacuity’,	   ‘proclivity	   to	   violence’,	   and	   ‘appetite	   for	   power’.2	  Twelve	  years	  after	   this	  article	  was	  published,	  Kenya’s	   forty	   -­‐	  or	  more	  accurately	   -­‐	  eighty	  year	  experiment	  with	  British	  local	  government	  was	  abandoned.	  Councillors	  were	  put	   ‘out	   of	  work’,	   and	   local	   government	  was	   replaced	  by	   a	  more	   ‘ambitious	  and	   rigorous	   experiment	   in	   democratic	   decentralisation’.3	  This	   experiment	   came	  into	   effect	   at	   the	   general	   elections	   of	   March	   2013,	   the	   first	   held	   under	   a	   new	  constitution.	   The	   constitution	   has	   devolved	   power	   to	   forty-­‐seven	   newly	   created	  county	   governments,	   which	   consist	   of	   a	   county	   executive	   (governor,	   deputy	   and	  executive	   committee)	   and	   county	   assembly.	   Like	   councillors,	  Members	   of	   County	  Assemblies	   (MCAs)	   are	   elected	   to	   represent	   their	   wards	   within	   county	  governments.	   Since	   taking	   office,	   MCAs	   have	   been	   characterised	   by	   the	   press	   in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  as	  their	  local	  government	  predecessors	  were.	  The	  Star	  wrote	  in	  August	   2014	   that	   ‘[w]hen	   MCAs	   replaced	   the	   old	   councillor	   system…	   Kenyans	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Kwamchetsi	  Makokha,	  'These	  mayors	  should	  be	  our	  last',	  Daily	  Nation,	  6	  July	  2001,	  p.	  8.	  2	  Ibid.	  	  3	  Rotimi	  Subera	  ‘Federalism	  and	  decentralization’,	  in	  Nic	  Cheeseman,	  David	  Anderson	  &	  Andrea	  Scheibler	  (eds.),	  Routledge	  Handbook	  of	  African	  Politics	  (London,	  2013),	  pp.	  24-­‐	  36,	  p.	  32.	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heaved	   a	   collective	   sigh	   of	   relief.	   To	   their	   horror,	   the	   councillors	   have	   merely	  morphed	  into	  the	  MCAs’.4	  	  	   The	   persistently	   negatively	   portrayal	   of	   Kenya’s	   ‘grassroots	   leaders’	   is	  difficult	   to	   understand	   given	   the	   historical	   and	   contemporary	   importance	   of	  decentralisation	   in	   Kenyan	   political	   debate.	   Since	   the	   late-­‐colonial	   period,	   debate	  over	   the	   relative	   merits	   of	   centralised	   and	   decentralised	   political	   systems	   has	  periodically	   recurred.	   The	   arguments	   for	   decentralisation	   have	   been	   framed	  differently	  over	  the	  years,	  but	  the	  idea	  of	  bringing	  government	  ‘closer	  to	  the	  people’	  has	  always	  enjoyed	  wide	  popular	  support.	  But	  what	  exactly	  does	   it	  mean	  to	  bring	  ‘government’	   to	  the	   ‘people’?	  This	  thesis	  considers	  this	  question	  by	  examining	  the	  institutions,	   ideas	   and	   individuals	   that	   together	   made	   up	   the	   local	   government	  system	  in	  Kenya.	  The	  final	  abolition	  of	   local	  authorities	  represented	  the	  end	  of	  an	  idea	   of	   local	   government	   –	   developed	   in	   the	   colonial	   period	   –	   that	   had	   remained	  remarkably	   powerful,	   at	   least	   rhetorically	   if	   not	   in	   practice,	   since	   independence.	  The	   system	   brought	   in	   to	   replace	   it	   can	   only	   be	   fully	   understood	   in	   reference	   to	  longer	  processes	  of	  contestation	  over	  what	   local	   leaders	  should	  provide,	  and	  how	  resources	  should	  be	  generated	  and	  distributed	  nationally	  and	  locally.	  	   Despite	   being	   part	   of	   the	   state’s	   architecture	   since	   the	   mid-­‐1920s,	   the	  significance	   of	   local	   authorities	   has	   not	   been	   comprehensively	   addressed	   in	   the	  literature.	   By	   overlooking	   local	   government,	   scholars	   of	   Kenya	   have	   missed	   an	  opportunity	  to	  explore	  how	  local	  debates	  over	  what	  is	  expected	  of	  ‘the	  state’,	  relate	  to	  macro	   processes	   of	   political	   change.	   This	   thesis	   argues	   that	   by	   examining	   the	  experience	   of	   local	   authorities,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   more	   fully	   appreciate	   how	  competing	  expectations	  of	  ‘the	  state’	  and	  ‘the	  government’	  have	  emerged	  in	  Kenya,	  and	   how	   state	   practice	   has	   evolved	   to	   meet	   those	   expectations	   and	   norms.	  Furthermore,	  the	  history	  of	   local	  government,	   it	   is	  argued,	  provides	  an	  alternative	  view	   into	  Kenya’s	  post-­‐independence	  experience	   to	   that	  prevalent	   in	  much	  of	   the	  literature.	   Scholars	   of	   Kenya	   have	   tended	   to	   ascribe	   considerable	   power	   to	   ‘the	  state’,	   and	   at	   times	   have	   seemingly	   conflated	   ‘the	   state’	   with	   the	   political	  leadership.5	  Consequently	  Kenya’s	  post-­‐independence	  political	  history	  is	  read,	  first	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Matt	  Gathigira,	  ‘MCAs	  smear	  investment	  destination	  credentials’,	  The	  Star,	  31	  July	  2014,	  retrieved	  from	  http://allafrica.com/stories/201408010496.html,	  last	  accessed	  20	  August	  2015.	  	  5	  For	  example	  see	  David	  Throup,	  ‘The	  construction	  and	  destruction	  of	  the	  Kenyatta	  state’,	  in	  Michael	  Schatzberg	  (ed.),	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Kenya	  (New	  York,	  1987),	  pp.	  33-­‐74.	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and	   foremost,	   as	   a	   function	   of	   elite	   agency.	   Yet	  when	   politics	   is	   viewed	   from	   the	  vantage	   point	   of	   local	   authorities,	   the	   tension	   between	   a	   bureaucratic	   ideal	   of	  government,	  and	  a	  neo-­‐patrimonial	  reality	  emerges	  less	  as	  solely	  a	  product	  of	  elite	  interest.	  By	  focusing	  in	  particular	  on	  councillors,	  this	  thesis	  uses	  local	  office	  holders	  to	  explore	  some	  of	  the	  consequences	  –	  for	   individuals	  and	  institutions	  –	  of	  having	  government	  close	  to	   the	  people;	  of	  having	  elected	   leaders,	  drawn	  from,	  and	   living	  amongst,	  those	  they	  represent.	  The	  most	  publicised	  consequence,	   ‘corruption’,	  has	  not	   been	   the	   subject	   of	   as	   much	   scholarly	   critique	   in	   Kenya	   as	   in	   other	   African	  contexts.	   The	   search	   for	   a	   ‘moral	   economy	   of	   corruption’	   has	   for	   too	   long	   been	  denied	   due	   a	   prevailing	   popular	   and	   academic	   narrative	   that	   ascribes	   many	   of	  Kenya’s	   intractable	   political	   problems	   to	   the	   corrupt	   actions	   of	   its	   historical	  governing	   elite.6	  Yet	   when	   viewed	   from	   the	   ‘bottom-­‐up’,	   corruption	   –	   or	   neo-­‐patrimonialism	  –	  emerges	  as	  less	  a	  function	  of	  individual	  self-­‐interest	  and	  more	  as	  a	   response	   to	   weak	   institutional	   capacity,	   and	   great	   public	   demand	   for	   local	  services.	   Furthermore,	   an	   examination	   of	   the	   irregular,	   practical	   norms	   in	   local	  authorities	   can	   shed	   light	   on	   the	   existence	   of	   contradictory	   expectations	   of	  government	   and	   elected	   leaders.	   As	   Kenya	   transitions	   to	   devolved	   government,	  there	  is	  an	  urgent	  need	  to	  explore	  how	  and	  why	  certain	  informal	  norms	  developed	  in	   local	   authorities,	   in	   order	   to	   understand	   why	   such	   practices	   are	   being	  reproduced	  by	  MCAs	  despite	  them	  operating	  in	  a	  vastly	  improved	  devolved	  system.	  	  	   In	  historicising	  the	  process	  that	   led	  to	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  new	  constitution,	  few	  scholars	  discuss	   local	   government.	   Instead	  when	  considering	   the	  background	  to	   the	   debate	   over	   devolution,	   most	   focus	   on	   Kenya’s	   independence	   ‘majimbo’	  (regions)	  constitution	  which	  was	  structured	  around	  seven	  freshly	  created	  regional	  authorities.7	  The	  regional	  provisions	  in	  the	  independence	  constitution	  were	  drafted	  a	   year	   before	   independence	   in	  1963	   after	   appeals	   from	  members	   of	   the	  minority	  Kenya	  African	  Democratic	  Union	  (KADU)	  party	  which	  was	  composed	  mainly	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The	  notion	  of	  a	  ‘moral	  economy	  of	  corruption’	  was	  first	  developed	  by	  Jean-­‐Pierre	  Olivier	  de	  Sardan	  in	  ‘A	  moral	  economy	  of	  corruption	  in	  Africa?’,	  JOMAS,	  37:1	  (1999),	  pp.	  25-­‐52.	  For	  a	  popular	  account	  of	  the	  role	  of	  corruption	  in	  Kenyan	  politics	  see	  Michela	  Wrong,	  It’s	  Our	  
Turn	  to	  Eat:	  The	  Story	  of	  a	  Kenyan	  Whistle-­‐blower	  (New	  York,	  2009).	  	  7	  See	  for	  example:	  John	  Harbeson,	  ‘Kenya’s	  2013	  elections’,	  African	  Studies	  Review,	  57:	  1	  (2014),	  pp.	  197-­‐207;	  Fred	  Otieno,	  ‘Kenya:	  Devolution	  and	  prospects	  for	  peace’,	  Horn	  of	  
Africa	  Bulletin	  -­‐	  Life	  &	  Peace	  Institute,	  November-­‐	  December	  2014,	  accessed	  online	  at:	  http://life-­‐peace.org/hab/devolution-­‐and-­‐prospects-­‐for-­‐peace;	  ‘At	  last,	  devolution	  comes	  home’,	  New	  African,	  14	  November	  2011,	  accessed	  online	  at:	  http://newafricanmagazine.com/at-­‐last-­‐genuine-­‐devolution-­‐comes-­‐home.	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‘smaller’	   tribes,	   and	   had	   the	   support	   of	   key	   settler	   politicians.8	  Their	   hopes	   that	  regionalism	  would	  protect	   ethnic	  minorities	   in	   a	   state	  dominated	  by	   the	  Luo	   and	  Kikuyu	   politicians	   were	   dashed	   when	   the	   Kenya	   African	   National	   Union	   (KANU)	  party	  won	   the	  May	   1963	   election	   in	   a	   landslide.9	  Always	   opposed	   to	   regionalism,	  Kenyatta’s	   government	   denied	   the	   regions	   funds	   and	   functions	   in	   the	   months	  following	  internal	  self-­‐government.10	  After	  KADU’s	  members	  dissolved	  the	  party	  in	  November	   1964,	   the	   fate	   of	   the	   regions	   was	   sealed;	   regional	   authorities	   were	  swiftly	  disbanded.11	  	  	   Many	   studies	   assume	   that	   substantive	   debate	   over	   devolution	   did	   not	  resume	  in	  Kenya	  until	  the	  early	  1990s	  as	  part	  of	  the	  return	  to	  multi-­‐partyism.12	  In	  such	   analyses,	   after	   the	   brief	   experiment	   in	   decentralisation	  was	   abandoned,	   the	  state	  returned	  to	  its	  highly	  centralised	  structure,	  whereby	  considerable	  power	  was	  vested	  in	  the	  executive.	  Understanding	  this	  structure	  has	  been	  an	  enduring	  concern	  for	   scholars	   of	   the	   Kenyan	   state.13	  In	   2006,	   Branch	   and	   Cheeseman	   outlined	   a	  narrative	  and	  theory	  of	  this	  structure	  and	  system,	  proposing	  that	  in	  the	  last	  decade	  of	   independence,	   and	   throughout	   Kenyatta’s	   presidency	   (1963-­‐78)	   Kenya	   was	  ruled	   as	   a	   ‘bureaucratic-­‐executive	   state’.14	  They	   see	   this	   category	   as	   a	   subset	   of	   a	  more	   general	   type	   of	   state	   ‘history’	   in	   Africa,	   namely	   that	   of	   ‘centralised-­‐authoritarian’	   regimes.15	  These,	   Chris	   Allen	   explains,	   were	   distinguishable	   in	   the	  post-­‐independence	  era	  by	  four	  common	  features:	  ‘the	  retention	  of	  clientelism’;	  ‘the	  centralisation	   of	   power	   in	   an	   executive	   presidency’;	   ‘the	   displacement	   of	   the	  party…by	   a	   bureaucracy	   answerable	   to	   the	   presidency’;	   and	   ‘the	   downgrading	   of	  representative	   institutions…within	   the	   political	   system.’16	  Branch	   and	   Cheeseman	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Keith	  Kyle,	  The	  Politics	  of	  the	  Independence	  of	  Kenya	  (London,	  1997),	  pp.	  138-­‐147.	  	  9	  David	  Anderson,	  ‘Majimboism:	  The	  troubled	  history	  of	  an	  idea’,	  in	  Daniel	  Branch,	  Nic	  Cheeseman	  and	  Leigh	  Gardner	  (eds.),	  Our	  turn	  to	  Eat:	  Politics	  in	  Kenya	  Since	  1950	  (Berlin,	  2010),	  pp.	  23-­‐52.	  	  10	  Charles	  Hornsby,	  Kenya:	  A	  History	  Since	  Independence	  (London,	  2012),	  pp.	  85-­‐86.	  	  11	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  94-­‐96.	  	  	  12	  For	  example	  see:	  Yash	  Ghai,	  ‘Devolution:	  Restructuring	  the	  Kenyan	  State’,	  	  JEAS,	  2:2	  (2008),	  pp.	  211-­‐226;	  Gabrielle	  Lynch,	  I	  Say	  to	  You:	  Ethnic	  Politics	  and	  the	  Kalenjin	  in	  Kenya	  (London,	  2011),	  pp.	  65-­‐67,	  pp.	  157-­‐50;	  Angelique	  Haugerud,	  The	  Culture	  of	  Politics	  in	  
Modern	  Kenya	  (Cambridge,	  1995),	  p.	  41.	  Anderson,	  ‘Majimboism’.	  	  13	  Gertzel,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Independent	  Kenya	  (Evanston,	  1970);	  Mordechai	  Tamarkin,	  ‘The	  roots	  of	  political	  stability	  in	  Kenya’,	  African	  Affairs,	  77:	  208	  (1978),	  pp.	  297-­‐320.	  	  14	  Daniel	  Branch	  and	  Nic	  Cheeseman,	  ‘The	  politics	  of	  control	  in	  Kenya:	  Understanding	  the	  bureaucratic-­‐executive	  state,	  1952-­‐78’,	  ROAPE,	  33:107	  (2006),	  pp.	  11-­‐31.	  	  	  15	  Ibid.	  	  16	  Chris	  Allen,	  ‘Understanding	  African	  politics’,	  ROAPE,	  22:65	  (1995),	  pp.	  301–320.	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refine	   this	  analysis,	  by	  shifting	   the	   focus	   from	  post-­‐independence	  policies,	   to	  pre-­‐independence	   processes	   of	   ‘institution	   building	   and	   class	   formation’. 17 	  Their	  contribution	  is	  more	  a	  synthesis	  of	  the	  literature,	  than	  a	  corrective	  to	  it.	  It	  draws	  on	  early	  studies	  of	  the	  Kenyan	  state	  and	  combines	  these	  with	  insights	  on	  the	  colonial	  economy	  and	  class	  formation	  from	  scholars	  writing	  mainly	  in	  the	  1970s,	  with	  more	  recent	  attempts	   to	  deconstruct	   the	  colonial	  experience,	  and	  the	  colonial	  state.18	  In	  doing	   so,	   a	   very	   convincing	   portrait	   is	   offered	   which	   explains	   the	   historical	  development	   of	   a	   highly	   effective	   structure	   of	   control	   during	   the	   late-­‐colonial	  period,	   which	   continued	   to	   appeal	   to	   political	   leaders	   after	   the	   bureaucratic-­‐executive	  state’s	  heyday	  under	  Jomo	  Kenyatta.	  	  	   Yet	   by	   focusing	   on	   the	   continuities	   and	   sheer	   effectiveness	   of	   this	   system,	  the	   authors	   present	   the	   triumph	   of	   a	   highly	   centralised	   political	   system	   as	  somehow	   a	   fait	   accompli.	  This	   is	  most	   evident	   in	   their	   treatment	   of	   the	   regional	  independence	   constitution.	  Whilst	   they	   acknowledge	   that	   ‘the	   immediate	  pre	   and	  post-­‐independence	  periods…saw	  a	  battle	  over	  the	  centralisation	  of	  authority	  within	  the	  Kenyan	   state’,	   that	   this	   battle	  was	   swiftly	   ‘overcome’	   and	   indeed	   conclusively	  won	   by	   the	   executive	   and	   the	   administration	   appears	   not	   in	   dispute. 19 	  This	  portrayal,	   although	   not	   unique	   to	   Branch	   and	   Cheeseman,	   is	   problematic.20	  It	  suggests	  that	  debates	  about	  decentralisation	  began	  in	  the	  years	  immediately	  before	  independence	   and	   ended	   soon	   after,	   and	   that	   the	   scope	   of	   these	   debates	   did	   not	  extend	  beyond	   the	   regional	  provisions	   in	   the	   constitution.	  This	   thesis	   argues	   that	  by	  broadening	  both	  the	  scope	  and	  period	  of	  analysis,	  a	  slightly	  more	  contradictory	  picture	  of	   the	   centralising	   state	   comes	   in	   to	   view,	   and	   if	   focus	   is	   shifted	   from	   the	  short-­‐lived	   regional	   constitution	   to	   local	   government,	   a	   different	   set	   of	   questions	  emerge.	  Unlike	  regional	  authorities,	  Kenya’s	  local	  councils	  were	  not	  created	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  independence.	  Local	  authorities	  had	  existed	  in	  parts	  of	  colonial	  Kenya	  since	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Branch	  and	  Cheeseman,	  ‘The	  politics	  of	  control',	  p.	  28.	  18	  Cherry	  Gertzel	  provided	  the	  first	  contribution	  on	  state-­‐centralisation	  after	  independence	  in	  The	  Politics	  of	  Independent	  Kenya.	  Debate	  over	  Kenya’s	  post-­‐colonial	  economy	  were	  prompted	  by	  Colin	  Leys,	  Underdevelopment	  in	  Kenya	  (London,	  1974);	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  this	  debate	  see	  Rafael	  Kaplinsky,	  ‘Capitalist	  accumulation	  in	  the	  periphery:	  The	  Kenyan	  case	  re-­‐examined’,	  ROAPE,	  7:17	  (1980),	  pp.	  83-­‐105.	  On	  the	  colonial	  state	  see	  Bruce	  Berman,	  
Control	  &	  Crisis	  in	  Colonial	  Kenya:	  The	  Dialectic	  of	  Domination	  (London,	  1990).	  	  19	  Branch	  and	  Cheeseman,	  ‘The	  politics	  of	  control',	  p.	  22.	  	  20	  See	  also	  David	  Anderson,	  ‘“Yours	  in	  struggle	  for	  majimbo”:	  Nationalism	  and	  the	  party	  politics	  of	  decolonization	  in	  Kenya,	  1955-­‐64’,	  Journal	  of	  Contemporary	  History,	  40:3	  (2005),	  pp.	  547–564.	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the	  mid-­‐1920s.	  This	  thesis	  asks	  why	  a	  policy	  of	  British-­‐style	  local	  government	  was	  adopted	  in	  colonial	  Kenya	  and	  how	  the	  uncertain	  survival	  of	   this	  system	  –	  and	  its	  final	   replacement	   –	   should	   be	   understood.	   It	   does	   so	   through	   studying	   both	   the	  institutions	   of	   local	   government	   and	   the	   people	  who	   operated	   them.	   It	   examines	  official	  policy	  and	  state	  practice,	  and	  how	  this	  changed	  from	  the	  late-­‐colonial	  period,	  up	  to	  2010.	  During	  this	  eighty	  year	  period,	  there	  were	  times	  of	  ‘drama	  and	  intrigues’	  in	   local	   government	   policy	   and	   practice,	   as	   well	   as	   periods	   of	   ‘general	   morass’,	  when	   councils	   were	   widely	   regarded	   as	   inconsequential	   both	   as	   public	   service	  providers	  and	  as	  political	  platforms.21	  Yet	  the	  cases	  presented	  in	  this	  thesis	  confirm	  the	   importance	   of	   looking	   beyond	   the	   formal	   confines	   of	   council	   offices	   to	  appreciate	  the	  full	  extent	  of	  councillors’	  roles	  in	  local	  service	  delivery	  and	  political	  representation.	  	  	  	   This	   introductory	   chapter	   begins	   by	   setting	   out	   the	  main	   contributions	   to	  the	  study	  of	  local	  government	  in	  colonial	  Kenya,	  before	  examining	  how	  the	  story	  of	  local	   authorities	   features	   in	   the	   prevailing	   academic	   narrative	   of	   Kenya’s	   post-­‐independence	  political	  history.	  This	   is	   followed	  by	  a	  discussion	  of	  how	   the	  Kenya	  literature	   relates	   to	   broader	  debates	   about	   the	   state	   in	  Africa,	   before	   considering	  some	  of	  the	  more	  recent	  scholarly	  inquiries	  into	  local	  governance,	  corruption,	  and	  the	  local	  state.	  The	  last	  part	  of	  the	  chapter	  sets	  out	  the	  cases,	  sources	  and	  structure	  of	  the	  thesis.	  	  
Local	  government	  in	  colonial	  Kenya	  &	  Africa	  	  In	   a	   speech	   made	   in	   1976,	   Kenya’s	   then	   Minister	   for	   Local	   Government,	   Robert	  Matano,	  suggested	  that	  the	  country’s	   local	  government	  system	  had	  been	  set	  up	  by	  statute	   at	   independence.22	  Matano	  made	  no	   reference	   to	   the	   existence	  of	   councils	  before	  1963,	   stating	   instead	   that	   local	   authorities	  were	   established	  by	  KANU	   ‘not	  only	   to	   fill	   the	   void	   created	   by	   the	   destruction	   of	   our	   traditional	   institutions,	   but	  also	   to	   form	  an	  essential	  political	   link	  between	   the	  people	  and	   the	  government’.23	  This	  was	   rather	   a	   striking	   omission	   on	  Matano’s	   part.	   Indeed,	   some	   have	   argued	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Walter	  Oyugi,	  ‘Local	  government	  in	  Kenya:	  A	  case	  of	  institutional	  decline’,	  in	  Philip	  Mawhood	  (ed.),	  Local	  Government	  in	  the	  Third	  World:	  The	  Experience	  of	  Tropical	  Africa	  (Chichester:	  Wiley,	  1983),	  pp.	  107-­‐140,	  p.	  107;	  Roger	  Southall	  and	  Geoffrey	  Wood,	  ‘Local	  government	  and	  the	  return	  to	  multi-­‐partyism	  in	  Kenya’,	  African	  Affairs,	  95:381	  (1996),	  pp.	  501-­‐527,	  p.	  515.	  	  22	  Robert	  Matano	  speech	  ‘The	  challenge	  of	  Local	  Government’,	  reproduced	  in	  Weekly	  Review,	  30	  August	  1976,	  pp.	  4-­‐5,	  p.	  4.	  23	  Ibid.	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that	   that	   ‘the	   history	   of	   local	   government	   is	   perhaps	   as	   old	   as	   modern	   Kenya	  itself.’24	  This	   statement,	  made	  by	  Walter	  Oyugi	   in	  1983	   traced	   the	  origins	  of	   local	  government	  to	  the	  very	  beginnings	  of	  colonial	  administration.	  But	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  thesis,	  the	  origins	  of	  local	  government	  are	  identified	  by	  the	  establishment	  of	  formally	  recognised	  councils,	  which	  occurred	   in	  different	  places	  at	  different	   times	  in	   colonial	   Kenya.	   After	   the	   Second	   World	   War,	   local	   government	   ‘absorbed	   an	  extraordinarily	   high	   proportion	   of	   the	   energies’	   of	   British	   colonial	   officials	   in	  London	  and	  in	  Africa.25	  The	  development	  of	  an	  ‘efficient	  and	  democratic	  system	  of	  local	   government’	   was	   a	   hallmark	   of	   post-­‐war	   imperial	   policy.26	  In	   Kenya,	   and	  across	  colonial	  British	  Africa,	  the	  aim	  was	  to	  ‘modernise’	  native	  authorities	  so	  that	  they	  could	  become	  more	  akin	  to	  British	  local	  government,	  and	  capable	  of	  playing	  a	  dynamic	  role	  in	  the	  economic	  development	  of	  their	  areas	  and	  political	  education	  of	  their	  members.27	  Writing	  in	  1964,	  Ronald	  Wraith,	  a	  former	  member	  of	  the	  Colonial	  Local	  Government	  Advisory	  Panel	  admitted	  that	  ‘with	  the	  advantage	  of	  hindsight,	  it	  is	   remarkable	  what	  a	  parochial	  view	  was	   taken	  of	   the	  possible	  ways	   in	  which	   the	  old	  native	  authorities	  could	  be	  modernised’.28	  Yet	  however	  ‘parochial’,	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  policy,	  and	  the	  legacy	  it	  left	  must	  be	  considered	  if	  the	  story	  of	  local	  authorities	  after	  independence	  is	  to	  be	  fully	  contextualised.	  	  	  	   Neighbouring	  Uganda’s	  Ministry	  of	  Local	  Government,	  Mahmood	  Mamdani	  argues,	  acted	  like	  ‘a	  state	  within	  a	  state…the	  ministry	  for	  the	  peasants…the	  heart	  of	  the	   colonial	   state.’29	  Historical	   inquiry	   into	   this	   ‘heart	   of	   the	   colonial	   state’	   has	  tended	   to	   be	   directed	   towards	   case	   studies,	   rather	   than	   comparative	   or	   thematic	  expositions.	   Thus,	   scholars	   have	   explored	   the	   establishment	   of	   local	   government	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Oyugi,	  ‘Local	  government	  in	  Kenya’,	  p.	  107.	  25	  Ronald	  Wraith,	  Local	  Government	  in	  West	  Africa	  (London,	  1964),	  p.	  181.	  	  26	  Ursula	  Hicks,	  Development	  from	  Below:	  Local	  Government	  and	  Finances	  in	  Developing	  
Countries	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  (London,	  1961),	  pp.	  1-­‐9,	  p.4.	  	  27	  Ibid.	  	  28	  Wraith,	  Local	  Government	  in	  West	  Africa,	  p.	  178.	  	  29	  Mahmood	  Mamdani,	  ‘Political	  identity,	  citizenship	  and	  ethnicity	  in	  post-­‐colonial	  Africa’,	  keynote	  address	  presented	  at	  New	  Frontiers	  of	  Social	  Policy	  Conference,	  Arusha,	  Tanzania,	  December	  12-­‐15,	  2005).	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systems	   in	   different	   parts	   of	   British	   Africa,	   including	   in	   Tanganyika	   and	   Sudan.30	  These	   works	   demonstrate	   the	   sheer	   range	   of	   questions	   that	   can	   productively	   be	  considered	  through	  studying	  colonial	  local	  authorities.	  In	  regards	  to	  Kenya,	  despite	  Donald	   Schilling’s	   concern	   that	   local	   councils	   could	   be	   ‘overlooked’	   by	   historians,	  this	   has	   generally	   not	   been	   the	   case.31	  Although	   few	   identify	   local	   councils	   as	   the	  ‘heart	   of	   the	   colonial	   state’,	   their	   existence	   –	   if	   not	   significance	   –	   is	   widely	  acknowledged	  in	  the	  literature.	  	  	   Arguably	  the	  defining	  feature	  of	   local	  government	   in	  Kenya,	  at	   least	  before	  1950,	   was	   that	   it	   evolved	   in	   an	   ad	   hoc	  way	   in	   response	   to	   local	   circumstances.	  Different	   systems	   of	   local	   administration	   were	   applied	   to	   the	   rural	   districts	  designated	   for	   Africans	   in	   the	   ‘Native	   Reserves’,	   and	   for	   Europeans	   in	   the	  ‘Scheduled	  Areas’.	  Legislation	  was	  passed	  to	  formalise	  the	  creation	  of	  Local	  Native	  Councils	  (LNCs)	  in	  some	  reserves	  in	  1924,	  and	  European	  District	  Councils	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	   ‘White	   Highlands’	   in	   1928.32	  The	   experiences	   of	   urban	   and	   rural	   councils	  were	  also	  quite	  distinct;	  the	  Nairobi	  Municipal	  Council	  was	  established	  in	  1919,	  and	  in	  other	  towns	  shortly	  after.33	  Central	  government	  direction	  and	  control	  over	  these	  bodies	   was	   limited	   in	   the	   inter-­‐war	   period.	   From	   the	   late	   1940s	   this	   started	   to	  change	  in	  response	  to	  then	  Colonial	  Secretary	  Arthur	  Creech-­‐Jones’	  ‘famous	  circular	  despatch’	   of	   1947.34	  Creech-­‐Jones	   instructed	   governors	   across	   the	   continent	   that	  the	   development	   of	   ‘efficient	   and	   democratic	   local	   government’	   in	   Africa	   was	   of	  primary	   importance	   to	   the	   Colonial	   Office.35	  In	   1950	   legislation	   was	   passed	   to	  transform	  LNCs	  into	  African	  District	  Councils	  (ADCs)	  with	  ‘expanded	  authority	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Andreas	  Eckert,	  ‘“A	  showcase	  for	  experiments”:	  Local	  government	  reforms	  in	  colonial	  Tanzania,	  1940s	  and	  1950s’,	  Afrika	  Spectrum,	  34:2	  (1999),	  pp.	  213–235;	  	  Rohland	  Schuknecht,	  British	  Colonial	  Development	  Policy	  After	  the	  Second	  World	  War:	  The	  Case	  of	  
Sukumaland,	  Tanganyika	  (London,	  2010),	  pp.	  111-­‐126;	  Chris	  Vaughan,	  ‘Reinventing	  the	  wheel?	  Local	  government	  and	  neo-­‐traditional	  authority	  in	  late-­‐colonial	  northern	  Sudan’,	  
International	  Journal	  of	  African	  Historical	  Studies,	  43:2	  (2010),	  pp.	  255–278;	  Justin	  Willis,	  ‘Tribal	  gatherings:	  Colonial	  spectacle,	  native	  administration	  and	  local	  government	  in	  condominium	  Sudan’,	  Past	  and	  Present,	  211:1	  (2011),	  pp.	  243–268.	  31	  	  Donald	  Schilling,	  ‘Local	  Native	  Councils	  and	  the	  politics	  of	  education	  in	  Kenya,	  1925-­‐1939’,	  The	  International	  Journal	  of	  African	  Historical	  Studies,	  9:2	  (1976),	  pp.	  218-­‐247,	  p.	  220.	  	  32	  Native	  Authority	  (Amendment)	  Ordinance	  1924;	  Local	  Government	  (District	  Councils)	  Ordinance,	  1928.	  	  33	  Herbert	  Werlin,	  Governing	  an	  African	  City:	  A	  Study	  of	  Nairobi	  (New	  York,	  1974),	  pp.	  41-­‐43.	  	  34	  John	  Cell,	  ‘On	  the	  eve	  of	  decolonization:	  The	  Colonial	  Office’s	  plans	  for	  the	  transfer	  of	  power	  in	  Africa,	  1947’,	  JICH,	  8:3	  (1980),	  pp.	  235–257,	  p.	  235.	  35	  R.	  D.	  Pearce,	  The	  Turning	  Points	  in	  Africa:	  British	  Colonial	  Policy,	  1938-­‐48	  (London,	  1982),	  pp.	  141-­‐159.	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responsibility’.36	  Two	  years	  later,	  European	  District	  Councils	  were	  refashioned	  into	  British-­‐style	  County	  Councils.	  These	  different	  streams	  of	  local	  government	  had	  ‘no	  connection	  with	  each	  other’	  until	  independence.37	  On	  account	  of	  this,	  research	  into	  colonial	   councils	   has	   tended	   to	   follow	   these	   same	   divisions.	   Most	   studies	   have	  focused	   on	   local	   government	   in	   the	   reserves.	   Scholars	   have	   debated	   the	   ‘political	  intentions’	  and	  political	   ramifications	  of	  LNCs,	  and	   the	  enhanced	  objectives	  of	   the	  post-­‐war	   reforms. 38 	  Councils	   themselves	   have	   been	   examined	   as	   sites	   of	  collaboration	  and	  contestation,	  which	  offered	  opportunities	   to	   their	  members	  but	  also	   constrained	   them.39	  The	   welfare	   and	   development	   programmes	   of	   councils,	  and	  their	  taxation	  regimes	  have	  been	  explored.40	  And	  the	  records	  of	   local	  councils	  have	  also	  been	  used	  by	  historians	  to	  understand	  how	  Africans	  debated	  processes	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  change.41	  	  	   Most	   scholars	   agree	   that	   initially,	   colonial	   authorities	   aimed	   through	   local	  government	   to	  co-­‐opt	   the	  growing	  number	  of	  mission-­‐educated	  men,	  and	  prevent	  the	   development	   of	   national	   political	   organisations.42	  In	   this	   way,	   the	   creation	   of	  LNCs	   ‘deliberately	   fragmented	   African	   political	   organisation’. 43 	  There	   is	   less	  consensus	   in	   the	   literature	   on	  whether	   LNCs	  were	   in	   any	  way	   participatory	   and	  democratic,	  or	  whether	   they	  only	  served	  as	  advisory	  bodies.	  The	   fact	   that	  district	  commissioners,	   as	   the	   presidents	   of	   LNCs,	   could	   veto	   any	   decision	   passed	   by	  members,	  according	  to	  Oyugi	  reveals	  that	  ‘as	  political	  entities	  they	  did	  not	  count’.44	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Berman,	  Control	  &	  Crisis,	  p.	  312.	  37	  Hicks,	  Development	  from	  Below,	  p.	  125.	  	  38	  On	  the	  original	  ‘political	  intentions’,	  and	  post-­‐war	  reforms	  see	  Berman,	  Control	  and	  Crisis,	  pp.	  216-­‐218,	  pp.	  309-­‐312.	  	  39	  Gavin	  Kitching,	  Class	  and	  Economic	  Change	  in	  Kenya:	  The	  Making	  of	  an	  African	  Petite	  
Bourgeoisie	  1905-­‐1970	  (New	  Haven,	  1980),	  pp.	  188-­‐	  199.	  40	  Schilling,	  ‘Local	  Native	  Councils';	  Leigh	  Gardner,	  Taxing	  Colonial	  Africa:	  The	  Political	  
Economy	  of	  British	  Imperialism	  (Oxford,	  2012),	  pp.	  161-­‐191.	  	  41	  Louise	  Thomas,	  ‘Imperial	  concerns	  and	  “Women's	  Affairs’:	  State	  efforts	  to	  regulate	  clitoridectomy	  and	  eradicate	  abortion	  in	  Meru,	  Kenya,	  c.	  1910-­‐1950’,	  JAH,	  39:1	  (1998),	  pp.	  121–145;	  Priscilla	  Shilaro,	  A	  Failed	  Eldorado:	  Colonial	  Capitalism,	  Rural	  Industrialization,	  
African	  Land	  Rights	  in	  Kenya,	  and	  the	  Kakamega	  Gold	  Rush,	  1930-­‐1952	  (Plymouth,	  2008),	  pp.	  114-­‐131,	  pp.	  210-­‐216.	  	  42	  Kitching,	  Class	  and	  Economic	  Change	  in	  Kenya,	  p.	  188;	  John	  Lonsdale,	  ‘Some	  origins	  of	  nationalism	  in	  East	  Africa’,	  JAH,	  9:1	  (1968),	  pp.	  119-­‐146;	  Bruce	  Berman,	  ‘Bureaucracy	  &	  incumbent	  violence:	  Colonial	  administration	  &	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  ‘Mau	  Mau’	  emergency’,	  in	  Berman	  &	  Lonsdale	  Unhappy	  Valley:	  Conflict	  in	  Kenya	  &	  Africa	  (London,	  1992),	  vol.	  2.,	  pp.	  227-­‐264,	  p.	  247.	  	  43	  John	  Lonsdale,	  ‘The	  moral	  economy	  of	  Mau	  Mau’,	  in	  John	  Lonsdale	  and	  Bruce	  Berman,	  
Unhappy	  Valley:	  Conflict	  in	  Kenya	  &	  Africa	  (London,	  1992),	  vol.	  2.,	  pp.	  466-­‐68.	  44	  Oyugi,	  ‘Local	  government	  in	  Kenya',	  	  p.	  	  114.	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Yet	   Lonsdale	  notes,	   regardless	   of	   the	   restrictions	  placed	  on	  members,	   LNCs	  were	  still,	   for	   many	   years,	   ‘the	   most	   democratic	   form	   of	   local	   government	   in	   British	  Africa’.45	  Bruce	   Berman	   discusses	   changes	   to	   election	   procedures	   in	   the	   post-­‐war	  period,	   and	   Lynn	   Thomas’	   writes	   that	   ‘[r]eports	   of	   crowds	   of	   men	   gathering	   to	  participate	  in	  LNC	  ‘elections’	  and	  to	  witness	  LNC	  proceedings	  suggest	  that	  some	  in	  Meru	  embraced	  the	  performative,	  if	  not	  the	  substantive,	  aspects	  of	  LNC	  work.’46	  Yet	  the	   exact	   ways	   in	   which	   electoral	   practices	   changed,	   and	   the	   way	   these	   were	  engaged	  with	  could	  still	  be	  better	  understood.	  	  	   Few	  share	  Oginga	  Odinga’s	  view	  of	  councils	  as	  simply	  the	  ‘shield	  with	  which	  the	   government	   protected	   itself	   from	   the	   people’. 47 	  Indeed	   most	   accounts	  acknowledge	   that	   multiple	   objectives	   were	   attached	   to	   the	   policy	   of	   local	  government,	   and	   that	   these	   aims	   changed	   over	   time.	   The	   impact	   of	   the	   reforms	  introduced	  from	  1950	  are	  unclear.	  Berman	  suggests	  that	  ‘the	  educative	  function	  of	  local	   government	   faded’	   after	   the	  African	  District	  Council	  Ordinance	  of	  1950,	   and	  that	  the	  functions	  and	  budgets	  of	  councils	  became	  far	  more	  complex.48	  For	  Patricia	  Stamp,	   the	   contradictions	   inherent	   in	   the	   local	   government	   project	   became	   even	  more	  apparent	  in	  the	  1950s.49	  She	  suggests	  that	  the	  colonial	  government	  intended	  local	   councils	   to	   serve	   as	   both	   instruments	   of	   control	   and	   functional,	   democratic	  institutions.	  Chapter	  one	  of	  this	  thesis	  considers	  further	  the	  significance	  of	  Creech-­‐Jones’	  despatch	  for	  local	  councils	  in	  Kenya.	  Using	  source	  material	  from	  the	  Colonial	  Office,	  the	  Secretariat	  in	  Nairobi,	  and	  councils	  themselves,	  it	  examines	  how	  officials	  interpreted	  and	  implemented	  the	   ‘new	  policy’.	  By	   looking	   in	  greater	  detail	  at	  how	  councils	  and	  the	  local	  government	  system	  changed	  in	  the	  late-­‐colonial	  period,	  it	   is	  possible	   to	   more	   accurately	   understand	   the	   context	   in	   which	   post-­‐independence	  reforms	  were	  negotiated.	  	  	   Compared	  with	  the	  literature	  on	  LNCs	  and	  ADCs,	  the	  study	  of	  councils	  in	  the	  ‘White	   Highlands’	   has	   been	   far	   more	   limited.	   This	   reflects	   the	   reality	   that	   most	  settlers	  exhibited	   little	   interest	   in	  participating	   in	   local	  government	  until	   the	   final	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  John	  Lonsdale,	  ‘The	  moral	  economy	  of	  Mau	  Mau:	  The	  problem’,	  in	  John	  Lonsdale	  and	  Bruce	  Berman,	  Unhappy	  Valley:	  Conflict	  in	  Kenya	  &	  Africa	  vol.	  2	  (London,	  1992),	  pp.	  265-­‐314,	  p.	  272.	  	  46	  Berman,	  Control	  &	  Crisis,	  p.	  311;	  Lynn	  Thomas,	  ‘Imperial	  concerns'.	  	  47	  Oginga	  Odinga,	  Not	  yet	  Uhuru:	  An	  autobiography	  of	  Odinga	  Oginga	  (London,	  1967),	  p.	  92.	  	  	  48	  Berman,	  Control	  &	  Crisis,	  p.	  312.	  	  49	  Patricia	  Stamp,	  ‘Local	  government	  in	  Kenya:	  Ideology	  and	  political	  practice,	  1895-­‐1974’,	  
African	  Studies	  Review,	  29:4	  (1986),	  pp.	  17–42.	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days	   of	   colonial	   rule.	   Urban	   local	   government	   has	   been	   similarly	   overlooked	   by	  scholars.	  This	  corresponds	  with	  John	  Lonsdale’s	  observation	  that	  ‘colonial	  Kenya’s	  historians	  have	  hitherto	  paid	  more	  attention	  to	  its	  rural	  political	  economies	  than	  its	  urban	  social	  histories’.50	  Knowledge	  of	  municipal	  governance	  has	  thus	  mainly	  been	  produced	   by	   scholars	   interested	   in	   the	   way	   ideas	   about	   the	   provision	   of	   African	  welfare	  services	   in	  towns,	  specifically	  that	  of	  housing	  shifted	   in	  the	  decade	  before	  independence.51	  Scholars	  have	  mainly	  focused	  on	  Nairobi	  and	  Mombasa;	  indeed	  the	  paucity	   of	   research	   into	   other	   provincial	   towns	   makes	   it	   difficult	   to	   draw	   any	  conclusions	  about	  urban	  government	  or	  town	  life	   in	  colonial	  Kenya	  outside	  of	   the	  capital	  and	  the	  port	  city.	  52	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  case	  of	  Nakuru	  Municipal	  Council	  is	  examined	  in	  this	  thesis	  to	  broaden	  scholarly	  understanding	  of	  processes	  of	  change	  in	   towns	   in	   the	   late-­‐colonial	   period	   and	   the	   legacies	   these	   left	   for	   post-­‐independence	  local	  governments.	  	  	   Alongside	   the	   development	   of	   ‘efficient,	   democratic	   local	   government’,	   the	  late-­‐colonial	   period	   also	   saw	   a	   rapid	   expansion	   in	   the	   size	   and	   strength	   of	   the	  provincial	   administration;	   a	   generalised	   branch	   of	   the	   civil	   service	   structured	  around	   a	   hierarchy	   of	   administrators,	   controlled	   by	   the	   governor.53	  Provincial	  commissioners,	   district	   commissioners	   and	   chiefs	   were	   used	   to	   penetrate	   ‘all	  corners	  of	   the	  country.’54	  In	   the	  post-­‐war	  period	   there	  was	  a	   tension	  between	   the	  policy	   of	   modern	   local	   government	   and	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   administration;	  naturally	   conservative	   and	   resistant	   to	   change.55	  The	   declaration	   of	   a	   State	   of	  Emergency	  in	  1952	  served	  to	  reaffirm	  the	  position	  of	  the	  provincial	  administration.	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  John	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  ‘Town	  life	  in	  colonial	  Kenya’,	  Azania:	  Archaeological	  Research	  in	  Africa,	  36–37:1	  (2001),	  pp.	  206–222,	  p.	  206.	  	  51	  David	  Anderson,	  ‘Corruption	  at	  City	  Hall:	  African	  housing	  and	  urban	  development	  in	  colonial	  Nairobi’,	  Azania:	  Archaeological	  Research	  in	  Africa,	  36–37:1	  (2001),	  pp.	  138-­‐154;	  Richard	  Harris,	  ‘From	  trusteeship	  to	  development:	  How	  class	  and	  gender	  complicated	  Kenya’s	  housing	  policy,	  1939-­‐1963’,	  Journal	  of	  Historical	  Geography,	  34	  (2008),	  pp.	  311–337;	  Janet	  Seeley,	  ‘Social	  welfare	  in	  a	  Kenyan	  town:	  Policy	  and	  practice,	  1902-­‐1985’,	  African	  
Affairs,	  86:345	  (1987),	  pp.	  541–566.	  52	  For	  Nairobi	  see	  Werlin,	  Governing	  an	  African	  City,	  pp.	  37-­‐67;	  and	  Marc	  Howard	  Ross,	  
Grass	  Roots	  in	  an	  African	  City:	  Political	  Behavior	  in	  Nairobi	  (Cambridge,	  Mass.,	  1975),	  pp.	  18-­‐38.	  For	  Mombasa	  see	  Justin	  Willis	  Mombasa,	  the	  Swahili,	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  the	  Mijikenda	  (Oxford,	  1993),	  pp.	  145-­‐160.	  Frederick	  Cooper,	  On	  the	  African	  Waterfront:	  Urban	  Disorder	  
and	  the	  Transformation	  of	  Work	  in	  Colonial	  Mombasa	  (New	  Haven,	  1987).	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  Werlin,	  none	  of	  these	  volumes	  explicitly	  address	  municipal	  governance	  in	  their	  discussions.	  	  53	  Daniel	  Branch,	  Defeating	  Mau	  Mau,	  creating	  Kenya:	  Counterinsurgency,	  Civil	  War	  and	  
Decolonization	  (New	  York,	  2009),	  pp.	  165-­‐173.	  	  54	  Tamarkin,	  ‘The	  roots	  of	  political	  stability’,	  p.	  305.	  	  55	  Berman,	  Control	  &	  Crisis,	  	  pp.	  309-­‐322.	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Over	   the	   next	   few	   years,	   the	   provincial	   administration	   became	   a	   ‘powerful,	  sophisticated,	  and	  centralised	  machine’.56	  This	  machine	  ‘played	  a	  crucial	  part	  in	  the	  centralisation	   of	   power’	   in	   the	   executive	   after	   independence,	   giving	   Kenyatta	   ‘a	  position	  very	  much	  akin’	   to	   that	  of	   the	  colonial	  governor.	  57	  	  Writing	  on	   the	  eve	  of	  Kenyatta’s	  death	   in	  1978,	  Mordechai	  Tamarkin	  suggested	  that	  Kenyatta’s	  decision	  to	  use	  the	  civil	  service	  rather	  than	  the	  nationalist	  party	  -­‐	  KANU	  -­‐	  as	  his	   ‘agency	  of	  control	   and	   social	   and	   political	   mobilization’,	   was	   ‘the	   most	   outstanding	   and	  characteristic	  feature	  of	  the	  Kenyan	  regime’.58	  	   Taken	   together,	   a	   rather	   incomplete	   picture	   emerges	   of	   the	   development	  and	   experience	   of	   local	   government	   in	   colonial	   Kenya.	   Thus	   this	   thesis	   offers	  further	  insights	  and	  analysis	  of	  the	  government’s	  intentions	  towards	  local	  councils	  after	   1947,	   and	   how	   this	   worked	   out	   in	   practice.	   Notwithstanding	   regional,	   and	  rural-­‐urban	   variations,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   by	   1963	   local	   councils	   had	   played	   an	  important	   role	   in	   the	   lives	   of	   many	   Africans.	   They	   were	   the	   primary	   service	  providers	   in	   the	   former	   reserves,	   and	   had	   assumed	   greater	   responsibility	   for	   the	  welfare	   of	   Africans	   in	   towns	   in	   the	   preceding	   decade.	   In	   some	   districts	   local	  councils	   had	   existed	   for	   thirty-­‐seven	   years,	   meaning	   multiple	   generations	   had	  witnessed	   the	   institutions	   and	   idea	   of	   local	   government	   evolve.	   Many	   had	   been	  exposed	  to	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  ‘local	  government	  model’	  and	  had	  accepted,	  albeit	  with	  some	  resistance,	  the	  imposition	  of	  taxes	  and	  levies	  in	  order	  to	  expand	  non-­‐mission	  education	   in	   the	   reserves. 59 	  Yet	   the	   existence	   and	   strength	   of	   the	   provincial	  administration	  presented	  an	  alternative	  structure	  through	  which	  local	  communities	  could	   be	   governed.	   The	   tension	   between	   these	   two	   systems	   became	   immediately	  apparent	  after	  independence	  as	  Chapter	  Two	  explores.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Local	  government	  &	  the	  historiography	  of	  independent	  Kenya	  	  This	   historical	   interest	   in	   colonial	   local	   government	   has	   not	   been	   replicated	   by	  scholars	  of	  post-­‐colonial	  Kenya.	  Indeed,	  local	  government	  features	  peripherally	  -­‐	  if	  at	   all	   -­‐	   in	   the	   main	   accounts	   of	   post-­‐independence	   politics.60	  Those	   who	   have	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Cherry	  Gertzel,	  ‘The	  provincial	  administration	  in	  Kenya’,	  Journal	  of	  Commonwealth	  
Political	  Studies,	  4:3	  (1966),	  pp.	  201–215,	  p.	  201.	  57	  Gertzel,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Independent	  Kenya,	  p.	  166,	  p.	  171.	  	  58	  Tamarkin,	  ‘The	  roots	  of	  political	  stability’,	  p.	  306.	  	  	  59	  Schilling,	  ‘Local	  Native	  Councils'.	  	  60	  For	  example	  there	  are	  no	  substantive	  references	  to	  local	  government	  in	  Daniel	  Branch,	  
Kenya:	  Between	  Hope	  and	  Despair	  (New	  Haven,	  2011),	  nor	  in	  B.	  A.	  Ogot	  and	  W.	  R.	  Ochieng’	  (eds.),	  Decolonization	  &	  Independence	  in	  Kenya,	  1940-­‐93	  (London,	  1995).	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addressed	  the	  question	  of	  what	  happened	  to	  local	  government	  after	  independence	  offer	  a	  broadly	  similar	  narrative	  and	  analysis.	  In	  this	  narrative,	  the	  most	  important	  turning	  points	  for	  local	  authorities	  all	  occurred	  between	  1963	  and	  1974.61	  The	  first	  milestone	  came	  in	  December	  1964	  when	  regional	  authorities	  were	  abolished,	  only	  eighteen	  months	  after	  their	  creation.	  This	  marked	  the	  end	  of	  a	  period	  characterised	  by	   intense	   confusion	   in	   the	   field	   between	   regional	   and	   local	   governments,	   the	  provincial	   administration	   and	   central	   government	   line	   ministries.62	  The	   previous	  year	  –	  a	  month	  before	   independence	  –	  the	  three	  streams	  of	   local	  government	  had	  finally	   been	   merged	   and	   standardised	   across	   the	   country.	   Responsibility	   for	  primary	  education,	  healthcare	  and	  secondary	  roads	  passed	  to	  all	   local	  authorities.	  Councils	  in	  the	  former	  reserves	  had	  been	  administering	  these	  functions	  for	  at	  least	  a	   decade;	   but	   for	   the	   newly	   democratised	   councils	   in	   the	   settled	   districts,	  responsibility	  for	  African	  development	  –	  on	  this	  scale	  –	  was	  entirely	  new.	  	  	   The	   end	   of	   regional	   assemblies	   was	   followed	   by	   five	   years	   of	   mounting	  difficulties	   for	   local	   authorities,	   especially	   in	   rural	   areas	   where	   many	   county	  councils	  developed	  substantial	  deficits	   in	  a	  short	  space	  of	   time.63	  Late	   in	  1969	  the	  government	   passed	   the	   Local	   Government	   (Transfer	   of	   Functions)	   Act	   which	  removed	   from	  county	   councils	   their	  primary	   functions:	   education,	  healthcare	   and	  roads.	  Earlier	  that	  year,	  Kenya	  had	  become	  a	  de	  facto	  one	  party	  state.	  Yet	  power	  lay	  neither	  with	  the	  ruling	  party	  nor	  with	  the	  legislature.	  Indeed,	  the	  civil	  service	  was	  strengthened	  at	   the	  expense	  of	  other	  branches	  of	   government	  and	   representative	  institutions.64	  Four	  years	   later,	   the	  government	  abolished	  Graduated	  Personal	  Tax	  which	   had	   been	   the	   main	   source	   of	   funding	   for	   local	   authorities.	   This	   ‘dramatic	  attack	   on	   local	   government’,	   served	   to	   ensure	   that	   ‘a	   clear	   relation’	   no	   longer	  ‘existed	  between	  local	  revenue	  and	  local	  government	  expenditure.’65	  	  	   In	  analysing	   these	  events	  scholars	  have	  sought	   to	  understand	  whether	   the	  marginalisation	   of	   local	   government	   was	   a	   conscious	   and	   deliberate	   aim	   of	  Kenyatta’s	  administration,	  or	  whether	  it	  was	  –	  at	  least	  to	  some	  degree	  –	  a	  reaction	  to	   changing	   circumstances	   and	   shifting	   political	   priorities.	   Most	   consider	   the	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  Stamp,	  ‘Local	  government	  in	  Kenya’;	  Oyugi,	  ‘Local	  government	  in	  Kenya’.	  	  62	  Oyugi,	  ‘Local	  government	  in	  Kenya’,	  pp.	  120-­‐123.	  	  63	  Cherry	  Gertzel,	  Maure	  Goldschmidt	  and	  Don	  Rothchild	  (eds.),	  Government	  and	  Politics:	  A	  
Nation	  Building	  Text	  (Nairobi,	  1969),	  pp.	  400-­‐419.	  	  64	  Henry	  Bienen,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Participation	  and	  Control	  in	  Kenya	  (Princeton,	  1974),	  pp.	  25-­‐65.	  	  65	  Stamp,	  ‘Local	  government	  in	  Kenya',	  p.	  30.	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treatment	   of	   local	   government	   as	   integral	   to	   the	   process	   of	   state	   centralisation	  engineered	  by	  Kenyatta	   and	  his	   inner	   circle.66	  Thus	   emphasis	   has	   been	  placed	   on	  the	   contradictions	   and	   tensions	   between	   the	   provincial	   administration	   and	   local	  authorities.67	  Patricia	   Stamp	   argues	   that	   through	   ‘strengthening	   the	   hand	   of	   the	  provincial	   administration’	   the	   government	   was	   able	   to	   weaken	   local	   autonomy	  without	  having	  to	  ‘attack	  the	  local	  government	  system	  directly’.68	  She	  suggests	  that	  the	  financial	  difficulties	  that	  county	  councils	  experienced	  between	  1963	  and	  1970	  were	  inevitable	  given	  the	  many	  functions	  they	  were	  charged	  with,	   ‘for	  which	  they	  had	   neither	   the	   human	   nor	   financial	   resources’.69	  In	   this	  way,	   Stamp	   implies	   that	  the	  central	  government	  deliberately	  allowed	  councils	  to	  underperform	  to	  create	  the	  conditions	  necessary	   for	   the	  government	   to	   legitimately	   recentralise	   services	   and	  spending.	  	  	   Cherry	  Gertzel	  meanwhile	  was	   less	   inclined	   to	  analyse	   the	  same	  processes	  as	  evidence	  solely	  of	  State	  House	  manoeuvring.70	  Thus	  along	  with	  the	  institutional	  problems	   –	   staff,	   finance,	   tax	   collection	   –	   she	   also	   drew	   attention	   to	   councillors,	  who	  she	  suggested	  were	  ‘slow	  to	  settle	  down	  and	  accept	  the	  limitations	  as	  well	  as	  the	   responsibilities	   of	   their	   office’. 71 	  Her	   work	   indicates	   that	   councils	   were	  significant	   sources	   of	   patronage	   in	   the	   1960s,	   and	   councillors	   played	   important	  roles	   in	   district	   level	   politics.72	  Henry	   Bienen	   explores	   this	   further,	   noting	   that	  councils	   ‘provided	   an	   important	   arena	   for	   factional	   politics’	   within	   KANU	   in	   the	  immediate	   post-­‐independence	   period.73	  In	   explaining	   why	   local	   authorities	   were	  disempowered	   in	  1969,	   he	   argues	   that	   the	   government	   ‘found	   competition	   at	   the	  local	   level	   messy…and	   even	   at	   times	   threatening	   to	   national	   stability	   as	   local	  factionalism	  ramified	  up	   to	   the	  national	   level’.74	  This	  uneasy	  relationship	  between	  the	  government	  and	  district	  politics	  in	  the	  1960s	  suggests	  that	  the	  process	  of	  state	  centralisation	   was	   as	   much	   reactionary	   as	   it	   was	   intended.	   This	   thesis	   seeks	   to	  uncover	  why	  the	  government	  wanted	  to	  set	  ‘limits	  to	  participation	  from	  below’,	  and	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  Ibid.,	  Oyugi,	  ‘Local	  government’.	  	  	  67	  Gertzel,	  Goldschmidt	  and	  Rothchild	  (eds.),	  Government	  and	  Politics,	  pp.	  428-­‐432.	  	  68	  Stamp,	  ‘Local	  government	  in	  Kenya’,	  p.	  26.	  69	  Ibid.,	  p.	  26.	  	  70	  Gertzel,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Independent	  Kenya,	  pp.	  37-­‐38.	  71	  Ibid.,	  p.	  38.	  72	  Gertzel,	  Goldschmidt	  &	  Rothchild,	  Government	  and	  Politics,	  p.	  437.	  	  73	  Bienen,	  Kenya:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Participation	  and	  Control,	  p.	  46.	  74	  Ibid.,	  p.	  46.	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specifically	  from	  participation	  through	  local	  government	  institutions.75	  Framing	  the	  question	   in	   this	   way	   allows	   for	   a	   far	   more	   historically	   grounded	   and	   nuanced	  analysis.	   This	   differs	   with	   the	   top-­‐down	   and	   static	   portrayal	   offered	   by	   Walter	  Oyugi	   who	   wrote	   that	   ‘historically,	   the	   institution	   of	   local	   government	   has	   been	  treated	  by	  the	  centre	  as	  though	  it	  were	  just	  another	  government	  department’.76	  In	  contrast,	   this	   thesis	   shows	   that	   for	   the	   first	   decade	   after	   independence,	   the	  government	   grappled	   with	   trying	   to	   decide	   on	   what	   future	   it	   wanted	   for	   local	  authorities.	   The	   government’s	   ambivalence	   towards	   councils	   not	   only	   reflected	  internal	  resistance	  within	  the	  regime	  to	  devolution,	  nor	  was	  it	  simply	  a	  reaction	  to	  financial	  problems	  in	  local	  authorities.	  The	  difficulty	  that	  the	  council	  system	  posed	  for	   the	   government	  was	  more	   complex,	   and	  was	   closely	   bound	   up	  with	   the	   high	  expectations	  that	  councillors	  and	  citizens	  attached	  to	  independence.	  	  	   After	  the	  transfer	  of	  functions	  and	  loss	  of	  government	  grants,	  councils	  were	  pushed	   into	   a	   tense	   relationship	   with	   their	   public.	   In	   order	   to	   finance	   their	  remaining	  services	  and	  support	  large	  staff	  establishments,	  councils	  had	  to	  continue	  to	  exact	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  local	  taxes.	  To	  the	  public,	  it	  became	  increasingly	  unclear	  in	  the	   latter	   half	   of	   Kenyatta’s	   presidency,	   what	   exactly	   county	   councils	   offered	   to	  their	   fee-­‐paying	   electorate.	   Without	   access	   to	   state	   patronage,	   local	   authorities	  faced	   a	   crisis	   of	   legitimacy,	   particularly	   in	   rural	   areas.	   The	  weak	  position	  of	   local	  authorities	  is	  seen	  to	  correspond	  with	  that	  of	  other	  representative	  institutions	  such	  as	   KANU.	   Yet	   in	   the	   1970s,	   the	   centralisation	   of	   power	   in	   Kenya’s	   ‘bureaucratic-­‐executive’,	  was	  widely	  considered	  as	  a	  source	  of	  the	  regime’s	  stability,	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  its	  weakness.77	  Anticipating	  the	  death	  of	  Kenyatta,	  Mordechai	  Tamarkin	  confidently	   asserted	   in	   1978	   that	   the	   succession	   was	   unlikely	   to	   threaten	   the	  ‘elaborate,	   strong,	   and	   resilient’	   state	   apparatus	   consolidated	   under	   Kenyatta.78	  Later	   that	   year,	   Kenyatta	   died	   and	   his	   deputy,	   Daniel	   arap	  Moi,	   succeeded	   to	   the	  presidency.	  The	  transition	  from	  Kenyatta	  to	  Moi	  has	  often	  been	  framed	  in	  ways	  that	  emphasise	  the	  strategies	  the	  two	  leaders	  pursued	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  the	  demands	  of	  their	   different	   ethnic	   constituencies.	   David	   Throup	   for	   example,	   distils	   a	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  Ibid.	  	  76	  Oyugi,	  ‘Local	  government	  in	  Kenya',	  p.	  126.	  77	  Nicola	  Swainson,	  ‘State	  and	  economy	  in	  post-­‐colonial	  Kenya,	  1963-­‐1978’,	  Canadian	  
Journal	  of	  African	  Studies,	  12:3	  (1978),	  pp.	  357-­‐381;	  David	  Throup,	  ‘The	  construction	  and	  deconstruction	  of	  the	  Kenyatta	  State’,	  pp.	  33-­‐74.	  	  78	  Tamarkin,	  ‘The	  roots	  of	  political	  stability’,	  p.	  318.	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comparison	  of	   the	  state	  under	  Kenyatta	  and	  Moi,	   into	   the	  two	  presidents’	  relative	  abilities	  to	  manage	  their	  ethnic	  communities.79	  Kenyatta’s	  success,	  he	  argues,	  lay	  in	  his	   creation	   of	   ‘a	   relatively	   united	   Central	   Province	   Coalition’	  which	   transcended	  ‘district	  and	  class	  divisions	  within	  his	  Kikuyu	  ethnic	  community’.80	  By	  contrast,	  Moi	  proved	   less	   able	   to	   ‘weld	   the	   Kalenjin	   into	   a	   coherent	   coalition’.81	  This,	   Throup	  concluded	   in	   1987,	   ultimately	   made	   Moi’s	   regime	   inherently	   weaker	   than	  Kenyatta’s.	  	  	   David	  Throup’s	  critical	  appraisal	  of	  Moi’s	  one-­‐party	  state	  is	  mirrored	  across	  the	   literature.	   Few	   dispute	   that	   the	   Moi	   regime	   was	   more	   authoritarian	   than	   its	  predecessor.	   Barkan	   and	   Ng’ethe	   described	   the	   Moi	   state	   as	   a	   ‘kleptocratic	  dictatorship’,	  whilst	  Makua	  wa	  Mutua	  has	  argued	  that	  ‘Moi	  perfected	  the	  repressive	  state	   crafted	   by	   Kenyatta’. 82 	  Although	   Moi	   promised	   to	   follow	   in	   Kenyatta’s	  ‘footsteps’,	   the	  beginning	  of	   his	  presidency	  was	   also	  marked	  by	  populist	   rhetoric,	  particularly	   attacking	   corruption,	   thus	   implicitly	   critiquing	   the	   largesse	   of	   the	  Kenyatta	  regime.83	  On	  account	  of	  this,	  Tamarkin	  was	  able	  to	  observe	  that,	  within	  a	  few	  months	   of	   taking	   office,	  Moi	   had	   become	   ‘extremely	   popular’;	   his	   presidency	  giving	   rise	   to	   ‘hopes	   for	   a	   better	   and	   more	   just	   Kenya.’84	  This	   changed	   in	   1982	  following	   an	  unsuccessful	   coup	   attempt.85	  Thereafter,	  Moi	   ‘used	   the	   state’s	   strong	  coercive	  capacity	  to	  increase	  the	  regime’s	  control	  over	  political	  and	  economic	  life.’86	  Any	  legitimacy	  the	  regime	  maintained	  was	  extinguished	  in	  1988,	  argue	  Throup	  and	  Hornsby,	   when	   queue	   voting	   was	   reintroduced	   at	   the	   general	   elections	   of	   that	  year.87	  Up	  until	   this	  point,	   the	  National	  Assembly	  had	  continued	  to	  operate	  with	  a	  semblance	   of	   independence	   from	   the	   executive.	   By	   exerting	   such	   control	   over	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parliament,	   ‘the	   state…laid	   the	   groundwork	   for	   its	   downfall.’88	  For	   Throup	   and	  Hornsby	   ‘the	  state’	   and	   ‘Moi’	  had	  become	   interchangeable	  by	   the	   late	  1980s.	  This	  analysis	   is	   shared	   by	   Susanne	   Mueller	   who	   examines	   Moi’s	   ‘highly	   personalized	  presidency’,	  where	   bureaucratic	   norms	   and	   procedures	  were	   flouted	   in	   favour	   of	  the	  president’s	  whims.89	  	  	   The	   absence	   of	   literature	   on	   local	   government	   in	   the	   1980s	   suggests	   that	  councils	  had	  by	  this	  point	  become	  irrelevant.	  In	  this	  way,	  Charles	  Hornsby	  observes	  that	  ‘[ev]erywhere,	  local	  authorities	  remained	  ineffectual,	  politicised	  and	  corrupt’.90	  Like	   others	   who	   examine	   this	   period,	   Hornsby	   dismisses	   local	   government	   as	  insignificant	  and	  unconnected	  to	  the	  exercise	  of	  power.	  The	  changing	  role	  of	   local	  authorities	  within	  President	  Moi’s	  one-­‐party	  state	  (1978-­‐1992),	  is	  little	  considered	  by	  either	  Jennifer	  Widner	  or	  Gabrielle	  Lynch	  in	  their	  studies	  of	  Moi’s	  regime.91	  Yet	  arguably,	   through	   this	  an	  opportunity	   is	   lost	   for	  understanding	  Moi’s	   relationship	  to	  the	  ‘grassroots’,	  and	  how	  he	  used	  patronage	  to	  secure	  support.	  Indeed	  this	  thesis	  shows	   that	   the	   common	   contrast	   between	   Kenyatta’s	   regime	   as	   ‘regulated’	   and	  effective	   neo-­‐patrimonialism	   and	   Moi’s	   as	   ‘predatory’,	   appears	   less	   convincing	  when	  examined	  from	  below.92	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  thesis	  attempts	  to	  uncover	  the	  ‘moral	  economy’	   of	   local	   government	   corruption	   in	   order	   to	   better	   understand	   the	  purposes	  this	  served	  for	  the	  president.	  Moi	  has	  been	  described	  as	  demonstrating	  ‘a	  rapport	  with	   the	  wananchi	   that	  went	   far	   beyond	   that	   of	   the	   later	   Kenyatta’.93	  Yet	  equally,	   numerous	   scholars	   have	   also	   argued	   that	   Moi	   dismantled	   Kenyatta’s	  effective	   clientelist	   networks,	   erecting	   in	   their	   place	   a	   crude	   system	   entirely	  dependent	  on	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  President.94	  These	  might	  appear	  to	  be	  incompatible	  points,	  but	  actually	  both	  may	  be	  true;	  closer	  consideration	  of	  local	  government,	  it	  is	  argued,	  helps	  explain	  how.	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   The	  transition	  to	  multi-­‐party	  democracy	  from	  1991	  did	  not	  deliver	  the	  	  kind	  of	   transformation	   that	   reformers	   had	   anticipated. 95 	  Indeed,	   as	   Branch	   and	  Cheeseman	   note,	   ‘the	   story	   of	   Kenya	   in	   the	   1990s	   is	   not	   one	   of	   democratic	  consolidation	  and	  institutional	  reform.	  Rather,	   it	   is	  a	  tale	  of	  corruption,	   increasing	  elite	  polarization,	   the	   rise	  of	  militias,	   and…the	  diffusion	  of	   violence.’96	  At	   the	   local	  government	   level,	   observers	   found	   little	   to	   celebrate. 97 	  Southall	   and	   Wood	  concluded	   in	   1996	   that	   ‘the	   national	   political	   struggle	   between	   classes,	   parties,	  factions	  within	  parties,	  and	  ethnic	  groupings’	  had	  simply	  been	  reproduced	  at	  local	  level.98	  Their	   analysis	   corresponded	  with	   the	   extremely	   critical	   press	   coverage	   of	  local	  government	  politics	   in	   the	  1990s.	  Even	  though	  opposition	  parties	  succeeded	  in	  gaining	  control	  of	  many	  local	  authorities	  in	  1992,	  structural	  constraints	  imposed	  from	  the	  centre,	   along	  with	   the	   ‘ignorance	  and	  rapaciousness’	  of	  most	   councillors	  meant	   that	   ‘virtually	   nothing	   changed	   in	   local	   government’,	   according	   to	   Southall	  and	  Wood.99	  	  	   The	   increasing	   influence	   of	   ethnicity	   in	   politics;	   escalation	   in	   corruption;	  and	  instrumental	  use	  of	  violence	  from	  the	  early	  1990s	  were	  mostly	  analysed	  at	  the	  time	  as	  the	  outcome	  of	  Moi	  and	  KANU’s	  electoral	  strategy.100	  Yet	  events	  since	  Moi’s	  retirement	   in	   2002	   have	   forced	   scholars	   to	   move	   past	   seeing	   Moi	   as	   the	   sole	  mastermind	   of	   disorder.	   Corruption,	   ethnic	   voting	   and	   political	   violence	   have	  continued	   to	   undermine	   the	   democratic	   record	   of	   successive	   governments.	   More	  recent	   analysis	   thus	   sees	   these	   enduring	   dynamics	   as	   not	   just	   Moi’s	   legacy,	   but	  rather	   as	   the	   cumulative	   effect	   of	   longer	   processes	   of	   state	   formation	   by	   which	  Kenya’s	  political	  economy	  has	  developed	  primarily	  to	  serve	  the	  interests	  of	  colonial	  and	   post-­‐colonial	   elites.101 	  Whilst	   in	   the	   1960s	   and	   1970s,	   the	   elite’s	   use	   of	  patronage	   was	   viewed	   by	  many	   scholars	   as	   a	   core	   part	   of	   the	   regime’s	   stability,	  contemporary	   analysis	   now	   considers	   these	   as	   historical	   abuses	   rather	   than	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examples	   of	   effective	   regime	   building. 102 	  This	   turn	   was	   most	   evident	   in	   the	  academic	   and	   popular	   analyses	   of	   Kenya’s	   disputed	   election	   and	   the	   associated	  violence	   in	   late	   2007	   and	   early	   2008.103	  Thus,	   in	   explaining	   the	   election	   crisis,	  Mwangi	   wa	   Gĩthĩnji	   and	   Frank	   Holmquist	   highlight	   the	   importance	   of	   enduring	  patterns	   of	   neo-­‐patrimonial	   rule,	   claiming	   that	   ‘from	   the	   colonial	   period	   to	   the	  present,	  the	  state	  has	  been	  central	  to	  the	  process	  of	  private	  accumulation’.104	  Yet	  to	  frame	  this	  as	  exclusively	  ‘private	  accumulation’	  by	  Kenya’s	  rotating	  elites,	  discounts	  the	  possible	  ways	   in	  which	  elite	  action	  has	  –	  at	   least	   in	  part	  –	  been	  a	  response	   to	  popular	  demands.	  	  	   This	  thesis	  critiques	  and	  contributes	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  Kenyan	  state	  in	  several	   ways.	   As	   this	   section	   described,	   writing	   on	   Kenya	   has	   tended	   to	   ascribe	  substantial	  power	  to	  ‘the	  state’,	  and	  at	  times	  conflated	  ‘the	  state’	  with	  the	  political	  leadership.	   In	   such	   instances,	   Kenyatta’s	   ‘kitchen	   cabinet’,	   and	   Moi’s	   cronies	   are	  regarded	   as	   powerful	   agents	   of	   the	   state.	   This	   thesis	   questions	   this	   in	   two	  ways.	  Firstly,	  whilst	  acknowledging	  that	  the	  administration	  has	  been	  unusually	  cohesive	  and	  powerful	   in	  Kenya,	   it	   is	  suggested	  here	  that	  the	   ‘the	  state’	  has	  often	  been	  less	  autonomous	  and	  more	   tangled	  up	  with	  society	  at	   the	   local	   level	   than	  much	  of	   the	  literature	   suggests.	   Secondly,	   an	   awareness	   of	   that	   entanglement	   encourages	   a	  sense	   that	   Kenya	  may	   have	   been	   less	   centralised	   than	   some	   have	   argued.	   These	  observations	   provoke	   an	   interest	   in	   the	   nature	   of	   political	   processes	   at	   the	   local	  level.	   A	   focus	   on	   local	   government	   offers	   a	  way	   to	   understand	   how	   the	   state	   has	  been	  constituted	  in	  sub-­‐national	  spaces,	  making	  possible	  the	  politics	  of	  clientelism	  whilst	  apparently	  performing	  the	  important,	  if	  illusionary	  difference	  between	  state	  and	  society.	  In	  order	  to	  consider	  these	  questions,	  it	  is	  instructive	  to	  reflect	  further	  on	   what	   is	   meant	   by	   the	   ‘state’,	   and	   how	   it	   has	   been	   studied	   in	   other	   African	  contexts.	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  Mueller,	  ‘The	  political	  economy	  of	  Kenya’s	  crisis’;	  Karuti	  Kanyinga,	  ‘The	  legacy	  of	  the	  White	  Highlands:	  Land	  rights,	  ethnicity	  and	  the	  post-­‐2007	  election	  violence’,	  Journal	  of	  
Contemporary	  African	  Studies,	  27:3	  (2009),	  pp.	  325-­‐344.	  103	  See	  the	  Journal	  of	  Eastern	  African	  Studies,	  	  8:2	  (2008);	  special	  issue	  on	  the	  2007/08	  post-­‐election	  violence.	  	  104	  Mwangi	  wa	  Githinji	  and	  Frank	  Holmquist,	  ‘Kenya’s	  hopes	  and	  impediments:	  The	  anatomy	  of	  a	  crisis	  of	  exclusion’,	  JEAS,	  2:2	  (2008),	  pp.	  344–358,	  p.	  347.	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The	  Kenyan	  case	  compared:	  neo-­‐patrimonialism	  and	  the	  state	  in	  
Africa	  	  ‘Peasants	  avoid	  it,	  urban	  workers	  despise	  it,	  military	  men	  destroy	  it,	  civil	  servants	  rape	  it	  and	  academics	  ponder	  the	  short-­‐	  and	  long-­‐term	  results’:	  in	  Africa,	  the	  state’s	  claim	  to	  be	  ‘the	  master	  noun	  of	  modern	  political	  discourse’,	  appears	  just	  as	  strong	  as	  elsewhere.105	  Yet	  even	  though	  the	  term	  is	  ubiquitous,	  its	  exact	  meaning	  remains	  elusive.	  Scholarly	  debate	  on	   the	  state	   in	  Africa,	  particularly	  since	   the	  early	  1980s,	  has	   seen	   the	   concept	   formulated	   in	   a	  myriad	   of	  ways.	   The	  African	   state	   has	   thus	  emerged	   as	   a	   hydra,	   variously	   described	   as:	   ‘juridical’,	   ‘quasi’,	   ‘collapsed’,	   ‘weak’,	  ‘bifurcated’,	   a	   ‘shadow	  state,’	   and	  a	   ‘rhizome’;	   the	   list	  goes	  on,	  yet	  arguably,	   these	  labels	   obscure	   more	   than	   they	   illuminate.106	  Instead	   of	   searching	   for	   the	   perfect	  prefix,	  greater	  thought	  should	  be	  given	  to	  the	   ‘master	  noun’	   itself.	  This	  was	  Philip	  Abrams’	   intention	   in	   his	   1977	   paper	   –	   published	   in	   1988	   -­‐	   on	   ‘the	   difficulty	   of	  studying	  the	  state’.107	  In	  seeking	  to	  problematise	  the	  very	  existence	  of	  a	  monolithic	  ‘state’,	  Abrams	  proposed:	  that	   we	   should	   abandon	   the	   state	   as	   a	   material	   object	   of	   study	  whether	  concrete	  or	  abstract	  while	  continuing	  to	  take	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state	   extremely	   seriously.	   The	   internal	   and	   external	   relations	   of	  political	   and	   governmental	   institutions	   (the	   state-­‐system)	   can	   be	  studied	  effectively	  without	  postulating	   the	   reality	  of	   the	  state.	  So	   in	  particular	   can	   their	   involvements	   with	   economic	   interests	   in	   an	  overall	  complex	  of	  domination	  and	  subjection.’108	  	  Although	  writing	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  Abrams’	  insights	  are	  equally	  relevant	   to	   Africa.	   Indeed,	   the	   strengths	   of	   his	   analysis	   are	   arguably	   easier	   to	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  ‘The	  state,	  the	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  economy,	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  the	  changing	  structure	  of	  patronage	  systems’,	  in	  Donald	  Rothchild	  and	  Naomi	  Chazan	  (eds.),	  The	  Precarious	  Balance:	  
State	  and	  Society	  in	  Africa	  (Colorado,	  1988),	  pp.	  149-­‐171,	  p.	  149;	  Clifford	  Geertz's	  description	  of	  the	  state	  as	  the	  'master	  noun'	  occurs	  in	  Negara:	  The	  Theatre	  State	  in	  
Nineteenth-­‐century	  Bali	  (Princeton,	  N.	  J.,	  1980),	  p.	  121.	  106	  ‘Juridical’:	  Robert	  Jackson	  and	  Carl	  Rosberg,	  ‘Why	  Africa’s	  weak	  states	  persist:	  the	  empirical	  and	  juridical	  in	  statehood’,	  World	  Politics,	  35:1	  (1982),	  pp.	  1–24;	  'Quasi':	  Robert	  Jackson,	  Quasi-­‐States:	  Sovereignty,	  International	  Relations	  and	  the	  Third	  World	  (Cambridge,	  1990);	  'Collapsed':	  William	  Zartman,	  Collapsed	  States:	  The	  Disintegration	  and	  Restoration	  of	  
Legitimate	  Authority	  (Boulder,	  1995);	  'Weak':	  Joel	  Migdal,	  Strong	  Societies	  and	  Weak	  States:	  
State-­‐Society	  Relations	  and	  State	  Capabilities	  in	  the	  Third	  World	  (Princeton,	  1988);	  'Bifurcated':	  Mahmood	  Mamdani,	  Citizen	  and	  Subject:	  Contemporary	  Africa	  and	  the	  Legacy	  of	  
Late	  Colonialism	  (Princeton,	  1996);	  'Shadow	  state':	  William	  Reno,	  Corruption	  and	  State	  
Politics	  in	  Sierra	  Leone	  (Cambridge,	  1995);	  'Rhizome';	  Jean	  Francois	  Bayart,	  The	  State	  in	  
Africa:	  The	  Politics	  of	  the	  Belly	  (London,	  1993).	  	  	  	  	  107	  Philip	  Abrams,	  ‘Notes	  on	  the	  difficulty	  of	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  the	  state’,	  Journal	  of	  Historical	  
Sociology,	  1:1	  (1988),	  pp.	  58–89.	  108	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  75.	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discern	   in	  Africa,	  where	   the	  processes	   that	  enabled	   the	   ‘idea	  of	   the	   state’	   and	   the	  evolution	   of	   the	   ‘state-­‐system’	   to	   be	   fused	   together	   in	   such	   a	   powerful	  way	   have	  taken	  place	  in	  the	  recent	  past.	   In	  this	  way,	  Abrams’	  assertion	  that	  the	  only	  way	  to	  understand	  the	  state,	  is	  to	  see	  it	  as	  ‘historically	  constructed’,	  has	  been	  taken	  up	  by	  Africanists	   such	   as	   Crawford	   Young,	  who	   argues	   that:	   ‘The	   state	   is	   not	   simply	   an	  inert	   abstraction;	   it	   is,	   above	   all,	   a	   historical	   actor,	   a	   collective	   agent	   of	  macropolitical	  process’.109	  	   Yet	   to	   call	   the	   state	   an	   ‘historical	   actor’	   is	   in	   itself	   a	   form	   of	   reification;	  clearly	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   avoid	   seeing	   the	   state	   as	   an	   entity	   of	   some	   kind.	   This	  problematic	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  vast	  debates	  that	  have	  taken	  place	  over	  the	  division	  –	  real	   or	   imaginary	   –	   between	   ‘state’	   and	   ‘society’	   in	   Africa.	   Inspired	   by	   a	   turn	   in	  France	  in	  the	  1980s	  towards	  analysing	  ‘politics	  from	  below’,	  much	  of	  this	  work	  has	  sought	  to	  understand	  the	  way	  that	  the	  state	  is	  embedded	  in	  society.110	  In	  this	  way,	  Victor	  Azarya	  describes	  the	  state	  as	  ‘an	  organization	  within	  society’,	  and	  Chabal	  and	  Daloz	  write	   of	   the	   African	   state,	   as	   never	   having	   been	   significantly	   ‘emancipated	  from	  society’.111	  They	  argue	  that,	  in	  Africa,	  rather	  than	  having	  achieved	  ‘hegemonic	  domination’,	   the	   state	   itself	   had	   been	   ‘captured’	   by	   society.112	  For	   Naomi	   Chazan,	  the	   task	   for	   scholars	   then	  was	   to	   examine	   patterns	   of	   state-­‐society	   incorporation	  and	  disengagement;	   the	  processes	  of	  exchange	  and	   interaction	  between	  state	  and	  society;	   the	   actors	   involved;	   and	   the	   meanings	   inscribed.113	  Through	   this,	   she	  argued,	   it	   became	   possible	   to	   understand	   the	   ‘degrees	   of	   stateness	   on	   the	  continent’.114	  Such	  an	  approach	  however,	   appears	   to	  affirm	   Jean-­‐Francois	  Bayart’s	  observation	   that	   ‘the	   logic	   of	   deconstruction	   in	   the	   statist	   arena	   is	   not	   so	   easily	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  ‘The	  African	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  and	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  political	  legacy’,	  in	  Donald	  Rothchild	  and	  Naomi	  Chazan	  (eds.),	  
The	  Precarious	  Balance:	  State	  and	  Society	  in	  Africa	  (Colorado,	  1988),	  pp.	  25-­‐66.	  110	  Jean-­‐Francois	  Bayart,	  ‘Le	  politique	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  Afrique	  noire’,	  Politique	  Africaine,	  1	  (1981),	  pp.	  53–82;	  Jean	  Francois	  Bayart,	  Achille	  Mbembe,	  and	  Comi	  Toulabour	  (eds.),	  Le	  
Politique	  Par	  Les	  Bas	  En	  Afrique	  Noire:	  Contributions	  á	  Une	  Problématique	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  La	  Démocratie	  (Paris,	  1992).	  111	  Victor	  Azarya,	  ‘Reordering	  state-­‐society	  relations:	  Incorporation	  and	  disengagement’,	  in	  Donald	  Rothchild	  and	  Naomi	  Chazan	  (eds.),	  The	  Precarious	  Balance:	  State	  and	  Society	  in	  
Africa	  (Colorado,	  1988),	  pp.	  3-­‐21,	  p.	  9;	  Patrick	  Chabal	  and	  Jean-­‐Pascal	  Daloz,	  Africa	  Works:	  
Disorder	  as	  Political	  Instrument	  (Oxford,	  1999),	  p.	  4.	  112	  Ibid.,	  p.	  26.	  113	  Naomi	  Chazan,	  ‘Patterns	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  state-­‐society	  incorporation	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  in	  Africa’,	  in	  Donald	  Rothchild	  and	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  Chazan	  (eds.),	  The	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  State	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separated	  from	  the	  logic	  of	  its	  construction’.115	  Given	  such	  hazards,	  the	  rationale	  for	  limiting	   the	  scholarly	  gaze	  –	  as	  Abrams	  proposed	  –	  seems	  valid.	  Yet	  surrendering	  ‘the	  state’	  as	  an	  object	  of	  analysis	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  ‘state-­‐idea’	  and	  ‘state-­‐system’	   does	  not	  mean	   that	   the	   social	   environments	   in	  which	   these	   exist	   are	   any	  less	   important.	   Rather	  what	  matters,	   is	   ‘how	   the	   putative	   division	   between	   state	  and	  society	  is	  produced’.116	  	   The	   intensity	   of	   the	   state-­‐society	   debate	   is	   understandable	   given	   the	  considerable	   influence	   that	   concepts	   of	   clientelism	   and	   neo-­‐patrimonialism	   have	  had	  on	  the	  study	  of	  African	  politics.	  Since	  their	  first	  application	  to	  Africa	  by	  scholars	  such	   as	   Aristide	   Zolberg,	   Rene	   Lemarchand,	   Christopher	   Clapham	   and	   Jean-­‐Francois	   Medard,	   these	   concepts	   have	   become	   ‘endemic	   to	   the	   study	   of	  contemporary	   African	   polities’,	   as	   Mamoudou	   Gazibo	   observes. 117 	  This	   early	  research	   displays	   the	   same	   concern	   with	   definitions	   and	   distinguishing	   between	  different	   forms	   of	   patron-­‐client	   politics	   that	   has	   persisted	   in	   the	   literature.	   In	  proposing	  a	  definition	  of	  political	  clientelism	  in	  1972,	  Rene	  Lemarchand	  and	  Keith	  Legg	   offered	   a	   broad	   conception	   of	   the	   term,	   which	   focused	   on	   transactions	  between	   patrons	   and	   clients	   whose	   relationship	   was	   unequal,	   ‘personalized,	  affective	   and	   reciprocal’. 118 	  Lemarchand	   and	   Legg	   stressed	   that	   the	   kinds	   of	  relationships	   they	   described	   were	   not	   in	   any	   way	   unique	   to	   Africa,	   but	   were	   a	  ‘generic	  trait	  of	  political	  systems	  regardless	  of	  their	  stages	  of	  development’.119	  	   The	  term	  ‘neo-­‐patrimonialism’	  builds	  on	  this	  basic	  conception	  of	  clientelism	  but	  inserts	  it	  into	  a	  setting	  where	  a	  ‘contradictory	  combination	  of	  bureaucratic	  and	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patrimonial	   norms’	   co-­‐exist. 120 	  For	   Medard,	   the	   characteristic	   feature	   of	   neo-­‐patrimonial	   states	  was	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   ‘clear	   division’	   or	   ‘confusion	   over	   public	  and	   private	   domains’.121	  The	   strength	   of	   neo-­‐patrimonialism,	   as	   a	   term,	   Medard	  argued,	  was	  that	  it	  was	  able	  to	  incorporate	  ‘not	  only	  clientelism,	  but	  also	  nepotism,	  ethnicity	  and	  corruption,	  which	  are	  all	  constitutive	  elements	  of	  the	  underdeveloped	  state	   in	   tropical	   Africa.’122	  Perhaps	   the	   greatest	   strength	   of	   the	   neo-­‐patrimonial	  approach	   however,	   is	   that	   it	   creates	   a	   framework	   for	   understanding	   the	  development	   and	   perpetuation	   of	   a	   very	   different	   kind	   of	   ‘state-­‐idea’	   and	   ‘state-­‐system’	   to	   that	  prevalent	   in	   the	  West.	  Explaining	  how	   these	   two	   systems	   interact	  has	  thus	  been	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  research	  agendas	  for	  scholars	  interested	  in	  Africa.	  From	  this	  long,	  interdisciplinary	  conversation,	  a	  model	  of	  the	  neo-­‐patrimonial	  state	  has	  emerged,	  which	  aims	  to	  explain	  how	  political	  clientelism	  has	  enabled	  both	  the	  ‘reciprocal	  assimilation	  of	  elites’	  and	  how	  it	  is	  ‘instrumental	  as	  a	  way	  of	  articulating	  the	  centre	  and	  periphery’.	  123	  It	   is	   thus	  a	  political	  and	  economic	  system	  structured	  on:	  	   a	  multilevel	  network	  of	  patron-­‐client	  relations	  starting	  between	   the	  national	   politicians	   (patrons)	   and	   competing	   elites	   (clients),	   and	  building	   upon	   regional	   networks	   where	   the	   latter	   elites	   have	  traditionally	  played	   the	   role	  of	  patrons.	  The	   formation	  of	   the	   ruling	  class	   is	   therefore	   predicated	   upon	   a	   system	   of	   nonformal	   political	  and	  economic	  relations	  that	  take	  precedence	  over	  the	  formal	  political	  system.124	  	   By	   analysing	   neo-­‐patrimonialism	   mainly	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   political	  economy	  however,	  there	  is	  a	  of	  danger	  of	  overlooking	  the	  important	  ‘legitimation-­‐work’	  –	  to	  borrow	  again	  from	  Philip	  Abrams	  –	  involved	  in	  the	  redistribution	  of	  state	  resources.	   As	   Christopher	   Clapham	   observes,	   ‘the	   patron-­‐client	   bond	   is	   a	   moral	  one’.125	  Neo-­‐patrimonial	   systems	   thus	   have	   their	   own	   ‘socio-­‐cultural	   logic	   and	  moral	   economy’.126	  This	   moral	   dimension	   of	   neo-­‐patrimonialism	   cannot	   properly	  be	   understood	   in	   the	   abstract.	   Indeed	   even	   though	   Bratton	   and	   van	   de	   Walle	  describe	  neo-­‐patrimonialism	  as	   ‘the	  core	  feature	  of	  politics	  in	  Africa’,	   its	  analytical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	  Medard,	  ‘The	  underdeveloped	  state',	  p.	  180.	  121	  Ibid.,	  p.	  180.	  122	  Ibid.,	  p.	  165.	  123	  Bayart,	  The	  State	  in	  Africa,	  pp.	  152-­‐154;	  Medard,	  ‘The	  underdeveloped	  state',	  p.	  169.	  124	  Pierre	  Englebert,	  State	  Legitimacy	  and	  Development	  in	  Africa	  (Boulder,	  2000),	  p.	  99.	  125	  Clapham,	  Private	  Patronage	  and	  Public	  Power,	  p.	  5.	  126	  Cherry	  Leonardi,	  ‘Paying	  “buckets	  of	  blood”	  for	  the	  land:	  Moral	  debates	  over	  economy,	  war	  and	  sate	  in	  southern	  Sudan’,	  JOMAS,	  49:2	  (2011),	  pp.	  215–240.	  p.	  233.	  
	  	  
31	  
utility	   is	   arguably	  greatest	  when	  used	   in	   context,	   to	  explain	   the	  development	  of	  a	  specific	   ‘moral	   matrix’.	   127 	  	   The	   moral	   economy	   of	   political	   clientelism	   is	   not	  universal	  across	  Africa,	  unique	  to	  Africa,	  nor	  is	  it	  static;	  it	  is	  subject	  to	  contestation	  and	   debate.	   Views	   of	   legitimate	   and	   illegitimate	   behaviour	   change,	   as	   do	   public	  expectations	  of	  leaders.	  Neo-­‐patrimonialism	  should	  not,	  as	  Theobald	  observed,	  be	  a	  ‘catch-­‐all	  concept’;	  scholars	  must	  seek	  to	  understand	  the	  way	  that	  Africans	  ‘engage	  in	   critical	   and	   comparative’	   debate	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   political	   accountability.128	  This	   requires	   looking	   at	   politics	   ‘from	   below’,	   or	   what	   Bayart	   has	   termed	   ‘the	  politics	  of	  the	  belly’.129	  The	  study	  of	  local	  government	  thus	  emerges	  as	  a	  logical	  and	  fruitful	  method	   for	   exploring	   the	  way	   that	  different	   ideas	  and	  expectations	  of	   the	  state	  are	  negotiated	  by	  society.	  Yet	  scholars	  have	  only	  quite	  recently	  begun	  to	  look	  to	   local	   state	   institutions	   to	   answer	   these	   kinds	   of	   questions,	   as	   the	   next	   section	  outlines.	  	  
Decentralisation,	  corruption	  and	  the	  local	  state	  in	  Africa	  	  The	  centralisation	  of	  power	   in	  Kenya’s	   ‘bureaucratic-­‐executive	   state’,	  was	  a	   trend	  replicated	   in	   many	   other	   African	   states	   in	   the	   1960s.	   After	   independence,	  ‘centralisation	   became	   the	   order	   of	   the	   day’,	   in	   Tanzania,	   Zambia,	   Malawi,	  Cameroon,	   Senegal	   and	   Cote	   d’Ivoire,	   and	   in	   turn	   academic	   interest	   in	   local	  government	   dissipated. 130 	  When	   the	   second	   edition	   of	   Ronald	   Wraith’s	   Local	  
Government	   in	  West	   Africa	  was	   published	   in	   1972,	   the	   name	   of	   the	   volume	   had	  conspicuously	  changed	  to	  Local	  Administration	  in	  West	  Africa.	  As	  Nelson	  Kasfir	  has	  quipped,	  Wraith	   ‘could	  no	   longer	   find	  any	   local	  governments’	   in	  West	  Africa	   ‘with	  control	   over	   their	   budgets	   nor	   any	  with	   autonomous	   policy-­‐making	   powers.’131	  It	  was	  not	  until	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s	  that	  scholars	  returned	  to	  the	  study	  of	  local	  government.132	  This	  time	  cast	  in	  the	  language	  of	  ‘decentralisation’,	  the	  second	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wave	  of	   interest	   in	   local	   government	   came	   from	  scholars	  working	   in	   the	   fields	  of	  development	   studies	   and	   public	   administration.	   Frequently	   directed	   towards	   a	  policy	   audience,	   these	   writers	   –	   who	   Patricia	   Stamp	   describes	   as	   ‘scholar-­‐practitioners’	  –	   tended	  to	  view	  decentralisation	  as	  an	  administrative	  arrangement	  more	  than	  a	  field	  for	  political	  negotiation.133	  The	  study	  of	  decentralisation	  was	  thus	  –	  and	  to	  an	  extent	  remains	  –	  dominated	  by	  scholars	  whose	  interests	  are	  technical	  and	   specialised.	   This	   ‘tendency	   of	   disciplinary	   specialists	   to	   compartmentalise	  decentralisation’	   has	   been	   noted	   by	   Paul	   Smoke:	   ‘Economists	   focus	   on	   fiscal	   and	  economic	   development,	   political	   scientists	   focus	   on	   intergovernmental	   relations,	  local	   elections	   and	   accountability	  mechanisms,	   and	   public	   administration	   experts	  work	   on	   institutional	   structures,	   processes	   and	   procedures.’134	  This	   tendency	   to	  narrow	   down	   on	   specific	   aspects	   of	   decentralisation,	   and	   indeed	   to	   view	   local	  government	  in	  isolation,	  removed	  from	  the	  state’s	  broader	  political-­‐economy,	  made	  local	   government	   into	   a	   marginal,	   ‘special	   interest’	   field,	   seen	   as	   having	   little	   to	  contribute	  to	  broader	  debates	  on	  the	  African	  state.	  	  	   This	  started	  to	  shift	  after	  the	  1990s	  with	  the	  ‘third	  wave’	  of	  democratisation	  in	   Africa.	   From	   then	   on,	   scholars	   and	   practitioners	   turned	   their	   attention	   to	  ‘democratic	   decentralisation’.135	  A	   more	   inclusive	   framework	   of	   local	   governance	  was	  favoured	  as	  a	  way	  to	  conceptualise	  the	  many	  different	   forms	  of	   local	  political	  organisation	  that	  did	  and	  could	  exist	  across	  the	  continent.136	  This	  formed	  part	  of	  a	  search	  to	  find	  more	  rooted	  and	  organic	  forms	  of	  authority,	  that	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  more	  accountable	  than	  the	  central	  state.	  This	  coincided	  with	  a	  growing	  interest	  in	  the	  way	  states	  ‘work’	  in	  practice.	  Prompted	  by	  the	  critical	  literature	  on	  the	  state	  in	  Africa	  –	  discussed	  earlier	   in	   the	  chapter	  –	  more	  scholars	  began	   to	   look	   to	   local	  bureaucracies	   to	   understand	   the	   state’s	   daily	   construction	   and	   negotiation.	  Frequently	  drawing	  on	  anthropological	  and	  sociological	  approaches,	  these	  scholars	  –	  who	   are	   not	   exclusively	   Africanists	   –	   recognise	   the	   importance	   of	   studying	   the	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  Administration	  and	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  3:2	  (1983),	  pp.	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  134	  Paul	  Smoke,	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  in	  Africa:	  Goals,	  dimensions,	  myths	  and	  challenges’,	  Public	  
Administration	  and	  Development,	  23:1	  (2003),	  pp.	  7-­‐16,	  p.	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  135	  James	  Manor,	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Democratic	  Decentralization	  (Washington,	  1999).	  136	  Donald	  Rothchild	  (ed.),	  Strengthening	  African	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  Initiative:	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  Self-­‐Governance,	  
Decentralisation	  and	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  1994);	  James	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local	   state,	   because	   it	   is	   in	   such	   contexts	   that	   that	   the	   state’s	   ‘capacity	   is	   tested…	  and	  attitudes	  to	  official	  authority	  are	  produced’.137	  	  	   This	   strand	   of	   research	   has	   been	   particularly	   prevalent	   amongst	   scholars	  working	   on	   Francophone	  West	   Africa.	   For	   example	   Jean-­‐Pierre	   Olivier	   de	   Sardan	  argues	   that	   by	   examining	   the	   everyday	   practices	   of	   states,	   the	   analytical	   and	  descriptive	   limitations	   of	   ‘neo-­‐patrimonialism’	   become	   more	   apparent.	   He	   notes	  that	  the	  concept	  is	  unable	  to	  satisfactorily	  explain	  ‘islands	  of	  effectiveness’	  within	  a	  state’s	  institutional	  matrix,	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  often	  ‘deep-­‐seated	  attachment	  to	  bureaucratic	   behaviours’	   alongside	   endemic	   corruption.138	  Olivier	   de	   Sardan	   and	  Giorgio	  Blundo’s	  contributions	  on	  corruption	   in	  Africa	  have	  greatly	  enhanced	  and	  refined	   scholarly	   understandings	   of	   the	   logics,	   value	   systems	   and	   cultural	   codes	  that	   ‘anchor	  corruption	  in	  ordinary	  everyday	  practice.’139	  Olivier	  de	  Sardan	  argues	  that	  ‘petty	  corruption’	  and	  ‘grand	  corruption’	  are	  ‘two	  poles	  of	  a	  continuum’	  rather	  than	   categorically	   distinct	   phenomena. 140 	  In	   Kenya	   the	   repudiation	   of	   ‘grand	  corruption’	  has	  been	  an	  enduring	   feature	  of	  public	  discourse	   since	   independence.	  Academic	   analysis	   has	   largely	   failed	   to	   tackle	   the	   question	   of	   why	   corruption	   in	  Kenya	  is	  ‘as	  frequently	  denounced	  in	  words	  as	  it	  is	  practiced	  in	  fact.’141	  Instead	  the	  use	   of	   public	   office	   for	   private	   gain	   is	   primarily	   seen	   as	   a	   practice	   that	   has	   been	  produced	  first	  and	  foremost	  by	  the	  holders	  of	  executive	  power.	  Yet	  the	  experience	  of	   local	   authorities,	   this	   thesis	   argues,	   provides	   important	   insights	   into	   how	   the	  neo-­‐patrimonial	  state	  is	  reproduced	  –	  and	  arguably	  produced	  –	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  	  	   Much	  of	  the	  	  writing	  on	  ‘states	  at	  work’	  has	  thus	  far	  focused	  on	  officials,	  civil	  servants	  and	  bureaucrats;	  on	  the	  offices	  where	  citizens	  go	  to	  negotiate	  with	  agents	  of	  the	  state.142	  By	  looking	  at	  councillors,	  this	  thesis	  shifts	  the	  focus	  to	  those	  who	  are	  not	  only	  elected	  to	  serve	  the	  government,	  but	  also	  to	  represent	  the	  people.	  Outside	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  and	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  pp.	  375-­‐402,	  p.	  375.	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  reform	  in	  Africa:	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  of	  effectiveness”	  and	  organisational	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  and	  Comparative	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  48:4	  (2010),	  pp.	  479-­‐504;	  Paul	  Nugent,	  ‘States	  and	  social	  contracts	  in	  Africa’,	  New	  Left	  Review,	  63	  (2010),	  pp.	  35-­‐	  68,	  p.	  37.	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  B.	  Arifari	  and	  M.	  T.	  Alou,	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  Corruption	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  State:	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  Africa	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of	   the	   Kenyan	   context,	   questions	   over	   the	   nature	   of	   political	   leadership,	   local	  legitimacy	  and	  moral	  authority	  have	  often	  –	  although	  not	  exclusively	  –	  been	  framed	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  institution	  of	  chieftaincy.143	  Rather	  than	  a	  ‘traditional	  institution’,	  most	  argue	  that	  chiefs	  have	  served	  as	  an	  adaptable,	  ‘intermediary	  institution’.144	  Yet	  whereas	  chiefs	  were	  usually	   ‘recognised	  or	  selected’,	   local	  government	  councillors	  were,	  in	  theory,	  self-­‐selecting.145	  They	  chose	  to	  put	  themselves	  forward	  to	  serve	  on	  local	  government	  bodies.	  This	  thesis	  considers	  the	  motivations	  and	  expectations	  of	  councillors,	  and	  how	  this	  has	  changed	  over	  time.	  Examining	  why	  councillors	  were	  drawn	  to	  local	  government	  office,	  and	  how	  their	  experiences	  compared	  with	  their	  expectations,	  it	  explores	  how	  competing	  ideas	  of	  ‘the	  state’	  have	  been	  debated	  and	  negotiated	   discursively	   and	   in	   everyday	   practice.	   It	   explores	   how	   notions	   of	  reciprocity	  develop	  and	  mutate	  as	  much	  from	  the	  ‘bottom	  up’	  as	  from	  the	  top	  down,	  and	   how	   the	   individual	   aspirations	   of	   local	   politicians	   impact	   the	   way	   state	  institutions	  function.	  
Cases,	  sources	  and	  structure	  	  To	  write	   the	  history	  of	   local	   government	   in	  Kenya	   ‘from	  above’	   and	   ‘from	  below’,	  different	  sources	  and	  methods	  are	  needed	  that	  can	  answer	  both	  questions	  of	  policy	  and	  of	  practice.	  This	  thesis	  combines	  the	  use	  of	  interviews	  with	  former	  councillors	  and	  officials	  with	  a	  range	  of	  documentary	  sources.	  Records	  from	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  are	  used	  to	  complement	  papers	  at	  the	  Kenya	  National	  Archives,	  including	  files	  from	  the	  Ministry	   of	   Local	   Government	   and	   official	   reports	   and	   policy	   documents.	   The	  Kenyan	  parliamentary	  debate	   records	   reveal	  how	  members	  of	  parliament	  viewed	  their	   local	   authorities	   and	   the	   local	   government	   system.	   As	   the	   ‘big	   men’	   of	   the	  district,	   their	   views	   offer	   an	   additional	   perspective	   on	   the	   connections	   between	  elite	   and	  deep	  politics.	  Three	   case	   study	   councils	   from	  different	   regions	   in	  Kenya	  are	   used	   to	   explore	   local	   authority	   experience	   in	   a	   range	   of	   settings.	   These	  examples	  are	  not	   intended	   to	  serve	  as	   illustrations	  of	  any	  particular	   ‘type’,	   rather	  merely	  as	  an	  indication	  of	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  that	  local	  government	  was	  understood	  and	  experienced	  similarly	  across	  Kenya	  and	  some	  of	  the	  differences.	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  (eds.),	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  Governance?	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  (Woodbridge,	  2013).	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   Two	  rural	  authorities;	  Kakamega	  County	  Council	  and	  Kilifi	  County	  Council,	  and	   on	   one	   urban	   authority;	  Nakuru	  Municipal	   Council	   are	   studied	   in	   this	   thesis.	  These	  cases	  were	  selected	  because	  they	  offered	  examples	  of	  how	  local	  government	  was	   established	   and	   experienced	   differently	   in	   the	   colonial	   period.	   Kakamega	   in	  Western	   Province	  was	   the	  wealthiest	   African	  District	   Council	   at	   independence.	   It	  had	  played	  an	   extremely	   important	  part	   in	   local	   development	  over	   the	  preceding	  three	   decades.	   By	   contrast	   Kilifi	   County	   Council,	   situated	   on	   the	   coast	   north	   of	  Mombasa,	   played	   a	   comparatively	   small	   role	   in	   the	   district	   before	   independence.	  The	   identity	   of	   the	   populations	   of	   both	   county	   council	   areas	  were	   formed	   out	   of	  late-­‐colonial	  ‘invention’.146	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Kakamega,	  there	  has	  remained	  a	  ‘complex	  tension	   among	   the	   constituent	   groups	   who	   came	   to	   form	   this	   corporate	   body’	  known	  as	  the	  ‘Luhya	  tribe’.147	  At	  the	  coast	  a	  similar	  corporate	  identity	  was	  formed	  in	   the	   late-­‐colonial	  period,	  with	   the	  re-­‐imagining	  of	   the	  nine	   ‘indigenous	  tribes’	  of	  the	  coast	  to	  create	  the	  ‘Mijikenda’.148	  Within	  Kenya’s	  post-­‐colonial	  politics	  these	  two	  ethnic	  communities,	  or	  political	  regions	  have	  not	  been	  valued	  equally	  by	  the	  centre.	  This	  has	  had	  significant	  ramifications	  on	  the	  vitality	  of	  local	  government	  in	  the	  two	  regions,	  as	  will	  demonstrated	  throughout.	  The	  third	  case	  study	  is	  of	  Nakuru	  town,	  which	  in	  the	  colonial	  period	  was	  considered	  the	  ‘capital	  of	  the	  White	  Highlands’.149	  It	  thus	  provides	  an	  example	  of	  a	  council	  and	  town	  that	  changed	  considerably	  in	  the	  years	  before	  and	  after	  independence.	  Nakuru	  town	  became	  an	  incredibly	  significant	  political	  battleground	  after	  independence.	  Unlike	  Kilifi	  and	  Kakamega,	  the	  council’s	  politics	  were	   scrutinised	  by	   the	   centre,	   and	   councillors	  were	   fully	   integrated	   into	  district	  and	  national	  clientelist	  networks.	  	  	   These	  cases	  are	  not	  intended	  to	  serve	  as	  detailed	  studies	  of	  district	  politics.	  Indeed	   the	   complexities	   of	   each	   locale	   can	   only	   be	   touched	   upon,	   sometimes	   in	  quite	  unsatisfactory	  ways.	  Nonetheless	  as	   John	  Lonsdale	  notes,	   ‘[c]ase	  studies	  can	  show	  how	  the	  ‘big	  why	  questions’	  of	  world	  history	  actually	  manifest	  themselves	  to	  human	  actors	  in	  real	  life,	  and	  how	  in	  real	  lives	  they	  can,	  if	  always	  provisionally,	  be	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answered.’150	  Councillors’	   thoughts	   and	   experiences	   can	   reveal	   how	   ideas	   and	  expectations	  of	  ‘the	  state’	  in	  Kenya	  have	  been	  constructed,	  negotiated	  and	  debated.	  Most	  councillors	  conceived	  of	  themselves	  as	  public	  servants	  and	  leaders	  who	  were	  respected	  and	  valued	  by	  their	  local	  community.	  This	  was	  reflected	  in	  the	  ways	  they	  narrated	   their	   experiences	   of	   local	   government.	   They	  were	   self-­‐selecting	   in	  what	  they	   remembered,	   emphasised,	   omitted	   and	   underplayed.	   This	   has	   to	   be	   born	   in	  mind	  when	  assessing	  the	  value	  and	  accuracy	  of	  interview	  sources.	  Most	  councillors	  told	  stories	  of	  triumph	  against	  adversity,	  not	  of	  failure	  and	  corruption.	  The	  timing	  of	  the	  research	  is	  also	  significant.	  Interviews	  were	  mainly	  conducted	  in	  the	  months	  before	   and	   after	   the	   March	   2013	   national	   elections;	   the	   first	   under	   the	   new	  devolved	  constitution.	  Asked	  to	  recount	  experiences	  that	  in	  many	  cases	  took	  place	  two	   to	   three	   decades	   ago,	   at	   a	   time	   when	   a	   new	   devolved	   system	   was	   being	  introduced,	  there	  was	  often	  some	  confusion	  for	  councillors.	  	  	   The	  case	  studies	  are	  examined	  both	  through	  the	  oral	  histories	  of	  councillors	  and	  through	  the	  documentary	  records	  of	  councils,	  most	  importantly	  full	  council	  and	  committee	  minutes,	  which	  were	  accessed	  at	  the	  Kenya	  National	  Archives	  in	  Nairobi,	  Nakuru	  and	  Kakamega,	  and	  at	  the	  offices	  of	  Nakuru	  and	  Kilifi	  councils.	  As	  sources,	  council	  minutes	  offer	  a	  particular,	  and	  limited	  view	  into	  local	  government.	  Through	  examining	   minutes,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   know	   when	   meetings	   occurred,	   who	   was	  present,	  the	  agenda,	  and	  roughly	  what	  was	  said	  and	  decided.	  Yet	  as	  with	  parliament,	  council	   and	   committees	   meetings	   are	   highly	   codified	   spaces,	   as	   are	   the	   written	  records	   of	   these	   events.	   Prepared	   by	   educated	   officials,	   minutes	   are	   selective	   in	  what	   they	   record.	  They	  offer	   a	   sanitised	  version	  of	  proceedings,	   prepared	   for	   the	  consumption	   of	   higher	   officials	   within	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Local	   Government	   and	  provincial	  administration.	  Council	  minutes	  are	  not	  particularly	  useful	  for	  revealing	  political	   divisions	   between	  members.	  Whether	   censored	   out	   by	   scribes,	   or	   taking	  place	  outside	  of	  council	  offices,	  the	  personal	  and	  petty	  politics	  –	  found	  universally	  in	   local	   government	   –	   cannot	   be	   uncovered	   through	   official	   minutes.	   Newspaper	  records	  are	  useful	   for	   completing	   this	  picture,	   as	   are	   the	  memories	  of	   councillors	  themselves.	  Stories	  of	  local	  government	  were	  most	  often	  featured	  in	  the	  ‘civic	  pages’	  of	   Kenya’s	   newspapers.	   The	   East	   African	   and	   The	   Standard	   on	   occasion	   covered	  local	   government	   affairs,	   but	   it	   was	   the	  Daily	  Nation	  and	   the	  Weekly	  Review	   that	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most	   commonly	   published	   news	   and	   commentary	   on	   local	   authorities.	   These	  stories	   provide	   an	   indication	   of	   the	   changing	   nature	   of	   public	   debate	   about	   local	  government.	  Yet	  in	  maintaining	  normative	  expectations	  and	  thus	  always	  measuring	  Kenya’s	  councils	  against	  the	  official	  norms	  of	   local	  government,	   these	  newspapers	  offer	   a	   particular	   view	   into	   local	   authorities	   which	   cannot	   be	   taken	   as	  representative	  of	   ‘society’.	   They	   are	  nonetheless	   still	   important	   sources,	   as	  Gupta	  Akhil	   argues,	   the	   	  media	   is	   one	   of	   a	   number	   of	   ‘contexts	   through	  which	   the	   state	  comes	  to	  be	  constructed’.151	  	   This	   thesis	   does	   not	   attempt	   to	   provide	   a	   comprehensive	   account	   of	   how	  Kenya’s	   citizens	  have	  engaged	  with	   the	   idea	  and	   institutions	  of	   local	  government;	  rather	  it	  offers	  one	  view	  into	  how	  local	  politicians	  have	  interpreted	  and	  performed	  their	   roles.	   It	   is	   impossible	   to	   assess	   exactly	   how	   selective	   and	   self-­‐aggrandizing	  councillors	  were	  when	  retelling	  their	  years	  of	   ‘service’.	  Yet	  the	  process	  of	   locating	  former	   councillors	   –	   which	   in	   some	   instances	   was	   very	   straightforward,	   and	   in	  other	   cases	   far	   less	   so	   –	   suggests	   that	  Oyugi’s	   statement	   that	   ‘many	  do	  not	   know	  who	  their	  councillors	  are’	  must	  be	  revised.152	  The	  title	  ‘councillor’	  is	  retained	  for	  life,	  as	  was	  discovered	   in	  Kilifi,	   Kakamega	   and	  Nakuru	  when	   seeking	  out	   former	   civic	  leaders.	  The	  significance	  of	  this	  should	  not	  be	  overstated,	  but	  as	  the	  thesis	  shows,	  the	   fact	   that	   councillors	  were	  known	  and	  remembered	  does	   reveal	   that	   their	   role	  extended	  beyond	  the	  formal	  confines	  of	  county	  halls.	  The	  ‘real	  lives’	  of	  councillors	  
do	   as	   Lonsdale	   has	   suggested	   provide	   ‘the	   counter-­‐evidence’	   to	   the	   narrative	   of	  local	  government	  currently	   found	   in	   the	   literature.	  153	  Yet	   in	  making	   the	  argument	  for	  bringing	  councillors	  into	  the	  study	  of	  Kenyan	  politics	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  role	  as	  patrons	  and	  clients,	  certain	  methodological	  risks	  arise,	  which	  Christopher	  Clapham	  first	  noted	  in	  1982:	  	  	  Unlike	  generalized	  abstractions	  such	  as	  class,	  patron-­‐client	  ties	  exist	  in	   a	   directly	   observable	   form.	   One	   can	   stand	   at	   the	   patron’s	   elbow	  and	  watch	  him	  conducting	  his	  business	  and	  in	  the	  fascination	  of	  the	  scene	  miss	  both	  those	  aspects	  of	  political	   life	  which	  are	  not	  enacted	  in	  so	  dramatic	  a	  way,	  and	  those	  features	  of	  the	  social	  backcloth	  which	  are	  needed	   for	   the	  play	   to	  be	   staged	   in	   the	   first	  place.	   If	   clients	   are	  what	  one	  looks	  for,	  then	  clients	  are	  what	  one	  will	  see.154	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A	  related	  question	  was	  posed	  by	  Rene	  Lemarchand	  who	  asked	  whether	  patronage	  is	  ‘merely	  a	  symptom	  of	  something	  more	  fundamental,	  or	  whether	  it	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  the	  analytic	  key	  that	  enables	  us	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  otherwise	  untractable	  political	  realities?’155	  The	  findings	  of	  this	  thesis	  suggest	  that	  both	  are	  the	  case.	  Patronage	  is	  a	  symptom	  or	  response	  to	  insufficient	  state	  capacity	  and	  inadequate	  resources.	  But	  it	  is	   also	   an	   expression	   of	   particular	   expectations	   of	   leaders	   and	   those	  who	   occupy	  state	   institution	   that	   have	   evolved,	   if	   not	   organically	   from	   ‘the	   grassroots’	   up,	   at	  least	  through	  symbiosis	  between	  high	  and	  deep	  state	  politics.	  	  	   The	   thesis	   is	   organised	   chronologically,	   beginning	  with	   chapter	  one	  which	  examines	   the	   period	   from	   Arthur	   Creech-­‐Jones’	   1947	   dispatch	   to	   Kenyan	  independence	   in	  1963.	   It	  examines	  how	  the	  new	   ‘policy’	  was	  elaborated	  on	   in	  the	  decade	  after	  1947,	  at	  conferences,	   in	   journals	  and	   in	  the	  Colonial	  Office	   itself,	  and	  how	  these	  ideas	  were	  engaged	  with	  and	  implemented	  in	  Kenya	  in	  the	  late-­‐colonial	  period.	  Chapters	  two,	  three	  and	  four	  explore	  changing	  government	  policy	  towards	  local	  government	  between	  1963	  and	  1992.	  They	  focus	  on	  the	  ways	  policy	  affected	  practice	  in	  Kakamega	  and	  Kilifi	  county	  councils	  during	  this	  period,	  and	  the	  different	  approaches	  taken	  by	  presidents	  Kenyatta	  and	  Moi	  to	  the	  local	  government	  system.	  The	   same	  period	   is	   examined	   in	   chapter	   five	  which	   focuses	   on	  Nakuru	  Municipal	  Council.	   Chapter	   six	   looks	   at	   the	   impact	   multi-­‐partyism	   had	   on	   local	   authorities	  after	   1992	   up	   to	   1997	   and	   uses	   material	   from	   all	   three	   cases.	   The	   final	   chapter	  examines	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  local	  government	  reform	  programme	  from	  1997,	  which	   was	   overtaken	   by	   a	   broader	   process	   of	   constitutional	   review.	   The	   thesis	  concludes	  by	  reflecting	  on	   the	  way	  that	   the	  new	  devolved	  structure	  relates	   to	   the	  system	  it	  was	  brought	  into	  replace,	  both	  in	  theory	  and	  in	  practice.	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Chapter	  One:	  ‘The	  prospects	  of	  a	  glorious	  future’:	  Colonial	  visions	  for	  local	  government,	  1945	  –	  1963	  	  
Introduction	  	  This	   chapter	   examines	   how	   the	   Colonial	   Office’s	   post-­‐war	   vision	   for	   British	   local	  government	  was	  implemented	  in	  Kenya	  in	  the	  late-­‐colonial	  period.	  It	  describes	  the	  existence	  of	   different	   racialised	   local	   government	   streams	  during	   the	   colonial	   era	  which	   served	   Africans,	   Europeans	   and	   urban	   residents	   separately,	   and	   which	  complicated	  the	  development	  of	  local	  government	  in	  Kenya	  after	  1945.	  The	  African	  District	  Council	  ordinance	  of	  1950	  was	  intended	  to	  usher	  in	  a	  new	  era;	  prior	  to	  this,	  Local	   Native	   Councils	   (LNCs)	   had	   evolved	   predominantly	   in	   response	   to	   local	  circumstances.	   Yet	   although	   the	   late-­‐colonial	   period	  was	   characterised	  by	   a	  more	  systematic	   approach	   to	   local	   government	   on	   the	   part	   of	   officials	   in	   London	   and	  Nairobi,	   events	   of	   the	   1950s	   and	   early	   1960s	   served	   to	   ensure	   that	  when	   Kenya	  achieved	   independence	   in	   1963,	   the	   local	   government	   foundations	   varied	   greatly	  from	  district	  to	  district,	  and	  town	  to	  town,	  and	  councils	  everywhere	  were	  in	  a	  state	  of	  confusion.	  	  	   In	  the	  context	  of	  this	  thesis,	  the	  colonial	  era	  is	  significant	  in	  three	  ways.	  First,	  county	   councils	   at	   independence	   began	   life	   on	   the	   foundations	   of	   their	   African	  District	   Council	   (ADC)	   predecessors.	   The	   legacies	   bequeathed	   to	   local	   authorities	  differed	  immensely	  between	  councils,	  and	  this	  had	  important	  consequences	  for	  the	  post-­‐colonial	   trajectories	   of	   local	   government	   in	   different	   regions.	   Second,	   the	  model	  of	  local	  government	  promoted	  in	  this	  era	  remained	  intensely	  powerful	  after	  independence,	  resonating	  with	  officials	  and	  the	  public	  alike.	  Councils’	  shortcomings	  were	  perceived	  in	  relation	  to	  an	  idealised	  understanding	  of	  how	  local	  government	  should	  function	  and	  the	  purposes	  it	  should	  serve,	  based	  on	  notions	  conceived	  and	  inculcated	  in	  the	  late-­‐colonial	  period.	  Finally,	  and	  most	  importantly,	  there	  are	  clear	  continuities	   between	   the	   pre-­‐	   and	   post-­‐independence	   eras	   in	   the	   way	   that	  councillors	   used	   their	   positions	   to	   enhance	   and	   extract	   opportunities	   for	  themselves	  and	  their	  constituents	  from	  the	  state.	  Local	  councils	  provided	  a	  range	  of	  accumulation	   opportunities	   to	   their	   African	   members	   before	   independence,	   the	  expectation	  of	  such	  opportunities	  continued	  to	  influence	  the	  actions	  of	  councillors	  for	  generations	  afterwards.	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   Local	  government	  reform	  reflected	  a	  broader	  shift	  in	  colonial	  policy-­‐making,	  which	  began	  in	  the	  late	  1930s	  and	  found	  expression	  in	  a	  myriad	  of	  post-­‐war	  plans	  for	  colonial	  development.	  The	  so-­‐called	   ‘second	  colonial	  occupation’,	  was	  a	  period	  of	   unprecedented	   	   intervention	   by	   colonial	   states	   in	   the	   lives	   of	   Africans.1	  Robert	  Pearce	   sees	   this	   period	   as	   the	   ‘turning	   point’	   in	   British	   Africa,	   when	   attitudes	  towards	   the	   colonial	   mission	   were	   fundamentally	   reworked;	   the	   principle	   of	  trusteeship	   gave	   way	   to	   ‘development’,	   and	   formulating	   strategies	   for	   political	  evolution	   became	   of	   prime	   importance.2	  A	   core	   feature	   of	   this	   shift	   was	   the	  refashioning	  of	   local	   government	   institutions	   in	  Africa.	   It	  was	  no	   longer	  adequate	  for	   ‘Native	  Authorities’	  –	  in	  their	  various	  forms	  –	  to	  function	  merely	  as	  forums	  for	  debate	  and	  participation	  for	  the	  chiefs.3	  Instead	  they	  had	  to	  figure	  more	  centrally	  in	  African	   economic	   development	   programmes	   and	   serve	   as	   training	   grounds	   in	  citizenship	   and	   political	   responsibility	   for	   the	   younger	   generation	   of	   emerging	  leaders.	  The	  chapter	  begins	  by	  exploring	  how	  this	  vision	  for	  local	  government	  came	  to	   dominate	   official	   thinking	   in	   the	   Colonial	   Office	   in	   the	   late	   1940s.	   The	   next	  section	  turns	  to	  Kenya,	  outlining	  how	  local	  government	  evolved	  in	  the	  colony	  in	  the	  inter-­‐war	  period,	  before	  looking	  in	  detail	  at	  the	  changes	  that	  occurred	  post-­‐1947.	  It	  is	   shown	   in	   the	   third	   section	   that	   the	   budgets	   and	   scope	   of	   African	   councils’	  activities	   expanded	   enormously	   in	   the	   1950s,	   yet	   still	   the	   members	   of	   ADCs	  continued	   to	   call	   for	   further	   powers,	   greater	   funding	   and	   more	   executive	  responsibility. 4 	  This	   section	   specifically	   compares	   the	   councils	   in	   Kilifi	   and	  Kakamega,	  known	  at	  this	  time	  as	  Giriama	  and	  North	  Nyanza	  respectively.	  	  	   The	  situation	  in	  ADCs	  contrasted	  greatly	  with	  county	  councils	  and	  municipal	  councils.	  The	   former	  –	   in	   the	   ‘White	  Highlands’	  –	  were	  the	  preserve	  of	  Europeans	  who	   remained	   reluctant	   throughout	   this	   period	   to	   provide	   services	   for	   Africans	  living	   in	   the	   scheduled	   districts.	   Municipal	   councils	   also	   struggled	   with	   the	  questions	   of	   representation	   and	   services	   for	   Africans	   in	   the	   towns.	   This	   led	  municipal	   councils	   to	   adopt	   quite	   contradictory	   policies	   towards	   Africans,	  simultaneously	  promoting	  African	  housing	  schemes,	  and	  the	  development	  of	  ‘urban	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  D.	  A.	  Low	  and	  J.	  M.	  Lonsdale,	  ‘Introduction:	  Towards	  the	  new	  order	  1945-­‐1963’,	  in	  D.	  A.	  Low	  and	  A.	  Smith	  (eds.),	  History	  of	  East	  Africa,	  vol.	  III,	  (Oxford,	  1976),	  pp.	  1-­‐63,	  p.	  12.	  	  	  	  2	  Pearce,	  The	  Turning	  Point	  in	  Africa.	  	  3	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  132-­‐161.	  	  4	  Address	  of	  welcome	  to	  Havelock	  by	  Chief	  Laban	  Motaroki,	  JA/12/27,	  KNA,	  Nairobi.	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citizenship’,	   whilst	   resisting	   calls	   from	   African	   politicians	   to	   increase	   their	  representation	  on	  municipal	  councils.	  	  
‘Efficient,	  democratic	  local	  government’:	  Creech	  Jones’	  plan	  for	  Africa	  	  Soon	  after	  taking	  office	  in	  October	  1946,	  the	  new	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Colonies	  Arthur	   Creech	   Jones	   sent	   out	   a	   circular	   despatch	   to	   all	   African	   governors.	   The	  ‘famous’	  despatch	  of	  February	  1947	  set	  out	  his	  vision	  for	  colonial	  administration	  on	  the	  continent.5	  	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  key	  to	  success	  lies	  in	  the	  development	  of	  an	  efficient,	  and	  democratic	   system	   of	   local	   government…I	   use	   the	   words	   because	   they	  seem	   to	  me	   to	   contain	   the	   kernel	   of	   the	  whole	  matter:	   local	  because	   the	  system	   of	   government	   must	   be	   close	   to	   the	   common	   people	   and	   their	  problems;	   efficient	   because	   it	   must	   be	   capable	   of	   managing	   the	   local	  services	   in	  a	  way	  which	  will	  not	  only	   find	  a	  place	  for	  the	  growing	  class	  of	  educated	  men,	  but	  at	   the	  same	  time	  command	  the	  respect	  and	  support	  of	  the	  mass	  of	  the	  people.6	  	  As	  John	  Cell	  wrote	  in	  1980,	  ‘[s]tudents	  have	  long	  recognized	  this	  document’s	  wider	  implications	   and	   its	   pivotal	   character.’7	  Yet	   in	   trying	   to	   contextualise	   and	   account	  for	   the	   despatch,	   scholarship	   has	   been	   divided	   on	  whether	   it	   did,	   as	   Cell	   argued,	  signal	   a	   ‘new	   policy’	   for	   Africa	   and	   if	   so,	   how	   this	   policy	   had	   been	   formulated.	  Creech	  Jones’	  assessment	  of	  local	  government	  as	  ‘the	  key	  to	  success’	  was	  informed	  by	   his	   own	   party’s	   strength	   in	   that	   field.8	  As	   Paul	   Kelemen	   has	   discussed,	   the	  Labour	   Party	   drew	   on	   its	   own	   ‘ideological	   and	   political	   traditions’	   when	  formulating	  colonial	  policy	  after	  the	  1945	  election.9	  Along	  with	  local	  government	  -­‐	  which	  had	  been	  Labour’s	  ‘main	  organisational	  base’	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century	  -­‐	  the	   party	   also	   sought	   to	   promote	   trade	   unions	   and	   cooperatives	   as	   a	   means	   ‘to	  reorganise	  the	  colonial	  state’s	  relationship	  with	  its	  African	  subjects.’10	  	  	   Yet	   to	   fully	   contextualise	   Creech	   Jones’	   despatch	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   look	  beyond	   the	  Labour	  Party’s	  particular	   attachment	   to	   local	   government.	   Indeed	   the	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  Numerous	  scholars	  have	  described	  the	  local	  government	  despatch	  as	  ‘famous’	  including	  John	  Cell,	  S.	  O.	  Okafor	  and	  Kenneth	  Robinson:	  Cell,	  ‘On	  the	  eve	  of	  decolonization',	  p.	  235;	  Okafor,	  ‘Ideal	  and	  reality	  in	  British	  administrative	  policy	  in	  Eastern	  Nigeria’,	  African	  Affairs,	  73:293	  (1974),	  pp.	  459–471,	  p.	  469;	  Kenneth	  Robinson,	  ‘Colonialism	  French-­‐style,	  1945-­‐1955:	  A	  backward	  glance’,	  JICH,	  12:2	  (1984),	  pp.	  24-­‐41,	  p.	  28.	  6	  Circular	  quoted	  in	  Hicks,	  Development	  from	  Below,	  p.	  5.	  	  	  7	  Cell,	  ‘On	  the	  eve	  of	  decolonization',	  p.	  235.	  	  8	  Paul	  Kelemen,	  ‘Modernising	  colonialism:	  The	  British	  labour	  movement	  and	  Africa’,	  JICH,	  34:2	  (2006),	  pp.	  223–244.	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  Ibid.,	  p.	  224.	  10	  Ibid.,	  p.	  226,	  p.	  225.	  	  
	  	  
42	  
significance	   of	   the	   ‘new	   policy’	   can	   only	   be	   understood	   in	   reference	   to	   much	  broader	  debates	  circulating	  in	  the	  late	  1930s	  and	  early	  1940s	  about	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  matters	  of	  economic	  development	  and	  social	  welfare,	  both	  in	  the	  metropole	  and	   in	   the	   colonies.11	  Here	   Frederick	   Cooper’s	   work	   is	   particularly	   revealing.	  Cooper	   examines	   how	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘development’	   emerged	   in	   the	   years	  immediately	  before	  1940	  as	  a	  way	  to	  reframe	  the	  problems	  affecting	  many	  British	  colonies. 12 	  In	   particular,	   labour	   strikes	   and	   disturbances	   in	   the	   West	   Indies,	  Northern	  Rhodesia,	   and	   east	   and	  west	  Africa	   between	  1935	   and	   1939	  had	   led	   to	  difficult	   questions	   at	   home	   about	   the	   purpose	   and	   consequences	   of	   Britain’s	  colonial	  mission.	  Cooper	  shows	  how	  this	  ‘complex	  issue	  became	  clarified,	  simplified	  and	   symbolised	  within	   the	   decision-­‐making	   apparatus	   of	   the	  British	   government’	  under	   the	   banner	   of	   ‘development’.13	  The	   publication	   of	   Lord	   Hailey’s	  An	  African	  
Survey,	   in	   1938,	   had	   further	   provoked	   discussions	   about	   colonial	   governments’	  poor	   records	   in	   respect	   of	  African	  welfare.14	  The	   landmark	  Colonial	  Development	  and	  Welfare	  Act	  of	  1940	  was	   thus	  a	   	   ‘grand	  gesture’,	  which	  aimed	  to	  redefine	   the	  relationship	   between	   state	   and	   society	   in	   the	   colonies	   by	   incorporating	   the	   new	  language	  of	  ‘development’.15	  In	  linking	  this	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘welfare’	  -­‐	  which	  Cooper	  notes,	   ‘meant	   rather	   a	   lot	   in	   the	   domestic	   politics	   of	   Great	   Britain’	   -­‐	   the	   Act	  connected	   the	   poor	   in	   the	   metropole	   with	   those	   in	   the	   colonies	   in	   a	   new	   and	  powerful	   way. 16 	  It	   allocated	   £50	   million	   for	   colonial	   development	   over	   the	  following	   decade,	   plus	   an	   annual	   disbursement	   of	   £500,000	   for	   research.17	  The	  publication	  in	  1942	  of	  the	  Beveridge	  Report,	  which	  outlined	  the	  ‘Five	  Giants	  facing	  society:	   Squalor,	   ignorance,	   want,	   idleness	   and	   disease’;	   provided	   further	  opportunity	   for	   the	   cross-­‐fertilisation	   of	   ideas	   about	   government’s	   responsibility	  towards	  the	  poor	  in	  Britain	  and	  in	  Africa.18	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  Frederick	  Cooper,	  Decolonization	  and	  African	  Society:	  The	  Labor	  Question	  in	  French	  and	  
British	  Africa	  (Cambridge,	  1996),	  pp.	  111-­‐141.	  	  12	  Ibid.	  	  13	  Ibid.,	  p.	  65.	  14	  Lord	  Hailey,	  An	  African	  survey:	  A	  study	  of	  problems	  arising	  in	  Africa	  south	  of	  the	  Sahara	  (London,	  1938).	  	  15	  Joanna	  Lewis,	  Empire	  State-­‐Building:	  War	  &	  Welfare	  in	  Kenya,	  1925-­‐52	  (Oxford,	  2000),	  p.	  21.	  16	  Cooper,	  Decolonization	  and	  African	  Society,	  p.	  67.	  17	  E.	  R.	  Wicker,	  ‘Colonial	  development	  and	  welfare,	  1929-­‐1957:	  The	  evolution	  of	  a	  policy’,	  
Social	  and	  Economic	  Studies,	  7:4	  (1958),	  pp.	  170–192.	  18	  James	  Midgley,	  ‘Imperialism,	  colonialism	  and	  social	  welfare’,	  in	  James	  Midgley	  and	  David	  Piachaud	  (eds.),	  Colonialism	  and	  Welfare:	  Social	  Policy	  and	  the	  British	  Imperial	  Legacy	  (Cheltenham,	  2011),	  pp.	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   The	  exigencies	  of	  war	  prevented	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  from	  being	  able	  to	  fully	  act	  upon	  its	  evolving	  mandate.	  With	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war,	  a	  ‘revolution’	  at	  the	  Colonial	  Office	   begun.19	  To	   Anthony	   Kirk-­‐Greene	   this	   ‘revolution’	   found	   expression	   in	   a	  ‘package	  deal’	  of	  reforms	  announced	  in	  1947	  by	  Arthur	  Creech	  Jones.20	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  deal	  was	  the	  local	  government	  despatch,	  ‘which	  replaced	  the	  pre-­‐war	  credo	  of	   indirect	   rule	   and	   Native	   Administration’.21	  The	   system	   of	   administration	   Lord	  Lugard	   had	   first	   pioneered	   in	   Nigeria	   at	   the	   start	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century,	   was	  based	  on	  the	  co-­‐option	  or	  appointment	  of	  native	  leaders.22	  Since	  then,	  the	  practices	  of	  ‘indirect	  rule’	  had	  evolved	  across	  the	  continent,	  and	  efforts	  had	  been	  made	  in	  the	  1920s	  and	  1930s	  to	  incorporate	  the	  growing	  number	  of	  mission-­‐educated	  Africans	  into	   the	   Native	   Authorities,	   as	   a	   means	   to	   check	   the	   development	   of	   nationalist	  politics.23	  Yet	  whilst	  the	  work	  and	  membership	  of	  native	  councils	  had	  expanded	  in	  the	  inter-­‐war	  period,	  there	  remained	  a	  sense	  that	  the	  native	  authority	  system	  was	  essentially	   conservative,	   and	   indeed	   Creech	   Jones	   described	   indirect	   rule	   as	  ‘broadly	   speaking,	   a	   static	   policy’. 24 	  The	   native	   authority	   system	   had	   to	   be	  overhauled	  in	  order	  to	  fit	  in	  with	  the	  ‘new	  look	  Colonial	  Service’.25	  Refashioning	  and	  reforming	   ‘native	   authorities’	   into	   ‘local	   governments’	   thus	   aimed	   to	   address	   the	  new	   –	   and	   less	   new	   -­‐	   agendas	   of	   social	   welfare,	   economic	   development,	   political	  evolution	   and	   civic	   education	   in	   one	   policy;	   a	   policy	   that	   could	   convincingly	   be	  presented	   to	   the	   traditionally	  conservative	  members	  of	   the	  Colonial	  Service	  as	  an	  extension	   of	   existing	   policy,	   rather	   than	   a	   revolution.	   Yet	   nonetheless,	   as	   Hicks	  notes,	  whilst	  not	  an	  entirely	  ‘new	  policy’,	  the	  despatch	  did	  ‘state	  the	  objectives	  in	  a	  way	  in	  which	  they	  could	  hardly	  have	  been	  stated	  at	  an	  earlier	  date’,	  specifically	  by	  placing	  African	  councils	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  plans	  for	  eventual	  self-­‐government.26	  	  	   This	  development	   in	  policy	  enjoyed	  wide	  support	  across	  Westminster.	  For	  Labour	  it	  promised	   ‘representative	  institutions’,	  whilst	   for	  the	  Conservative	  Party,	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  R.	  D.	  Pearce,	  ‘The	  Colonial	  Office	  in	  1947	  and	  the	  transfer	  of	  power	  in	  Africa:	  An	  addendum	  to	  John	  Cell’,	  JICH,	  10:2	  (1982),	  pp.	  211–215,	  p.	  213.	  20	  Anthony	  Kirk-­‐Greene,	  Glimpse	  of	  Empire:	  A	  Corona	  Anthology	  (London,	  2001),	  p.	  xi.	  21	  Ibid.,	  p.	  xi.	  22	  Bryan	  Keith	  Lucas,	  ‘The	  dilemma	  of	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  government	  in	  Africa’,	  in	  Kenneth	  Robinson	  &	  A.	  F.	  Madden	  (eds.),	  Essays	  in	  Imperial	  Government	  presented	  to	  Margery	  Perham	  (Oxford,	  1963),	  pp.	  193-­‐208.	  23	  Lonsdale,	  ‘Some	  origins	  of	  nationalism’,	  p.	  121-­‐22.	  	  24	  Arthur	  Creech	  Jones,	  ‘The	  place	  of	  African	  local	  administration	  in	  colonial	  policy’,	  Journal	  
of	  African	  Administration,	  1:1	  (1949),	  pp.	  3-­‐6,	  p.	  4.	  	  	  25	  Kirk-­‐Greene,	  Glimpse	  of	  Empire,	  p.	  xi.	  26	  Hicks,	  Development	  from	  Below,	  p.	  4.	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local	   government	   offered	   a	   way	   to	   ensure	   ‘the	   emergence	   of	   ‘natural	   leaders’.27	  London	  may	  have	  been	  united	  behind	  the	  pursuit	  of	  local	  government,	  but	  as	  with	  most	   Colonial	   Office	   initiatives,	   convincing	   the	   ‘man	   on	   the	   spot’	   was	   another	  matter.28	  Even	  as	  an	  evolution	  rather	  than	  revolution	  of	  existing	  policy,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	   despatch	   implied	   a	   transition	   to	   self-­‐government	   within	   one	   generation	   was	  sufficient	   to	   alarm	   some	   members	   of	   ‘the	   old	   guard	   of	   colonial	   officials’.29	  So	   in	  order	   ‘to	  get	  the	  younger	  generation	  of	  middle-­‐ranking	  colonial	  administrators	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  Colonial	  Office’	  and	  its	  plans	  for	  local	  government,	  a	  summer	  school	  was	  held	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Cambridge	  in	  1947.30	  ‘African	  Local	  Government’	  was	  the	   theme	   of	   the	   first	   conference;	   and	   D.	   K.	   Fieldhouse	   notes	   that	   ‘the	   list	   of	  speakers’	  at	  the	  conference	  included	  many	  of	  the	  ‘great	  and	  good	  in	  contemporary	  colonial	  affairs’.31	  Over	  the	  next	  twelve	  years,	  local	  government	  was	  on	  two	  further	  occasions	   the	   focus	   of	   discussion	   at	  what	   became	   annual	   conferences	   on	   colonial	  administration	   in	   British	   Africa.32 	  Attendees	   included	   officials	   from	   Whitehall,	  administrators	   from	   across	   the	   continent	   and	   sector	   specialists	   on	   local	  government,	  and	  other	  topics	  such	  as	  agriculture	  and	  community	  development.	  The	  first	   conference	   began	  with	   an	   address	   by	   the	   Parliamentary	   Under	   Secretary	   of	  State	   for	   the	  Colonial	  Office	  who	  summed	  up	   the	  principle	  of	   local	  government	  as	  ‘the	  education	  of	  Africans	   in	  managing	  their	  own	   local	  affairs	  as	  a	  preparation	   for	  self-­‐government’.33	  In	  between	  cricket	  matches	  which	   set	   east	  Africa	  against	  west	  Africa,	  attendees	  considered	  the	  practical	  problems	  presented	  by	  local	  government	  including	   finance,	   functions,	   and	   relations	   with	   other	   authorities.	   By	   the	   first	  conference’s	  close,	  progress	  had	  been	  made	  in	  schooling	  attendees	  on	  the	  principal	  aim	  of	  local	  government.	  A	  group	  tasked	  with	  considering	  political	  aspects	  of	  local	  government	  concluded	  in	  its	  final	  report	  that	  ‘local	  government	  institutions…must	  provide	   representation	   for	   the	   traditional	   elements	   of	   the	   emerging	   professional	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  Colonial	  Development	  and	  Good	  Government:	  A	  Study	  of	  the	  Ideas	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  ‘On	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  Anthony	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  History	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  Ibid.,	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  JICH,	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  pp.	  173–199,	  p.	  175.	  32	  In	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  Colonial	  Office	  Summer	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  African	  Administration,	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  (London,	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  Summer	  Conference	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and	  commercial	  classes,	  and	  the	  educated	  element	  generally	   from	  which	  the	  most	  politically-­‐conscious	  members	   of	   the	   community	   emerge,	   as	  well	   as	   for	   the	   great	  mass	   of	   the	   rural	   population’.34	  No	   longer	   were	   native	   authorities	   to	   provide	   a	  means	  to	  contain	  the	  ‘politically-­‐conscious’	  rather,	  through	  ‘local	  government’	  these	  individuals	  were	   to	  be	   trained	  so	   that	   ‘a	   chain	  of	  democratic	   representation	   from	  the	  local	  to	  the	  central	  government’	  could	  be	  ‘built	  up’.’35	  	  	   Following	  the	  first	  summer	  school,	  the	  Colonial	  Local	  Government	  Advisory	  Panel	  was	  formed	  and	  an	  internal	  African	  Studies	  Branch	  was	  set-­‐up	  in	  the	  Colonial	  Office.36	  Eighteen	  months	  after	  the	  first	  conference,	  the	  Branch	  launched	  the	  Journal	  
of	   African	   Administration.	   The	   JAA	   was	   to	   provide	   a	   forum	   where	   problems	  encountered	  in	  the	  field	  could	  be	  shared	  and	  surmounted	  through	  the	  exchange	  of	  ideas	   and	   experience	   gained	   in	   the	   colonies	   and	   at	   home.	   In	   the	   inaugural	   issue,	  Creech	  Jones	  declared	  that	  ‘[t]he	  essential	  and	  permanent	  objective	  of	  British	  policy	  is	   to	   bring	   forward	   the	   African	   territories	   to	   self-­‐governing	   responsibility	   within	  the	   Commonwealth.	   To	   that	   end,	   an	   evolutionary	   process	   towards	   more	   liberal,	  representative	   and	   responsible	   political	   institutions	   is	   going	   on.’37	  He	   expected	  local	  government	  to	   facilitate	  such	  political	  evolution,	  and	  matters	  related	  to	   local	  government	   dominated	   in	   particular	   the	   early	   issues	   of	   the	   journal.	   Articles	  explored	   the	   principles	   underlying	   local	   government	   reform	   and	   the	   practical	  challenges	   to	   its	   implementation,	   particularly	   regarding	   training	   and	   finance.38	  In	  making	   the	   case	   for	   local	   government,	   most	   contributors	   emphasised	   that	   local	  authorities	   had	   to	   be	   ‘representative	   and	   acceptable	   to	   the	   people’,	   Ronald	  Robinson	   wrote	   explicitly	   of	   the	   need	   to	   move	   towards	   ‘democratic	   local	   self-­‐governing	  bodies	  of	  the	  English	  type’.39	  	  	   Yet	  whilst	  the	  arguments	  for	  local	  government	  might	  have	  been	  couched	  in	  liberal,	  progressive	  terms	  there	  were	  also	  more	  pragmatic	  reasons	  for	  encouraging	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  Journal	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the	  development	  of	   local	   government.	  As	  Leigh	  Gardner	  notes,	   the	  post-­‐war	  push	  for	   local	   government	   was	   as	   much	   informed	   by	   Whitehall’s	   need	   to	   finance	   its	  ‘expanding	   ambitions’	   for	   the	   colonies	   as	   it	   was	   by	   a	   newfound	   commitment	   to	  representative	   institutions.40	  By	   bringing	   services	   closer	   to	   the	   ‘taxpayer’	   it	   was	  hoped	  that	  people	  ‘might	  then	  be	  willing	  to	  pay	  more’.41	  This	  theory	  lay	  at	  the	  heart	  of	   the	   ‘local	   government	   model’;	   it	   tied	   programmes	   of	   social	   and	   economic	  development	  to	  the	  objects	  of	  financial	  self-­‐sufficiency	  and	  political	  evolution.	  As	  an	  idea	  it	  was	  appealingly	  simple.	  Through	  the	  services	  provided	  by	  local	  authorities,	  Africa’s	   masses	   would	   experience	   the	   benefits	   of	   taxation.	   A	   sense	   of	   citizenship	  would	  be	  created	  starting	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  These	  institutions	  would	  train	  Africans	  both	  for	  professional	  and	  political	  careers,	  so	  that	  eventually	  they	  could	  assume	  the	  institutions	  of	  central	  government.	  As	  Creech	  Jones	  explained	  when	  addressing	  the	  Colonial	  Local	  Government	  Advisory	  Panel	   ‘local	  government	  …	   is	  a	   school	  where	  we	  hope	  Africans	  will	  master,	   in	  miniature,	   the	  arts	  of	  democratic	   administration	  and	  politics.’42	  To	  planners	  in	  London,	  the	  value	  of	  this	  ‘school’	  was	  that	  it	  appeared	  to	  contain	  the	  potential	  to	  transcend	  the	  particularities	  of	  different	  African	  colonies.	  Indeed,	  as	  Chris	  Vaughan	  writes,	   local	  government	  was	  part	  of	   ‘a	  wider	  project	  of	  post-­‐war	   imperial	   policy	   to	   make	   “other”	   political	   cultures	   look	   less	   “other”	   and	  more	   like	   the	   metropole	   itself.’43	  Exposure	   to	   the	   ritualised	   practices	   of	   local	  government	   would	   work	   to	   transform	   African	   councillors	   into	   ‘statesmen	   of	   the	  future’.44	  These	  practices,	  or	  conventions,	  in	  theory	  defined	  the	  limits	  of	  acceptable	  behaviour	   of	   members	   and	   set	   out	   the	   scope	   and	   style	   of	   legitimate	   political	  debate. 45 	  In	   this	   way,	   the	   conventions	   of	   councils	   were	   seen	   to	   contain	  transformative	   potential,	   by	   harnessing	   the	   ‘language	   of	   the	   people’	   within	   a	  bureaucratic	  apparatus,	  councils	  were	  considered	  particularly	  well	  adapted	  to	  the	  important	  task	  of	  political	  education.46	  	  	   By	  1950	  this	  model	  had	  seemingly	  been	  accepted;	  Ronald	  Robinson	  wrote	  of	  ‘local	   government’	   having	   replaced	   ‘indirect	   rule’	   in	   the	   ‘nomenclature	   of	   British	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  Gardner,	  Taxing	  Colonial	  Africa,	  p.	  161.	  	  41	  Ibid.,	  p.	  162.	  42	  Address	  by	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Arthur	  Creech	  Jones	  to	  the	  first	  meeting	  of	  the	  Colonial	  Local	  Government	  Advisory	  Panel,	  23	  July	  1948,	  JA/16/13,	  KNA,	  Nairobi.	  43	  Vaughan,	  ‘Reinventing	  the	  wheel?',	  p.	  255.	  44	  Ibid.,	  p.	  255.	  45	  Alison	  Richards,	  ‘The	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  problem’,	  in	  Alison	  Richards	  and	  Adam	  Kuper	  (eds.),	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  (Cambridge,	  1971),	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native	  administration’.47	  Yet	  Ronald	  Robinson’s	  enthusiasm	  may	  have	  been	  a	   little	  premature.	   The	   next	   section	   examines	   how	   this	   ‘new	   policy’	   was	   received	   and	  implemented	  in	  Kenya.	  It	  outlines	  the	  role	  that	  LNCs	  have	  played	  in	  Kenya	  up	  to	  the	  mid-­‐1940s.	   In	   the	   decade	   that	   followed,	   councils	   in	   the	   reserves	   embraced	   the	  opportunity	  to	  expand	  their	  services	  by	  enlarging	  their	  treasuries;	  neither	  Africans,	  nor	   government	   officials	   appeared	   to	   object	   greatly	   to	   the	   ‘taxes	   for	   services’	  dimension	  of	   local	  government	  reform.	  Yet	   the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  connect	   this	   to	  wider	   programmes	   for	   political	   evolution	   and	   fairer,	   more	   democratic	  representation	   proved	   far	   more	   complex	   and	   controversial	   in	   Kenya’s	   deeply	  divided	  society.	  	  
‘An	  achievement	  of	  which	  the	  colony	  could	  be	  proud’:	  Local	  Native	  
Councils,	  1924	  –	  1947	  	  When	   Sir	   Philip	   Mitchell,	   Governor	   of	   Kenya,	   received	   Creech-­‐Jones’	   despatch	   in	  February	   1947,	   a	   process	   of	   local	   government	   reorganisation	   was	   already	  underway	  in	  the	  colony.48	  In	  a	  letter	  to	  a	  colleague	  in	  Lusaka,	  the	  new	  Member	  for	  Health	   and	   Local	   Government,	   Charles	   Mortimer	   attempted	   to	   summarise	   the	  changes	  taking	  place.	  This	  was	  not	  an	  easy	  task.	  Kenya’s	   local	  government	  system	  up	   to	  1947,	   and	   indeed	   afterwards,	  was	   complicated	  by	   the	   existence	   of	  multiple	  structures	  -­‐	  governed	  differently	  -­‐	  in	  rural	  African	  areas,	  rural	  ‘European’	  areas,	  and	  urban	  areas.	  Furthermore,	  within	   these	   three	   systems	   there	  was	   little	  uniformity.	  Mortimer’s	   convoluted	   explanation	   included	   details	   of	   the	   new	   “Member”	   system	  which	  grouped	  departments	   and	   created	   ‘quasi	  ministers’	   to	   run	   them.49	  He	  went	  on	  to	  note	  that	  local	  native	  authorities	  –	  the	  councils	  in	  the	  reserves	  –	  were	  ‘being	  brought	   into	   the	   local	   government	   organization	   as	   ADCs,	   with	   increased	   powers	  and	   more	   customary	   local	   government	   procedure’.50	  Finally	   Mortimer	   described	  the	  new	  ‘Local	  Government	  Board’	  which	  would	  have	  ‘three	  standing	  committees	  –	  for	   municipalities,	   settled	   districts	   and	   African	   District	   Councils	   respectively.’51	  Bringing	  the	  three	  systems	  together	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  one	  Member	  and	  one	  Board	  was	  a	  major	  development	  (although	  this	  was	  not	  actually	  implemented	  until	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  and	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  Government	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  1947,	  JA/12/58,	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June	  1953).52	  Up	  until	   this	  point,	   in	   line	  with	   the	  broader	  policy	   in	  Kenya	  of	   ‘dual	  development’	   for	   different	   races,	   the	   three	   council	   systems	   were	   treated	   quite	  independently.	  In	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  changes	  that	  occurred	  from	  1947	  onwards	  it	  is	  necessary	  first	  to	  examine	  how	  the	  three	  local	  government	  streams	  had	  evolved	  up	  to	  that	  point.	  This	  section	  first	  discusses	  European	  district	  and	  urban	  councils,	  before	  exploring	  in	  greater	  detail	  the	  activities	  of	  councils	  in	  the	  reserves.	  	  	   In	   the	   towns	   and	   in	   settled	   districts,	   up	   until	   at	   least	   the	   1940s,	   local	  government	  bodies	  were	  controlled	  entirely	  by	  European	  councillors	  with	   limited	  Asian	  –	  usually	  nominated	  –	   representation.	  Both	   types	  of	   councils	  demonstrated	  little	  interest	  in	  the	  Africans	  living	  and	  working	  in	  their	  areas	  of	  jurisdiction	  beyond	  periodic	   attempts	   to	   regulate	   their	   labour	   power,	   and	   control	   their	   movements.	  European	   district	   councils	   were	   established	   in	   seven	   ‘non-­‐African’	   areas	   in	   1928	  following	   the	   recommendations	   of	   the	   Feetham	   Commission	   (1926)	   into	   local	  government.53	  ‘The	   architect	   of	   local	   government’	   in	   South	   Africa,	   Judge	   Feetham	  had	  been	  briefed	  that	   ‘the	  local	  interests	  of	  the	  white	  farmer	  and	  non-­‐native	  town	  dweller	   are	   distinct	   from	   the	   local	   interests	   of	   the	   African	   in	   his	   reserve’.54	  Scholarship	  on	  district	  councils	  has	  mainly	  focused	  on	  settlers’	  efforts	  to	  restrict	  the	  economic	   activity	   of	   ‘squatters’;	   those	  who	   lived	   and	  worked	   on	   European	   farms	  but	   were	   designated	   as	   ‘migrant	   labourers’.55	  Councils	   were	   slow	   to	   accept	   any	  responsibility	  for	  the	  welfare	  of	   ‘squatters’,	  claiming	  that	  such	  services	  were	  to	  be	  provided	  in	  their	  homes	  in	  the	  reserves.	  Instead,	  district	  councils	  primarily	  focused	  on	  providing	   the	   infrastructure	   to	   ‘service	   settler	   accumulation’	   such	  as	   access	   to	  roads	   and	   water. 56 	  They	   continually	   resisted	   recommendations	   from	   central	  government	   to	   levy	   rates,	   choosing	   instead	   to	   limit	   their	  activities	  mainly	   to	   road	  construction,	   financed	   by	   the	   central	   government.	  57	  The	   Commissioner	   for	   Local	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Government,	  Charles	  Mortimer,	  noted	  ‘with	  regret’	  in	  1947	  that	  amongst	  European	  district	   councils,	   there	   had	   been	   ‘little	   progress	   …	   in	   that	   fundamental	   to	  assumption	  of	  further	  responsibility,	  the	  imposition	  of	  local	  rating’.58	  	  	   If	   levying	   rates	   was	   one	   indication	   of	   a	   vibrant	   local	   authority,	   another	   –	  according	  to	  the	  commissioner	  –	  was	  the	  turnout	  on	  election	  day.	  This	  was	  also	  an	  area	  of	  disappointment	  for	  the	  Commissioner	  for	  Local	  Government,	  particularly	  in	  respect	  of	  municipal	  authorities.	  He	  observed	  in	  1947	  that:	  	  if	  contested	  elections	  and	  heavy	  polling	  are	  an	  indication	  of	  public	  interest	  in	  municipal	  affairs	  those	  concerned	  with	  the	  future	  of	  local	  government	  in	  Kenya	  might	  feel	  dejection	  and	  despondency,	  and	  it	  would	  be	  more	  honour	  to	   electorates	   if	   they	   chose	   to	   express	   their	   feelings	   by	   a	   more	   active	  participation	  in	  municipal	  life	  than	  writing	  letters	  to	  the	  press.59	  This	   assessment,	   of	   course,	   fails	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   not	   all	   of	   colonial	   Kenya’s	  urban	  residents	  were	  able	  to	  participate	  equally	  in	  municipal	  life.	  Indeed	  questions	  about	  who	  belonged	  in	  ‘the	  town’,	  where	  they	  should	  live,	  and	  how	  they	  should	  be	  represented	   fundamentally	   shaped	   the	   structure	   and	   composition	   of	   urban	  municipal	  councils	  and	  thus	  the	  principles	  that	  underpinned	  town	  planning	  policies.	  The	  answers	  that	  Nairobi’s	  European	  residents	  and	  councillors	  had	  provided	  in	  the	  inter-­‐war	   period	   were	   increasingly	   challenged	   after	   1945.	   Municipal	   politics	   up	  until	   that	   point	   had	   primarily	   consisted	   of	   a	   ‘struggle	   between	   European	   and	  Indians	  for	  domination	  and	  control	  of	  Nairobi’.60	  Designated	  by	  colonial	  authorities	  as	   ‘temporary	   workers’,	   Africans	   were	   not	   permitted	   to	   remain	   in	   the	   town	  unemployed,	  and	  from	  1919	  ‘native	  reserves’	  were	  designated	  to	  further	  zone	  and	  segregate	  urban	  Africans	  from	  Europeans	  and	  Indians.	  	  	   In	  Mombasa,	  it	  took	  the	  dockworkers’	  strike	  of	  1939	  for	  colonial	  officials	  to	  reconsider	  their	  long	  held	  view	  of	  Africans	  in	  the	  town	  as	  simply	  ‘casual	  labour’.61	  Thereafter,	  as	  Cooper	  writes:	   ‘The	  workers	   in	   the	  post,	   in	   the	  city,	  on	  the	  railway,	  and	   eventually	   throughout	   the	   colony	   ceased	   to	   be	   anonymous	   embodiments	   of	  labor	  power,	  but	  social	  beings,	  whose	  culture,	  welfare,	  and	  relationships	  with	  each	  other	  and	  with	  employers	  were	  vital	  determinants	  of	  order	  and	  productivity.’62	  The	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changes	  to	  local	  authorities	  in	  settled	  areas	  and	  municipal	  councils	  after	  1940	  were	  thus	  more	  connected	  to	  questions	  of	  labour	  and	  stability	  than	  to	  a	  commitment	  to	  certain	   local	   government	   ideals.	   Therefore	   the	   early	   history	   of	   these	   two	   local	  government	   streams	   need	   not	   be	   examined	   in	   any	   great	   depth	   in	   order	   to	  understand	   the	   changes	   that	   came	   after	   1940,	   when	   municipal	   councils	   in	  particular	   began	   to	   reconsider	   their	   policies	   towards	   Africans	   who	   lived	   in	   the	  towns.	  	  	   An	  amendment	  to	  the	  Native	  Authority	  Ordinance	  saw	  Local	  Native	  Councils	  established	   in	  most	  districts	   in	   the	   ‘African	  reserves’	   from	  1925.63	  Unlike	   in	  other	  colonies,	  these	  ‘Native	  Authorities’	  were	  established	  without	  ‘even	  a	  shred	  of	  fiction	  about	   traditional	   or	   indigenous	   origins’.64	  Instead	   their	   express	   purpose	   was	   to	  provide	   ‘local	   forums	   in	  which	  Africans	   could	  harmlessly	   let	  off	   steam’.65	  Just	   two	  years	   earlier,	   colonial	   Kenya	   ‘had	   witnessed	   its	   first	   violent	   political	   protest’	   in	  Nairobi	  after	   the	  arrest	  of	  Harry	  Thuku,	   the	  charismatic,	  young	   leader	  of	   the	  East	  African	   Association.66	  Mission-­‐educated,	   Thuku	   challenged	   the	   authority	   of	   the	  chiefs	   in	   Kikuyuland	   and	   campaigned	   against	   the	   payment	   of	   taxes. 67 	  It	   was	  intended	  that	  LNCs	  would	  provide	  a	   forum	  to	   incorporate	  the	  younger	  generation	  of	   educated	   Africans,	   such	   as	   Thuku,	   so	   as	   to	   prevent	   the	   growth	   of	   pan-­‐ethnic	  political	   associations.	   Furthermore,	   by	   having	   both	   government-­‐appointed	   chiefs	  and	   ‘elected’	   members,	   LNCs	   were	   to	   bridge	   the	   emerging	   divide	   between	  ‘traditional	   authority’	   and	   younger	   politicians	   in	   that	   the	   council	   system	   forced	  chiefs	   ‘to	   share	   power	   with	   their	   literate	   subjects’.68	  Yet	   this	   purpose	   was	   not	  achieved	  with	  equal	  success	  everywhere,	   in	   this	  way	  E.	  S.	  Otieno-­‐Adhiambo	  notes	  that	   ‘[d]uring	   the	   inter-­‐war	   years,	   the	   Central	   and	   South	   Nyanza	   Local	   Native	  Councils	  provided	  arenas	  for	  fierce	  competition	  between	  the	  appointed	  chiefs	  and	  the	   elected	   rival	   elites’.69	  This	   competition	   stemmed	   partly	   from	   the	   increasing	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revenues	  LNCs	  had	  at	  their	  disposal.	  By	  1938,	  the	  total	  revenue	  of	  all	  Local	  Native	  Councils	  had	  reached	  K£61,651;	  an	  increase	  of	  K£30,000	  over	  1928	  figures.70	  	  	   A	  large	  proportion	  of	  LNCs’	  revenues	  were	  raised	  from	  rates;	  a	  tax	  levied	  on	  property.	  To	  begin	  with,	  LNCs	  levied	  a	  local	  rate	  of	  one	  shilling	  per	  hut,	  which	  rose	  steadily	  thereafter.	  Expenditure	  supported	  ‘progressive’	  activities	  in	  the	  reserves.71	  Benjamin	   Kipkorir	   has	   suggested	   that	   ‘right	   from	   the	   early	   stages	   of	   their	  existence…	  LNCs	  undertook	  all	  the	  social	  development	  and	  welfare	  functions	  of	  the	  government	   in	   the	   areas	   of	   their	   jurisdiction’.72	  Kipkorir	   perhaps	   overstates	   the	  case,	   but	   there	   is	   considerable	   evidence	   that	   local	   councils	   were	   instrumental	   in	  expanding	   the	   education	   opportunities	   available	   in	   the	   reserves,	   particularly	   the	  number	   of	   non-­‐mission	   run	   schools,	   as	   Donald	   Schilling	   has	   shown. 73 	  LNCs’	  preoccupation	   with	   education	   was	   typical	   of	   councils	   in	   Central	   and	   Nyanza	  Province.74	  In	   her	   tour	   of	   Kenya	   and	   Tanganyika	   in	   1929-­‐30,	   Margery	   Perham	  attended	   a	   meeting	   of	   Central	   Kavirondo	   LNC,	   where	   members	   discussed	   the	  construction	  of	  a	  new	  school.	  She	  admired	  -­‐	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  native	  authorities	  in	  Tanganyika	  –	  how:	  	  	  Their	  only	  revenue	  comes	   from	  any	  rents	   from	  land	   leased	   in	   the	  reserve	  and	   from	   a	   special	   extra	   tax	   they	   put	   on	   themselves.	   They	   began	  with	   a	  shilling,	  but	  in	  their	  enthusiasm	  here	  for	  education	  they	  raised	  it	  to	  2S	  and	  so	  produced	  enough	  to	  build	  a	  really	  fine	  central	  school.75	  Perham	  went	  on	  to	  describe	  some	  of	  the	  other	  activities	  Central	  Kavirondo	  LNC	  was	  engaged	   in:	   building	   and	  managing	  medical	   dispensaries;	   constructing	   roads	   and	  bridges;	   running	   forestry	   and	   agricultural	   services;	   and	   a	  model	   dairy.76	  Through	  initiating	  and	  maintaining	  all	  of	   these	  services,	  LNCs	  assumed	  pivotal	  positions	   in	  the	   economic	   life	   of	   the	   reserves.	   Gavin	   Kitching	   underlines	   the	   important	  contribution	  LNCs	  made	  in	  facilitating	  African	  business,	  supplying	  loans	  to	  traders,	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and	   employing	   skilled	   and	   unskilled	   workers.	   In	   this	   way,	   he	   argues	   that	   LNCs	  functioned	   as	   ‘a	   training	   ground	   for	   the	   African	   petite	   bourgeoisie’. 77 	  Also	  interested	   in	   spheres	   of	   ‘collaboration’,	   John	   Lonsdale	   notes	   that	   ‘whatever	   their	  shortcomings,	  these	  LNCs	  were	  crucial	  in	  that	  they	  enlarged	  the	  circle	  of	  recognised	  communicators	  between	  people	  and	  government’	   to	   include	   teachers,	   traders	  and	  farmers.	  78	  	  	   Regarding	   the	   constitution	   of	   councils,	   Lord	  Hailey	   observed	   considerable	  variations	   across	   the	   districts.79	  Members	   in	   1938	   were	   both	   nominated	   and	  ‘appointed	   after	   election.’ 80 The	   president	   of	   each	   LNC	   was	   the	   district	  commissioner	   who	   was	   empowered	   to	   veto	   any	   resolution.	   In	   this	   way,	   LNCs	  activities	  and	  development	  were	   firmly	  under	  official	  control.	  This	  did	  not	  change	  significantly	  after	  1945,	  even	  with	  the	  expanding	  remit	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Local	  Government.	  Events	  of	   the	  1950s	  –	  notably	   the	   ‘Mau	  Mau’	  Emergency	  –	  served	  to	  ensure	   that	   the	   provincial	   administration’s	   primacy	   ‘in	   the	   field’	   remained	   intact,	  despite	  the	  immediate	  post-­‐war	  challenge	  to	  its	  authority.	  And	  as	  the	  next	  section	  will	  show,	  district	  commissioners	  had	  quite	  different	  expectations	  to	  the	  ideologues	  at	   the	   Colonial	   Office	   about	   how	   quickly	   African	   councils	   could	   be	   expected	   to	  conform	  to	  ‘English	  local	  government’	  standards.	  	  
‘An	  open	  door	  to	  larger	  responsibilities’:	  Implementing	  reform,	  1947	  –	  
1963	  In	   1949	   the	   African	   Studies	   Branch	   proudly	   remarked	   in	   the	   Journal	   of	   African	  
Administration	   that	   Kenya’s	   new	   African	   District	   Council	   Bill	   represented	   ‘the	  application	   of	   English	   local	   government	   principles	   to	   African	   conditions	   to	   an	  extent	  unparalleled	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  territories.’81	  Kenya’s	  Member	  for	  Local	  Government,	  Charles	  Mortimer	  used	  strikingly	  similar	   language	  during	  a	  Legislative	  Council	  debate	  on	  the	  bill	   in	   January	  1950.82	  Although	  there	  were	  only	  four	  Africans	  on	  the	  Legislative	  Council	  at	  this	  time,	  the	  ordinance	  was	  considered	  by	  Mortimer	   to	  be	  of	   ‘far	  greater	   importance	   to	  Africans	   than	  any	  addition	   to	   the	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number	   of	   Africans’	   on	   the	   Legislative	   Council.’83	  Commending	   the	   bill	   to	   council,	  Mortimer	  concluded	  that	  it	  should	  be	  viewed	  by	  Africans	  as	  ‘an	  open	  door	  to	  larger	  responsibilities,	  to	  greater	  freedom	  and	  to	  fuller	  control	  of	  their	  own	  affairs’.	  	   Passed	   in	  1950,	   the	  African	  District	  Council	  Ordinance	  replaced	  LNCs	  with	  ADCs;	  the	  latter	  having	  ‘constitutions	  and	  powers	  similar	  to	  local	  authorities	  in	  the	  European	  settled	  areas’.	  84	  	  Unlike	   the	   (Local)	  Native	  Authority	  Ordinance	  of	  1937	  which	   it	   superseded,	   the	   ordinance	   provided	   considerable	   detail	   on	   the	  organisation	  and	  powers	  of	  ADCs.	  Councils	  became	  corporate	  bodies	  empowered	  to	  make	  by-­‐laws,	  borrow	  money	  and	  invest	  funds.	  The	  Native	  Authority	  Ordinance	  of	  1937	   had	   been	   comparatively	   vague	   on	   the	   revenues	   local	   councils	   were	  empowered	   to	   collect,	   specifying	  only	   that	   they	   could	   levy	   a	   rate	   and	   collect	   ‘any	  other	  moneys	  which	  may	   lawfully	   be	   paid	   into	   such	   fund’.85	  By	   contrast,	   the	  ADC	  ordinance	   clearly	   set	   out	   the	   full	   range	   of	   revenue	   sources	   available	   to	   councils:	  rates,	   taxes,	   cesses	   on	   agricultural	   produce,	   license	   fees,	   permit	   charges,	   fines,	  service	  charges,	  interest	  from	  investments	  and	  central	  government	  contributions.86	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  membership	  of	  councils,	   the	  ordinance	  vested	  considerable	  power	  in	  provincial	  commissioners,	  the	  Member	  for	  Health	  and	  Local	  Government	  and	  the	  Governor.	   It	   was	   at	   the	   discretion	   of	   individual	   provincial	   commissioners	   to	  determine	   for	   the	   ADCs	   in	   their	   province:	   which	   Africans	   to	   nominate	   as	  councillors;	   the	   method	   and	   proportion	   of	   councillors	   to	   be	   elected;	   and	   who	  should	   hold	   the	   posts	   of	   president	   and	   deputy	   president	   on	   each	   council.	   This	  flexibility	  was	  ostensibly	   intended	   to	   allow	   ‘advanced’	   and	   ‘backward’	   districts	   to	  develop	  at	  their	  own	  pace.	  	  	   The	   ADC	   ordinance	   included	   an	   extensive	   list	   of	   the	   powers	   which	   were	  entrusted	   to	   ADCs	   with	   the	   authorisation	   of	   the	   Member	   for	   Health	   and	   Local	  Government	   gave	   his	   authorisation.87	  It	   specified	   that	   they	   could:	  make,	   establish	  and	   control	   roads	   and	   bridges,	   markets,	   recreation	   grounds,	   cemeteries,	   council	  offices	  and	  buildings,	  camping	  grounds,	  slaughterhouses,	  hides	  and	  skins	  facilities,	  forests	   and	   woodlands,	   social	   centres,	   and	   canteens.88	  Furthermore,	   ADCs	   could	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  The	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  Authority	  Ordinance,	  1937.	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  Ordinance,	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provide	  water	  services,	  health	  services,	  educational	  facilities,	  refuse	  collection,	  and	  agricultural	   and	   transport	   services.	   Many	   LNCs	   were	   already	   exercising	   some	   of	  these	   powers,	   although	   the	   level	   of	   activity	   varied	   markedly	   between	   provinces.	  Indeed	   there	   were	   pronounced	   regional	   differences	   in	   the	   operation	   of	   councils,	  both	  before	  and	  after	  the	  1950	  ordinance.	  Budgets	  varied	  immensely,	  and	  by	  virtue	  of	   this,	   the	  scale	  and	  scope	  of	  activities	   that	   local	  councils	  were	  able	   to	  undertake	  also	   differed	   significantly.	   Comparing	   the	   revenue	   and	   expenditure	   of	   LNCs	   by	  province	   demonstrates	   this	   see	   Figure	   3.	   At	   the	   two	   extremes	   were	   North	  Kavirondo	  and	  Marsabit	  LNC.	  North	  Kavirondo,	  which	  later	  became	  North	  Nyanza	  –	  and	   Kakamega	   at	   independence	   -­‐	   was	   the	   richest	   council	   at	   this	   time.	   In	   the	  immediate	  post-­‐war	  period	   its	   treasury	  grew	   rapidly.	   In	  1945,	  North	  Kavirondo’s	  revenue	  stood	  at	  K£50,062	  and	  expenditure	  at	  K£37,396.89	  	  
Figure	  3:	  LNC	  revenue/expenditure	  by	  province	  in	  1945.	  	  
Province	  	   Revenue	  (K£)	   Expenditure	  (K£)	  Nyanza	  	   138,552	   101,645	  Central	  	   133,078	   109,461	  Rift	  Valley	  	   25,930	   18,090	  Coast	  	   21,900	   18,555	  Masai	  District	  	   23,676	   8,645	  Northern	  Frontier	  District	  	   1,035	   566	  In	  Kenyan	  Pounds.	  Source:	  adapted	  from	  Gardner	  (2012:	  177).	  	  For	   the	   year	   1952,	   the	   council	   estimated	   an	   annual	   revenue	   of	   K£191,759	   and	  expenditure	   of	   K£190,259.90	  By	   comparison,	   Marsabit	   ADC’s	   estimates	   for	   1952	  predicted	  an	  annual	  revenue	  of	  	  K£745;	  an	  increase	  of	  just	  K£487	  on	  1945	  figures.91	  The	  only	  service	  that	  Marsabit	  ADC	  undertook	  was	  the	  running	  of	  a	  school,	  whereas	  North	   Nyanza	   ADC	   extended	   its	   reach	   into	   all	   areas	   of	   ‘development’	   work.	   The	  position	  of	  Giriama	  African	  District	  Council	  in	  Kilifi	  was	  somewhere	  between	  these	  two	   extremes.	   Figure	   4	   compares	   estimated	   expenditure	   between	   North	   Nyanza	  and	  Giriama	  in	  1951.	   It	  highlights	  the	  high	  proportion	  of	  expenditure	  taken	  up	  by	  education	   in	   some	   councils	   such	   as	   North	   Nyanza	   where	   this	   item	   constituted	   a	  third	   of	   the	   annual	   estimates.	   The	   District	   Commissioner	   for	   Kilifi,	   writing	   his	  annual	  report	  in	  1950	  was	  pleased	  to	  note	  that	  the	  council	  had	  ‘not	  crippled	  itself	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  Gardner,	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  North	  Nyanza	  ADC	  estimates	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  Marsabit	  ADC	  estimates	  revenue/expenditure	  1952,	  CO822/342,	  TNA.	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by	   spending	   too	   much	   on	   education’. 92 	  The	   tone	   of	   his	   appraisal	   contrasted	  somewhat	  with	  the	  previous	  year’s	  report	  where	  he	  had	  noted	  that	   ‘[t]he	  Giriama	  are	  still	  it	  appears,	  dubious	  as	  to	  the	  value	  of	  education’.93	  	  	   The	  contrasting	  financial	  capacities	  of	  councils	  was	  the	  outcome	  of	  various	  factors.	   Different	   population	   densities	   had	   a	   direct	   bearing	   on	   the	   number	   of	  ratepayers	   in	   each	   district.	   The	   1962	   census	   estimated	   that	   North	   Nyanza	   had	   a	  population	   of	   608,197;	   significantly	   greater	   than	   Kilifi	   district	   which	   had	   a	   total	  population	  of	  240,646.94	  Furthermore,	  ADCs	  chose	  the	  level	  of	  the	  rate	  themselves.	  In	   1951	   the	   rate	   in	   Kilifi	   was	   set	   at	   3/-­‐	   sh	   with	   an	   additional	   special	   rate	   for	  education	   of	   1/-­‐	   sh.95	  This	   figure	  was	   similar	   to	   other	   councils	   in	   Coast	   Province,	  but	  much	  smaller	  than	  most	  other	  ADCs.96	  The	  rate	  in	  North	  Nyanza	  was	  set	  at	  8/-­‐	  sh	  in	  1951	  with	  an	  additional	  1/-­‐	  sh	  on	  education.	  The	  highest	  rates	  were	  found	  in	  Kajiado	   and	   Machakos	   where	   ratepayers	   were	   expected	   to	   pay	   14/-­‐	   and	   13/-­‐	  respectively.97	  	  	  
Figure	  4:	  Expenditure	  North	  Nyanza	  and	  Giriama	  ADCs,	  1951.	  	  
Expenditure	  Items,	  1951	  	   North	  Nyanza	  (K£)	   Giriama	  (K£)	  	  Administration	  	   9,140	   2,516	  Law	  and	  Order	   16,200	   4,319	  Social	  Welfare	   2,670	   324	  Public	  Health	   16,320	   3,120	  Education	  	   53,086	   5,000	  Agricultural	  Services	  	   3,745	   2,490	  Veterinary	  Services	   1,471	   5,609	  Roads	  and	  Bridges	   9,364	   3,365	  Upkeep	  of	  Property	  and	  Markets	   3,642	   899	  Forestry	  	   -­‐	  	   274	  Water	  Supplies	   -­‐	  	   2,695	  Extraordinary	  	   42,055	   6,165	  Miscellaneous	  	   1,935	   £45	  Balance	  carried	  forward	   2,127	   -­‐	  	  
Total	  	   K£161,737	   K£36,731	  In	  Kenyan	  Pounds.	  Source:	  JA/1/828,	  KNA.	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  District	  Annual	  Report,	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  Council	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   Decisions	   over	   rates	   were	   made	   in	   reference	   to	   perceived	   wealth	   in	   the	  district,	   which	   varied	   greatly,	   reflecting	   the	   uneven	   impact	   of	   colonialism	   on	  different	   places	   and	   peoples	   in	   Kenya.	   The	   impressive	   revenue	   streams	   that	  councils	   in	   Nyanza	   and	   Central	   Province	   enjoyed	   indicated	   just	   how	  much	   these	  regions’	   political-­‐economies	   had	   been	   transformed	   by	   colonial	   capitalism	   and	  missionary	  education,	  and	  how	  much	  their	  populations’	  ideas	  of	  progress	  had	  been	  shaped	  by	  colonial	  encounter.	  North	  Nyanza	  was	  the	  ‘granary	  of	  the	  colony’,	  where	  maize	  production	  contributed	  immensely	  to	  the	  local	  council’s	  coffers.98	  Introduced	  in	  1942,	  the	  Agricultural	  Betterment	  Fund	  (ABF)	  worked	  by	  applying	  a	  cess	  on	  each	  bag	   of	   produce	   sold	   to	   the	   Maize	   and	   Produce	   Control	   board,	   and	   these	   monies	  ‘were	  credited	   to	   the	  account	  of	   the	  LNC	  of	   the	  district	   in	  which	   the	  produce	  was	  marketed’.99	  This	  meant	   that	   ‘the	   bulk	   of	   the	   revenue	   from	   this	   source	  went	   into	  areas	  which	  marketed	  large	  quantities	  of	  maize’.100	  In	  1947	  North	  Nyanza	  received	  K£133,276	  from	  the	  Fund	  	  –	  the	  most	  in	  the	  colony	  –	  and	  by	  1952,	  70	  percent	  of	  its	  budget	   derived	   from	   Agricultural	   Betterment	   Fund	   transfers.	  101	  In	   Kilifi,	   cess	   on	  mangoes,	   cotton,	   charcoal	   and	  milk	   –	   the	   district’s	  main	   produce	   in	   the	   post-­‐war	  period	  –	  helped	  enlarge	   the	  council’s	  revenue	  by	  K£12,000	   in	   total	  between	  1949	  and	  1951,	  but	  this	  increase	  was	  not	  on	  the	  same	  scale	  as	  in	  Nyanza.102	  The	  council	  mainly	  depended	  on	  the	  direct	  rate,	  collection	  of	  which	  fluctuated	  from	  year	  to	  year.	  	   As	  ADCs’	  budgets	  continued	  to	  increase	  in	  the	  early	  1950s,	  optimism	  about	  their	   capacities	   as	   agents	   of	   development	   soared.	   La	   Fontaine	   and	   Mowers	  triumphantly	  claimed	  in	  1955	  that	  there	  was	  ‘no	  limit	  to	  the	  progress,	  educational,	  medical,	   agricultural	   or	   otherwise	   to	   which	   the	   Councils	   could	   lead	   the	   people,	  provided	  the	  latter	  are	  prepared	  to	  work	  and	  to	  co-­‐operate.’103	  Yet	  the	  ever	  growing	  wealth	  of	  councils	  in	  fact	  undermined	  peoples’	  willingness	  to	  ‘co-­‐operate’	  as	  Gavin	  Kitching	  argues:	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  Kitching,	  Class	  and	  Economic	  Change,	  p.	  134.	  99	  Gardner,	  Taxing	  Colonial	  Africa,	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  Ibid.,	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  North	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the	   LNCs	   were	   an	   arena	   of	   struggle	   among	   different	   groups	   within	   the	  African	  petite	  bourgeoisie,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  source	  of	  some	  power	  and	  resources	  which	  they	  could	  use	  or	  attempt	  to	  use	  against	  Indians	  and	  (occasionally)	  against	   other	   Africans…	   In	   short,	   after	   the	   war,	   as	   before,	   the	   LNCs	  continued	   to	   function	   as	   a	   training	   ground	   for	   the	   African	   petite	  bourgeoisie,	   and	   taught	   important	   lessons	   about	   the	   uses	   to	   which	  governmental	  power	  could	  be	  put104	  	   As	   was	   discussed	   above,	   for	   the	   Colonial	   Office,	   a	   crucial	   part	   of	   local	  government	  reform	  was	  the	  introduction	  of	  more	  democratic	  practices	  at	  the	  local	  level.	   At	   the	   point	   when	   the	   African	   District	   Council	   Ordinance	   came	   into	   effect	  most	   councils	   had	   a	   majority	   of	   ‘elected	   members’.	  105	  Indeed	   Low	   and	   Lonsdale	  have	   even	   suggested	   that	   LNCs	   ‘could	   well	   have	   served	   as	   the	   model	   for	   that	  [Creech	  Jones]	  despatch,	  in	  their	  representative	  qualities	  at	  least,	  if	  not	  in	  the	  extent	  of	  their	  powers.’106	  These	  ‘elections’	  took	  various	  forms.	  Some	  councils	  used	  queue	  voting,	  and	  others	  used	   locational	   councils	  –	  a	   lower	   tier	   introduced	   in	  1946	  –	  as	  electoral	  colleges.107	  The	  Giriama	  LNC	  in	  1948	  had	  twenty-­‐seven	  elected	  members	  and	   eleven	   nominated	   members.	   How	   these	   members	   were	   elected,	   was	   not	  explained	  in	  the	  district	  annual	  report,	  but	  the	  DC	  did	  praise	  the	  ‘nucleus	  of	  sensible	  and	  intelligent	  members’	  on	  the	  council,	  whose	  skills	  surpassed	  those	  of	  the	  chiefs:	  ‘generally	   speaking	   a	   poor	   lot’,	   with	   ‘a	   large	   amount	   of	   “dead	   wood”’.108	  In	   the	  annual	   report	   for	   1951	   the	   district	   commissioner	   offered	   further	   detail	   on	   the	  method	  of	  election:	  	  When	   the	   new	   council	   was	   elected	   in	   July,	   the	   election	   barazas	   were	  attended	  by	  either	  the	  District	  Commissioner	  or	  the	  District	  Officer,	  Malindi.	  Each	   baraza	   was	   invited	   to	   nominate	   by	   word	   of	   mouth	   a	   number	   of	  persons,	  who	  were	  then	  told	  to	  walk	  some	  distance	  away	  from	  the	  baraza.	  The	  people	  in	  the	  baraza	  were	  then	  asked	  to	  stand	  behind	  the	  man	  of	  their	  choice.	  The	  election	  resulted	  in	  the	  constitution	  of	  a	  considerably	  younger	  and	  better	  educated	  council	  which	  include	  the	  only	  two	  “politicians”	  in	  the	  district.	  Both	  these	  men	  seem	  to	  have	  settled	  down	  happily	  and	  have	  been	  appointed	  to	  sub-­‐committees.109	  	  	   The	  ADC	  Ordinance	  upheld	  provincial	  commissioners’	  ‘right	  to	  prescribe	  the	  form	  and	  method	  of	  election	  to	  councils’.110	  When	  the	  bill	  was	  put	  forward,	  the	  JAA	  claimed	  that	  it	  looked	  ‘forward	  to	  a	  time	  when	  council	  business	  will	  be	  run	  entirely	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  Kitching,	  Class	  and	  Economic	  Change,	  p.	  198.	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by	   African	   councillors	   and	   when	   the	   district	   commissioner	   has	   withdrawn	   from	  direct	  participation’.111	  But	  given	  the	  dominant	  worldview	  of	  most	  administrators,	  it	   is	   highly	   doubtful	   whether	   most	   DCs	   did	   look	   forward	   to	   that	   time.112 	  An	  administrative	  officer	   in	  Taita,	  Coast	  Province,	   reflected	   in	   the	   JAA	   in	  1954	  on	  the	  progress	  made	  in	  his	  district	  in	  respect	  of	  local	  government.	  Although	  he	  accepted	  the	  colonial	  government’s	  aim	  to	  ‘make	  a	  class	  of	  responsible	  leaders’	  through	  ADCs,	  he	  nevertheless	  maintained	  that	   ‘to	  withdraw	  the	  paternal	  element	  from	  the	  Taita	  district’	   would	   cause	   great	   suffering	   to	   the	   ‘peasantry’.113	  The	   people	   of	   Taita	   –	  according	  to	  their	  district	  commissioner	  –	  were	  not	  ready	  for	  truly	  democratic	  local	  government.	  This	  parochial	  view	  was	  shared	  by	  some	  of	  the	  most	  ardent	  advocates	  of	   British	   local	   government.	   Dr.	   A.	   H.	  Marshall,	   City	   Treasurer	   of	   Coventry	   and	   a	  member	  of	  the	  Colonial	  Local	  Government	  Advisory	  Panel	  wrote	  in	  1955	  that:	  ‘[t]he	  pure	  milk	  of	   the	  British	   gospel	   thus	  has	   to	  be	  watered	  down	   in	   the	   initial	   stages.	  With	  such	  adaptations,	  the	  British	  system	  can	  be	  made	  to	  work	  well;	  without	  them	  it	  would	  be	  sometimes	  unworkable.’114	  	  	   It	  was	  not	  until	  1956	  that	   the	  now	  Ministry	  of	  Local	  Government	  began	  to	  reconsider	  its	  laissez-­‐faire	  approach	  to	  ADC	  elections.	  The	  previous	  year	  the	  Coutts	  report	  which	  had	  examined	  methods	  of	  electing	  Africans	  to	  the	  Legislative	  Council,	  recommended	   that	   	   Africans	   ‘be	   directly	   elected	   by	   secret	   ballot’	   on	   a	   qualitative	  franchise	   whereby	   certain	   qualifications	   such	   as	   age,	   education	   and	   property,	  entitled	  the	  voter	  to	  additional	  votes.	  After	  the	  report	  was	  published,	  the	  Member	  for	   Local	   Government,	   Wilfred	   Havelock,	   wrote	   to	   his	   secretary,	   noting	   that	   the	  Coutts	   report	   would	   ‘inevitably	   have	   repercussions	   on	   African	   District	   Councils’,	  suggesting	   that	   it	   was	   ‘not	   too	   soon	   to	   start	   thinking	   about	   the	   problems	  involved’.115	  	   The	   ‘problems’	   his	   letter	   went	   on	   to	   outline	   were	   numerous.	   First,	  Havelock	  began	  by	  highlighting	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  ADC	  ‘elections’	  actually	  had	  no	  legal	  basis	  -­‐	  councillors	  whether	  ‘elected’	  or	  ‘nominated’	  -­‐	  were	  all	  formally	  appointed	  by	  the	  provincial	  commissioner.116	  The	   letter	  posed	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  time	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had	  come	  ‘for	  these	  informal	  elections	  to	  be	  placed	  on	  a	  legal	  basis’,	  and	  if	  so,	  what	  procedures	  should	  be	  put	  in	  place,	  whether	  a	  secret	  ballot	  was	  necessary,	  and	  how	  to	  determine	  the	  qualifications	  of	  voters	  and	  candidates.117	  	  	  	   The	  ministry	   appears	   to	   have	   delayed	   examining	   these	   questions.	   Instead,	  officials	   focused	   their	   attention	   on	   local	   government	   finances.	   In	   1957	   the	  government	  published	  a	  	  White	  Paper	  entitled:	  ‘Financial	  Relationships	  between	  the	  
Kenya	   Government	   and	   African	   District	   Councils’. 118 	  Considered	   ‘a	   landmark	   in	  Kenya’s	  local	  government	  history’,	  the	  White	  Paper	  proposed	  a	  new	  grant	  structure	  for	  ADCs,	  and	  from	  1958	  councils	  became	  public	  health	  authorities,	  and	  ‘were	  also	  to	   finance	   one-­‐third	   of	   the	   net	   expenditure	   (total	   expenditure	   minus	   fees)	   on	  primary	   education,	   the	   residual	   remaining	   the	   Central	   Government’s	  responsibility.’119	  These	   additional	   financial	   responsibilities	   placed	   on	   councils	   in	  the	   last	   five	   years	   before	   independence	   had	   important	   repercussions	   on	   county	  council’s	  financial	  stability	  after	  1963	  as	  the	  next	  chapter	  will	  show.	  	  	   Ensuring	   that	   ADCs	   were	   established	   on	   a	   sound	   financial	   footing	   was	  considered	  essential	  by	  officials	  in	  the	  ministry	  and	  by	  experts	  at	  the	  Jeanes	  School	  of	  Administration;	  a	  regular	  advisor	  to	  the	  government.	  Experts	  at	  the	  time	  insisted	  that	   finance	   was	   ‘the	   rock	   on	   which	   local	   government	   can	   so	   easily	   founder.’120	  Decisions	   over	   ADCs’	   budgets,	   however,	   became	   a	   key	   battleground	   in	   the	   late	  1950s	  between	  African	  councillors	  and	  officials.	  Central	  Nyanza	  ADC	  voted	  in	  1958	  to	  lower	  taxes,	  discontinue	  an	  expensive	  afforestation	  scheme,	  dismiss	  some	  of	  its	  technical	  officers	  and	  reduce	  road	  expenditure	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  tax	  burden	  on	  its	  constituents.121	  This	  demonstrated	  a	  growing	  confidence	  amongst	  councillors	  to	  resist	   the	   conservation	  policies	   the	   administration	  had	   imposed	  on	   the	   council	   in	  the	   past.122	  However,	   the	   Governor	   was	   deeply	   troubled	   by	   this.	   He	   wrote	   to	  Colonial	   Secretary	   Lennox	   Boyd	   to	   inform	   him	   of	   these	   events,	   which	   to	   him	  represented	   ‘the	   first	   time	   that	   an	   African	   district	   has	   tried	   to	   assert	   its	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independence	  in	  a	  manner	  to	  cause	  disquiet.’123	  The	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  ultimately	  decided	   to	   dissolve	   the	   council,	   and	   release	   its	   forty	   ‘elected’	   and	   thirteen	  nominated	   members	   from	   service.	   Afterwards,	   Central	   Nyanza	   ADC	   was	  reconstituted	  with	  fifteen	  elected	  and	  fifteen	  nominated	  members	  and	  the	  local	  rate	  was	  raised.124	  However,	  the	  people	  of	  Central	  Nyanza	  refused	  to	  pay	  the	  new	  rate.	  Dixon	   Makasembo,	   chairman	   of	   the	   Central	   Nyanza	   African	   District	   Association	  cabled	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  in	  protest:	  	  Public	  view	  with	  indignation	  blind	  decision	  of	  Kenya	  government	  on	  report	  of	   enquiry	   Central	   Nyanza	   African	   District	   Council.	   Government	   action	  resulting	  deadlock	  now.	  Such	  action	  jeopardising	  relations	  between	  public	  and	   government.	   Sudden	   and	   abrupt	   moves	   such	   as	   this	   breeding	  frustration	  and	  suspicions.125	  	  The	   timing	   of	   the	   whole	   affair	   was	   deemed	   most	   unfortunate	   by	   the	   Provincial	  Commissioner	  of	  Nyanza	  who	  had	  recently	  decided	  that	   the	  moment	  had	  come	  to	  experiment	   with	   withdrawing	   the	   district	   commissioner	   from	   one	   council	  altogether.126	  The	  African	  District	  Council	  Ordinance	  of	  1950	  had	  not	  specified	  that	  district	   commissioners	   had	   to	   be	   the	   president	   of	   the	   council;	   instead	   filling	   this	  role	  was	   left	   to	   the	  discretion	  of	   the	  provincial	   commissioner.127	  It	  would	  be	  nine	  years	  before	  the	  first	  ADC	  had	  an	  African	  president,	  and	  the	  council	  that	  ultimately	  was	  bestowed	  this	  honour	  was	  Elgon	  Nyanza.128	  Pascal	  Nabwana	  became	  the	   first	  African	   chairman	   in	   1959,	   in	   the	   same	   year	   he	   was	   also	   appointed	   as	   the	   first	  African	  President	  of	  the	  District	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  in	  Kakamega.129	  	  	   Examining	  the	  history	  of	  Nabwana	  highlights	  the	  degree	  of	  ambivalence	  that	  often	  defined	  interactions	  between	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘progressive’	  members	  of	  councils,	  and	  the	  colonial	  state.	  Nabwana	  was	  educated	  by	  a	  Catholic	  mission	  and	  trained	  as	  a	   teacher	   at	   the	   Jeanes	   School	   of	   Administration.	   He	   was	   a	   member	   of	   North	  Kavirondo	  LNC	  throughout	   the	  1930s,	  during	  which	   time	  he	  regularly	  objected	   to	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  to	  Lennox	  Boyd,	  25	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  1958,	  CO822/1564,	  TNA.	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  Ministers	  African	  District	  Council,	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  of	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  Colonial	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  25	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  TNA,	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  Baring	  to	  Lennox	  Boyd,	  25	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  1958,	  TNA,	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  127	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  District	  Councils’.	  128	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  and	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  Report	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  Local	  
Government,	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  (Nairobi,	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the	   government’s	   refusal	   to	   let	   Africans	   grow	   coffee.130	  He	   formed	   the	   Bukusu	  Union	   in	  1940,	   a	  political	   society	   ‘concerned	  with	   education	   and	  with	  uniting	   the	  Bukusu	   people	   as	   a	   group.’131	  He	   came	   into	   regular	   conflict	   with	   the	   chief	   in	   his	  location,	   and	   the	   administration	   responded	   to	   these	   activities	   by	   creating	   and	  appointing	  him	  to	  a	  Locational	  Advisory	  Council,	  hoping	  that	  this	  would	  encourage	  a	  more	  ‘responsible’	  approach	  to	  politics	  by	  giving	  Nabwana	  and	  his	  friends	  ‘more	  influence’.132	  However,	   in	  1948	  he	  was	  accused	  of	   supporting	  Dini	  ya	  Msambwa,	  a	  group	   ‘which	   sought	   the	   expulsion	  of	   Europeans	   from	  Kenya	   and	   the	   rejection	  of	  European	   civilization.’133	  Furthermore,	   he	   faced	   charges	   of	   ‘inciting	   people	   not	   to	  pay	  poll	  tax	  and	  engineering	  a	  plot	  to	  remove’	  his	   locational	  chief.134	  This	  stain	  on	  his	   reputation	   passed,	   and	   just	   over	   a	   decade	   later,	   he	   became	   the	   first	   African	  chairman	  of	  a	  local	  government	  body.	  	   This	   account	   of	   Nabwana’s	   political	   career	   reveals	   the	   complicated	   and	  sometimes	  contradictory	  nature	  of	  collaboration	  between	  councils	  and	  the	  colonial	  government.	   It	  was	   not	   always	   the	   compliant	   and	   cooperative	  who	   ‘collaborated’	  with	   the	   government.	   And	   these	   individuals	   often	   pursued	   particular	   local	   and	  national	  agendas	  outside	  of	  their	  capacities	  as	  councillors	  through	  other	  official	  and	  unofficial	  channels.	  Another	  example	  of	  this	   is	   found	  in	  the	  activities	  of	  Councillor	  Herman	   Asava,	   who	   in	   the	   years	   before	   independence	   simultaneously	   served	   on	  North	  Nyanza	  African	  District	  Council,	  formed	  the	  North	  Nyanza	  African	  Nationalist	  Association	  and	  was	  district	  chairman	  of	  the	  Kenya	  African	  Democratic	  Union.135	  It	  was	  in	  the	  latter	  role	  that	  Asava	  wrote	  to	  the	  Governor	  in	  1961	  requesting	  that	  the	  North	  Nyanza	  ADC	  be	  allowed	  an	  African	  chairman,	  ‘in	  view	  of	  the	  progressive	  and	  enlightened	   population	   in	   the	   district.’136	  The	   goal	   of	   having	   an	   African	   chairman	  was	  a	  particular	  preoccupation	  for	  the	  members	  of	  North	  Nyanza	  ADC.	   In	  January	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  36	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  (Oxford,	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1959	   councillors	   had	   lobbied	   Havelock	   on	   the	   issue	   during	   his	   tour	   of	   the	  province.137	  Several	   months	   later	   councillors	   took	   the	   opportunity	   to	   inform	   the	  ministry’s	  permanent	   secretary	   that	   ‘it	  had	  been	  a	  great	   shock	   to	   the	  council	   that	  the	  first	  African	  chairman	  should	  have	  been	  appointed	  to	  Elgon	  Nyanza	  which	  only	  a	   few	  years	   ago	  had	  been	  part	  of	   the	  North	  Nyanza	  African	  District	  Council.’138	  In	  reply	   the	  permanent	  secretary	  reiterated	   the	  minister’s	  comments	   from	  earlier	   in	  the	   year	  when	  Havelock	   had	   said	   ‘he	  wanted	   Council	   to	   put	   its	   financial	  matters	  straight	  first’.139	  	   1958	  had	  seen	  the	  worst	  payment	  of	  the	  ADC	  rate	  in	  North	  Nyanza	  in	  many	  years,	  causing	  a	  significant	  deficit	  in	  the	  council’s	  estimated	  revenue.140	  The	  district	  commissioner	  accounted	  for	  the	  shortfall	  of	  19,339	  ratepayers	  (27.6	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  total)	   by	   observing	   that	   ‘a	   large	   number	   of	   the	   able-­‐bodied	   men	   go	   to	   look	   for	  employment	   outside	   the	   district’. 141 	  Yet	   the	   problems	   North	   Nyanza	   was	  experiencing	  were	  not	  unique.	  Indeed,	  many	  other	  councils	  were	  struggling	  to	  meet	  their	  estimates	  for	  ratepayers,	  including	  Kilifi	  ADC,	  as	  Figure	  5	  shows:	  	  	  	  
Figure	  5:	  Number	  of	  ratepayers	  in	  Kilifi	  district,	  1957-­‐62.	  
Year	   1957	   1958	   1959	   1960	   1961	   1962	  
No.	  of	  ratepayers	  	   42,629	   39,780	   36,291	   41,017	   34,133	   27,375	  Source:	  JA/1/650,	  KNA,	  Nairobi.	  	  	  Kilifi’s	  district	  commissioner	  considered	  the	   ‘alarming’	  decline	   ‘to	  indicate	  the	  law	  of	   diminishing	   returns’.142	  By	  1962	   the	   council	  was	   levying	   a	   rate	   of	   15/-­‐	   sh,	   and	  locational	  councils	  demanded	  an	  additional	  rate	  equal	  to	  the	  full	  council’s	  rate.	  This	  amounted	   to	   an	   increase	   from	   5/-­‐	   sh	   in	   1952	   to	   30/-­‐sh	   in	   some	   locations	   in	   the	  district	   in	   1962.	   The	   ‘law	   of	   diminishing	   returns’	   may	   have	   been	   part	   of	   the	  explanation,	  but	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Local	  Government’s	  preferred	  analysis	  was	  that	  the	  colony’s	  declining	  tax	  revenues	  was	  the	  consequence	  of	  drought.143	  Unsurprisingly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  137	  Memo	  North	  Nyanza	  ADC	  to	  the	  Minister	  for	  Local	  Government,	  JA/12/27,	  KNA,	  Nairobi.	  	  138	  Notes	  on	  the	  tour	  of	  the	  Permanent	  Secretary,	  Kakamega,	  18	  June	  1959,	  JA/12/28,	  KNA,	  Nairobi.	  	  139	  Special	  finance	  committee	  minutes,	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the	  ministry	   was	   not	   inclined	   to	   consider	   whether	   declining	   tax	   compliance	  was	  reflective	  of	  more	  fundamental	  shifts	  in	  how	  Africans	  were	  viewing	  the	  relationship	  between	  taxation,	  representation,	  and	  services,	  and	  in	  particular,	  how	  the	  idea	  and	  prospect	   of	   ‘uhuru’	   –	   meaning	   freedom	   or	   independence	   in	   KiSwahili	   –	   was	  challenging	   the	   norms	   the	   colonial	   state	   had	   strived	   to	   establish.	   Rate	   paying	  further	   dropped	   between	   1960	   and	   1961	   after	   the	   British	   government	   indicated	  that	  Kenya	  would	  imminently	  gain	  independence	  (see	  Figure	  6).	  The	  foundations	  of	  local	  authorities’	   fiscal	  crisis	  were	   laid	   in	  the	   late-­‐colonial	  period	  when	  conflicting	  ideas	  emerged	  about	  who	  was	  expected	  to	  do	  what	  ‘for	  the	  nation’.	  	  	  
Figure	  6:	  Decline	  in	  ratepayers	  by	  ADC,	  1959-­‐61.	  
African	  District	  Council	  	  	   Number	  of	  ratepayers	  
	   1959/60	   1960/61	  	  South	  Nyanza	  	   76,205	   46,834	  Kipsigis	   13,960	   8,387	  Nandi	  	   10,048	   4,894	  Elgeyo	  Marakwet	  	   5,282	   3,000	  Baringo	  	   3,613	   2,104	  West	  Pokot	  	   3,872	   2,589	  Fort	  Hall	  	   12,582	   7,064	  Nyeri	  	   9,261	   7,866	  Embu	  	   21,000	   14,175	  Kitui	  	   12,022	   3,959	  Kilifi	  	   25,690	   21,316	  Taita	  Taveta	   4,817	   3,111	  Source:	  TNA,	  CO822/2682.	  	  	   In	   spite	   of	   the	   downward	   trend	  with	   tax	   compliance,	   the	   achievements	   of	  ADCs	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period	  were	  clear	  to	  all	  observers.	  In	  1960	  Professor	  W.	  J.	  M.	  Mackenzie	   of	   Manchester	   University	   prepared	   a	   background	   note	   on	   ‘Political	  opinion	   in	  Kenya’	   for	   the	  Colonial	  Office	   in	  preparation	   for	   the	   first	  constitutional	  conference	  at	  Lancaster	  House	  in	  January	  1960.144	  His	  observations	  regarding	  local	  government	  were	  broadly	  positive:	  	  The	  English	  tradition	  has	  been	  surprisingly	  successful	   in	  reasserting	   itself	  in	   spite	   of	   difficult	   conditions	   and	   limited	   financial	   resources.	   Local	  authorities	  and	  numerous	  amateur	  “boards”	  are	  not	  free	  from	  parochialism,	  sectionalism	   and	   even	   corruption;	   but	   they	   have	   established	   in	   limited	  spheres	  a	  rough	  but	  realistic	  model	  of	  what	  self-­‐government	  means…	  This	  programme	   is	   clear	   in	   people’s	   minds;	   but	   I	   got	   the	   impression	   that	   a	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tremendous	  amount	  remains	  to	  be	  done	  in	  a	  very	  short	  time,	  if	  this	  model	  of	   self-­‐government	   is	   to	   stand	   a	   chance	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	   centralising	  politics	  of	  African	  nationalism.145	  Mackenzie’s	  concern	  about	  ‘the	  centralising	  politics	  of	  African	  nationalism’	  proved	  valid,	  as	   the	  next	  chapter	  shows.	  But	   in	  order	   to	  understand	  how	  and	  why	  Kenya	  became	  highly	  centralised	  after	  independence,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  examine	  the	  ways	  that	  Kenya’s	  administrative	  apparatus	  changed	  in	  the	  late-­‐colonial	  period,	  and	  the	  different	   constitutional	   debates	   that	   occurred	   at	   this	   time.	   The	   next	   section	  considers	  this,	  and	  touches	  on	  how	  municipalities	  and	  councils	  in	  scheduled	  areas	  evolved	  during	  this	  time.	  	  	  
‘The	  necessity	  for	  rapid	  advance’:	  “Mau	  Mau”,	  municipalities,	  and	  
majimbo,	  1952-­‐1963	  As	   the	   introductory	   chapter	   discussed,	   many	   scholars	   have	   drawn	   attention	   to	  continuities	   in	   the	   role	   played	   by	   the	   provincial	   administration	   in	   pre	   and	   post-­‐independence	  Kenya.	  In	  particular,	  emphasis	  has	  been	  placed	  on	  changes	  to	  the	  size	  and	   scope	   of	   the	   administration	   in	   the	   late-­‐colonial	   period.	   Bruce	   Berman	   has	  argued	  that	  during	  the	  period	  from	  1945	  to	  1963,	  the	  administration	  experienced	  a	  consecutive	   process	   of	   decline,	   restoration,	   and	   decline.146	  Before	   the	   war,	   field	  administrators	   had	   enjoyed	   the	   freedom	   to	   ‘work	   out	   the	   implementation	   of	   any	  policy	  in	  the	  light	  of	  their	  judgement	  of	  local	  circumstances.’147	  They	  regarded	  their	  duty	  in	  paternal	  terms,	  as	  the	  protectors	  of	  traditional,	  tribal	  Africa,	  and	  they	  ‘lived	  the	  lives	  of	  little	  kings	  in	  an	  epoch	  when	  their	  home	  based	  brothers	  had	  exchanged	  kingship	  for	  bourgeois	  democracy’.148	  The	  end	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  brought	  a	  boom	   in	   the	   Kenyan	   economy	   and	   a	   surge	   in	   political	   activity;	   it	   was	   the	  administration	  which	  was	  most	  dismayed	  by	  the	  pace	  of	  change	  and	  fearful	  of	  the	  consequent	   effects	   on	   African	   society,	   perceived	   as	   harmonious,	   tribal	   and	  vulnerable	   to	   the	   more	   insidious	   aspects	   of	   modernity.149 	  The	   administration	  remained	  ambivalent	  about	  the	  new	  post-­‐war	  obligation	  of	   ‘development’	  and	  felt	  threatened	   by	   the	   rise	   of	   technical	   ministries	   in	   the	   Secretariat	   tasked	   with	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instituting	  such	  change.	  The	  declaration	  of	  a	  State	  of	  Emergency	  in	  1952	  however,	  allowed	   for	   a	   ‘restoration’	   in	   the	   position	   of	   the	   administration.	   Administrators	  blamed	   incidences	  of	   ‘Mau	  Mau’	  violence	  on	  a	   ‘loss	  of	   contact’	  between	   them	  and	  those	  they	  were	  governing.	  They	  claimed	  that	  the	  bureaucratisation	  of	  government	  had	   prevented	   them	   from	   pursuing	   reliable	  methods	   of	   administration	   based	   on	  direct	  personal	  contact	  with	   the	   ‘natives’.150	  This	  analysis	   led	  to	  a	  policy	  of	   ‘closer	  administration’;	   the	   size	   of	   the	   administration	  more	   than	   doubled	   between	   1951	  and	   1962,	   and	   the	   supremacy	   of	   administrators	   in	   the	   field	   was	   reaffirmed.151	  During	   the	   Emergency,	   the	   provincial	   administration	   proved	   itself	   to	   be	   a	   highly	  effective	   structure	   for	   guaranteeing	   central	   government	   control	  of	   the	  grassroots.	  The	   rapid	   expansion	   of	   this	   system	   left	   a	   lasting	  mark	   on	   the	   state’s	   institutional	  landscape,	  which	  remained	  ‘profoundly	  unbalanced’	  long	  after	  independence.152	  	   Despite	   its	   central	   location	   in	   the	   ‘White	   Highlands’	   Nakuru	   town	   did	   not	  experience	   much	   violence	   during	   the	   Emergency.	   This	   was	   partly	   because	   of	  passbook	   regulations	   which	   prevented	   Kikuyu	   from	   entering	   the	   town	   without	  permission.153	  These	  regulations	  were	  only	  lifted	  at	  the	  end	  of	  1959,	  at	  which	  point	  there	  was	  an	  estimated	  African	  population	  of	  23,000.	  Within	  a	  year,	  the	  municipal	  council	   estimated	   that	   this	   figure	   had	   doubled. 154 	  Members	   of	   the	   council	  responded	   to	   this	   influx,	   and	   the	   rise	  of	   ‘unemployment	   and	  destitution’	   that	   this	  created,	  by	  introducing	  programmes	  reminiscent	  of	  local	  authorities	  ‘at	  home’.	  The	  Joint	   Committee	   for	   	   the	   Relief	   of	   Distress	   in	   Nakuru	   Town’	   was	   formed,	   which	  opened	  a	  soup	  kitchen	  in	  1961	  for	  women	  and	  children.	  The	  rapid	  increase	  in	  the	  town’s	   population	   also	   led	   to	   severe	   housing	   shortages.	   The	   issue	   of	   whether	  housing	   should	   be	   provided	   for	   Africans	   in	   towns,	   and	   if	   so	   in	   what	   form	   and	  provided	  by	  whom,	  had	  been	  a	  key	  debate	  within	  municipal	   councils	   in	   the	  post-­‐war	  period.	  	  	   There	   had	   been	   a	   broad	   consensus,	   ever	   since	   the	   inception	   of	   boards	  responsible	   for	   urban	   management	   that	   Africans	   ‘did	   not	   belong’	   in	   the	   towns	  except	   as	   migrant	   labour. 155 	  Therefore	   their	   welfare	   was	   considered	   the	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responsibility	   of	   their	   employers,	   rather	   than	   the	  municipal	   boards.	   In	  Nairobi	   in	  particular,	   this	  created	  severe	  housing	  problems,	  which	  were	  compounded	  by	   the	  Local	   Government	   (Municipalities)	   Ordinance	   of	   1928,	   which	   prevented	   Africans	  from	   residing	   anywhere	   other	   than	   the	   ‘locations’,	   designated	   to	   them	   by	   the	  municipal	  authority.	  As	  migration	  to	  the	  towns	  continued	  in	  the	  1930s,	  conditions	  worsened	   for	   Africans	   living	   in	   Nairobi,	   and	   in	   other	   towns.	   Nonetheless	   it	   was,	  according	   to	   Seeley,	   ‘largely	   pressures	   from	   outside	   the	   colony	   which	   brought	  about	  a	  change	  in	  social	  welfare	  policy’	  in	  Kenya’s	  towns	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period.156	  Investments	   in	   housing	   projects	   transformed	   Nairobi	   from	   the	   1940s,	   from	   a	  ‘ramshackle	  backwater’	   to	   a	   ‘vibrant	   and	   fashionable	   city’.157	  These	  developments	  were	   mirrored	   in	   Mombasa,	   and	   other	   provincial	   towns.	   At	   last,	   municipal	  authorities	   accepted	   the	   principle	   that	   Africans	   and	   their	   families	   would	   be	  permanent	   residents	   in	   towns.	   For	   Richard	   Harris,	   this	   ‘shift	   in	   housing	   policy’,	  came	   to	   encompass	   a	   hope	   that	   good	   housing	  would	   ‘stabilize	  workers,	   promote	  social	  mobility	  and,	  eventually,	  ease	  the	  transition	  to	  political	  independence’.158	  On	  this	  point,	  officials	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Local	  Government	  did	  not	  always	  see	  eye	  to	   eye	  with	   European	   councillors.	   The	  Member	   for	  Health	   and	   Local	   Government	  articulated	  his	  vision	   to	   the	  Mayor	  of	  Nairobi	   in	  a	   letter	   in	  1950,	  writing	   that	   ‘the	  correct	   channel	   of	   development	   is	   to	   build	   the	   African	   resident	   in	   Nairobi	   into	   a	  feeling	  of	  citizenship	  of	  Nairobi,	  and	  as	  long	  as	  he	  feels	  that	  the	  central	  government	  can	  be	  played	  off	  against	  the	  local	  government	  authority,	  so	  long	  is	  he	  likely	  to	  fail	  to	   recognise	   that	  he	  must	  become	  part	  of	   the	   town’.159	  Yet	  arguably	  despite	   these	  sentiments	  Africans	  in	  Nairobi	  and	  indeed	  in	  Nakuru	  and	  other	  municipalities	  were	  not	  truly	  able	  to	  became	  ‘part	  of	  the	  town’	  until	  independence.	  	  	   In	   1945,	   Nairobi	   became	   the	   first	   municipal	   council	   to	   have	   African	  nominated	  members.	   Two	   years	   later	   Nakuru,	   Eldoret	   and	   Kisumu	   followed	   suit.	  Critically	  outnumbered	  by	  elected	  European	  and	  Asian	  members,	  African	  members	  had	  little	  influence	  on	  the	  full	  council.	  The	  business	  of	   ‘African	  Affairs’	  was	  mainly	  conducted	  through	  ‘Advisory	  Councils’,	  which	  served	  as	  an	  official	  link	  between	  the	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council	   and	   African	   areas.	   The	   District	   Commissioner	   for	   Nairobi	   noted	   in	   1950	  that:	  	  the	   establishment	   of	   the	   African	   Advisory	   Council	   itself	   is	   regarded	   by	  many	  of	  the	  more	  intelligent	  Africans	  as	  having	  been	  a	  ruse	  to	  divert	  them	  from	   their	   legitimate	   aspirations	   for	   greater	   representation	   of	   the	   city	  council	   itself,	   into	   the	   blind	   alley	   of	   joining	   a	   powerless	   debating	   society,	  and	  the	   feeling	   is	  growing	  that	   the	  time	   is	  ripe	   for	  Africans	  to	  discard	  the	  shadow	  of	  the	  African	  Advisory	  Council	  and	  go	  all	  out	  for	  the	  substance	  of	  greatly	  increased	  representation.160	  Eight	   years	   after	   this	   was	   written,	   the	   object	   of	   increased	   representation	   on	  municipal	  councils	  and	  indeed	  on	  county	  councils	  in	  settled	  areas	  remained	  one	  of	  the	  demands	  forwarded	  by	  African	  politicians.	  In	  the	  Legislative	  Council,	  Justus	  ole	  Tipis	  moved	  a	  motion	  in	  June	  1958	  to	  this	  effect:161	  Sir,	   sometimes	   I	   am	   entirely	   at	   a	   loss.	   I	   fail	   to	   reconcile	   the	   Government	  policy	   and	   attitude.	  On	   the	   one	   hand	   they	   say	   that	   there	   are	   no	   qualified	  Africans	   who	   can	   contribute	   efficiently	   to	   the	   deliberations	   on	   these	  councils.	   On	   the	   other	   hand	   they	   go	   on	   to	   nominate	   people	   of	   their	   own	  choice	  and	  place	  them	  in	  a	  very	  awkward	  position...	  If	  the	  training	  grounds	  on	   the	   various	   things	   are	   the	   local	   government	   bodies	   then	   surely	   you	  cannot	  train	  someone	  without,	  Sir,	  but	  you	  have	  got	   to	  train	  them	  within;	  and	  for	  that	  simple	  reason	  I	  think	  it	  is	  time	  that	  we	  adjusted	  our	  attitude	  or	  our	  policies	   and	  made	   the	  African	   feel	   that	  he	   is	  part	   and	  parcel	   of	   these	  councils	   and	   that	   his	   interests	   are	   safeguarded	   by	   those	   who	   have	   the	  interests	   of	   the	  African	   community	   and	   interests	   of	   the	  whole	   country	   at	  heart.162	  	  The	  Minister	  for	  Local	  Government	  did	  not	  challenge	  the	  principle	  put	  forward	  by	  ole	  Tipis,	   but	   rather	   insisted	   that	  African	   representation	  had	  been	   increased,	   and	  would	  be	  increased	  further	  in	  time,	  according	  to	  the	  requirements	  of	  different	  areas.	  But	   to	  many	  who	   sat	  on	   the	  predominantly	  European	   county	   councils,	   this	  policy	  ran	  counter	  to	  what	  they	  hoped	  to	  achieve	  through	  local	  government	  in	  the	  1950s.	  The	  two	  new	  constitutions	  introduced	  during	  the	  decade	  had	  both	  been	  based	  on	  a	  system	  of	  multi	  racialism	  which	  shared	  power	  amongst	  ‘racially	  defined	  groups’.163	  Multi-­‐racial	   or	   ‘mixed	   government’	   proceeded	   at	   the	   national	   level,	   albeit	   slowly,	  with	  more	  African	  members	  elected	  to	  Legislative	  Council,	  yet	  these	  developments	  were	  not	  mirrored	  at	  the	   local	   level.	   In	  fact,	   in	  response	  to	  the	  gradual	  movement	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  DC	  Nairobi,	  ‘The	  African	  part	  in	  Nairobi	  local	  government	  –	  draft	  memo’,	  28	  March	  1950,	  JA/19/224,	  KNA,	  Nairobi.	  	  161	  Colony	  and	  Protectorate	  of	  Kenya,	  Legislative	  Council	  Debates,	  12	  June	  1958,	  col.	  1807.	  	  162	  Ibid.,	  cols.	  1809-­‐1810.	  163	  The	  Lyttelton	  Constitution,	  1954;	  Lennox-­‐Boyd	  Constitution,	  1957-­‐58,	  see	  Robert	  Maxon,	  
Britain	  and	  Kenya’s	  Constitutions,	  1950-­‐1960	  (Amhert,	  2011).	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towards	   multiracialism,	   some	   county	   councils	   attempted	   to	   shore	   up	   their	   own	  autonomy	  to	   ‘protect’	  certain	   ‘European’	  spheres.	  This	  aim	  was	  expressed	  by	  A.	  B.	  Goord,	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  Nakuru	  County	  Council	  in	  the	  mid	  1950s,	  who	  went	  on	  to	  serve	  on	  the	  Legislative	  Council.	  New	  Zealand-­‐born	  Goord	  wrote	  in	  a	  note	  for	  the	  Association	  of	  District	  Councils	  in	  1954	  that:	  	  	  Whatever	   views	  may	   be	   held	   regarding	   the	   Lyttelton	   Plan,	   the	   course	   of	  multi-­‐racial	   government	   has	   been	   taken…	  We	   are	   thus	   committed,	   willy	  nilly,	   to	   a	   policy	   which,	   however	   estimable	   in	   theory,	   must	   result	   in	   a	  steady	   diminution	   of	   European	   influence	   at	   the	   centre	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   that	   of	  other	  races,	  the	  end	  of	  which	  cannot	  be	  foreseen.	  Faced	  with	  this	  situation	  there	  is	  an	  obvious	  and	  urgent	  need	  for	  the	  European	  community	  to	  secure	  the	   maximum	   possible	   control	   within	   the	   European	   Highlands,	   with	   the	  object	   of	   securing,	   not	   racial	   advantage,	   but	   rather	   the	   maintenance	   of	  European	   Standards	   and	   the	   progress	   of	   non-­‐Europeans	   towards	   the	  Western	  way	  of	  life.	  164	  	   Two	   months	   before	   this	   note	   was	   circulated,	   the	   Federal	   Independence	  Party	   had	   formed.165	  It	   rejected	   the	   Lyttelton	   plan	   and	   pushed	   for	   ‘provincial	  autonomy’.	   In	   1958	   the	   Federal	   Independence	   Party	  was	   -­‐	   somewhat	   ironically	   -­‐	  reconstituted	   as	   the	   Progressive	   Local	   Government	   Party;	   its	   aims	   of	   racial	  segregation	   and	   ‘European’	   control	   of	   the	   highlands	   remained	   the	   same.	   These	  right-­‐wing	   groups,	   however,	   never	   enjoyed	   the	   support	   of	   the	   majority	   of	  Europeans.	   The	   Progressive	   Local	   Government	   Party’s	   funds	   in	   January	   1959	  amounted	  to	  only	  three	  hundred	  shillings,	  and	  at	  the	  party’s	  annual	  conference	  two	  months	   later	   just	   eighty	   members	   attended.166	  In	   a	   speech	   to	   the	   members	   of	  Nakuru	  County	  Council	   in	  March	  1958,	  Havelock	  distanced	  himself	   from	  the	   ideas	  promoted	   by	   the	   PLGP.	   He	   stated	   that	   ‘some	   people	   in	   this	   country	   believe	   that	  local	  government	  and	  the	  development	  of	  it	  is	  a	  sort	  of	  cloak	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  provincial	  autonomy,	  or	  black	  and	  white	  states	  in	  Kenya.	  This	  is	  certainly	  not	  my	  idea.’167	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  A.	  B.	  Goord,	  ‘The	  development	  of	  the	  county	  system’,	  21	  July	  1954,	  JA/1/89,	  KNA,	  Nairobi.	  	  165	  Robert	  Maxon,	  ‘Constitution-­‐making	  in	  contemporary	  Kenya:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  twentieth	  century’,	  Kenya	  Studies	  Review,	  1:1	  (2009),	  pp.	  11–30.	  166	  Letter	  Director	  of	  Intelligence	  to	  Chief	  Secretary,	  6	  January	  1959;	  Letter	  ‘Annual	  Conference	  Progressive	  Local	  Government	  Party’,	  from	  Director	  of	  Intelligence	  to	  Chief	  Secretary,	  4	  March	  1959,	  FCO	  141/6649,	  TNA.	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  Speech	  by	  Wilfred	  Havelock	  to	  Nakuru	  County	  Council,	  22	  March	  1958,	  CO822/1630,	  TNA.	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   Yet	   according	   to	   Bethwell	   Ogot,	   ‘[b]y	   1960,	   the	   ‘white	   island’	   concept	   had	  been	   sold	   to	   some	   African	   leaders	   who	   renamed	   it	   ‘regionalism’	   or	  majimbo.’168	  Ogot’s	   analysis,	  which	   sees	   a	   direct	   link	  between	   settlers’	   plans	   in	   the	  1950s	   and	  African	  politicians’	  proposals	  after	  1960	   is	   too	  simplistic.	   Indeed	  highlighting,	  and	  arguably	   overstating,	   the	   connection	   between	   these	   two	   ideas	   was	   part	   of	   the	  KANU’s	  strategy	  in	  the	  early	  1960s	  for	  turning	  public	  opinion	  against	  the	  majimbo	  constitution.169	  As	   Robert	  Maxon	   argues,	   the	   proposals	   put	   forward	   by	   the	  KADU	  from	  1960	  were	  different	   from	   those	  of	   the	  Progressive	  Local	  Government	  Party,	  both	   in	   substance	   and	   intent.	   The	   first	   Lancaster	   House	   conference	   was	   held	   in	  January	   1960,	   which	   was	   attended	   by	   Michael	   Blundell	   of	   the	   multi-­‐racial	   New	  Kenya	  Group,	  and	  Ronald	  Ngala	  who	  led	  the	  delegation	  of	  African	  Elected	  Members.	  Regionalism	   was	   not	   discussed	   at	   the	   first	   conference,	   but	   the	   African	   Elected	  Members	   did	   raise	  with	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State,	   Iain	  Macleod,	   their	   concerns	   over	  local	  government:	  The	  African	  Members	  draw	  your	  attention	  to	  discrepancies	  existing	  in	  the	  development	  of	  local	  government	  in	  Kenya	  and	  especially	  the	  very	  blatant	  racism	   that	   seems	   to	   be	   the	   basis	   of	   present	   Government	   approach	   and	  policy.	  With	  the	  new	  changes	  now	  taking	  place	  local	  government,	  must	  not	  lag	  behind.	   In	   fact	  we	  believe	   that	   local	  government	  as	   the	   foundation	   for	  our	   future	  government	  should	  be	  very	  much	  ahead	   in	  positive	  and	   liberal	  development.	   We	   therefore	   demand	   the	   immediate	   review	   of	   local	  government	  structure	  and	  development	  in	  Kenya.170	  	   The	  negotiations	  in	  London	  had	  ‘sounded	  the	  death-­‐knell	  for	  multiracialism’	  and	   brought	   the	   prospect	   of	   Kenyan	   independence	   into	   clear	   view.171	  Yet	   at	   this	  point,	   the	   local	   government	   system	   was	   still	   essentially	   segregated	   by	   race,	   as	  Ngala’s	  note	   implied.	  Of	   the	  ninety-­‐one	  members	  of	   the	   five	  municipal	   councils	   in	  1960,	   there	  were	   only	   twelve	   African	  members,	   all	   of	   whom	  were	   nominated.172	  Compared	   to	   the	   membership	   of	   county	   councils,	   municipalities	   were	   far	   more	  representative.	  The	  seven	  county	  councils	  only	  had	  eleven	  African	  members	  out	  of	  a	   total	  of	  179.	  After	   the	  conference,	  both	  London	  and	  Nairobi	   initiated	  reviews	  of	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  Anderson,	  ‘Yours	  in	  struggle	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  African	  Elected	  Members	  delegation	  –	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  Gary	  Wasserman,	  ‘The	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  Journal	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  11:2	  (1973),	  pp.	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  From	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  Governor	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  SofS,	  telegram	  members	  of	  councils	  by	  communal	  groups,	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local	  government,	  each	  reaching	  rather	  different	  conclusions.	  To	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  the	   problem	   was	   ‘how,	   during	   the	   pre-­‐independence	   period,	   to	   set	   about	  eliminating	  discrimination	  from	  local	  government’.173	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  was	  hoped	  that	  moderate	   influences	   could	   be	  maintained	  which	  would	   help	   to	   avoid	   ‘merely	   the	  replacement	   of	   white	   by	   black	   supremacy’.174	  In	   Nairobi,	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Local	  Government	  approached	  the	  question	  differently.	  For	  them,	  the	  task	  was	  to	   find	  a	  way	  to	  manipulate	  the	  franchise	  and	  electoral	  boundaries	  favourably	  for	  European	  candidates,	   to	   ensure	   the	   maintenance	   of	   some	   European	   influence	   at	   the	   local	  level.175	  Officials	   in	   Nairobi	   approached	   the	   Colonial	   Local	   Government	   Advisory	  Panel	   for	   recommendations	   on	   how	   to	   get	   round	   ‘the	   problem	   of	   the	   basis	   of	  representation’.176	  This	   question	   was	   also	   put	   to	   local	   authorities	   in	   a	   circular	  which	  invited	  councils	  to	  express	  their	  views	  on	  the	  future	  reorganisation	  of	   local	  government.	   Goord	   responded	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   Association	   of	   Local	   Government	  Authorities	   of	   Kenya	   (ALGAK),	   a	   body	   established	   by	   councils	   to	   represent	   their	  interests.	  Goord	  rejected	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  Lancaster	  House	  (common	  roll)	  franchise,	  claiming	   that	   it	  would	   ‘kill	   local	   government	   stone	   dead.’177	  He	   argued	   that	   ‘local	  government	   has	   an	   administrative	   rather	   than	   a	   political	   function’,	   and	   that	  Africans	   could	   not	   yet	   be	   expected	   to	   responsibly	   manage	   these	   ‘administrative’	  institutions.178	  	   The	  flurry	  of	  local	  government	  memos	  and	  meetings	  that	  followed	  the	  first	  Lancaster	   House	   conference	   slowed	   down	   mid-­‐way	   through	   1960	   after	   the	  formation	   of	   two	   Kenya-­‐wide	   African	   nationalist	   parties	   KANU	   and	   KADU.	   From	  this	  point	  onwards,	  the	  issue	  of	  local	  government	  reform	  was	  not	  pursued	  by	  either	  party.	  Instead,	  negotiations	  between	  KANU,	  KADU,	  Nairobi	  and	  London	  focused	  on	  the	   transfer	   and	   constitution	   of	   the	   central	   government.	   Both	   parties	   were	  ‘coalitions	  of	  varied	  and	  diverse	  local	  politics’.179	  KANU	  was	  primarily	  composed	  of	  Kikuyu	   and	   Luo	   politicians,	  whilst	   KADU	   represented	   ‘minority’	   tribes	   in	   the	   Rift	  Valley	  and	  at	  the	  Coast.	  These	  ethnic	  blocs,	  David	  Anderson	  argues,	  ‘reflected	  a	  very	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significant	  divide	  in	  political	  ideology	  and	  practice’	  between	  different	  communities	  in	  Kenya.	  Specifically,	  supporters	  of	  KADU	  believed	  the	  ‘overwhelming	  political	  and	  economic	  power’	  of	  Kikuyu	  and	  Luo	  politicians	  would	   lead	  to	   the	  domination	  and	  oppression	   of	   smaller	   communities	   after	   independence.180	  To	   counter	   this,	   at	   the	  second	  Lancaster	  House	  conference	  which	  began	   in	  February	  1962,	  KADU,	   led	  by	  Ronald	   Ngala,	   proposed	   ‘decentralisation	   of	   power’	   or	   what	   became	   known	   as	  
majimboism,	  meaning	  regionalism.	  This	  plan,	  like	  those	  of	  the	  1950s	  was	  essentially	  ‘defensive’	   in	   nature.181	  KADU’s	   proposals	  were	   prepared	  with	   the	   support	   of	   the	  New	   Kenya	   Group’s	   ‘liberal’	   European	   politicians	   including	  Michael	   Blundell	   and	  Wilfred	  Havelock.182	  After	  seven	  weeks	  negotiating	  in	  London,	  KANU	  finally	  yielded	  with	  the	  broad	  substance	  of	  KADU’s	  majimbo	  plan,	  which	  consisted	  of	  a	  bicameral	  parliament,	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  seven	  decentralised	  regional	  bodies	  with	  legislative	  and	  executive	  powers.183	  Many	  of	  the	  details	  of	  the	  majimbo	  constitution	  were	  left	  to	  be	  filled	  in	  at	  a	  later	  date,	  but	  in	  practice,	  KANU	  remained	  staunchly	  opposed	  to	  any	  form	  of	  regionalism.184	  KANU	  won	  in	  a	  landslide	  in	  the	  elections	  of	  May	  1963,	  gaining	  eighty-­‐three	  seats	  to	  KADU’s	  thirty-­‐three.	  The	  third	  and	  final	  constitutional	  conference	   of	   October	   that	   year	   was	   arranged	   to	   ‘tie	   up	   loose-­‐ends	   and	   only	   to	  make	   modifications	   in	   the	   majimbo	   constitution	   where	   its	   implementation	   had	  been	   shown	   to	   be	   impractical.’185	  However,	   the	  KANU	  government,	   ‘backed	   by	   an	  impressive	   mandate’	   called	   on	   Secretary	   of	   State	   Duncan	   Sandys	   to	   make	   major	  changes	   to	   the	   majimbo	   model. 186 	  Sandys’	   support	   was	   not	   necessary;	   Jomo	  Kenyatta’s	   government	   encountered	   minimal	   political	   and	   popular	   opposition	  when	   it	   begun	   the	  process	  of	   reconstituting	  Kenya	   into	   a	  unitary	   state,	   as	  will	   be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  
Conclusion	  	  From	  1961	  onwards	   negotiations	   over	   the	  majimbo	  constitution	   eclipsed	  debates	  about	   local	   government.	   Discussions	   about	   local	   authorities	   however,	   continued	  amongst	   a	   core	   group	   of	   officials	   in	   Nairobi	   and	   London.	   Yet	   the	   review	   of	   local	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government	  proved	  so	  contentious	  that	  it	  was	  not	  until	  April	  1963,	  a	  month	  before	  the	  general	  elections,	  that	  the	  government	  published	  legislation	  removing	  the	  racial	  bars	  that	  separated	  the	  three	  local	  government	  streams.187	  	  	   The	   fact	   that	   the	   local	   government	   system	   had	  managed	   to	  withstand	   the	  ‘winds	  of	  change’	  longer	  than	  most	  other	  arms	  of	  government	  was	  ironic	  given	  the	  explicitly	   liberal	   motivations	   that	   had	   underpinned	   the	   programme	   of	   post-­‐war	  reforms.	   From	   the	   mid	   1940s,	   Kenya	   was	   at	   the	   forefront	   of	   a	   process	   of	   local	  government	   reform	   driven	   to	   a	   large	   degree	   by	   new	   ideas	   circulating	   in	   the	  metropole.	  The	  idea	  that	  ‘development’	  and	  training	  in	  citizenship	  could	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	   through	   local	   authorities	  was	   vigorously	   promoted	   from	   London.	   In	   Kenya,	  whilst	   administrators	   tasked	   with	   modernising	   African	   councils	   may	   not	   have	  chosen	   to	   see	   this	   process	   as	   part	   of	   an	   evolution	   towards	   self-­‐government,	   this	  conservatism	  did	  not	  prevent	   local	  authorities	   in	  African	  areas	   from	  advancing	   in	  the	  1950s,	  becoming	  more	  sophisticated	  and	  fiscally	  important.	  The	  progress	  made	  in	  developing	   the	   local	   government	   system	  was	   celebrated	   in	  a	   training	  guide	   for	  councillors	  published	   in	  1955.	   It	  concluded:	   ‘You	  have	  been	  privileged	  to	  see	  how	  African	  District	   Councils	   have	   grown	   from	   the	   early	   gatherings	   of	   old	  men	  under	  the	  trees.	   If	   they	  are	  well	  and	  wisely	  directed,	  as	   there	   is	  every	  hope	  they	  will	  be,	  they	  have	  the	  prospects	  of	  a	  glorious	  future.’188	  	  	   But	   this	   ‘glorious	   future’,	   as	   the	   last	   section	   of	   the	   chapter	   discussed,	  was	  derailed	   by	   the	   Emergency	   which	   empowered	   the	   administration,	   took	   policy	  attention	   away	   from	   local	   government	   and	   deepened	   colonial	   suspicions	   of	   the	  African	  entrepreneur	  and	  local	  politicians	  who	  were,	  potentially,	  the	  natural	  allies	  of	   councils.	   This,	   the	   entrenched	   power	   of	   settlers	   in	   county	   councils,	   and	  ambivalence	  over	  municipal	  authorities	  meant	  that	  by	  the	  late	  1950s,	  progress	  had	  stalled.	  African	  politicians’	  interest	  in	  local	  government	  effectively	  ended	  when	  the	  British	  government	  committed	  to	  Kenyan	  independence	  in	  1960.	  The	  new	  regional	  governments	  created	  by	  the	  majimbo	  constitution	  meant	  that	  when	  Kenya	  became	  independent,	   local	   authorities	  were	   in	   a	   state	   of	   confusion.	  These	  bodies	   –	  which	  had	  been	  created	  to	  be	  the	  centrepiece	  of	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  governance	  –	  had	  a	  mixed	  record	   across	   the	   country.	   In	   some	   regions,	   councils	   had	   for	   decades	   played	  increasingly	  important	  roles	  as	  service	  providers.	  Furthermore,	  these	  councils	  had	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contributed	   -­‐	   through	   regular	   ‘elections’	   -­‐	   to	   the	   development	   of	   particular	   ideas	  and	   expectations	   of	   government	   institutions	   and	   political	   leaders.	   Yet	   in	   some	  regions,	   including	   in	   former	   ‘settled	  districts’,	   such	   legacies	  were	  weak	  or	  absent.	  Ahead	  of	  the	  local	  government	  elections	  of	  August	  1963,	  one	  regional	  government	  agent	  wrote	  to	  his	  assistants	  that	  it	  was	  ‘most	  unlikely	  that	  prospective	  candidates	  will	  have	  any	  idea	  what	  these	  elections	  are	  all	  about’.189	  The	  next	  chapter	  considers	  whether	   this	  assessment	  bore	  any	   truth	  by	  examining	  how	  councillors	  positioned	  themselves	  and	  understood	  their	  roles	  during	   the	   first	  parliament	  of	   independent	  Kenya.	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Chapter	  Two:	  ‘Pay	  tax	  to	  protect	  freedom’:	  County	  councils	  after	  independence,	  1963-­‐1967	  	  Now,	  this	  is	  tough.	  I	  know,	  but	  it	   is	  necessary.	  We	  have	  tried	  publicity,	  we	  have	  tried	  persuasion,	  we	  have	  tried	  appeals	  and	  I	  have	  already	  indicated	  what	  a	  low	  proportion	  of	  people	  have	  paid	  their	  tax.1	  	  
Introduction	  	  This	  chapter	  considers	  how	  debate	  about	  local	  government	  changed	  in	  the	  first	  five	  years	   of	   independence.	   Whilst	   the	   fifteen	   years	   preceding	   1963	   had	   seen	   the	  colonial	   government	   –	   at	   the	   behest	   of	   London	   –	   attempt	   to	   apply	   ‘English	   local	  government	   principles’	   in	   Kenya;	   this	   project	   had	   been	   thrown	   into	   a	   state	   of	  confusion	   by	   the	   passage	   of	   an	   independence	   constitution	   which	   created	   new	  middle-­‐tier	   regional	   authorities	   responsible	   for	   local	   government.	   A	   further	  complication	   arose	   from	   the	   difficulty	   departing	   colonial	   officials	   encountered	   in	  their	   attempts	   to	   reform	   the	   racially	   segregated	   local	   government	   system	  whilst	  still	  maintaining	  a	  place	  for	  various	  kinds	  of	  ‘moderates’	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  It	  was	  in	  the	  context	  of	   these	   two	  concurrent	  processes	   that	   -­‐	  a	  month	  before	   internal	  self-­‐government	  began	  -­‐	  the	  Daily	  Nation	  published	  an	  article	  expressing	  concern	  over	  the	  future	  of	  local	  government:	  	  Regulations	   for	   the	   establishment	   of	   local	   government	   in	   an	   independent	  Kenya	  were	  published	  this	  week,	  nearly	  two	  years	  after	  the	  problems	  that	  will	   arise	   from	   changed	   conditions	   were	   first	   debated	   in	   the	   Legislative	  Council…This	   set	   of	   regulations	  might	   be	   called	   the	   “Ideal	   Guide	   to	   Local	  Government.”	  It	  is.	  And	  only	  one	  question	  hangs	  over	  it:	  Will	  it	  work?2	  	   The	  article	  suggested	  that	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  posed	  would	  depend	  on	   the	   kind	   of	   relationship	   that	   developed	   between	   local	   authorities,	   regional	  governments	  and	  the	  national	  government.	  Yet	  just	  over	  a	  year	  after	  the	  article	  was	  published,	   Kenyatta	   announced	   his	   intention	   to	   disband	   regional	   authorities	   and	  introduce	   a	   republic.3	  By	   December	   of	   1964	   that	   process	   was	   complete.	   Local	  authorities	   however,	   survived	   and	   they	   remained	   responsible	   for	   important	  government	   services	   including	   primary	   education,	   primary	   healthcare,	   and	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secondary	  roads.	  That	  councils	  were	  not	  dealt	  the	  same	  fatal	  blow	  was	  not	  a	  sign	  of	  the	   government’s	   confidence	   in	   and	   commitment	   to	   local	   government.	   As	   this	  chapter	   will	   show,	   the	   central	   government	   and	   in	   particular	   the	   provincial	  administration,	   appears	   to	   have	   been	   profoundly	   ambivalent	   about	   the	   kinds	   of	  people	   that	   local	   government	   empowered,	   and	   the	   sorts	   of	   demands	   they	   were	  prone	   to	   making.	   Through	   exploring	   the	   profile	   and	   political	   expectations	   of	  councillors,	   this	   chapter	   offers	   an	   alternative	  way	   of	   framing	   the	   question	   ‘will	   it	  work?’,	  by	  suggesting	   that	  as	  much	  attention	  must	  be	  devoted	   to	   the	   idea	  of	   local	  government	   as	   to	   its	   institutions	   and,	   importantly,	   how	   these	   changed	   after	  independence.	   It	   argues	   that	   only	   by	   attending	   to	   both	   aspects	   is	   it	   possible	   to	  understand	  why	  the	  performance	  of	  local	  authorities,	  in	  terms	  of	  service	  provision,	  declined	   so	   noticeably	   between	   1963	   and	   1969.	   The	   financial	   difficulties	  experienced	   by	   many	   councils	   after	   independence	   can	   be	   explained	   both	   by	   the	  institutional	  changes	  brought	  about	   in	  1963,	  and	  by	  the	  particular	  expectations	  of	  local	  government	  office	  held	  by	  the	  councillors	  of	  1963	  and	  those	  they	  represented.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  struggles	  taking	  place	  in	  local	  authorities	  provide	  further	  evidence	  to	  support	  James	  Giblin’s	  argument	  that	   ‘this	  period	  of	  transition	  was	  experienced	  as	   a	   complex	  mixture	   of	   both	   compliance	   and	  dissent,	   exultation	   in	   new	   freedom	  
and	  dissidence’.4	  	  	   By	  beginning	  this	  chapter	  in	  1963	  there	  is	  a	  danger	  of	  overstating	  the	  extent	  to	   which	   independence	   constituted	   a	   watershed	   moment.	   In	   line	   with	   recent	  scholarship,	   this	   chapter	   recognises	   the	   important	   continuities	   in	   terms	   of	   state	  action	  and	  ideology,	  before	  and	  after	  independence.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  period	  from	  the	  1940s	   to	   the	   1970s,	   are	   ‘taking	   shape	   in	   a	   number	   of	   accounts	   as	   a	   single,	  continuous	   era	   characterised	   above	   all	   by	   an	   official	   creed	   of	  modernisation	   and	  development’.5	  Yet	   this	   ‘official	   creed’	   was	   also	   confronted	   with	   the	   challenge	   of	  having	  to	  meet	  or	  manage	  ‘the	  expectations	  of	  independence’.6	  Writing	  in	  reference	  to	   Zambia,	   Giacomo	   Macola	   characterises	   these	   expectations	   as	   ‘fundamentally	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acquisitive’.7	  Demands	   for	   employment,	   education,	   and	   an	   end	   to	   taxation	   were	  commonly	   placed	   upon	   the	   new	   independent	   governments,	   and	   as	   Frederick	  Cooper	  notes,	  being	  ‘simultaneously	  developmentalist-­‐interventionist	  and	  populist-­‐clientelist’	   proved	   a	   difficult	   tight-­‐rope	   for	  many	   African	   governments	   to	  walk	   in	  the	  1960s.8	  In	  neighbouring	  Tanzania,	  Julius	  Nyerere	  ‘worked	  hard	  to	  reframe	  such	  expectations	   [of	  uhuru]	   in	   terms	  which	   emphasised	   that	   such	   changes	  would	   not	  appear	  overnight,	  and	  rather	  than	  stress	  uhuru	  alone,	  Nyerere,	  TANU	  [Tanganyika	  African	   National	   Union]	   and	   local	   officials	   began	   to	   emphasize	   uhuru	   na	   jasho,	  freedom	  and	  work.’9	  	  	   In	   Kenya,	   the	   new	   KANU	   government	   faced	   similar	   challenges. 10 	  The	  provincial	   headquarters	   in	   Mombasa,	   built	   after	   independence,	   had	   the	   words	  ‘uhuru	   na	   kazi’,	   freedom	   and	   work,	   spelt	   out	   on	   its	   roof.	   Like	   Nyerere,	   Jomo	  Kenyatta	  fought	  hard	  to	  counter	  the	  impression	  that	  ‘freedom’	  meant	  ‘free	  things’.11	  As	   Daniel	   Branch	   notes,	   this	   was	   both	   out	   of	   pragmatism	   and	   ideology.12	  For	  Kenyatta,	   ‘development’	   was	   best	   achieved	   through	   ‘the	   virtues	   of	   discipline	   and	  productive	  labour’.13	  This	  was	  the	  message	  he	  espoused	  to	  Mau	  Mau	  veterans	  who	  had	   fought	   for	   ‘land	  and	   freedom’	   a	  decade	  earlier.	   Yet	   this	  message	  was	  directly	  challenged	   in	   1966	   when	   Oginga	   Odinga	   broke	   from	   the	   party	   and	   formed	   the	  Kenya	   People’s	   Union	   (KPU).	   KPU	   built	   support	   for	   its	   redistributive	   agenda	   by	  condemning	   the	   government’s	   treatment	   of	   Mau	   Mau	   veterans.	   Odinga	   who	   had	  served	   as	   Kenyatta’s	  Minister	   for	   Home	  Affairs	   in	   1963-­‐64	   and	   Vice	   President	   in	  1964-­‐66,	   published	   his	   autobiography	   Not	   Yet	   Uhuru	   in	   1967.	   In	   it	   he	   recalled	  touring	   the	  country	   in	   the	   first	  year	  of	   independence	   to	  counter	   the	  view	  held	  by	  ‘[s]ome	  people	  in	  the	  villages	  …	  that	  there	  was	  lots	  of	  money	  in	  the	  bank	  and	  Kenya	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would	   give	   it	   all	   to	   us’.14	  But	   after	   several	   years	   of	   KANU	   rule,	   Odinga	   concluded	  that	  ‘the	  people’	  were	  right	  in	  beginning	  ‘to	  wonder	  the	  meaning	  of	  uhuru’.15	  	  	   This	  chapter	  considers	  how	  such	  wondering	  played	  out	  in	  local	  government	  offices	   in	   the	   1960s.	   The	   debates	   that	   took	   place	   in	  Kenya’s	   county	   halls	   and	   the	  struggles	  that	  went	  on	  around	  them	  in	  the	  1960s	  shed	  light	  on	  a	  historical	  moment	  ‘when	   the	   meaning	   and	   limits	   of	   freedom	   were	   not	   yet	   fixed’.16 	  Through	   an	  examination	   of	   Kilifi	   and	   Kakamega	   county	   councils	   and	   the	   proceedings	   of	   a	  national	  commission	  of	  inquiry	  held	  in	  1966	  into	  local	  government,	  it	  is	  shown	  that	  the	  immediate	  post-­‐independence	  period	  was	  marked	  by	  considerable	  contestation	  over	   the	   meaning	   and	   means	   by	   which	   ‘freedom’	   and	   ‘development’	   would	   be	  realised.	   In	  Central	  Province	  and	  the	  Rift	  Valley	  such	  contestations	  centred	  on	  the	  question	  of	  land;	  but	  in	  local	  authorities	  across	  Kenya,	  taxation	  was	  the	  focal	  point.	  	  	   The	   main	   sources	   of	   revenue	   for	   county	   councils	   in	   this	   period	   were	  Graduated	  Personal	  Tax	  (GPT)	  –	  a	  progressive	  form	  of	  direct	  taxation	  introduced	  at	  the	   start	   of	   1964	   to	   replace	   the	   poll	   tax	   –	   and	   government	   grants.	   Councils	   both	  struggled	  and	  were	  reluctant	  to	  collect	  GPT,	  and	  expected	  the	  central	  government	  to	   provide	   funds	   which	   would	   make	   up	   the	   shortfall	   in	   councils’	   budgets,	   and	  ensure	  the	  rapid	  expansion	  of	   local	  services.	  This	  expectation	  was	  rebuffed	  by	  the	  establishment.	   In	   July	   1963	   –	   a	  month	   after	   internal	   self-­‐government	   began	   -­‐	   the	  
Daily	  Nation	  reported	  that	  it	  was:	  	  time	   the	   laggards	   who	   have	   not	   paid	   rates	   awakened	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  “freedom”	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  all	  things	  are	  “free,	  gratis	  and	  for	  nothing.”	  It	  is	   time	  that	   they	  pulled	  their	  weight,	  heeded	  the	  pleas	  of	   the	  Government	  and	  accepted	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  Uhuru.17	  	  At	   first,	   the	  government	   tried	   to	   frame	  the	  message	   in	  a	  way	  that	  appealed	  to	   the	  public.	  Provincial	   commissioners	  were	   instructed	   in	  December	  1963	   to	  distribute	  pamphlets	  reading	   ‘lipa	  ushuru	  kuchunga	  uhuru’:	  pay	   tax	   to	  protect	   freedom.18	  Yet	  despite	   the	   propaganda,	   Kenya’s	   councillors	   still	   attempted	   to	   renegotiate	   the	  terms	  of	  uhuru	   by	   challenging	   the	   imperative	  of	   tax	   collection.	  The	   independence	  constitution	   had	   contributed	   to	   a	   feeling	   amongst	   councillors	   that	   they	   had	   the	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authority	   and	   power	   to	   contest	   government	   directives.	   They	   quickly	   discovered	  however,	   that	   that	   the	  new	  administration	  had	  no	   intention	  of	  empowering	   these	  voices	  of	  the	  grassroots.	  	  	   The	   tension	   between	   local	   authorities	   and	   the	   central	   government	   that	  emerged	  during	  this	  period,	  and	  the	  cautious	  way	  -­‐	  at	  least	  compared	  to	  later	  years	  -­‐	   in	   which	   the	   government	   asserted	   its	   authority	   over	   councils	   reveals	   an	  uncertainty	  about	  state	   legitimacy	  that	  rarely	  features	  in	  accounts	  of	  the	  Kenyatta	  state.	   This	   has	   important	   implications	   for	   academic	   understandings	   of	   broader	  processes	  of	  political	  change	  taking	  place	  in	  many	  other	  African	  states	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	   early	   1970s.	   The	   significance	   of	   such	   localised	   debates	   about	   the	   nature	   of	  political	   legitimacy	   have	   not	   been	   routinely	   incorporated	   into	   scholarship	   on	   the	  emergence	  of	  ‘centralised-­‐bureaucratic’	  regimes	  in	  Africa.	  As	  Emma	  Hunter	  writes,	  the	   insights	   of	   ‘intellectual	   history	   from	   below’	   have	   ‘remained	   largely	   separate	  from	  the	  concerns	  which	  animate	  political	  historians	  and	  social	  scientists	  such	  as,	  crucially	  the	  political	  transition	  from	  colony	  to	  independent	  state	  and	  questions	  of	  political	  legitimacy	  within	  these	  two	  state	  formations’.19	  Yet	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  why	   the	   powers	   of	   local	   government	  were	   so	   dramatically	   curtailed	   in	   late	   1969	  (discussed	   in	   the	   next	   chapter)	   it	   is	   essential	   to	   look	   beyond	   a	   generalised	   trend	  towards	   centralisation,	   by	   probing	   the	   deeper	   challenge	   being	   posed	   by	   locally	  elected	   leaders	   who	   articulated	   a	   vision	   for	   an	   alternative	   political	   settlement	  which	   undermined	   the	   principles	   that	   both	   the	   colonial	   and	   post-­‐colonial	  governments	  had	  so	  desperately	  sought	  to	  instil.	  	  	   Public	   debate	   on	   local	   government	   in	   the	   1960s	   –	   and	   indeed	   in	   the	  following	   decades	   -­‐	   centred	   on	   questioning	   the	   quality,	   capacity	   and	   integrity	   of	  councillors	   themselves.	   In	   light	   of	   this,	   the	   chapter	   begins	   by	   looking	   at	   the	   lives	  and	  ideas	  of	  two	  councillors	  who	  served	  on	  Kilifi	  County	  Council	  during	  this	  period.	  Their	  contrasting	  perspectives	  offer	  a	  vivid	  illustration	  of	  some	  of	  the	  tensions	  that	  arose	   in	   the	   immediate	   post-­‐independence	   period.	   This	   section	   also	   looks	   at	   a	  series	   of	   struggles	   that	   Kilifi	   County	   Council	   engaged	   in	   with	   the	   central	  government,	   and	   internally,	   during	   its	   first	   few	   years,	   and	   considers	   what	   these	  reveal	   about	   councillors’	   expectations	  of	   independence.	   Shifting	   to	  Kakamega,	   the	  next	   section	   examines	   the	   difficulties	   the	   council	   encountered	   collecting	   GPT	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  Emma	  Hunter,	  Political	  Thought	  and	  the	  Public	  Sphere	  in	  Tanzania:	  Freedom,	  Democracy	  
and	  Citizenship	  in	  the	  Era	  of	  Decolonization	  (New	  York,	  2015),	  p.	  7.	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between	  1963-­‐65.	  Within	  a	   few	  short	  years,	  Kakamega	  County	  Council	  went	   from	  being	   one	   of	   the	   wealthiest	   local	   authorities	   in	   the	   country	   to	   bankruptcy.	   The	  different	   explanations	   of	   this	   offered	   by	   the	   council	   and	   the	   government	   are	  explored	   before	   the	   chapter	   turns	   to	   considering	   broader	   national	   trends	   which	  came	   to	   light	   through	   the	   1966	   Commission	   of	   Inquiry	   into	   Local	   Government,	  headed	  by	  Walter	  Hardacre,	  a	  local	  government	  official	  from	  Britain.	  The	  divergent	  views	   expressed	   in	   the	   evidence	   and	   proceedings	   of	   the	   Hardacre	   commission	  reveal	   that	  whilst	   the	   colonial	  model	   of	   local	   government	   continued	   to	   appeal	   to	  many	   in	   Kenya,	   the	   precise	   role	   of	   councils	   and	   the	   principles	   underpinning	   the	  system	  were	  being	   fundamentally	  questioned	  by	   some	  at	   this	   time.	  The	   report	   of	  the	  commission	  eventually	  led	  to	  the	  drafting	  and	  adoption	  of	  Sessional	  Paper	  No.	  12	  in	  1967.	  This	  formal	  policy	  paper	  recognised	  that	  local	  authorities	  had	  a	  part	  to	  play	   in	   maintaining	   the	   government’s	   legitimacy.	   Yet	   this	   rhetorical	   support	   for	  local	   government	   did	   not	   lead	   to	   the	   introduction	   of	   substantive	   institutional	  reforms.	  Nevertheless,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  1967,	  the	  future	  for	  local	  authorities	  in	  Kenya	  remained	  open	  and	  broadly	  optimistic.	  	  
‘Everything	  was	  going	  back	  to	  that	  tax’:	  Kilifi	  County	  Council,	  1963-­‐64	  At	  the	  first	  substantive	  meeting	  of	  Kilifi	  County	  Council,	  held	  on	  the	  last	  day	  of	  1963,	  the	   regional	   government	   agent	   (who	   was	   the	   former	   district	   commissioner	  restyled)	   informed	   the	  members	   that	   the	  budget	   estimates	   for	   the	  1964	   financial	  year	  forecast	  a	  deficit	  of	  K£5,853.20	  After	  approving	  the	  estimates,	  Councillor	  Binns	  proposed	   that	   a	   request	   be	   submitted	   to	   the	   regional	   assembly	   ‘to	   appoint	   a	  committee	   of	   enquiry	   into	   the	   administration	   and	   workings	   of	   the	   late	   African	  District	   Council	   for	   the	   past	   five	   years’.21	  The	   minutes	   record	   that	   the	   members	  were	   ‘very	  much	  perturbed	   in	   the	   administration,	   collection	   of	   taxes,	   supervision	  and	  security	  of	  council’s	  finances	  and	  expenditures’	  under	  the	  former	  ADC.	  22	  Even	  after	   the	   regional	   government	   agent	   informed	   the	   council	   that	   an	   auditor	   at	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Local	   Government	  would	   have	   overseen	   the	   council’s	   finances	   during	  that	  period,	   the	  council	   insisted	  that	   their	  recommendation	  be	  put	   to	   the	  regional	  assembly	   regardless.	   Throughout	   the	   meeting,	   the	   councillors	   exhibited	   a	  confidence	   and	   belief	   in	   their	   own	   authority	   that	   stood	   in	   stark	   contrast	   to	   their	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  Full	  council	  minutes,	  KCC,	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ADC	   predecessors.	   They	   rejected	   a	   legal	   notice	   that	   outlined	   new	   tembo	   (palm	  wine)	   tapping	   fees,	   deciding	   unilaterally	   to	   keep	   the	   fees	   as	   they	   were.	   They	  vociferously	  objected	  to	  the	  regional	  government	  agent’s	  proposal	  to	  write	  a	  letter	  to	   the	   chiefs,	   copying	   in	   councillors,	   instructing	   them	   to	   arrange	   local	   baraza	  (public	  meetings)	   to	   nominate	  members	   for	   local	   assessment	   committees	   for	   the	  new	   Graduated	   Personal	   Tax,	   insisting	   instead	   that	   the	   letters	   be	   addressed	   to	  councillors,	  as	  ‘the	  inhabitants	  had	  lost	  their	  confidence	  in	  their	  chiefs’.23	  	  	   The	   decisions	   reached	   by	   the	   council,	   and	   the	   defiant	   way	   in	   which	   they	  were	   expressed,	   reveals	   how	   much	   faith	   was	   placed	   in	   the	   independence	  constitution	   by	   these	   councillors	   who	   were	   elected	   by	   a	   largely-­‐KADU	   voting	  populace.	   For	   them,	   majimbo	   meant	   that	   locally	   elected	   politicians	   had	   been	  anointed	  with	  the	  authority	  to	  override	  decisions	  of	  civil	  servants	  and	  the	  national	  government	  alike.	  Yet	  the	  councillors	  soon	  discovered	  that	  this	  view	  was	  not	  widely	  shared.	  At	  a	  meeting	  of	   the	  council	   in	   June	  1964,	  councillors	   ‘complained	  bitterly’	  about	  two	  instances	  when	  council	  staff	  had	  refused	  the	  requests	  of	  councillors.24	  In	  one	  case	  the	  offended	  councillor	  had	  telephoned	  the	  president	  of	  the	  coast	  region	  –	  Ronald	  Ngala	  –	  to	  complain	  about	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  assistant	  clerk.	  In	  the	  other,	  it	   was	   actually	   the	  wife	   of	   an	   employee	   (the	   treasurer)	   who	   had	   refused	   to	   give	  councillors	   staying	   at	   the	   council	   rest	   house	   the	   ‘key	   for	   the	   lavatories’.25	  On	  account	   of	   this,	   the	   council	   resolved	   to	   form	   a	   sub-­‐committee	   to	   look	   into	   the	  treasurer’s	   case,	   ‘while	   bearing	   in	  mind	   that	   the	   council	  was	   not	   in	   favour	   of	   the	  treasurer	  to	  remain	  in	  employment’.26	  All	  in	  all,	  the	  members	  agreed	  ‘that	  in	  future,	  any	  council	  employee	  who	  defies	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  councillors	  or	  shows	  that	  he	  is	  unreasonably	   insubordinate	   should	   be	   liable	   to	   immediate	   dismissal’. 27 	  These	  seemingly	   minor	   instances	   of	   ‘insubordination’	   and	   the	   enraged	   responses	   these	  elicited	   from	   councillors	   revealed	   a	   growing	   anxiety	   in	   1963-­‐64	   amongst	   Kilifi’s	  councillors	   that	   their	  new	  elected	  offices	  did	  not	   carry	   the	   same	  standing	  as	   they	  had	   expected.	   Examining	   in	   greater	   detail	   the	   views	   of	   two	  Kilifi	   councillors	  who	  served	   in	   the	   1960s	   provides	   a	   means	   for	   reflecting	   on	   the	   expectations	   of	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  Special	  meeting	  minutes,	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councillors;	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   they	   conformed	   to	   the	   colonial	   vision	   of	   model	  councillors;	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  councillors	  carried	  their	  own	  ideas	  of	  what	  local	  government	  service	  entailed.	  	  	   Born	  in	  1926,	  Pekeshe	  Ndeje’s	  association	  with	  the	  council	  began	  as	  a	  young	  man.	  After	  a	  short	  spell	  at	  a	  village	  school,	  he	  acquired	  a	  position	  as	  an	  askari	  (tribal	  policeman)	  with	  the	  Giriama	  Local	  Native	  Council,	  and	  was	  responsible	  for	  assisting	  the	  chief	   in	  tax	  collection.	  With	  his	  government	  salary	  he	  found	  himself	  able,	  aged	  twenty-­‐five,	  to	  build	  a	  house	  and	  open	  a	  shop	  in	  Rabai.	  In	  1951	  he	  was	  nominated	  to	   the	   local	   native	   council,	   and	   was	   re-­‐elected	   at	   independence,	   where	   he	  represented	  Ruruma	  ward	  for	  a	  further	  ten	  years.	  Ndeje’s	  reflections	  on	  his	  time	  at	  the	   council;	   his	   views	   on	   taxation;	   and	   the	   council’s	   ‘development’	   record	   are	   in	  some	  ways	   contradictory,	   and	   reveal	   the	   ambivalent	   position	   held	   by	   councillors	  who	   straddled	   the	   colonial/post-­‐colonial	   divide.	   A	   staunch	   critic	   of	   the	   colonial	  state,	   Ndeje	   nonetheless	   collaborated	   in	   multiple	   ways	   with	   the	   colonial	  government,	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  extracted	  opportunities	  that	  served	  to	  distinguish	  him	  from	  those	  he	  represented.	  He	  was	  exposed	   to	   the	  principles	  of	   local	  government	  finance	  but	  these	  did	  not	  transform	  his	  worldview.	  The	  council	  offered	  him	  a	  way	  to	  better	  himself,	  and	  he	  expected	   it	   to	  serve	  the	  same	  purpose	   for	   the	  people	  of	  his	  location.	  	  	   In	   explaining	   why	   he	   joined	   the	   council,	   Ndeje	   recalled	   the	   ambitions	   he	  held	  -­‐	  for	  himself	  and	  his	  community	  –	  as	  a	  young	  man.	  Specifically,	  he	  remembered	  his	  reaction	  to	  witnessing	  life	  in	  Mombasa	  compared	  to	  Kilifi	  as	  a	  boy,	  thinking:	  	  Why,	  when	  I	  visit	  Mombasa	  do	  I	  see	  people	  smartly	  dressed,	  and	  at	  our	  place	  we	  are	  still	  wrapping	  ourselves	  in	  cloths,	  and	  I	  don’t	  even	  have	  a	  shirt?	  I	  was	  walking	  half	  naked.	  That	  was	  my	  jealousy.	  I	  said,	  what	  can	  we	  do,	  so	  that	  we	  can	  get	  to	  be	  like	  that.28	  	  His	  first	  step	  towards	  realising	  these	  ambitions	  came	  with	  his	  job	  at	  the	  council	  as	  an	  askari.	  Tax	  collectors	  often	  resorted	  to	  violent	  and	  coercive	  methods,	  physically	  taking	   people	   to	   be	   registered	   at	   the	   chief’s	   hut,	   and	   forcibly	   detaining	   tax	  evaders.29	  His	  nomination	  to	  the	  LNC	  suggests	  he	  served	  with	  sufficient	  zeal	  to	  win	  the	  district	   commissioner’s	   approval.	   Yet	  when	  he	   reflected	  on	   this	  period	  nearly	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  Pekeshe	  Ndeje,	  interview,	  23	  January	  2013,	  Ruruma	  (held	  in	  KiGiriama).	  	  	  29	  Tarus,	  ‘A	  history	  of	  the	  direct	  taxation'.	  
	  	  
82	  
sixty	  years	   later,	  he	   said	   it	  was	  becoming	  a	   councillor	   that	  made	  him	  realise	  how	  unsatisfactory	  the	  tax	  system	  was:	  Colonial	  government	  denied	  us	  many	  of	  our	  rights	  and	  we	  used	  to	  oppose	  that.	  On	  the	  issue	  of	  rate	  collections,	  a	  lot	  of	  money	  was	  collected	  and	  lots	  of	  it	  went	  to	  the	  central	  government	  side	  and	  we	  were	  left	  with	  very	  little.	  Out	   of	   say	   13-­‐15	   or	   so	   shillings	   collected,	   we	   were	   left	   with	   about	   3	  shillings.30	  	   He	   anticipated	   that	   independence	   would	   provide	   the	   change	   needed	   to	  enable	  him	  and	  his	  fellow	  councillors	  to	  play	  a	  more	  effective	  part	  in	  the	  district’s	  ‘development’,	   by	   using	   a	   higher	   proportion	   of	   the	   council’s	   revenue	   on	   the	  provision	  of	  material	  infrastructure.	  It	  was	  assumed	  that	  with	  an	  African	  chairman	  and	   African	   district	   commissioner	   there	   would	   be	   nothing	   to	   stop	   Kilifi	   from	  ‘developing’.	   However,	   two	   weeks	   before	   internal-­‐self-­‐government	   began,	   an	  extraordinary	  meeting	  was	  called	  to	  discuss	  the	  council’s	  finances.31	  On	  receiving	  a	  letter	   from	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Local	   Government,	   the	   chairman	   informed	   the	   council	  that	  out	  of	  30,000	  eligible	  rate	  payers	  in	  the	  district	  only	  2,456	  had	  paid	  that	  year.32	  The	   situation	   required	   both	   an	   aggressive	   programme	   of	   cuts,	   and	   a	   concerted	  effort	  to	  collect	  rates.	  The	  district	  commissioner	  told	  the	  members	  that	   ‘it	  was	  the	  duty	   of	   every	   councillor	   to	   persuade	   his	   people	   to	   pay	   ADC	   rates	   if	   they	  wanted	  services	  to	  continue.	  This	  responsibility	  should	  not	  be	  left	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  chiefs	  alone.’33 	  Three	   weeks	   later,	   an	   executive	   committee	   of	   the	   council	   agreed	   to	  implement	  a	  range	  of	  austerity	  measures	  recommended	  by	  the	  ministry	   including	  slashing	   the	   education	   budget	   to	  K£3,000	   and	   closing	   four	   dispensaries.34	  Then	   a	  month	   later,	   three	   hundred	   teachers	   in	   the	   district	   were	   served	   their	   notice.	  Commenting	   on	   the	   story,	   the	   Daily	   Nation	   laid	   the	   blame	   squarely	   on	   the	  taxpayers:	   ‘By	   cutting	   services,	   the	   county	   councils	   have	   provided	   undeniable	  evidence	  that	  the	  people	  just	  do	  not	  care.	  Apparently	  they	  are	  prepared	  to	  see	  the	  closing	  of	  dispensaries	  and	  health	  services	  provided	  for	  their	  benefit.	  And,	  above	  all,	  they	   apparently	   are	   prepared	   to	   see	   the	   end	   of	   educational	   progress	   for	   their	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  Pekeshe	  Ndeje,	  interview,	  23	  January	  2013	  Ruruma	  (KiGiriama).	  31	  Extraordinary	  meeting	  minutes,	  KCC,	  15	  May	  1963,	  Kilifi	  County	  Government	  Archive,	  uncatalogued.	  	  	  32	  Ibid.	  	  33	  Ibid.	  	  	  	  	  34	  Executive	  committee	  meeting	  minutes,	  KCC,	  8	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  1963,	  Kilifi	  County	  Government	  Archive.	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children.’35	  In	   the	   following	  months,	   the	  political	   and	  administrative	   class	   of	  Kilifi	  ‘went	  out	  of	  their	  way	  to	  persuade	  people	  to	  pay’	  according	  to	  council	  chairman	  H.	  G.	  S.	  Harrison.36	  Their	  efforts	  paid	  off;	  August	  saw	  the	  highest	  tax	  collection	  in	  the	  district	  for	  the	  year.37	  	   The	   councillors	   making	   these	   difficult	   decisions	   were	   not	   the	   same	   ones	  who	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year	  were	  acting	  so	  defiantly.	  The	  local	  government	  elections	  took	  place	  in	  August	  1963:	  out	  of	  the	  ADC’s	  forty-­‐four	  members	  only	  seven	  were	  re-­‐elected	   to	   serve	   on	   the	   new	   twenty-­‐eight	   member	   county	   council. 38 	  These	  councillors	  were	   less	   enthusiastic	   about	   the	   imperative	   of	   tax-­‐collection.	   Pekeshe	  Ndeje	   quickly	   became	   disillusioned	   with	   the	   council’s	   fiscal	   policies,	   which	   went	  against	  what	  he	  had	  expected	  of	  independence:	  	  	  there	   was	   exploitation	   of	   our	   people.	   They	   could	   not	   enjoy	   their	   crops	  directly.	   They	   paid	   taxes,	   the	   tappers	  who	   brought	   down	   the	   palm	  wine,	  they	  paid	  tax.	  It	  came	  so	  that	  even	  when	  you	  sold	  your	  maize,	  you	  had	  to	  …	  so	   it	   came	   that	   everything	  was	   going	   back	   to	   that	   tax.	   If	   you	   look	   at	   the	  roads,	  they	  did	  not	  go	  to	  the	  place	  where	  the	  crops	  came	  from.	  They	  went	  and	  got	  lost	  among	  our	  fellows,	  the	  chairman	  and	  the	  committee.	  You	  pay,	  and	  they	  pay	  well	  but	  they	  don’t	  get	  the	  road.39	  It	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  Ndeje	  raises	  palm	  wine	  tapping	  as	  a	  memorable	  example	  of	  the	   enduring	   injustices	   after	   independence.	   The	   issue	   of	   licence	   fees	   for	   tappers	  galvanised	   coastal	   councillors	   and	  members	   of	   parliament	   in	   the	   1960s.	   Trade	   in	  palm	  wine	  was	   a	   lucrative	   business	   in	  Kilifi	   and	   across	   the	   coast	   at	   the	   time.	   Yet	  whilst	   the	   owners	   of	   coconut	   trees	   and	   those	   involved	   in	   its	   transport	   and	  marketing	  amassed	  wealth,	  hired	  tappers	  were	  paid	  poorly,	  had	  little	  security,	  and	  had	   the	   expense	   of	   purchasing	   a	   licencing	   fee	   from	   the	   council.	   In	   1965,	   Ronald	  Ngala	  took	  this	  matter	  to	  the	  National	  Assembly,	  telling	  the	  House	  that	  the	  licence	  fee	  for	  tappers	  had	  stood	  at	  twenty	  shillings	  in	  1960,	  five	  years	  later	  it	  had	  risen	  to	  fifty	   shillings.40	  Ngala	   asked	   whether	   ‘in	   view	   of	   the	   tappers	   paying	   Graduated	  Personal	  Tax’	  it	  was	  necessary	  and	  fair	  for	  tappers	  to	  also	  pay	  fifty	  shillings	  a	  year	  for	   a	   licence.	  41	  Dismissing	   the	   question,	   government	   minister	   James	   Nyamweya	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  deplorable’.	  36	  ‘Kilifi	  schools:	  New	  hope’,	  Daily	  Nation,	  7	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  1963,	  p.	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  Ibid.	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  Full	  council	  minutes,	  KCC,	  15	  November	  1963,	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  Pekeshe	  Ndeje,	  interview,	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  January	  2013,	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replied	  saying	  ‘the	  President’s	  Office	  does	  not	  concern	  itself	  with	  taxation.	  What	  it	  concerns	   itself	   with	   is	   the	   orderly	   administration	   of	   the	   area	   and	   whether	   the	  licences	  are	  paid	  for	  or	  not.42	  Masinde	  Muliro	  censured	  Ngala	  further	  commenting	  that	   ‘the	  main	  problem	  behind	  this	  question	   is	  simply	  because	   the	  members	   from	  the	  Coast	  Province	  affected	  do	  not	  teach	  their	  people	  to	  do	  better	  crop	  husbandry,	  in	   order	   to	   get	   a	   better	   living	   from	   their	   trees?’.43	  Similar	   accusations	  were	  made	  across	  the	  country	  in	  places	  where	  revenues	  were	  not	  meeting	  estimates.	  To	  those	  who	  had	  taken	  over	  the	  national	  government	  the	  tension	  between	  expectations	  and	  reality	  had	  to	  be	  framed	  as	  a	  failure	  of	  leadership,	  negative	  politics,	  and	  ‘backwards’	  attitudes,	  rather	  than	  something	  more	  profound	  and	  challenging.	  	  	   The	  members	  of	  Kilifi	  County	  Council	  however	  continued	  to	  rail	  against	  the	  laws	   governing	   palm	  wine	   production.	   At	   a	  meeting	   in	   January	   1967	   the	   district	  commissioner	   tried	   to	   introduce	   a	   new	   licence	   form	   for	   tappers,	   to	   be	   collected	  from	  the	  council	  offices	  rather	  than	  chiefs.44	  The	  councillors	  ‘spoke	  strongly’	  against	  the	  suggestion	  and	  they	  ‘refused	  the	  use	  of	  the	  proposed	  form’.45	  They	  argued	  that	  tapping	  was	  a	   ‘temporary	   job’,	  and	  tappers	  were	  in	  a	  precarious	  position,	  as	  most	  did	   not	   own	   the	   trees	   they	   tapped,	   and	   could	   be	   dismissed	   at	   any	   point.	   They	  further	  stressed	  that	  ‘tapping	  was	  the	  last	  job	  to	  a	  local	  person’,	  that	  ‘they	  do	  it	  just	  to	  keep	  their	  families	  but	  not	  to	  enrich	  themselves’.46	  A	  fellow	  councillor	  of	  Ndeje’s,	  Gilbert	  Dzombo	  also	  considered	   licence	   fees	   for	   tappers	  punitive.	  His	   relationship	  with	   the	   location	   chief	   deteriorated	   after	   repeated	   disputes	   over	   the	   chief’s	  enthusiastic	   efforts	   to	   curb	   illegal	   tapping	   in	   their	   area.	   For	   Dzombo,	   charging	  tappers	  was	  excessive	  and	  ‘unfair’,	  because	  for	  the	  tapper	   ‘when	  he	  falls	  down,	  he	  dies’.47	  	  	   But	   whilst	   Ndeje’s	   opposition	   to	   tapping	   licences	   was	   part	   of	   a	   general	  dislike	  of	  taxation,	  Dzombo	  saw	  it	  as	  a	  distinct	  issue.	  He	  accepted	  the	  notion	  that	  his	  role	  as	  a	  councillor	  was	  to	  ‘educate	  them	  that	  you	  have	  to	  pay	  taxes	  for	  the	  services	  that	   you	   are	   going	   to	   be	   given’.48	  In	   contrast	   to	   many	   of	   his	   contemporaries,	  Dzombo	  did	   correspond	   fairly	  well	  with	   the	   colonial	   vision	  of	   a	  model	   councillor.	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  Ibid.,	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  Ibid.,	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  Special	  meeting	  minutes,	  KCC,	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  January	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  Dzombo,	  interview,	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  January	  2013,	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He	  attended	  a	  mission	  school	  in	  Ribe,	  a	  village	  sixteen	  miles	  northwest	  of	  Mombasa,	  where	  Kenya’s	  first	  Methodist	  mission	  station	  had	  been	  established	  in	  1862.49	  The	  experience	   profoundly	   shaped	   his	   life.	   After	   leaving	   school,	   Dzombo	   moved	   to	  Mombasa	  and	  enrolled	  at	  a	  commercial	  college	  where	  he	  learned	  to	  touch-­‐type.	  In	  the	  early	  1950s	  he	  held	  a	  number	  of	  white-­‐collar	  jobs	  in	  Mombasa	  before	  receiving	  an	  invitation	  to	  return	  to	  his	  former	  school	  from	  the	  head	  of	  the	  mission.	  The	  school	  had	   been	   transformed	   into	   a	   teachers’	   training	   college,	   and	   Dzombo	   took	   up	   a	  position	  as	  clerk.	  At	  independence	  he	  was	  promoted	  to	  accounts	  clerk,	  and	  in	  1980	  to	  school	  bursar;	  a	  decade	  later	  he	  retired.	  It	  was	  in	  1965,	  aged	  thirty,	  that	  he	  was	  elected	  to	  the	  council	  where	  he	  served	  three	  terms.	  Dzombo’s	  professional	  history	  stands	  out	   from	  his	  contemporaries.	   In	   the	   local	  government	  elections	  of	  1968,	  of	  those	   elected	   to	  Kilifi	   County	   Council,	   there	  were	   thirteen	   farmers,	   three	   traders,	  two	  shopkeepers,	  two	  businessmen,	  two	  local	  KANU	  officials,	  one	  hotelkeeper,	  one	  auctioneer,	  and	  only	  one	  ‘clerk’:	  Gilbert	  Dzombo.50	  As	  a	  ‘professional’	  with	  a	  reliable	  source	   of	   income,	   Dzombo	   took	   a	   different	   approach	   to	   councillorship	   from	   his	  peers.	  He	  claimed	  to	  accept	  that	  it	  was	  a	  voluntary	  service	  undertaken	  for	  the	  good	  of	  the	  community.	  This,	  he	  recalled,	  was	  not	  the	  attitude	  of	  most	  other	  councillors:	  	  Most	   of	  my	   fellow	   councillors	   took	   that	   [the	   council]	   as	   a	   job	   and	   that	   is	  why	  some	  of	  them	  got,	  became	  corrupt.	  Because,	  for	  example	  a	  mwananchi	  [citizen]	   wants	   to	   build	   a	   shop,	   we	   had	   a	   by-­‐law	   which	   the	  mwananchi	  should	  get	  a	  form	  to	  fill,	  and	  that	  form	  must	  pass	  through	  the	  councillor.	  So	  before,	   instead	   of	   the	   councillor	   giving	   that	  mwananchi	   that	   form	   free	   of	  charge,	  my	  colleagues	  were	  selling	  those	  forms.51	  Yet	   for	  Dzombo,	   the	   council	  was	   not	   a	   source	   for	   accumulation,	   but	   a	   vehicle	   for	  pursuing	  the	  general	  betterment	  of	  his	  community:	  	  So	   that	   we	   could	   together	   fight	   poverty,	   disease	   and	   ignorance.	   Yes	  ignorance.	  Those	  three	  enemies.	  When	  I	  joined	  the	  council	  those	  were	  the	  things	   I	   concentrated	   on.	   These	   made	   the	   people	   ….	   like	   me	   and	   I	   was	  returned	  every	  time	  unopposed.52	  	  Reproducing	   the	   rhetoric	   of	   the	   late	   colonial	   state,	   Dzombo	   echoed	   the	  words	   of	  William	   Beveridge	   whose	   1942	   report	   described	   the	   ‘five	   giants’	   facing	   British	  society.	   By	   drawing	   on	   this	   discursive	   framework	   to	   explain	   his	   calling	   to	   local	  government	  service,	  Dzombo	  provides	  evidence	  that	  the	  colonial	  state	  in	  Kilifi	  had	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  Charles	  New,	  Life,	  Wanderings,	  and	  Labours	  in	  Eastern	  Africa	  (3rd	  edn,	  London,	  1971).	  50	  Kilifi	  DC	  to	  Coast	  PC,	  3	  August	  1968,	  CA/8/72,	  KNA,	  Nairobi.	  51	  Gilbert	  Dzombo,	  interview,	  30	  January	  2013,	  Jibana	  (Kilifi).	  	  52	  Ibid.	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had	  some	  success	   in	  grooming	  young,	  educated	  Africans	   for	  the	  kind	  of	  work	  that	  the	   Colonial	   Office	   envisioned.	   Justin	   Willis	   notes	   the	   power	   and	   legacy	   of	   this	  specific	   language	   in	   Kenya,	   writing	   that	   ‘the	   unholy	   trinity	   of	   poverty,	   ignorance	  and	  disease	  played	  a	  prominent	  role	  in	  discursive	  justifications	  of	  state	  policy	  and	  authority	  after	  independence’	  in	  Kenya.53	  	  	   But	   the	   fact	   that	   Dzombo	   was	   in	   the	   minority,	   even	   possibly	   an	   anomaly	  within	  Kilifi,	  also	  serves	  to	  underline	  how	  limited	  this	  success	  was.	  Pekeshe	  Ndeje	  was	   far	   more	   representative	   of	   the	   norm.	   Whilst	   both	   men	   were	   ultimately	  motivated	  by	  similar	  aims	  –	   to	  bring	  development	   to	   their	  wards	  –	   they	  had	  very	  different	  understandings	  of	  the	  role	  that	  the	  council	  should	  play	  in	  this	  endeavour.	  Dzombo	   equated	   councillorship	   with	   being	   a	   counsellor,	   whereby	   his	   primary	  purpose	   was	   to	   enlighten	   his	   fellow	   Jibana,	   including	   on	   the	   imperative	   of	   tax	  payment.	   Whereas	   Ndeje	   thought	   independence	   would	   bring	   the	   end	   of	  exploitation,	  which	   he	   associated	  with	   heavy	   taxation,	   he	   thought	   that	   it	  was	   his	  role	  to	  articulate	  local	  demands	  for	  resources	  from	  the	  central	  state:	  	  	  the	   independence	  government	  was	  behaving	   like	  the	  colonial	  government	  because	  it	  was	  like	  a	  farmer	  harvests	  and	  all	  his	  harvest	  is	  taken	  away	  from	  him	   and	   he	   is	   left	   with	   nothing…The	   central	   government	   didn’t	   want	   to	  share	  tax	  collection	  with	  the	  council.54	  	  	   Many	   decades	   after	   he	   served	   as	   a	   councillor,	   Pekeshe	   Ndeje’s	   abiding	  memory	   of	   his	   time	   at	   Kilifi	   County	   Council	   is	   one	   of	   disappointment	   and	  disillusionment.	   Yet	   as	   the	   beginning	   of	   this	   section	   showed,	   the	   first	   cohort	   of	  elected	   independence	   era	   councillors	   did	   enter	   local	   government	   office	   with	   the	  expectation	   that	   they	   could	   make	   demands	   on	   the	   national	   and	   regional	  governments,	   and	   that	   these	  would	   be	   heard.	   That	   this	   expectation	  was	   common	  across	   councils	   can	   be	   deduced	   from	   a	   speech	   made	   by	   the	   Minister	   for	   Local	  Government	  to	  Mombasa	  Municipal	  Council	  in	  July	  1964.	  The	  East	  African	  Standard	  reported	  that	  the	  minister	  told	  councillors:	  	  A	  councillor	  is	  elected	  to	  serve	  and	  not	  to	  boss;	  to	  devote	  himself	  as	  much	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  humblest	  as	  to	  those	  of	  the	  more	  well-­‐to-­‐do	  members	  of	  the	   community,	   and	   to	   guard	   the	   interests	   of	   all	   his	   constituents,	   not	  merely	  those	  of	  his	  community,	  tribe	  or	  race.	  As	  the	  elected	  representatives	  of	  the	  people,	  you	  have	  the	  right	  and	  indeed	  the	  responsibility	  to	  come	  to	  council	  and	  committee	  meetings	  to	  express	  the	  views	  of	  those	  who	  elected	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  Justin	  Willis,	  Potent	  Brews:	  A	  Social	  History	  of	  Alcohol	  in	  East	  Africa	  1850-­‐1999	  (Oxford,	  2002),	  p.176.	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  Pekeshe	  Ndeje,	  interview,23	  January	  2013,	  Ruruma	  (Kilifi).	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you.	  It	  may	  be	  that	  those	  views	  do	  not	  coincide	  with	  the	  majority	  but	  when	  a	  decision	  has	  been	  taken	  it	  is	  your	  responsibility	  to	  uphold	  it.55	  The	  minister	  warned	  that	  only	  ‘disorder’	  could	  follow	  from	  councillors	  telling	  their	  constituents	  ‘to	  disobey	  or	  ignore	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  council’.	  56	  Such	  ‘discreditable’	  behaviour,	  he	  concluded	  ‘was	  directly	  opposed	  to	  the	  spirit	  of	  harambee’.	  57	  In	  this	  way,	   national	   politicians	   and	   civil	   servants	   attempted	   in	   the	   months	   following	  independence	   to	   discipline	   councillors	   and	   teach	   them	   that	   their	   role	   was	   to	  educate	  constituents	  on	  the	  value	  of	  hard	  work	  and	  obedience.	  As	  in	  Kilifi,	  disputes	  over	   taxation	   spoke	   to	   broader	   debates	   occurring	   within	   Kenyan	   communities	  immediately	  after	   independence	  over	  what	  kind	  of	   ‘development’	  was	  expected	  to	  follow	   uhuru,	   and	   who	   was	   responsible	   for	   providing	   this.	   In	   places	   that	   had	   a	  longer	   and	   more	   vibrant	   local	   government	   tradition	   such	   struggles	   were	   more	  pronounced.	  The	  next	  section	  examines	  one	  example,	  Kakamega,	  where	  the	  defiant	  actions	  of	  the	  council	  immediately	  after	  independence	  alarmed	  national	  elites.	  
‘Uhuru	  meant	  standing	  on	  one’s	  own’:	  Kakamega	  County	  Council,	  
1964-­‐65	  In	  1964	  a	  new	  direct	  tax	  was	  introduced	  to	  replace	  the	  former	  poll	  tax.	  Unlike	  the	  poll	  tax,	  the	  Graduated	  Personal	  Tax	  (GPT)	  was	  progressive;	  rates	  varied	  depending	  on	   income.	   GPT	   was	   designed	   to	   serve	   as	   the	   ‘financial	   mainstay	   of	   rural	   local	  government’,	  although	  a	  proportion	  was	  transferred	  to	  central	  government.58	  Until	  they	   were	   dissolved	   in	   late	   1964,	   regional	   governments	   had	   formal	   oversight	   of	  GPT.	  According	  to	  the	  Minister	  for	  Local	  Government,	  this	  resulted	  in	  a	  ‘very	  varied	  system	  of	  graduated	  personal	  tax	  assessment	  and	  collected’.59	  He	  told	  parliament	  in	  1966	   that	   ‘[s]ometimes	   the	   provincial	   administration	   and	   sometimes	   the	   council	  were	  responsible;	  sometimes	  the	  responsibility	  was	  shared;	  and	  sometimes	  no	  one	  seemed	   to	   be	   taking	   very	   much	   responsibility	   at	   all.’60	  Thus	   in	   the	   first	   year	   of	  independence,	  there	  was	  a	  level	  of	  uncertainty	  about	  local	  government	  finance	  that	  had	   not	   existed	   before.	   In	   Kakamega	   this	   uncertainty	   exacerbated	   the	   council’s	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  ‘Election	  to	  council	  ‘not	  a	  sinecure’,	  The	  East	  African	  Standard,	  25	  July	  1964,	  JA/12/26,	  KNA,	  Nairobi.	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  Ibid.	  	  57	  Ibid.	  	  	  58	  Government	  of	  Kenya,	  Report	  of	  the	  Local	  Government	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  (Nairobi,	  1966),	  p.	  37.	  59	  Republic	  of	  Kenya,	  Official	  Report,	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  First	  Parliament,	  Third	  Session,	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  1966,	  cols.	  212-­‐225,	  col.	  215.	  	  60	  Ibid.	  	  
	  	  
88	  
already	  strained	  financial	  position.	  As	  the	  last	  chapter	  discussed,	  North	  Nyanza	  was	  the	  wealthiest	  ADC	   in	   the	  colony	   for	  many	  years.	  Yet	  as	   the	  chapter	  also	   showed,	  the	   council’s	   financial	   security	   began	   to	   falter	   in	   the	   late	   1950s	   with	   increasing	  expenditure	   and	   declining	   rate	   payments	   which	   resulted	   in	   a	   rising	   deficit	   per	  annum.61	  With	  independence,	  these	  trends	  continued.	  	  	   In	   July	   1963	   Kakamega	   County	   Council	   issued	   a	   notice	   to	   ratepayers	  announcing	  a	  50	  percent	  penalty	  for	  late	  payment,	  thereby	  increasing	  the	  rate	  from	  forty	  to	  sixty	  shillings	  from	  September	  onwards.62	  This	  measure	  was	  applied	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  the	  rectify	  the	  fact	  that	  only	  44	  percent	  of	  those	  eligible	  had	  paid	  their	  rates.63	  Writing	  to	  the	  chairman,	  the	  council’s	  treasurer	  noted	  that	  although	  ‘we	  are	  better	  than	  previous	  years’,	  the	  rate	  level	  was	  ten	  shillings	  greater	  than	  it	  had	  been	  in	  1960	  when	  the	  ADC’s	  annual	  revenue	  from	  rates	  was	  roughly	  equivalent:64	  	  
Figure	  7:	  Kakamega	  ADC	  rates	  and	  revenue	  collections	  1960-­‐63.	  
	   1960	   1961	   1962	   1963*	  
Rate	  (shillings)	  	   30	   30	  	   37	   40	  	  
No.	  of	  rates	   1,020,038	  	   883,081	  	   745,976	  	   1,011,050	  	  
Total	  revenue	  	   K£1,509,965	  	   K£1,376,220	  	   K£1,215,137	  	   K£1,602,116	  	  	   	   Source:	  KNA	  DC/KMG/2/16/53.	  *As	  at	  31.7.1963	  Kenyan	  Shillings	  	  	  	  	   The	  following	  year	  the	  council’s	  record	  was	  even	  worse.	  In	  November	  1964,	  the	  Daily	  Nation	  reported	   that	   less	   than	  20	  percent	   of	   those	   liable	   had	  paid	   their	  GPT	   in	   Western	   Province. 65 	  Several	   months	   later,	   with	   no	   improvement,	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Local	   Government	   unilaterally	   decided	   to	   dismiss	   all	   Kakamega’s	  councillors	  and	  take	  over	  the	  running	  of	  the	  council.	  Examining	  the	  discussions	  that	  took	  place	  between	   the	  council	  and	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Local	  Government	   in	  1964-­‐65	  reveals	   a	   significant	   divergence	   of	   opinion	   over	   why	   Kakamega	   was	   facing	   a	  financial	   crisis,	   and	  what	   should	   be	   done	   to	   resolve	   the	   situation.	  Whilst	   officials	  and	  politicians	  of	  central	  government	  accused	  the	  council	  of	  acting	  negligently	  and	  irresponsibly,	   councillors	   located	   the	   problem	   in	   the	   central	   government,	   for	   its	  refusal	  to	  provide	  the	  resources	  needed	  to	  satisfy	  local	  demands.	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  North	  Nyanza	  ADC	  Annual	  Report	  1958,	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  Nairobi.	  	  62	  Kakamega	  notice	  to	  ratepayers,	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  to	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  KMGCC,	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  Ibid.	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   In	   November	   1964,	   the	   Minister	   for	   Local	   Government,	   Samuel	   Ayodo,	  visited	  Kakamega	  County	  Council.66	  Earlier	  that	  month,	  the	  last	  remaining	  members	  of	   KADU	   had	   crossed	   the	   floor,	   and	   dissolved	   the	   opposition.67	  This	   allowed	   the	  government	  to	  progress	  with	  its	  plan	  -­‐	  	  announced	  in	  August	  that	  year	  -­‐	  to	  abolish	  regionalism	  and	  declare	  Kenya	  a	  republic.	  Kakamega’s	  councillors	  considered	  that	  this	  development	  could	  only	  help	   improve	  revenue	  collection	  in	  the	  district,	  given	  that	   throughout	   the	   year,	   it	   had	   ‘not	   been	   an	   easy	   task	   to	   see	   eye	   to	   eye	   on	  problems	   common	   to	   the	   two	   parties’. 68 	  The	   minister	   was	   presented	   with	   a	  memorandum	  outlining	  the	  council’s	  analysis	  of	  its	  financial	  decline,	  and	  setting	  out	  a	   number	   of	   requests.	   Beyond	   party	   politics,	   the	   memorandum	   blamed	   the	  administration	   for	   the	  council’s	  poor	  collection,	  claiming	   that	   the	  administration’s	  ‘attitude	   has	   tended	   to	   be	   “Let	   the	   County	   Council	   itself	   collect	   its	   Graduated	  Personal	  Tax”.’69	  This	  was	   the	  reason	  stated	   in	   the	  memorandum	  for	   the	  council’s	  request	   that	   it	   relinquish	   ‘Graduated	   Personal	   Tax	   to	   the	   central	   government	   in	  exchange	   for	   adequate	   grants	   to	   enable	   us	   to	   run	   our	   services’.70	  Specifically	   the	  council	   asked	   that	   its	   grants	   ‘be	   increased	   at	   least	   threefold’.71	  The	  memorandum	  conveyed	  councillors’	  impression	  that	  ‘central	  government’	  could	  provide	  what	  the	  ‘administration’	   could	   not.	   A	   false	   distinction,	   it	   revealed	   councillors’	   expectation	  that	   a	   bountiful,	   independent	   government	   would	   remove	   the	   need	   for	   any	   local	  person	  –	  whether	  councillor	  or	  chief	  –	   to	  have	  to	  engage	   in	   the	  unpopular	   task	  of	  tax	   collection.	   The	   minister’s	   response	   was	   uncompromising;	   he	   rejected	   the	  request	   for	   increased	  grants,	  and	  chastised	  the	  council	   for	   failing	   to	  discipline	   the	  people	  of	  Kakamega	  into	  the	  realities	  of	  uhuru:	  He	   said	   that	   since	   the	   country	   had	   attained	   independence	   people	   have	  misinterpreted	   the	  meaning	  of	   the	  word	  “Uhuru”.	  This	  word	  had	  wrongly	  been	  taken	   for	  “Freedom”.	  He	  said	   that	   the	  word	  “Uhuru”	  meant	  standing	  on	   one’s	   own.	   People	   who	   had	   misinterpreted	   the	   word	   for	   “Freedom”	  were	  doing	  very	  bad	   in	   that	   they	  were	  not	  working	  hard	   to	  pay	   taxes.	  He	  regretted	   to	   say	   that	   this	   county	   council	  was	   doing	   very	   badly	   and	   yet	   it	  had	   been	   one	   of	   the	   richest.	   If	   this	   state	   of	   affairs	   went	   on,	   the	   central	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government	  would	  have	  no	  alternative	  but	   to	  dissolve	  this	  county	  council	  and	  run	  its	  affairs	  from	  Nairobi.72	  	   By	   the	   end	   of	   the	   year,	   the	   council	   had	   collected	   only	   K£78,000	   out	   of	   an	  estimated	  K£176,000	  in	  GPT.73	  Consequently	  the	  council	  had	  a	  deficit	  of	  K£140,800,	  and	  the	  general	  account	  was	  overdrawn	  by	  K£87,310.74	  At	  the	  start	  of	  the	  new	  year	  Ayodo	  was	   replaced	   by	   Lawrence	   Sagini,	   but	   this	   change	   at	   the	  ministry	   did	   not	  alter	   the	  government’s	  position.	  Like	  his	  predecessor,	   Sagini	  made	  a	   crisis	   call	  on	  the	   council,	   wanting	   to	   find	   out	   why	   Kakamega	   had	   performed	   even	  worse	   than	  other	   councils	   collecting	  GPT.75	  Sagini	   accepted	   ‘that	   there	  were	  difficulties	   in	   the	  collection	  of	  a	  new	  tax’	  but	  ultimately	  blamed	  ‘adverse	  political	  activity’	  and	  laxity	  amongst	  council	  officers	  and	  staff.76	  For	   its	  part,	   the	  council	  continued	  to	  hold	  the	  administration	  responsible.	  The	  minister	  refused	  to	  accept	  this,	  and	  retorted	  that	  if	  given	   the	  opportunity,	  he	  knew	   the	   council	  would	   readily	   leave	   ‘all	   the	   inevitably	  unpleasant	  duties	  associated	  with	  the	  collection	  of	  tax’	  to	  the	  district	  commissioner	  and	  his	  staff.77	  	  	   By	   March	   1965,	   the	   situation	   had	   little	   improved,	   and	   the	   provincial	  commissioner	  was	   ready	   to	   recommend	   drastic	   action.78	  He	   informed	   the	   council	  that	   he	   had	   requested	   permission	   to	   allow	   him	   to	   arrest	   GPT	   defaulters,	   and	  confiscate	   their	   property.	   This	   was,	   he	   admitted,	   ‘a	   system	   practised	   by	   the	  colonialists’,	  and	  therefore	  he	  was	  ‘not	  happy	  to	  employ	  it’.79	  At	  the	  same	  meeting,	  council	   members	   tried	   to	   address	   the	   severe	   shortfall	   in	   revenue.	   The	   chairman	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  public	  expected	  more	  than	  the	  council	  or	  government	  could	  provide.	  The	  first	  solution	  offered	  therefore	  was	  to	  encourage	  people	  to	  engage	  in	  ‘self-­‐help’	  activities:	  ‘the	  people	  should	  do	  60	  percent	  and	  government	  would	  do	  40	  percent	  of	  the	  service.’80	  This	  was	  portentous;	  the	  chairman’s	  suggestion	  that	  there	  should	  be	  more	  ‘self-­‐help’	  was	  in	  line	  with	  Kenyatta’s	  model	  of	  harambee,	  discussed	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more	   in	   the	   next	   chapter,	  which	   came	   to	   serve	   from	   the	   late-­‐1960s	   almost	   as	   an	  alternative	  system	  to	  local	  government.	  	  	   The	  next	  measure	   for	   debate	   related	   to	   the	   level	   of	  maize	   cess	   set	   for	   the	  year.	   For	   every	   bag	   of	   maize	   sold,	   the	   council	   hoped	   to	   receive	   two	   shillings	   in	  cess.81	  This	   proposal	   put	   forward	   earlier	   in	   the	   year	   had	   been	   rejected	   by	   the	  government	  who	  insisted	  that	  the	  cess	  remain	  at	  one	  shilling	  per	  bag.	  Defiant	  and	  desperate,	  the	  council	  refused	  to	  accept	  the	  government’s	  decision.	  The	  final	  area	  of	  discussion	  related	   to	   the	  education	  budget.	  The	  education	  committee	  submitted	  a	  report	  which	  showed	  that	  K£733,970	  was	  needed	  to	  finance	  the	  council’s	  planned	  education	   programmes.	   The	   committee	   recommended	   that	   fees	   for	   pupils	   in	  standards	  one	  and	  two	  be	  raised	  by	  a	  third,	  but	  even	  with	  this	  measure,	  the	  council	  was	  still	  short	  K£410,139.82	  	   The	  meeting	  –	  which	  was	  to	  be	  the	  elected	  councillors’	  last	  -­‐	  had	  exclusively	  focused	   on	   the	   council’s	   dire	   financial	   situation.	   The	   council’s	   solutions	   involved	  greater	   ‘self-­‐help’;	   maintaining	   a	   high	   rate	   of	   maize	   cess	   and	   increasing	   fees	   for	  school	  children.	  Whilst	  this	  may	  have	  been	  sobering	  for	  some	  councillors,	  it	  was	  not	  for	  Councillor	  Nashali.	  He	  ended	  the	  meeting	  by	  reporting	  to	  the	  council	  that	  other	  local	  authorities	  paid	  councillors	  allowances	  when	  they	  attended	  training	  courses.83	  Nashali	  asked	  whether	  Kakamega	  could	  do	  the	  same.	  This	  request	  came	  in	  the	  wake	  of	   a	   decision	   by	   the	   minister,	   which	   introduced	   a	   limit	   to	   the	   length	   of	   council	  meetings.	   Minister	   Sagini	   had	   been	   perturbed	   to	   discover	   that	   Kakamega	   paid	  K£1,500	   over	   the	   estimates	   for	   councillors’	   allowances	   in	   1964.84	  This	   provided	  further	   evidence	   of	   the	   practice	   prevalent	   amongst	   councils	   of	   deliberately	  extending	  the	  duration	  of	  meetings	  in	  order	  to	  receive	  the	  daily	  sitting	  allowance.85	  Nashali’s	   request	   was	   perhaps	   intended	   to	   make	   up	   for	   this	   loss	   in	   revenue.	  However,	   his	   bid	   was	   not	   successful.	   Two	   months	   after	   this	   meeting,	   Kakamega	  County	  Council	  became	  the	  first	  in	  Kenya	  to	  be	  taken	  over	  by	  the	  government	  and	  run	  as	  a	  commission.	  All	   the	  councillors	  were	  discharged,	   the	  new	  members	  were	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nominated	  by	  the	  government	  and	  the	  district	  commissioner	  assumed	  the	  powers	  of	  chairman.	  	  	  
The	  Hardacre	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  	  Kakamega	   County	   Council	   was	   the	   most	   dramatic	   manifestation	   of	   a	   general	  downward	   trend	   that	  most	   rural	   local	   authorities	   took	   in	   the	   years	   immediately	  after	   independence.	  With	   the	   end	  of	  majimboism	   in	   late	  1964,	  questions	  began	   to	  arise	  as	  to	  the	  overall	  capacity	  of	  local	  authorities.	  During	  a	  debate	  in	  the	  National	  Assembly	  in	  April	  1965,	  one	  member	  commented	  that	  the	  responsibilities	  given	  to	  local	  authorities	  –	  particularly	  in	  respect	  of	  primary	  education	  -­‐	  were	  ‘too	  heavy’.86	  Several	  months	  later,	  Sirikwa	  County	  Council	  had	  to	  dismiss	  five	  hundred	  teachers	  in	   order	   to	   save	   K£19,127.87	  By	   the	   end	   of	   1965,	   the	   mounting	   dissatisfaction	  regarding	  the	  functioning	  of	  local	  authorities	  gained	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  president.	  In	   Kenyatta’s	   opening	   address	   to	   a	   new	   session	   of	   parliament	   in	   November,	   he	  reaffirmed	  the	  government’s	  commitment	  to	  local	  government:	  	  	  My	   government	   is	   totally	   committed	   to	   serving	   the	   people,	   by	   increasing	  the	   initiative	   and	   improving	   the	   living	   standards	  of	   every	   family.	   Such	  an	  aim	  greatly	  depends	  on	  the	  effective	  operation	  of	  local	  government.	  In	  this	  regard	  we	  deplore	   a	  position	   in	  which	  people	   in	  many	  areas	   are	  blaming	  their	   local	   authorities	   for	   inefficiency,	   while	   the	   councils	   blame	   the	   local	  people	   for	   not	   paying	   taxes	   that	   are	   due.	   All	   this	   means	   in	   effect	   that	  thousands	   of	   families	   are	   unable	   to	   enjoy	   all	   the	   services	   that	   they	   need.	  We	   shall	   therefore	   continue	   to	   examine	   the	   whole	   local	   government	  position,	  and	  see	  how	  present	  difficulties	  can	  best	  be	  met	  and	  put	  right.88	  	   This	   commitment	   to	   examining	   ‘the	  whole	   local	   government	  position’	  was	  realised	   in	  1966	  when	   the	  government	   formed	  a	   commission	   to	   ‘inquire	   into	  and	  advise	  on	  the	  reforms	  necessary	  to	  make	  the	   local	  government	  system	  in	  Kenya	  a	  more	  effective	  instrument	  for	  the	  provision	  of	  local	  services	  and	  local	  development	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  national	  policy	  and	  national	  programmes’.89	  Analysing	  the	  commission’s	   terms	   of	   reference,	   Patricia	   Stamp	   argues	   that	   ‘[u]nder	   the	   neutral,	  technical	   language	   of	   this	   and	   subsequent	   reports	   and	   recommendations	   lay	   the	  true	   intentions	   towards	   local	   government:	   the	   reduction	   of	   its	   autonomy	   and	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  of	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  ‘Teacher	  sackings’,	  Daily	  Nation,	  15	  August	  1965,	  p.	  6.	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  Republic	  of	  Kenya,	  Official	  Report,	  House	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  Representatives,	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jurisdiction	  through	  the	  manipulation	  of	  constitutional	  processes.’90	  Writing	  in	  the	  knowledge	   of	   later	   reforms,	   it	   is	   easy	   to	   see	   how	   Stamp	   drew	   this	   conclusion.	  However,	   as	   this	   section	  will	   show,	   there	   is	   little	   compelling	   evidence	   to	   support	  the	   argument	   that,	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1960s,	   the	   government	   was	   united	   in	   its	  determination	  to	  disempower	  local	  councils.	  The	  oral	  and	  written	  statements	  made	  by	  members	  of	   parliament,	   the	   administration,	  Kenyatta	   and	  his	   cabinet	  between	  1966	  and	  1968	  together	  present	  a	  muddled	  picture	  of	  official	   ‘policy’	  at	   this	   time.	  Contained	   in	   this	   picture	   are	   signs	   that	   parts	   of	   the	   government	   were	   genuinely	  committed	  to	  positive	  and	  sustainable	  reform	  of	  the	  local	  government	  system.	  This	  was	  the	  Minister	  for	  Local	  Government,	  Lawrence	  Sagini’s	  message	  to	  parliament	  in	  January	  1966	  when	  proposing	  a	  bill	  to	  amend	  the	  GPT	  law:	  	  I	  know	  taxes	  are	  not	  popular	  and	  never	  have	  been,	  and	  I	  do	  not	  therefore	  expect	  this	  Bill	  to	  be	  a	  popular	  piece	  of	  legislation,	  but	  what	  I	  want	  to	  make	  quite	   clear	   is	   that	   this	   tax	   is	   intended	   to	   help	   people	   and	   not	   to	   oppress	  them.	  This	   tax	   and	   this	  Bill	   are	   essential	   if	   the	   local	   authorities	   are	   to	   be	  able	  to	  provide	  the	  services	  which	  the	  people	  of	  this	  country	  want.	  We	  do	  not	   want	   to	   hurt	   people,	   but	   to	   help	   them	   by	   providing	   the	   schools,	   the	  teachers,	   the	   health	   centres	   and	   dispensaries,	   the	   nurses	   and	   health	  assistants,	   the	   roads	   and	  markets	   and	   all	   the	   other	   services	   so	   necessary	  for	  their	  welfare	  and	  the	  improvement	  of	  their	  lot.91	  	  The	  bill	  eventually	  was	  withdrawn,	  and	  a	  new	  draft	  proposed	  by	  the	  minister	  in	  late	  September,	  which	  passed	  in	  December.	  In	  the	  intervening	  months,	  the	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  into	  Local	  Government	  had	  been	  held.	  The	  unlikely	  candidate	  chosen	  to	  chair	  the	  commission	  was	  Walter	  Hardacre,	  treasurer	  of	  Berkshire	  County	  Council.	  His	  trip	  was	  funded	  through	  a	  UK	  aid	  programme	  which	  suggested	  on-­‐going	  British	  support	   for	   the	   local	   government	   project	   in	   Kenya.	   Hardacre	   was	   joined	   by	   an	  accountant,	  a	  former	  KADU	  MP,	  and	  Dr	  Bethwell	  Ogot,	  a	  young,	  Luo	  academic.	  The	  somewhat	   obscure	   choice	   of	   commissioners	   did	   not	   suggest	   the	   inquiry	   was	   a	  particular	   priority	   for	   the	   government.	   Nevertheless,	   they	   undertook	   their	   work	  with	  enthusiasm;	  between	  April	  and	   June	  the	  commissioners	  held	  public	  hearings	  across	  the	  country	  and	  received	  over	  150	  memoranda	  from	  a	  plethora	  of	  different	  official	   and	   unofficial	   stakeholders. 92 	  These	   included	   local	   authorities;	   sector	  ministry	   officials;	   members	   of	   the	   provincial	   administration;	   agricultural	   boards;	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  of	  Kenya,	  Official	  Report,	  House	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labour	  unions;	   academics;	   as	  well	   as	   individuals	  who	  wrote	   to	   the	   commission	  of	  their	   own	   volition.	   The	   volume	   and	   variety	   of	   contributions	   attested	   to	   the	  seriousness	  with	  which	  the	  problems	  of	  local	  authorities	  were	  being	  regarded.	  Yet	  whilst	  all	  agreed	  that	  the	  local	  government	  system	  needed	  studying,	  there	  was	  far	  less	  consensus	  over	  the	  desired	  outcome	  of	  such	  an	  exercise.	  	  	   From	  the	  hearings	  and	  memoranda	  a	  prevailing	  account	  of	  the	  experiences	  of	   county	   councils	   since	   independence	   emerged.	   In	   1963,	   councils	   had	   formally	  been	   given	   responsibility	   for	   the	   provision	   of	   primary	   education,	   which	   had	  resulted	   in	   significant	   annual	   increases	   in	   local	   authorities’	   expenditures.	  Meanwhile	  councils’	  revenues	  had	  declined	  as	  government	  grants	  did	  not	  keep	  pace	  with	   rising	   expenditure	   and	   councils	   struggled	   to	   collect	   the	   new	   GPT.	   With	  mounting	  deficits,	  the	  administration	  stepped	  in	  at	  the	  start	  of	  1965	  and	  took	  over	  the	   collection	   of	   GPT,	   but	   the	   administration	   did	   not	   prove	   as	   effective	   at	   tax	  collection	  as	  it	  once	  was	  given	  post-­‐independence	  restrictions	  on	  what	  chiefs	  were	  permitted	   to	   do	   to	   discipline	   tax	   defaulters.	   On	   top	   of	   the	   financial	   problems,	  regular	   political	   and	   personal	   disputes	   between	   councillors,	   chief	   officers	   and	  members	   of	   the	   administration	   had	   served	   to	   negatively	   impact	   on	   the	   efficiency	  and	   internal	   functioning	  of	   councils.	  All	   in	  all,	   the	  public	  was	  growing	  dissatisfied	  with	  the	  services	  provided	  by	  councils.	  	  	   In	   narrating	   this	   story,	   councils	   and	   the	   administration	   offered	   opposing	  views	   on	   what	   had	   gone	   wrong	   and	   how	   it	   should	   be	   addressed.	   In	   general,	  administrators	   criticised	   the	   quality	   and	   outlook	   of	   councillors	  whilst	   bemoaning	  their	   diminished	   power	   over	   councils	   since	   independence.	   In	   contrast,	   councils	  focused	  their	  attention	  on	  making	  pleas	  for	  greater	  government	  grants.	  Some	  called	  for	   more	   services,	   some	   called	   for	   less,	   but	   all	   agreed	   that	   it	   was	   the	   duty	   of	  government	  to	  support	  councils	  and	  enable	  them	  to	  deliver	  the	  development	  being	  demanded	  from	  below.	  	  	  	   Debate	  over	   the	   relationship	  between	   central	   and	   local	   government	  was	   a	  recurring	   feature	   of	   commission	   hearings.	   Dr	   Ogot	   later	   recalled	   that	   President	  Kenyatta	   directed	   them	  before	   the	   inquiry	   began	   ‘that	   it	  was	   free	   to	   recommend	  any	   changes	   it	   felt	   necessary,	   provided	   such	   changes	   did	   not	   affect	   provincial	  administration	   which,	   in	   his	   view	  was	   the	   backbone	   of	   central	   administration.’93	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The	  commissioners	  disregarded	  this	   instruction	  and	  devoted	  considerable	  time	   in	  the	   public	   hearings	   probing	   the	   issue	   of	   ‘dual	   administration’,	   which	   proved	  immensely	   contentious.94	  The	   debate	   centred	   on	   a	   series	   of	   questions	   concerning	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  systems.	  The	  commissioners	  considered	  whether	  the	   provincial	   administration	   was,	   by	   nature,	   an	   obstacle	   to	   local	   government;	  whether	  it	  was	  practicable	  -­‐	  given	  the	  shortage	  of	  trained	  personnel	  -­‐	  to	  have	  two	  systems;	   whether	   it	   was	   possible	   to	   integrate	   the	   provincial	   administration	   and	  local	  government,	  and	  if	  so,	  what	  form	  that	  integration	  should	  take.95	  	  	   The	  portrait	  of	  councillors	  offered	  by	  administrators	  was	  not	  flattering.	  The	  DC	   for	  Baringo	   considered	   the	  new	  cohort	  of	   ‘half	   educated	  young	  men’	  who	  had	  entered	  local	  government	  prone	  to	  turning	  ‘into	  self-­‐seekers’.96	  Such	  disdain	  for	  the	  education	  and	  outlook	  of	  councillors	  was	  common,	  as	  the	  provincial	  commissioner	  for	   Coast	   Province,	   Isaiah	  Mathenge	   explained	   in	   a	   public	   hearing	   ‘you	   know	  our	  people	  –	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  immature	  people,	  some	  of	  whom	  think	  membership	  of	  the	  council	  should	  be	  made	  lucrative.’97	  Drawing	  a	  connection	  between	  the	  type	  of	  men	   serving	   as	   councillors,	   and	   their	   proclivity	   for	   corruption	   was	   frequently	  expressed,	  not	  only	  by	  members	  of	  the	  administration.	  An	  alderman	  of	  Nairobi	  City	  Council	   criticised	   ‘the	   mentality	   of	   the	   type	   of	   people’	   who	   had	   been	   given	  ‘authority’	   since	   1963:	   ‘Following	   the	   general	   election	   these	   people	   went	   in	   the	  offices	  and	  they	  thought	  they	  had	  a	  good	  chance	  to	  give	  their	  relatives,	  brothers	  and	  so	   forth,	   jobs.’98	  ‘Nepotism,	   parochialism	   and	   favouritism’	   was	   also	   raised	   by	   the	  provincial	   commissioner	   for	   Nyanza	   who	   complained	   that	   councils	   had	   been	  reduced	   to	   ‘organisations	   of	   friends’. 99 	  The	   district	   commissioner	   for	   Nakuru	  recognised	   that	   there	  was	   a	   gap	   developing	   between	   how	   local	   government	   was	  meant	  to	  function,	  and	  the	  reality	  as	  it	  was	  evolving	  across	  Kenya.	  He	  believed	  that	  ‘a	   successful	   council	   would	   be	   a	   council	   run	   by	   enterprising	   farmers	   and	  businessmen.’	   But	   ‘[i]n	   the	   absence	   of	   these	   people,	   consideration	   for	   financial	  return	   by	   councillors	   almost	   invariably	   colours	   the	   running	   of	   councils.’ 100	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  PC	  Nyanza,	  JA/7/11,	  KNA,	  Nairobi.	  	  100	  Memo	  DC	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Hardacre	   in	   particular	   struggled	   to	   grasp	   this	   inclination	   by	   councillors	   to	   try	   to	  maximise	   the	  patrimonial	   opportunities	   offered	  by	   local	   office.	  When	  questioning	  Mr	  Mustoe,	   the	   regional	   financial	   officer	   for	  Coast	  Province,	  Hardacre	  objected	   to	  his	   insistence	   that	  without	   central	   government	   control,	   all	   councillors	  would	   take	  out	   loans	   to	  buy	  cars,	   ‘But	  why?’,	  Hardacre	  persisted,	   to	  which	  Mustoe	  could	  only	  reply,	  ‘because	  they	  would	  just	  do	  it,	  Sir.’101	  	   When	  asked	  to	  provide	  recommendations	  for	  how	  to	  address	  the	  problems	  they	  had	   identified,	  most	  administrators	  suggested	  augmenting	   their	  powers	  over	  councils.	   In	  essence	   they	  recommended	   that	   the	  administration	  hold	  an	  executive	  position	  within	  councils,	  as	  they	  had	  in	  ADCs.	  Indeed,	  the	  provincial	  commissioner	  for	  Nyanza	  even	  quoted	  from	  a	  recent	  issue	  of	  the	  Journal	  of	  African	  Administration	  
Overseas	   -­‐	   	   successor	   to	   the	   JAA	   -­‐	   outlining	   how	   the	   system	   had	   operated	   before	  independence.	  He	  concluded	  from	  this	  that	  ‘with	  this	  manpower	  the	  African	  District	  Councils	  were	   able	   to	  direct	   their	   scarce	   resources	   to	  maximum	  use.’102	  Similarly,	  Isaiah	   Mathenge	   complained	   of	   district	   commissioners	   having	   been	   ‘stripped	   of	  their	   power	   and	   influence’	   and	   ‘replaced	   with	   elected	   chairman	   and	   councillors,	  most	   of	   who	   were	   imbued	   with	   negative	   political	   indoctrination’.103	  The	   DC	   for	  Kajiado	   concluded	   that	   ‘the	   central	   government	   should	   exercise	   full	   control	   over	  local	   government	   authorities.’104	  On	   the	   subject	   of	   local	   authority	   staff,	   many	   of	  those	  who	  submitted	  memoranda	  argued	  that	  councillors	  had	  to	  be	  prevented	  from	  interfering	   any	   further	   in	   the	   hiring	   and	   firing	   of	   officers.	   The	   Kenya	   Local	  Government	   Workers’	   Union	   (KLGWU)	   listed	   a	   number	   of	   disputes	   it	   had	  intervened	   in	   because	   council	   employees	   were	   suffering	   from	   ‘unnecessary	  victimisation’	   by	   councillors.105	  This	   led	   many	   to	   support	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	  Local	  Government	  Public	  Service	  Commission,	  which	  it	  was	  hoped	  would	   ‘insulate	  employees	   from	   the	   exploitation	   of	   the	   inexperienced	   councillors.’ 106 	  But	   the	  difficulties	   between	   councillors	   and	   officers	   was,	   to	   some,	   reflective	   of	   a	   more	  fundamental	  problem	  in	  the	  local	  government	  system.	  Mr	  Simmance,	  who	  taught	  at	  the	  Kenya	  Institute	  of	  Administration,	  confided	  that:	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  Mustoe,	  17	  June	  1966,	  JA/7/10,	  KNA,	  Nairobi.	  	  102	  Memo	  PC	  Nyanza,	  JA/7/11,	  KNA,	  Nairobi.	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  Memo	  PC	  Coast,	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  Memo	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  Memo	  KLGWU,	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  1966,	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  Ibid.	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I	   find	   that	   councillors	   very	   often,	   simply	   do	   not	   understand	   why	   their	  function	  should	  be	  to	  meet	   in	  a	  committee,	  sit	   there,	  pass	  resolutions	  and	  then	  have	  nothing	  whatsoever	  to	  do	  with	  the	  execution	  of	  these	  resolutions,	  until	   they	   come	   to	   their	   next	   meeting.	   They	   don’t	   understand	   why	   this	  should	  be	  so.	  This	  is	  the	  system:	  I	  am	  not	  sure	  I	  understand	  why	  it	  should	  be	  so	  either.	  That	  will	  change	  in	  time	  won’t	  it,	  it	  is	  like	  all	  teething	  troubles	  isn’t	  it?107	  	  The	   problem	   –	   as	   defined	   by	   Simmance	   –	   was	   the	   failure	   of	   councillors	   to	  understand	   their	   role	   and	   the	   limits	   of	   their	   powers.	   But	   for	   councillors,	   the	  problem	   was	   the	   lack	   of	   respect	   being	   accorded	   to	   council	   members.	   Several	  councils	   were	   eager	   to	   use	   the	   commission	   to	   establish	   the	   ‘standing	   and	  precedence	  of	  local	  authorities’.108	  A	  joint	  memorandum	  by	  the	  councils	  in	  Central	  Province	   complained	   that	  members	   get	   ‘forgotten	   in	  many	   government	   functions	  and	  ceremonies’.109	  Councillors’	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  ‘dignity	  of	  councils’	  exposed	  how	  the	  appeal	  of	  councillorship	  rested	  on	  much	  more	  than	  a	  desire	  for	  allowances	  and	  car	   loans.110	  However,	   the	   administration	   was	   reluctant	   to	   see	   it	   this	   way.	   The	  provincial	   commissioner	   for	   Nyanza	   insisted	   that	   ‘the	   spirit	   of	   working	   for	   the	  community	  has	  been	  killed	   through	   these	   large	   salaries/allowances’,	   and	   that	   the	  only	   appeal	   of	   local	   government	   for	  members	  was	   to	   use	   it	   as	   a	  way	   to	   derive	   a	  livelihood.111	  	  	   Unsurprisingly,	   local	   authorities	   offered	   an	   alternative	   diagnosis	   and	   cure	  for	   the	  problems	  facing	  councils.	  Difficulties	   in	   the	  relationship	  between	   local	  and	  central	   government	   was	   also	   raised	   by	   councils,	   but	   the	   issue	   was	   framed	   quite	  differently,	  as	  the	  memorandum	  from	  Kisumu	  Municipal	  Council	  made	  plain:	  	  The	   government	   made	   local	   authorities	   directly	   responsible	   for	   primary	  education	  when	  Kenya	  achieved	   independence.	   It	  was	   inevitable	   that	   this	  service	   would	   expand	   rapidly	   as	   the	   election	   campaign	   had	   virtually	  promised	   free	   education,	   local	   authorities	   were	   put	   under	   extreme	  pressure	  to	  develop	  and	  aid	  more	  schools	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  there	  was	  a	  reluctance	  on	  the	  part	  of	  parents	  to	  pay	  fees.112	  A	   similar	   analysis	   was	   forwarded	   by	   the	   Coffee	   Board	   of	   Kenya	   and	   the	   Coffee	  Marketing	  Association	  whose	   interest	   in	  the	   inquiry	  mainly	  related	  to	  agricultural	  cesses.	   Despite	   objecting	   to	   local	   authorities’	   coffee	   cess,	   the	   two	   organisations	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  Memo	  Kenya	  Institute	  of	  Administration,	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  KNA,	  Nairobi.	  	  108	  Memo	  Kisumu	  Municipal	  Council,	  JA/7/11,	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  Joint	  memo	  by	  Central	  Province	  Local	  Authorities,	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  April	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  Memo	  Thika	  Municipal	  Council,	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  1966,	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  KNA,	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  Memo	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  Memo	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were	  on	  the	  whole	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  position	  councils	  had	  been	  placed	  in	  by	  the	  government:	  we	  believe	  that	  there	  has	  in	  the	  past	  ten	  years	  been	  a	  tendency	  by	  central	  government	   to	   off-­‐load	   onto	   county	   councils	   services	   which	   were	   in	   the	  past	  substantially	  financed	  by	  central	  government.	  We	  believe	  that	  much	  of	  this	  off-­‐loading	  has	  been	  activated	  by	  central	  government	  being	  unable	  to	  raise	  the	  revenues	  to	  meet	  the	  ever	   increasing	  demand	  in	  certain	  spheres	  and	   therefore	   leaving	   it	   to	   county	   councils	   to	   raise	   the	   revenue	   by	  what	  means	   they	   can.	   We	   refer	   in	   particular	   to	   the	   educational	   and	   health	  services.113	  	   Whether	   councils	   were	   capable	   of	   administering	   the	   key	   services	   of	  education	   and	   health	   had	   not	   been	   a	   consideration	   during	   the	   independence	  constitution	   negotiations.	   This	   question	   received	   no	   further	   attention	   after	   the	  dissolution	  of	  regional	  governments.	  Such	  lack	  of	  consultation	  was	  a	  major	  cause	  of	  grievance	  expressed	  by	  councils.	  Eldoret	  Municipal	  Council	  stressed	  that	   ‘many	  of	  the	  difficulties’	   facing	  county	  councils	  were	  caused	  by	   the	  government’s	   failure	   to	  consult	   with	   local	   authorities	   on	   matters	   directly	   affecting	   them.114	  Numerous	  examples	  could	  have	  been	  cited,	   including	  repeated	   increases	   in	  teachers’	  salaries	  agreed	   by	   government	   that	   impacted	   councils;	   the	   1964	   ‘Additional	   Employment	  Scheme’	   which	   forced	   local	   authorities	   to	   increase	   their	   staff	   by	   15	   percent;	   the	  1965	   pay	   deal	   struck	   between	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Local	   Government	   and	   the	   Kenya	  Local	  Government	  Workers’	  Union	  without	  consulting	  councils;	  and	  most	  recently,	  the	   declaration	   by	   the	   president	   in	   June	   1965	   that	   outpatient	   medical	   services	  would	  be	  free,	  a	  move	  which	  deprived	  councils	  of	  major	  revenue	  in	  the	  form	  of	  user	  fees.	   The	  way	   in	  which	   all	   of	   these	   decisions	  were	  managed	   reflected	   the	   central	  government’s	   attitude	   towards	   local	   authorities:	   they	   were	   expected	   to	   conform	  without	  complaint	  to	  all	  directives	  from	  the	  centre.	  	   Along	   with	   highlighting	   tensions	   in	   the	   relationship	   between	   local	   and	  central	   government,	   councils	   also	   focused	   on	   issues	   related	   to	   finance.	   They	  capitalised	   on	   the	   opportunity	   provided	   by	   the	   commission	   to	   make	   a	   plea	   for	  increased	   government	   grants.	   The	   sources	   of	   county	   councils’	   revenue	   in	   1965	  stood	   at:	   33	   percent	   government	   grants,	   25	   percent	   GPT,	   4	   percent	   cesses,	   27	  percent	   school	   fees,	   and	   11	   percent	   fees,	   charges	   and	   rates.115	  Kipsigis	   County	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  Municipal	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  Memo	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  1966,	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Council	  highlighted	  the	  cumulative	  decline	  in	  grants	  since	  independence,	  which	  had	  meant	  some	  councils	  had	  ‘been	  forced	  to	  draw	  on	  balances	  very	  prudently	  built	  up	  over	  the	  last	  few	  years’;	  its	  memorandum	  suggested	  that	  it	  was	  ‘quite	  wrong	  for	  the	  government	  on	   the	  one	  hand	   to	   say	   that	   local	   authorities	  must	  build	  up	   reserves,	  and	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   to	   penalise	   those	   councils	   that	   have	   done	   so.’	  116	  This	   had	  particularly	   been	   the	   case	   for	   municipal	   councils,	   which	   stopped	   receiving	   any	  government	  grant	  in	  1966.	  Kipsigis	  also	  objected	  to	  the	  way	  the	  debate	  around	  GPT	  had	   been	   framed.	   It	   questioned	   the	   collection	   benchmarks	   set	   by	   the	   ministry,	  instead	  insisting	  that	  ‘actual	  collections	  achieved	  by	  local	  authorities	  are	  a	  realistic	  measure	   of	   taxable	   capacity’.117 	  When	   accounting	   for	   declining	   GPT	   revenues,	  others	   challenged	   the	   suitability	   of	   progressive	   taxation	   altogether.	   In	   general	  councils	   called	   for	   a	   reduction	   in	   taxation	   and	   an	   increase	   in	   government	   grants.	  The	  chairman	  of	  Malindi	  and	  Mambrui	  Urban	  Council	  summed	  up	  the	  spirit	  of	  local	  authorities’	  demands	  by	  suggesting	  ‘the	  idea	  that	  central	  government	  take	  over	  GPT,	  and	  finance	  local	  authorities	  by	  way	  of	  grants.’118	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  former	  Minister	  of	   Local	   Government	   Sir	   Wilfred	   Havelock	   –	   now	   a	   member	   of	   Malindi	   Urban	  Council	   –	   interjected,	   reiterating	   one	   of	   the	   fundamental	   premises	   of	   the	   system,	  stating	   that	   ‘it	   was	   better	   for	   local	   government	   to	   have	   its	   own	   sources	   of	  revenue.’119	  	  	   In	  restating	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  local	  government	  model,	  Havelock	  avoided	  looking	  too	  closely	  at	  whether	  the	  system	  was	  suitable	  for	  independent	  Kenya	  at	  all.	  He	  was	  not	  alone.	  Remarkably	  few	  of	  the	  memoranda	  questioned	  the	  need	  for	  local	  government,	  and	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  system	  invariably	  were	  expressed	  in	  terms	  that	  echoed	   colonial	   officials.	   In	   this	   way,	   the	   provincial	   commissioner	   for	   Western	  Province	  wrote	  that	  ‘local	  government	  gives	  people	  training	  in	  democracy’,	  and	  the	  Kenya	   Local	   Government	   Workers	   Union	   described	   local	   government	   as	   ‘the	  foundation	  stone	  of	  a	  nation’.120	  A	  memorandum	  from	  the	  district	  commissioner	  for	  Baringo	   included	  a	  sub-­‐section	  entitled	   ‘Politics	  vs	  Development’.	   In	  this	  he	  wrote	  that:	  ‘Although	  local	  self-­‐government	  is	  a	  useful	  education	  in	  democracy,	  it	  can	  also	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  Memo	  by	  the	  local	  authorities	  in	  the	  Kipsigis	  County	  area,	  JA/7/11,	  KNA,	  Nairobi.	  117	  Ibid.	  	  118	  Malindi	  Hearings,	  16-­‐17	  June	  1966,	  JA/7/9,	  KNA,	  Nairobi.	  	  119	  Malindi	  Hearings,	  16-­‐17	  June	  1966,	  JA/7/9,	  KNA,	  Nairobi.	  	  120	  Memo	  PC	  Western	  Province,	  28	  May	  1966,	  JA/7/9,	  KNA,	  Nairobi;	  Memo	  KLGWU,	  19	  April	  1966,	  JA/7/11,	  KNA,	  Nairobi.	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be	  unnecessarily	  expensive,	  a	  hindrance	  to	  rapid	  development	  and,	  in	  unscrupulous	  hands,	  a	  seed-­‐bed	  for	  destructive	  politics,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  roost	  for	  corruption.’121	  This	  discursive	   framing	   of	   ‘politics’	   as	   antithetical	   to	   the	   national	   project	   of	  ‘development’	   was	   not	   new,	   but	   rather	   another	   example	   of	   post-­‐independence	  leaders	   recirculating	   the	   ideas	   and	   language	   of	   their	   colonial	   predecessors.	   The	  merits	   of	   the	   local	   government	   system	  were	   thus	   firmly	   located	   in	   the	   ability	   of	  such	   councils	   to	   deliver	   ‘development’	   rather	   than	   their	   democratic	   utility	   as	  platforms	   for	   local	   opinion.	   Thus	   the	   DC	   for	   Narok	   complained	   that	   the	   1963	  councillors	  had	  ‘introduced	  politics	  into	  the	  local	  authorities	  and	  forgot	  to	  adhere	  to	  the	   fundamental	   work	   of	   a	   local	   government.122	  This	   type	   of	   criticism	  was	   called	  into	   question	   by	   Cherry	   Gertzel,	   who	   considered	   it	   ‘unrealistic’	   to	   expect	   that	  elected	  bodies	  could	  be	  ‘isolated	  completely	  from	  political	  events	  at	  both	  local	  and	  national	   level’.	  123	  Gertzel	   -­‐	   who	   at	   this	   point	   was	   working	   at	   University	   College	  Nairobi	  developing	  her	  analysis	  of	  the	  Kenyatta	  state	  –	  went	  on	  to	  make	  a	  broader	  observation	   about	   the	   evolving	   dynamic	   between	   government,	   councils	   and	  citizens:	  	  	  Over	   the	   past	   year	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Local	   Government	   has	   devoted	   a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  time	  and	  energy	  telling	  councillors	  and	  staff	  how	  to	  behave.	   They	   have	   spent	   far	   less	   time	   in	   creating	   in	   the	   public	   mind	   a	  positive	   image	   of	   local	   government	   as	   something	  more	   than	   just	   another	  forum	  from	  which	  to	  express	  demands	  upon	  the	  central	  government.124	  This	  valid	  critique	  was	  not	  explored	  by	  Hardacre	  in	  the	  commission’s	  final	  report,	  which	  failed	  to	  address	  the	  questions	  of	  how	  councillors	  understood	  their	  role,	  or	  what	   their	   constituents	   expected	   of	   them.	   Instead,	   a	   short	   section	   on	   educating	  councillors,	  recommended	  that	  a	  ‘Local	  Government	  Members’	  Guide’	  be	  produced,	  and	   a	   travelling	   team	   visit	   councils	   and	   run	   educative	   workshops.	   Despite	   this	  weakness,	   the	   report	  was	   relatively	   comprehensive	   and	   constructive,	   as	   the	   next	  section	  discusses.	  	  
Sessional	  Paper	  No.	  12	  of	  1967	  The	   commission’s	   report	   was	   privately	   presented	   to	   President	   Kenyatta	   in	  September	   1966.	   It	   included	   a	   detailed	   dissection	   of	  what	  was	   going	  wrong	  with	  local	   government	   finances,	   and	   offered	   practical	   reflections	   on	   problems	   at	   the	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  Ibid.	  	  122	  Memo	  DC	  Narok,	  20	  April	  1966,	  JA/7/11,	  KNA,	  Nairobi.	  123	  Memo	  Cherry	  Gertzel,	  31	  June	  1966,	  JA/7/9,	  KNA,	  Nairobi.	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  Ibid.	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Ministry	   of	   Local	   Government	   and	   in	   the	   relationship	   between	   councils	   and	   the	  administration.125	  The	  report	  paid	  tribute	  to	  the	  achievements	  of	  local	  government,	  and	  stressed	  the	  importance	  of	  forward	  planning,	  and	  patience.	  It	  did	  not	  underplay	  the	   fiscal	   crisis	   facing	  many	   councils,	   although	   it	   did	   distinguish	   between	   county	  and	  municipal	   councils,	   the	   latter	   following	   a	   similar	   trend	   but	   not	   on	   the	   same	  scale.	  The	  report	  drew	  particular	  attention	  to	  seven	  councils	  of	  gravest	  concern,	  all	  of	   which	   were	   in	   Central	   and	   Nyanza	   provinces,	   suggesting	   that	   demands	   for	  services	   and	   expectations	   of	   uhuru	   were	   greatest	   in	   places	   with	   the	   longest	  exposure	   to	   the	   colonial	   state.	  The	   reality	   that	  demand	  was	  outstripping	   capacity	  and	  resources	  was	  underlined	  by	  the	  fact	   that	  estimated	  expenditure	   in	  1966	  had	  increased	   by	   K£794,000	   compared	   to	   1965	   whereas	   estimated	   income	   had	   only	  risen	   by	   £146,000.126	  The	   most	   worrying	   figure	   was	   the	   estimated	   increase	   in	  county	   councils’	   combined	   net	   deficit	   from	   K£98,000	   in	   1965	   to	   K£746,000	   in	  1966.127	  Whilst	  municipalities	  had	   in	  1965	  an	  estimated	  surplus	  of	  K£234,000,	  by	  1966,	   they	   had	   an	   estimated	   net	   deficit	   of	   K£234,000.128	  The	   explanation	   for	   the	  financial	  decline	  of	  councils	  offered	  was	  straightforward:	  	  Put	   very	   simply,	   the	   demand	   for	   local	   government	   services	   which	   many	  local	  authorities	  are	  being	  asked	  to	  meet	  is	  beyond	  the	  existing	  income.	  In	  the	  short	  term,	  unless	  yields	  from	  graduated	  personal	  tax	  can	  be	  increased	  appreciably,	  by	  better	  collection,	  which	  is	  not	   impossible	   in	  some	  parts	  of	  Kenya,	   or	   by	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   tax	   scales,	   the	   only	   answer	   is	   increased	  Government	  grants	  or	  reduced	  services.129	  	  	   The	   report	   stressed	   that	   additional	   sources	   of	   income	   to	   local	   authorities	  would	   be	   hard	   to	   find	   given	   the	   fact	   that	   these	   would	   inevitably	   ‘infringe	   upon	  existing	   government	   taxes’. 130 	  Furthermore,	   the	   treasury	   had	   advised	   the	  commission	   that	   ‘taxation	   is	   high’	   and	   could	   not	   be	   increased	   ‘without	   damaging	  effects	   on	   the	   economy’.131	  Therefore	   the	   only	   recommendation	   the	   commission	  could	   make	   was	   for	   improvement	   in	   the	   existing	   sources	   of	   revenue,	   including	  government	  grants	  which	  for	  county	  councils	  accounted	  for	  33	  percent	  of	  revenue,	  and	  only	  3.5	  percent	  in	  municipalities	  (down	  from	  6	  percent	  in	  1965).	  In	  regards	  to	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  Report	  of	  the	  Local	  Government	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry.	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  Ibid.,	  p.	  32.	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  Ibid.,	  p.	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  Ibid.,	  p.	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  Report	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  the	  Local	  Government	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry,	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  Ibid.,	  p.	  37.	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  Ibid.,	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GPT	   the	   commission	   recommended	   an	   adjustment	   of	   the	   tax	   rates,	   improved	  enforcement	   procedures	   and	   changes	   to	   the	   way	   tax	   liability	   was	   assessed.	   The	  broad	   range	   in	   GPT	   collection	   between	   councils	   was	   also	   highlighted.	   In	   1965,	  Marsabit	  County	  Council	   collected	  K£2,972	  whereas	  Sirikwa	  collected	  K£206,591.	  Thus	  the	  need	  to	  find	  some	  form	  of	  equalisation	  mechanism	  was	  advocated.	  	  	   Rather	   than	   lay	   too	   much	   emphasis	   on	   the	   shortcomings	   of	   councils,	   the	  report	   highlighted	   weaknesses	   at	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Local	   Government,	   which	   it	  considered	  was	  overstretched	  and	  lacking	  the	  capacity	  needed	  to	  exercise	  the	  legal	  controls	   in	   place.	   The	   report	   emphasised	   a	   widespread	  misconception	   about	   the	  perceived	  autonomy	  of	   councils,	   arguing	   that	   the	  existing	   statutory	  controls	  were	  satisfactory,	   but	   that	   these	   were	   not	   being	   exercised	   in	   a	   consistent	   or	   timely	  fashion	   due	   to	   shortcomings	   at	   the	   ministry.	   The	   commission	   addressed	   the	  problem	   of	   ‘dual	   administration’	   by	   focusing	   its	   proposals	   on	   measures	   to	  strengthen	   the	  Ministry	  of	   Local	  Government	   so	   as	   to	   ensure	   that	   it	   had	  ultimate	  ‘responsibility	   for	   co-­‐ordination’	   in	   the	   field.	   The	   danger	   of	   duplication	   was	  underlined	  by	  figures	  regarding	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  provincial	  administration,	  which	   included	   3,154	   staff,	   along	   with	   5,000	   administrative	   police.132	  Treading	  carefully,	   the	   report	   commented	   that	   it	  was	   ‘quite	   aware	   that	   this	   administration	  has	  an	  important	  part	  to	  play	  in	  the	  national	  development	  of	  Kenya,	  but	  we	  express	  the	   hope	   that	   a	   closer	   examination	  might	   be	  made	   of	   the	   current	   duties	   of	   these	  personnel.’133	  The	  report’s	  specious	  assumption	  that	  ‘in	  the	  long	  run,	  it	  seems	  likely	  that	  much	  of	   the	  district	   administration	  will	   come	  mainly	  within	   the	   scope	  of	   the	  various	  ministries’	  was	  dashed	  by	   the	  president.134	  In	   his	   autobiography,	  Dr	  Ogot	  remembered	   that	   President	   Kenyatta,	   on	   reading	   the	   report,	   told	   them	   that	   its	  recommendations	   regarding	   the	   gradual	   transfer	   of	   administrative	   officers	   into	  local	  government	  service	  would	  ‘never	  be	  considered,	  let	  alone	  implemented’.135	  	  	   The	   report	   did	   not	   recommend	   the	   transfer	   of	   any	   local	   government	  functions	  to	  central	  government.	  It	  concluded	  by	  offering	  its	  view	  on	  the	  immediate	  priorities	   to	   be	   considered:	   ‘1)	   A	   decision	   about	   administration	   and	   finance	   of	  primary	   education	   2)	   Income	   estimates	   for	   1967	   3)	   Staffing	   4)	   Co-­‐ordinating	  committee	   –	   1967	   estimates	   5)	   Outstanding	   financial	   accounts	   6)	   Graduated	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  Ibid.,	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  Ibid.,	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  Ibid.,	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  57.	  135	  Ogot,	  My	  Footprints	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  Time,	  p.	  166.	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Personal	   Tax	   –	   review	   of	   procedure.’136	  Finally	   the	   report	   stressed	   that	   all	   action	  thereafter	   taken	   in	   respect	  of	   local	   government	   should	  be	   ‘very	   carefully	  planned	  and	  co-­‐ordinated,	  otherwise	  much	  effort	  could	  be	  wasted’.137	  	  	  	   Three	  months	  after	  the	  report	  was	  presented	  to	  the	  president,	  members	  of	  the	  National	  Assembly	  began	  to	  express	  frustration	  at	  the	  mystery	  surrounding	  its	  contents.	   One	   member	   asked	   the	   Assistant	   Minister	   for	   Local	   Government	   to	  ‘confirm	   or	   refute	   the	   rumour	   that	   the	  Minister	   for	   Local	   Government	   intends	   to	  dismiss	   some	   county	   councillors	   and	   replace	   them	   by	   commissioners’.138 	  The	  assistant	  minister	  replied	  that	  there	  was	  no	  truth	  in	  this,	  and	  insisted	  to	  the	  House	  that	   the	   report	  was	   simply	   under	   review	   at	   the	  ministry.139	  The	  members	   had	   to	  wait	  an	  entire	  year	  before	  being	  presented	  with	  the	  government’s	  proposed	  action.	  In	  December	  1967	  Minister	  Sagini	   tabled	   in	  parliament	  Sessional	  Paper	  No.	  12	  of	  1967.	   Sagini	   offered	   no	   explanation	   for	   the	   delay	   except	   to	   say	   that	   ‘it	   was	  necessary	   to	   devise	   means	   by	   which	   the	   services	   would	   be	   financed	   and	   to	  integrate	   taxation	   by	   local	   authorities	   with	   government’s	   taxation…You	   will	   all	  appreciate	  that	  considerable	  consultation	  and	  research	  has	  been	  necessary’.140	  This	  was	  not	  reflected	   in	  the	  paper	   itself,	  which	  was	  essentially	  an	  abridged	  version	  of	  the	   report,	   annotated	   with	   comments	   by	   the	   government	   either	   supporting	   or	  rejecting	   the	   recommendations.141	  Like	   the	   Hardacre	   Report,	   the	   paper	   did	   not	  recommend	   any	   major	   changes	   to	   the	   functions	   of	   local	   authorities.	   The	  government	   rejected	   the	   proposal	   to	   introduce	   literacy	   qualifications	   for	  councillors,	   and	   considered	   a	   general	   review	   of	   local	   government	   areas	   –	   as	  recommended	   by	   Hardacre	   -­‐	   ‘unnecessary	   and	   expensive’. 142 	  The	   paper	   also	  rejected	   the	   commission’s	   recommendation	   that	   the	  mandatory	   functions	   of	   local	  authorities	   be	   expanded	   to	   include	   social	   and	   community	   development,	   public	  utility	  services	  (water	  and	  buses)	  and	  a	  role	  in	  devising	  the	  National	  Development	  Plan.	  It	  proposed	  that	  50	  percent	  of	  Nairobi	  and	  Mombasa’s	  GPT	  takings	  should	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  136	  Report	  of	  the	  Local	  Government	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry,	  p.	  62.	  137	  Ibid.	  	  138	  Republic	  of	  Kenya,	  Official	  Report,	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  First	  Parliament,	  Fourth	  Session,	  2	  December	  1966,	  cols.	  2305-­‐2307.	  	  139	  Ibid.	  	  140	  Republic	  of	  Kenya,	  Official	  Report,	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  First	  Parliament,	  Seventh	  Session,	  18	  December	  1967,	  cols.	  3455-­‐3476,	  col.	  3455.	  	  141	  Government	  of	  Kenya,	  Proposed	  action	  by	  the	  Government	  of	  Kenya	  on	  the	  Report	  of	  the	  
Local	  Government	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  (Sessional	  Paper	  No.	  12),	  (Nairobi,	  1967).	  	  142	  Ibid.,	  p.	  2.	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transferred	   to	   government	   to	   help	   finance	   grants	   to	   county	   councils.	   The	   paper	  highlighted	   that	   a	   new	   Graduated	   Personal	   Tax	   Act	   had	   already	   been	   passed	   to	  make	  the	  system	  more	  workable.	  Furthermore,	   it	  provided	  details	  on	  a	  new	  grant	  formula,	   intended	   to	  enable	   local	  authorities	   to	   carry	  out	   their	   services,	   including	  education,	   roads	   and	   health	   ‘without	   undue	   financial	   difficulty’.143	  It	   was	   claimed	  that	   the	   formula	   recognized	   the	   ‘relative	   expenditure	   needs	   and	   relative	   fiscal	  abilities	  of	  county	  councils’144	  	  	   Introducing	   the	   paper	   to	   the	   House,	   Minister	   Sagini	   offered	   a	   lengthy	  overview	  of	   its	   contents.	   In	   this	  he	  outlined	   the	  ministry’s	   analysis	   as	   to	  why	   the	  administration	  of	  local	  government	  had	  proved	  so	  problematic	  since	  independence.	  Sagini	   claimed	   the	   unrealistic	   demands	   placed	   upon	   councils	   by	   citizens	  was	   the	  primary	  reason	  for	  councils’	  financial	  difficulties.	  According	  to	  him,	  this	  was	  driving	  many	   councils	   into	   bankruptcy.	   He	   called	   for	   ‘controlled	   development’	   otherwise	  the	  government	  would	  be	  forced	  to	  take	  over	  councils,	  ‘contrary	  to	  the	  very	  reason	  for	  establishing	  local	  government.’145	  The	  fault	  lay	  with	  the	  people	  for	  expecting	  too	  much,	  and	  councils	  for	  trying	  to	  yield	  to	  these	  demands.	  This	  analysis	  was	  not	  new;	  Kakamega	   County	   Council’s	   fiscal	   crisis	   in	   1963-­‐65	   had	   been	   approached	   by	   the	  government	   in	   very	   similar	   terms.	   The	   second	   explanation	   offered	   by	   Sagini	  however	   was	   relatively	   novel.	   Expanding	   on	   this	   analysis,	   he	   pointed	   to	   the	  competing	  demands	  placed	  on	   the	   country’s	   limited	   tax	  base	  by	   central	   and	   local	  authorities:	  	  revenue	  which	   local	   authorities	   require	   for	   their	   services	  must	   be	   found	  from	   basically	   the	   same	   person	   from	   whom	   government	   seeks	   its	   own	  revenue.	   There	   cannot	   be	   competition	   between	   government	   and	   local	  authorities	   in	   the	  matter	   of	   taxing	   the	   country…These	   days	   considerable	  amounts	  of	  overseas	  aid	  are	  difficult	  to	  obtain	  and	  it	  must	  be	  accepted	  that	  the	   majority	   of	   the	   money	   for	   development	   will	   have	   to	   come	   from	   the	  people	  of	  this	  country.’146	  In	  light	  of	  the	  changes	  to	  local	  government	  that	  followed	  in	  1969,	  the	  emergence	  of	  this	   line	   of	   thought	   is	   highly	   significant.	   The	   central	   government	   was	   becoming	  aware	  that	  its	  own	  development	  performance	  was	  being	  indirectly	  affected	  by	  the	  very	  existence	  of	  local	  government.	  The	  realisation	  that	  revenues	  collected	  by	  local	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  Ibid.,	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  Republic	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  Official	  Report,	  House	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authorities	   could	   assist	   government	   in	   meeting	   its	   demands	   was	   an	   important	  turning	  point	  in	  the	  debate	  on	  local	  government,	  in	  this	  way,	  the	  major	  reforms	  of	  1969	   would	   be	   justified	   in	   the	   name	   of	   ‘efficiency’.	   However,	   at	   this	   moment,	   in	  December	  1967,	  the	  government	  did	  not	  attempt	  to	  make	  any	  fundamental	  changes	  to	   the	   local	   government	   system.	   The	   sessional	   paper	   only	   recommended	   minor	  adjustments	  to	  the	  system,	  and	  largely	  upheld	  the	  status	  quo.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  This	  chapter	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  first	  five	  years	  of	   independence	  were	  a	  period	  of	  significant	  readjustment	  for	  councils,	  constituents	  and	  the	  government,	  all	  of	  whom	  grappled	   and	  negotiated	  with	   the	  meaning	   and	  purpose	   of	   local	   authorities	   in	   an	  independent	  Kenya.	  The	  lines	  of	  conflict	  that	  came	  to	  light	  in	  this	  era	  would	  remain	  sources	   of	   contention	   in	   the	   decades	   to	   come.	   Disputes	   between	   councillors	   and	  officers;	   councils	   and	   the	   administration;	   taxpayers	   and	   service	   providers	  undermined	   the	   reputation	   and	   performance	   of	   councils.	   Yet	   in	   spite	   of	   this,	   the	  government	   remained	   publicly	   committed	   to	   local	   government,	   and	   importantly,	  undertook	   some	   limited	   reforms	   aimed	   at	   strengthening	   the	   system.	   Despite	   the	  government’s	  disdain	  for	  councillors	  and	  irritation	  at	  having	  to	  discipline	  them	  into	  the	  realities	  of	  uhuru,	  these	  facts	  alone	  did	  not	  justify	  –	  or	  were	  not	  used	  to	  justify	  –	  either	   wholesale	   reform	   of	   the	   system,	   or	   its	   total	   removal.	   The	   government	  proceeded	   cautiously	   towards	   local	   government,	   guided	   by	   an	   understanding	   –	  inherited	  at	  independence	  –	  that	  local	  government	  was	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  a	  modern	  nation.	  This	   cautiousness	  was	   consistent	  with	   the	  government’s	  need	   to	   shore	  up	  the	  new	  regime’s	  legitimacy,	  both	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  its	  citizens,	  and	  to	  its	  international	  observers.	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Chapter	  Three:	  ‘The	  county	  councils	  are	  dead’:	  Local	  government	  in	  the	  late-­‐Kenyatta	  state,	  1968-­‐1978	  	  While	   not	   in	   any	  way	   trying	   to	   underrate	   the	   contribution,	   if	   any,	   which	  they	   made	   to	   their	   council,	   the	   ex-­‐councillors	   were	   an	   incongruous	  assembly	   of	   charlatan	   opportunists	   who	   acquiesced	   to	   any	   and	   every	  whimsical	  manipulation.	  When	  this	  becomes	  the	  dominant	  characteristic	  of	  such	   an	   institution,	   its	   political	   legitimacy	   is	   lost	   and	  mandate	   betrayed.	  Thus	   the	   councillors,	   at	   the	   time	   of	   their	   ouster,	   had	   virtually	   abdicated	  their	  responsibilities	  and	  outlived	  their	  usefulness.1	  
Introduction	  	  In	   late	  1967	   it	  appeared	   that	   the	  government	  was	  committed	   to	  securing	  a	  viable	  future	  for	  local	  authorities.	  Yet	  two	  years	  later,	  the	  government	  passed	  the	  Transfer	  of	   Functions	   Act	   which	   removed	   from	   county	   councils	   their	   main	   service	  responsibilities:	   primary	   education,	   healthcare	   and	   roads.	   This	   	   legislation	   had	   a	  devastating	  effect	  on	  the	  capacity	  of	  councils,	  and	  in	  turn,	  their	  public	  reputation.	  In	  the	   years	   that	   followed,	   councils	   became	   known	   as	   little	   more	   than	   bastions	   of	  corruption,	   nepotism	   and	   inefficiency.	   The	   value	   of	   local	   government	   was	  repeatedly	   called	   into	   question	   by	   commentators	   and	   politicians	   who	   criticised	  councils	  for	  not	  providing	  ‘development’	  or	  services,	  yet	  continuing	  to	  collect	  taxes.	  By	   the	   end	   of	   Kenyatta’s	   presidency,	   public	   opinion	   of	   local	   government	   was	  terrible;	  the	  institutions	  of	  local	  councils	  –	  and	  the	  individuals	  who	  managed	  them	  –	  were	  widely	  regarded	  as	  lacking	  legitimacy	  and	  authority.	  	  	   This	   chapter	   examines	  why	   the	   government	   reversed	   its	   position	   on	   local	  authorities	  in	  1969.	  To	  do	  so,	  it	  looks	  in	  detail	  at	  the	  challenges	  facing	  the	  Kenyatta	  regime	  in	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  early	  1970s.	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  rather	  than	  locating	  the	  reasons	   for	   the	   disempowerment	   of	   local	   government	   in	   the	   internal	   failures	   of	  councils,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  place	  the	  experiences	  of	  local	  authorities	  in	  the	  broader	  political	   and	  economic	   context	  of	   the	   late-­‐Kenyatta	   state.	   In	  doing	   so,	   the	   chapter	  reveals	   that	   over	   this	   period,	   the	   central	   government	   effectively	   -­‐	   and	   perhaps	  deliberately	   -­‐	   pushed	   councils	   into	   an	   increasingly	   tense	   relationship	   with	   their	  publics.	   Instead	   of	   using	   representative	   institutions	   such	   as	   local	   government	   to	  respond	  to	  the	  ‘expectations	  of	  uhuru’,	  President	  Kenyatta	  favoured	  an	  emphasis	  on	  ‘self-­‐help’,	   self-­‐sufficiency,	   and	   reciprocity	  within	   the	   imagined	  bounds	  of	  Kenya’s	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ethnic	  communities.	  Responsibility	  for	  the	  provision	  of	  development	  subtly	  shifted	  from	  the	  state,	  to	  state	  elites,	  not	  all	  of	  whom	  had	  equal	  access	  to	  the	  spoils.	  After	  1970,	   local	   authorities	   struggled	   to	   establish	   a	   legitimate	   place	   for	   themselves	   in	  this	   neo-­‐patrimonial	   order.	   By	   the	   end	   of	   this	   period,	   the	   essential	   link	   between	  local	   taxes	   and	   local	   services	   had	   –	   to	   most	   observers	   –	   been	   broken.	   County	  councils	  were	  regarded	  as	  little	  more	  than	  ‘employment	  agencies’,	  which,	   in	  order	  to	   finance	   this	   ‘service’	   had	   to	   exact	   ever	   increasing	   fees	   and	   charges	   from	   their	  constituents.	  	   The	   chapter	   begins	   by	   charting	   the	   political	   events	   that	   rocked	   Kenya	   in	  1968	  and	  1969	  and	  connects	  these	  with	  the	  sudden	  and	  unexpected	  introduction	  in	  November	   1969	   of	   the	   Transfer	   of	   Functions	   Bill.	   The	   next	   section	   considers	   the	  different	   explanations	   that	   have	   been	   offered	   for	   why	   local	   government	   was	  disempowered	   in	  1970.	   It	   suggests	   that	  neither	   the	  official	   narrative	  provided	  by	  the	  government	  at	   the	   time,	  nor	   the	  academic	  accounts,	   satisfactorily	   locate	   these	  events	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Kenyatta’s	   attempts	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   high	   public	  expectations	   that	   came	   after	   independence	   and	   were	   directed,	   in	   large	   part,	  towards	   local	  authorities.	   Instead	  of	   seeing	   the	  experience	  of	   local	  government	   in	  the	  1970s	  as	  solely	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  regime’s	  efforts	  to	  demobilise	  popular	  forces,	  the	  chapter	  suggests	  that	  local	  government	  was	  downgraded	  in	  favour	  of	  ‘local	  self-­‐help’	   because	   the	   latter	  was	  more	   in	   keeping	  with	  Kenyatta’s	   particular	   vision	   of	  ‘development’	   which	   demanded	   hard-­‐work	   and	   self-­‐mastery.	   The	   third	   section	  explores	   the	   question	   posed	   by	   one	  MP	   in	   1971	   about	   county	   councils	   after	   the	  transfer	   of	   function:	   the	   MP	   asked,	   ‘what	   in	   God’s	   name	   are	   they	   doing?’2	  It	  documents	  the	  measures	  taken	  by	  Kilifi	  and	  Kakamega	  councils	   to	  remain	  solvent	  after	  1970;	  measures	  that	  rapidly	  eroded	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  councillors,	  who	  came	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  taking	  from	  the	  poor	  to	  sustain	  their	  allowances,	  and	  the	  salaries	  of	  their	  nepotistic	   workforces.	   This	   narrative	   is	   pursued	   in	   the	   final	   section	   which	  demonstrates	   just	  how	  bad	   the	   reputation	  of	   local	   authorities	  had	  become	  by	   the	  end	  of	  Kenyatta’s	  presidency.	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  despite	  the	  tentative	  efforts	  of	  some	  central	   government	   technocrats	   to	   restore	   the	   system,	   the	   degradation	   of	  councillors	  –	  and	  their	  exclusion	  from	  patronage	  networks	  –	  ultimately	  suited	  the	  regime’s	  priorities	  and	  vision.	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‘A	  temporary	  but	  acute	  attack	  of	  political	  indigestion’:	  National	  
politics,	  1968-­‐70	  On	   3	   August	   1968,	   President	   Kenyatta	   offered	   a	   gift	   to	   South	   Nyanza	   County	  Council	  of	   a	  bull	   for	   slaughter;	   ‘in	   celebration	  of	   the	  KANU	  victory’.3	  This	   ‘victory’	  was	   the	   election,	   unopposed,	   of	   the	   thirty-­‐six	   KANU	   councillor	   candidates	   in	   the	  Kenya	   Peoples’	   Union	   (KPU)	   stronghold	   of	   Nyanza.	   On	   the	   same	   day,	   the	   Daily	  
Nation	   also	   reported	   that	   all	   1,800	   KPU	   local	   government	   candidates	   across	   the	  country	   had	   been	   disqualified	   by	   district	   commissioners,	   acting	   as	   returning	  officers.4	  A	   few	   days	   later,	   the	   newspaper	   noted	   that	   ‘the	   nation	   [was]	   suffering	  from	  a	  temporary	  but	  acute	  attack	  of	  political	  indigestion’.5	  As	  the	  month	  of	  August	  unfolded,	   the	   government’s	   handling	   of	   the	   local	   government	   elections	   forced	  debate	   over	   the	   nation’s	   political	   and	   economic	   future	   and	   over	   the	   democratic	  process	   more	   broadly.	   Furthermore,	   the	   elections	   revealed	   the	   intensity	   of	   the	  struggles	   occurring	   at	   local	   level	   for	   control	   of	   district	   KANU	   branches	   and	   the	  patronage	   resources	   of	   local	   authorities.	   These	   pressures	   -­‐	   which	   were	   at	   once	  ideological,	   constitutional,	   ethnic	   and	   resource-­‐based	   -­‐	   continued	   to	   mount	  throughout	  the	  year	  and	  in	  the	  year	  that	  followed.	  This	  section	  details	  the	  events	  of	  1968-­‐69	  and	  considers	  how	  national	  politics	  influenced	  policy	  on	  local	  government.	  	  	   Formed	   two	   years	   earlier,	   the	   KPU	   had	   been	   established	   to	   directly	  challenge	  the	  government’s	  vision	  and	  programme	  for	  the	  country’s	  socioeconomic	  development.	  Support	  for	  the	  party	  was	  strongest	  in	  Nyanza;	  of	  the	  nine	  KPU	  MPs	  returned	  to	  office	   in	   the	   ‘little	  general	  election’	  of	  1966	  six	  were	  Luo.6	  Yet	  despite	  the	   government’s	   attempts	   to	   brand	   the	   KPU	   as	   an	   exclusively	   Luo	   project,	   the	  party	   leaders’	   populist	   rhetoric	   from	   1966	   onwards	   threatened	   and	   undermined	  the	   government’s	   claims	   to	   moral	   authority.	   The	   local	   government	   elections	   of	  August	  1968	  presented	  the	  first	  opportunity	  for	  the	  public	  to	  express	  their	  support	  or	   disapproval	   of	   KANU’s	   policies	   and	   performance	   since	   independence.	   This	  opportunity	   was	   cut	   short;	   Tom	   Mboya	   the	   skilful	   secretary-­‐general	   of	   KANU	  claimed	   that	   the	  KPU,	   fearing	   nationwide	   electoral	   defeat,	   had	   -­‐	   in	   an	   act	   of	   self-­‐sabotage	  -­‐	  deliberately	  spoiled	  their	  nomination	  papers.7	  This	  supposed	  ‘deliberate	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  ‘KPU	  suffers	  country-­‐wide	  banning’,	  Daily	  Nation,	  3	  August	  1968,	  p.	  1.	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  Ibid.	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  ‘Odinga	  speaks’,	  Daily	  Nation,	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  1968,	  p.	  4.	  	  6	  Susanne	  Mueller,	  ‘Government	  and	  opposition	  in	  Kenya,	  1966-­‐9’,	  JOMAS,	  22:3	  (1984),	  pp.	  399–427.	  7	  ‘KPU	  tried	  to	  subvert	  civic	  poll	  –	  Mboya’,	  Daily	  Nation,	  13	  August	  1968,	  p.1.	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trick	  to	  save	  face’	  however	  did	  not	  tally	  with	  the	  reports	  coming	  in	  from	  individual	  branches.8	  In	  Kisii,	  KPU	  candidates	  had	  been	  arrested	  the	  night	  before	  nomination	  day,	  and	  not	  released	  until	  after	  the	  process	  had	  ended;	  in	  parts	  of	  the	  Rift	  Valley,	  the	   nomination	   date	   was	   abruptly	   changed;	   in	   Embu,	   Meru	   and	   Kiambu	   ‘KPU	  candidates	   were	   “physically	   barred”	   from	   presenting	   their	   papers’;	   whilst	   in	  Machakos	  and	  Kakamega	  returning	  officers	  refused	  to	  accept	  that	  the	  signature	  of	  KPU	  president	  Oginga	  Odinga	  was	  genuine.9	  In	   the	  weeks	   that	   followed,	   the	  Daily	  
Nation	   did	   not	   explicitly	   challenge	   the	   government’s	   actions,	   but	   editorials	   and	  letters	  were	  published	  which	  questioned	  the	  process.	  Writing	  from	  Nairobi,	  D.	  K.	  A.	  W.	  Sultan	  objected	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  ‘the	  public	  was	  not	  given	  an	  opportunity	  to	  make	  a	   choice’.10	  In	   a	   similar	   letter,	   Joseph	   Ajowi	   wrote	   that	   ‘[i]f	   KANU	   was	   really	  democratic,	  it	  could	  have	  given	  the	  opposition	  party	  a	  chance	  to	  contest	  all	  the	  seats	  so	  as	  to	  allow	  the	  public	  to	  know	  which	  party	  is	  popular.	  But	  now	  we	  are	  at	  sea.’11	  	   In	   excluding	   the	   KPU,	   the	   government	   aimed	   not	   only	   to	   restrict	   political	  debate	   but	   also	   to	   deny	   the	   opposition	   access	   to	   the	   ‘economic	   resources	   and	  patronage’	   available	   at	   local	   government	   level.12	  Cherry	   Gertzel	   has	   highlighted	  how	   competitive	   and	   fractious	   the	   contests	   were	   for	   control	   of	   KANU	   district	  branches	   ahead	   of	   the	   elections.13	  MPs	   sought	   to	   exercise	   and	   increase	   their	  influence	  within	  councils	  which	  were	  still	  ‘a	  major	  source	  of	  both	  development	  and	  patronage’	  by	   supporting	  particular	   candidates.14	  This	  was	  one	  of	   the	   factors	   that	  led	  some	  to	  join	  the	  KPU.	  In	  Kilifi,	  a	  councillor	  on	  the	  Malindi	  and	  Mambrui	  Urban	  Council	   had	   decided	   to	   run	   on	   a	   KPU	   ticket	   ‘as	   a	   token	   protest	   against	  “brotherisation	  and	  bad	  organisation	   in	  the	   local	  KANU’s	  branch”.’15	  Unable	  to	  see	  this	   protest	   through,	   the	   councillor	   returned	   to	  KANU,	   and	   claimed	   that	   ‘the	  KPU	  offered	  no	  satisfactory	  alternative	  to	  KANU’s	  policies	  and	  development	  aims’.16	  But	  even	  though	  KANU	  had	  total	  control	  over	  every	  local	  authority	  in	  Kenya	  by	  the	  end	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  Odinga	  Speaks,	  Daily	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  1968,	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  D.	  K.	  A.	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  Sultan	  (Nairobi),	  Letter	  -­‐	  ‘Some	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  Daily	  Nation,	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  1968,	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  Joseph	  Ajowi	  (letter),	  ‘Opposition	  has	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  role	  to	  play’,	  Daily	  Nation,	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  1968,	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  Mueller,	  ‘Government	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  opposition',	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  13	  Gertzel,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Independent	  Kenya,	  pp.	  161-­‐166.	  14	  Ibid.,	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  161-­‐166.	  	  15	  ‘Blow	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  at	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  seven	  resign’,	  Daily	  Nation,	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of	   August,	   whether	   the	   party	   structure	   could	   be	   depended	   upon	   to	   discipline	  councillors	  remained	  far	  from	  certain.	  	   For	   the	   councillors	   who	   were	   elected	   in	   August	   1968,	   the	   system	   they	  worked	   in	  was	  soon	  to	  change	  dramatically.	  Yet	   in	  October	  1968,	   the	  government	  maintained	  it	  was	  staying	  the	  course	  on	  the	  reforms	  announced	  the	  previous	  year.	  The	   Minister	   for	   Local	   Government,	   Lawrence	   Sagini	   gave	   a	   statement	   to	  parliament	  updating	  the	  House	  on	  progress	  made	  in	  implementing	  Sessional	  Paper	  No.	  12.17	  He	  confirmed	  that	  a	  new	  local	  government	  bill	  would	  soon	  be	  drafted;	  and	  promised	  that	  in	  the	  next	  two	  years	  a	  review	  commission	  would	  be	  established	  to	  consider	   local	   authority	   boundaries	   and	   a	   more	   detailed	   examination	   of	   local	  government	   finances	   would	   take	   place.18	  Yet	   the	   review	   commission	   was	   never	  appointed,	  and	  the	   local	  government	  bill	   that	  was	  eventually	  passed	  was	  radically	  different	  in	  content	  from	  that	  implied	  by	  the	  minister	  in	  October	  1968.	  	  	   Along	  with	  local	  council	  elections,	  parliamentary	  elections	  were	  expected	  to	  take	  place	   in	  1968.	  These	  were	  postponed	  and	  eventually	  took	  place	   in	  December	  1969.	  Throughout	  the	  year	  the	  government’s	  focus	  was	  on	  the	  polls.	  Concern	  about	  the	  KPU	  deepened	  when	  another	  opposition	  MP	  entered	  the	  House	   in	  May	  after	  a	  relatively	  free	  and	  fair	  by-­‐election	  in	  Siaya	  district.19	  During	  the	  campaign	  the	  KPU	  candidate	  ‘explained	  how	  KPU	  was	  formed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  government’s	  failure	  to	  honour	   promises	   it	   made	   in	   the	   1963	   KANU	   manifesto’.20	  KANU’s	   independence	  manifesto	   had	   placed	   great	   emphasis	   on	   its	   aim	   of	   moving	   towards	   universal	  primary	  education.	  Yet	  KANU’s	   record	  since	  1963	  on	  education	  was	  variable,	   and	  stories	   of	   intractable,	   disruptive	   and	   costly	   disputes	   between	   the	   Ministry	   of	  Education,	   local	   authorities,	   Kenya	   National	   Union	   of	   Teachers	   (KNUT)	   and	   the	  Teachers	   Service	   Commission	   came	   to	   dominate	   the	   national	   media	   in	   May	   and	  June	   of	   1969.	   Strikes	   and	   threats	   of	   strikes,	   which	   were	   especially	   common	   in	  Nyanza	  Province,	  were	  uncomfortable	  for	  the	  government,	  particularly	  so	  after	  the	  president	  confirmed	  on	  1	  June	  that	  elections	  would	  be	  held	  that	  year.	  In	  June,	  two	  thousand	   teachers	   in	   South	   Nyanza	   went	   on	   strike,	   following	   the	   dismissal	   the	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previous	   month	   of	   one	   thousand	   teachers.21	  The	   strike	   only	   ended	   when	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Local	  Government	  provided	  the	  council	  with	  funds	  to	  pay	  the	  teachers.22	  	  	   The	  teachers’	  strikes	  were	  knocked	  off	  the	  front	  page,	  and	  indeed	  cancelled	  out	  of	  respect,	  when	  Tom	  Mboya	  was	  shot	  dead	  in	  Nairobi	  in	  early	  July.	  As	  the	  most	  high-­‐profile	   Luo	   politician	   in	   the	   cabinet,	  Mboya’s	   death	   –	  widely	   believed	   at	   the	  time	  to	  have	  been	  sanctioned	  by	  Kenyatta	  –	  reinforced	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  were	  two	  governments	  in	  Kenya:	  ‘the	  official	  one	  in	  Nairobi…and	  the	  real	  one	  at	  Gatundu	  run	  by	  the	  Kikuyu	  inner	  caucus’.23	  Mboya’s	  murder	  led	  to	  violent	  protests;	  in	  response,	  Gikuyu	   were	   transported	   to	   Gatundu	   (Kenyatta’s	   home)	   to	   take	   an	   oath	   ‘to	  guarantee	   that	   the	   Kenyan	   flag	   would	   never	   leave	   the	   House	   of	   Mumbi’.24	  In	  October,	  Kenyatta	  made	  a	  formal	  visit	  to	  Nyanza	  to	  open	  a	  new	  hospital	  at	  Kisumu.	  He	   publicly	   criticised	   Odinga	   and	   the	   crowd	   became	   increasingly	   hostile.	   In	   the	  ensuing	   melee,	   Kenyatta’s	   bodyguards	   shot	   and	   killed	   at	   least	   one	   hundred	  people.25	  The	   next	   day	   one	   newspaper	   ran	   with	   the	   headline:	   ‘I’ll	   crush	   you’;	  whether	   the	  president’s	   threat	  was	   intended	   for	   just	   the	  crowd,	  or	   the	  KPU	  more	  broadly	   became	   clear	   in	   the	   following	   days. 26 	  The	   government	   immediately	  detained	  twenty-­‐two	  KPU	  supporters,	  including	  Oginga	  Odinga,	  and	  on	  30	  October	  the	  KPU	  was	  officially	  banned.	  	   A	   few	   days	   later,	   the	   Local	   Government	   (Transfer	   of	   Functions)	   Bill	   was	  introduced	   into	   parliament.	   The	   bill	   emerged	   unexpectedly	   and	   was	   drafted	  without	  consultation.	  Simple	  and	  brief,	  the	  Assistant	  Minister	  for	  Local	  Government	  summarised	   its	   contents:	   ‘the	   government	   has	   decided	   that,	   with	   effect	   from	   1st	  January	  1970,	  the	  three	  major	  services,	  education,	  public	  health	  and	  roads,	  together	  with	  the	  income	  from	  graduated	  personal	  tax,	  shall	  be	  transferred	  from	  the	  county	  councils	   to	   the	   central	   government.’27	  Although	   the	   bill	  was	   short,	   its	   significance	  was	   not	   lost	   on	   some	   members	   of	   the	   House.	   Hassan	   Wario,	   member	   for	   Isiolo	  South,	  described	  it	  as	  ‘a	  small	  and	  dangerous	  bill’,	  whilst	  in	  an	  unusual	  intervention,	  the	   speaker,	   Humphrey	   Slade	   insisted	   on	   explaining	   the	   ‘abnormal’	   nature	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  ‘No	  salary	  –	  so	  S.	  Nyanza	  teachers	  strike’,	  Daily	  Nation,	  6	  June	  1969,	  p.	  9.	  	  22	  ‘Ministry	  helps	  pay	  S.	  Nyanza	  teachers’,	  Daily	  Nation,	  16	  June	  1969,	  p.	  4.	  	  23	  Jeremy	  Murray-­‐Brown,	  Kenyatta,	  (London,	  1972),	  p.	  317.	  	  	  24	  Atieno	  Odhiambo,	  ‘Hegemonic	  enterprises	  and	  instrumentalities	  of	  survival',	  p.	  241.	  	  25	  Throup	  and	  Hornsby,	  Multi-­‐Party	  Politics	  in	  Kenya,	  pp.	  13-­‐15.	  26	  Atieno	  Odhiambo,	  ‘Hegemonic	  enterprises	  and	  instrumentalities	  of	  survival'.	  27	  Republic	  of	  Kenya,	  Official	  Report,	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  First	  Parliament,	  Twelfth	  Session,	  4	  November	  1969,	  cols.	  1435-­‐1482,	  col.	  1436.	  	  
	  	  
112	  
bill,	  which	  proposed	  that	  the	   ‘House	  should	  delegate	  to	  some	  other	  authority…the	  power…actually	   to	  amend	   the	   laws	  which	  have	  been	  made	  by	   this	  House’.28	  Slade	  referred	  by	  this,	   to	  the	  section	  of	   the	  bill	  which	  stated	  that	   ‘the	  President	  may,	  by	  regulations,	  make	  such	  amendment	   to	   the	  Exchequer	  and	  Audit	  Act	  and	   the	  Local	  Government	   Regulations,	   1963,	   as	   may	   be	   necessary’.29	  The	   reasoning	   used	   to	  justify	  the	  bill	  was	  seemingly	  uncontroversial.	  Assistant	  Minister	  Munoko	  outlined	  how,	   as	  demand	   for	   services	  had	  grown	   since	   independence,	   county	   councils	  had	  become	   increasingly	   dependent	   on	   central	   government	   grants. 30 	  Given	   the	  considerable	   size	   of	   these	   grants,	   Munoko	   argued,	   the	   government	   should	   have	  greater	  control	  over	  how	  services	  were	  run	  and	  funds	  were	  spent.	  He	  insisted	  that	  it	   was	   not	   councils’	   fault	   that	   they	   had	   failed	   to	   meet	   public	   demand,	   and	   he	  rejected	  the	   ‘general	  picture	  of	  corruption	  and	   inefficiency	   in	   local	  government	  as	  being	  a	  major	  cause	  of	  many	  councils	  going	  bankrupt.’31	  	  	   During	   the	   two	   debates	   on	   the	   bill,	   members	   repeatedly	   recalled	   the	  teachers’	  strikes	  that	  had	  taken	  place	  throughout	  the	  year	  as	  evidence	  of	  councils’	  failures.	   Vociferously	   supporting	   the	   bill,	   Martin	   Shikuku	   stated	   that	   in	   his	  constituency	  there	  were:	  	  72	   classes	  where	   the	   students	   have	   paid	   their	   school	   fees	  which	   are	   not	  functioning.	   The	   fees	   have	   been	   taken	   from	   the	   parents	   and	   yet	   the	   local	  authority	   is	   not	   providing	   the	   services.	   As	   a	   matter	   of	   fact,	   they	   have	  robbed	   my	   people;	   they	   have	   robbed	   the	   parents	   in	   my	   constituency	   of	  their	  money	  and	  have	  provided	  no	  services.	  Are	  we	  to	  leave	  this	  robbery	  to	  continue	  with	  nobody	  doing	  anything	  about	  it?32	  Shikuku	   claimed	   that	   anyone	   who	   opposed	   the	   bill	   would	   ‘only	   be	   playing	  politics’.33	  As	   later	   chapters	   reveal,	   Shikuku	  was	   not	   one	   to	   toe	   the	   party	   line;	   he	  became	  known	  in	  the	  1970s	  as	  something	  of	  a	  troublemaker	  and	  rebel.	  In	  1975	  he	  was	  detained	  for	  three	  years	  after	  suggesting	  in	  parliament	  that	  KANU	  was	  ‘dead’.34	  Therefore	   his	   support	   for	   the	   bill,	   can	   be	   seen	   to	   suggest	   that	   even	   critics	   of	   the	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state	  never	  actually	  quite	   saw	   the	  value	  of	   local	  government.	  But	   for	   the	  Member	  from	   Isiolo,	   the	   value	   of	   local	   government	   –	   and	   the	   consequences	   of	   its	  disempowerment	  were	  perfectly	  plain:	   ‘A	  person	  with	  primary	  education	  at	   least,	  in	  my	  constituency,	  has	  a	  chance	  of	  getting	  a	  job	  in	  the	  county	  council.	  But	  if	  we	  do	  away	  with	  these	  services	  and	  bring	  them	  all	  to	  the	  central	  government,	  what	  shall	  I	  do	  with	  that	  Standard	  IV	  man?’	  he	  asked	  the	  House.35	  The	  answer	  for	  Shikuku	  was	  simple:	  turn	  councillors	  ‘into	  agents	  of	  the	  central	  government’,	  who	  would	  then	  be	  given	   funds	   from	   the	   centre	   to	   dispense	   under	   government	   supervision.36	  This	  proposal	  perfectly	  captured	  the	  way	  that	  service	  delivery	  was	  conceived	  of	  within	  a	  neo-­‐patrimonial	   framework.	  Mention	  of	   the	  democratic	  value	  of	   local	  government	  was	  conspicuously	  absent	  throughout	  both	  debates	  on	  the	  bill.	  	  	   When	  debate	  on	  the	  bill	  resumed	  on	  the	  second	  day,	  the	  Assistant	  Minister	  appeared	   to	   have	   run	   out	   of	   justifications	   for	   the	   bill,	   concluding	   lamely	   that	   the	  ‘main	  purpose’	  of	  the	  bill	  was	  to	  ‘help	  the	  county	  councils,	  lighten	  their	  burden,	  and	  so	  that	  they	  can	  feel	  happier’.37	  Munoko’s	  somewhat	  lacklustre	  support	  for	  the	  bill	  revealed	   a	   degree	   of	   opposition	   to	   the	   proposals	   from	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Local	  Government	   itself.	  38	  Those	   opposed	   to	   the	   bill	   –	   including	   the	  Minister	   for	   Local	  Government	   -­‐	   ‘were	   overruled	   by	   more	   powerful	   ministers’	   observed	   Patricia	  Stamp.39	  One	  of	  the	  most	  powerful	  ministers	  at	  the	  time,	  Attorney	  General	  Charles	  Njonjo,	  by	  the	  second	  day	  of	  debate	  had	  lost	  patience	  for	  parliamentary	  procedure	  altogether.	  He	  said	   ‘on	  a	  point	  of	  order’,	   that	  the	  bill	  was	   ‘short’,	  and	  so	  should	  be	  voted	  on	  without	   further	  delay.40	  Njonjo	  went	  on	   to	   state	   that	   ‘we	  know	  what	  we	  are	  talking	  about,	  it	  is	  precise,	  and	  we	  want	  this	  legislation’.41	  Speaking	  as	  a	  cabinet	  member	  and	  close	  adviser	  of	   the	  president,	  Njonjo’s	  use	  of	   ‘we’	   served	   to	   remind	  the	  House	  that	  the	  legislation	  had	  the	  personal	  support	  of	  the	  president.	  The	  sense	  of	  urgency	  however	  was	  hard	   for	   supporters	  of	   the	  bill	   to	   justify.	  The	  House	  was	  due	  to	  go	  into	  recess	  on	  5	  November;	  the	  same	  day	  of	  the	  second	  debate	  on	  the	  bill	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  Report,	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  First	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  Session,	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  1969,	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(in	  committee).	  After	  this,	  MPs	  would	  begin	  in	  earnest	  their	  re-­‐election	  campaigns	  ahead	  of	  the	  December	  polls.	  Jean-­‐Marie	  Seroney	  accused	  the	  government	  of	  trying	  to	  ‘sneak	  it	  in	  through	  the	  back	  door	  at	  the	  eleventh	  hour…when	  the	  minds	  of	  many	  people	  are	  preoccupied	  with	  other	  things.’42	  Whilst	  the	  Member	  from	  Bureti	  agreed,	  Alexander	  arap	  Biy	  pointed	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  front	  and	  back	  benches	  were	  almost	  empty.43	  Njonjo’s	  attempt	  to	  bring	  the	  bill	  to	  vote	  was	  rebuffed	  by	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  committee,	  Dr	  De	  Souza.	  He	  considered	  the	  bill	  to	  contain	  ‘far	  reaching	  changes	  in	  our	  political	  structure’,	  and	  thus	  would	  not	  ‘allow	  it	  to	  be	  pushed	  through	  in	  ten	  minutes’.44	  Yet	   a	   longer	   debate	   did	   not	   change	   the	   outcome,	   the	   government	   had	  spoken,	  and	  the	  bill	  passed	  that	  day.	  	  	  
Self-­‐help	  versus	  self-­‐government:	  Kenyatta’s	  vision	  of	  local	  
development	  The	  passage	  of	   the	  Transfer	  of	   Functions	  Act	  has	  been	  analysed	  and	  explained	   in	  two	   ways.	   The	   official	   narrative	   –	   put	   forward	   by	   the	   government	   at	   the	   time	   -­‐	  identified	  the	  poor	  performance	  of	  councils	  as	  the	  main	  justification	  for	  the	  bill.	  By	  this	   reasoning,	   after	   five	   years	   of	   local	   authorities	   underperforming,	   the	  government	  was	   forced	   to	  step	   in.	   In	   response	   to	  mounting	  public	  dissatisfaction,	  and	   believing	   that	   the	   central	   government	   could	   more	   efficiently	   and	   effectively	  administer	   the	   three	   main	   services,	   councils	   were	   ‘temporarily’	   relieved	   of	   their	  main	   responsibilities.	   Scholars	   of	   post-­‐colonial	   Kenya	   have	   tended	   to	   favour	   an	  alternative	   narrative.	   In	   these	   accounts,	   the	   government’s	   actions	   towards	   local	  authorities	   formed	   part	   of	   a	   broader	   trend	   that	   saw	   the	   consolidation	   in	   the	   late	  1960s	  of	  Kenyatta’s	  ‘bureaucratic-­‐executive’	  state.45	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  popular	  forces	  contained	  in	  different	  representative	  institutions	  were	  systematically	  weakened	  in	  favour	   of	   an	   imperial	   presidency	   and	   centrally-­‐controlled	   bureaucracy.	   Thus	   the	  experience	  of	  local	  government	  is	  seen	  to	  correspond	  with	  that	  of	  the	  party,	  trade	  unions,	  cooperatives,	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  the	  legislature,	  all	  of	  which	  had	  enjoyed	  a	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  in	  the	  years	  following	  independence.	  	  	   In	   light	  of	   the	  previous	  chapter,	   this	  section	  argues	   that	   in	  order	   to	  bridge	  and	  nuance	  the	  official	  and	  academic	  narratives	  of	  the	  Transfer	  of	  Functions	  Act,	  it	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  Republic	  of	  Kenya,	  Official	  Report,	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  First	  Parliament,	  Twelfth	  Session,	  4	  November	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  cols.	  cols.	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  Ibid.,	  cols.	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  Ibid.,	  col.	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  Bienen,	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  Control,	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is	  useful	  to	  consider	  in	  greater	  depth	  how	  Kenyatta	  regarded	  and	  responded	  to	  the	  expectations	   of	   uhuru	   confronting	   his	   government.	   Jomo	   Kenyatta	   appears	  Machiavellian	  in	  much	  of	  the	  academic	  literature;	  he	  is	  presented	  as	  a	  leader	  whose	  tight	  control	  of	  political	  power	  was	  used	  to	  ensure	  the	  economic	  accumulation	  of	  a	  narrow,	   ethnic	   elite.46	  In	   these	   accounts,	   1969	   is	   often	   identified	   as	   the	   ‘turning	  point’,	  when	   ‘President	  Kenyatta	   and	   the	   circle	   around	  him	  became	   “the	   state”.’47	  This	   inner	   circle	   consisted	   of	   a	   small	   group	   of	   Kikuyu	   politicians,	  most	   of	  whom,	  like	   the	  president,	   came	   from	  Kiambu.	  The	   group	   included	  Mbiu	  Koinange,	   James	  Gichuru,	  Njoroge	  Mungai	  and	  Charles	  Njonjo,	  and	  were	  variously	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘the	  Gatundu	  Courtiers’,	   ‘the	  Family’,	   the	   ‘Kiambu	  cabal’	  and	  the	   ‘inner	  cabinet’.48	  They	  ensured	  that	  control	  of	  state	  institutions,	  notably	  the	  provincial	  administration,	  the	  military,	   the	   police,	   and	   the	   civil	   service,	   rested	   with	   the	   Kikuyu,	   and	   that	   the	  economic	  opportunities	  provided	  by	   the	   state	  were	   channelled	  primarily	   into	   the	  hands	  of	  Kikuyu	  ‘Big	  Men’	  who	  then	  used	  these	  resources	  to	  maintain	  their	  patron-­‐client	  networks.49	  	  	   Protecting	  the	   interests	  of	   this	  elite	  whilst	  maintaining	   legitimacy	  amongst	  the	  wider	  population	  became	   increasingly	  difficult	   for	   the	   government	   in	   the	   late	  1960s	   and	   1970s.	   The	   economy	   began	   to	   slow,	   inflation	   started	   to	   rise,	   foreign	  direct	   investment	  declined,	  as	  did	   real	  wages.	  The	  departure	  of	  expatriates	   in	   the	  early	   1960s	   had	   provided	   the	   regime	   with	   a	   stock	   of	   land	   and	   civil	   service	   jobs	  which	  went	  some	  way	  in	  assuaging	  the	  immediate	  popular	  demands	  that	  surfaced	  after	   independence.	   Between	   1962	   and	   1967,	   1.17	   million	   acres	   in	   the	   ‘White	  Highlands’	  were	  transferred	  via	  the	  Million	  Acre	  settlement	  scheme	  which	  aimed	  to	  deal	  directly	  with	   ‘Kikuyu	   land	  hunger’	  and	   to	  promote	   ‘an	  African	   landed	  middle	  class’.50	  As	   Wasserman	   notes,	   the	   Million	   Acre	   Scheme	   was	   deliberately	   used	   to	  ‘stabilise	   the	   new	   government	   by	  weakening	   rural	   unrest’.51	  Yet	   as	   the	   resources	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  and	  society	  in	  Kenya:	  The	  disintegration	  of	  the	  nationalist	  coalitions	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  presidential	  authoritarianism	  1963-­‐78’,	  African	  
Affairs,	  88:351	  (1989),	  pp.	  229–251,	  p.	  241.	  47	  Himbara,	  Kenyan	  Capitalists,	  p.	  118-­‐9.	  48	  Nyong’o,	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  and	  society	  in	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  Tamarkin,	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  World	  Today,	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  50	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available	   to	   the	   regime	   started	   to	   diminish	   in	   the	   latter	   half	   of	   the	   1960s,	   the	  question	   of	   how	   to	  manage	   or	  meet	   expectations	   became	   harder	   to	   answer.	   This	  contributed	   to	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   KPU,	   whose	   ideological	   and	   policy	   challenge	  required	  a	  response	  from	  the	  regime.	  Kenyatta	  reacted	  by	  ensuring	  that	  the	  power	  to	  control	   state	  resources	  ultimately	  rested	  with	   the	  executive.	   In	   this	  way,	  David	  Himbara	   highlights	   a	   number	   of	   ‘extraordinary	   episodes’	   in	   1969	   of	   ‘executive	  sabotage	  of	  fiscal	  management’.52	  The	  Transfer	  of	  Functions	  Act	  allowed	  the	  central	  government	  to	  retain	  all	  major	  taxing	  powers	  and	  the	  associated	  revenue.	  The	  Act	  also	   rebalanced	   the	   relationship	   between	   local	   authorities	   and	   the	   provincial	  administration.	  From	  1970,	  the	  administration’s	  dominance	  in	  district	  development	  committees;	   and	   land,	   agriculture	   and	   education	   boards	   augmented	   the	   role	   that	  administrators	  played	  in	  patronage	  politics.	  There	  was	  a	  parallel	   loss	  of	  resources	  for	   the	   party	   and	   local	   authorities.	   Partly	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   these	   processes	   of	  state	   centralisation,	   ‘the	   growth	   and	   instability	   of	   the	   1960s’,	   Charles	   Hornsby	  observes,	   ‘gave	   way	   to	   stability,	   slower	   development	   and	   the	   entrenchment	   of	  Kikuyu	  power’	  in	  the	  1970s.53	  	   In	   analysing	   how	  Kenyatta	   and	   his	   inner	   circle	   triumphed	   over	   their	   KPU	  opponents,	  Branch	  and	  Cheeseman	  suggest	  that	  the	  ‘the	  Kenyan	  elite’	  succeeded	  in	  presenting	   ‘a	   political	   platform	   tailored	   to	   their	   own	   vested	   interests	   as	   a	   set	   of	  policies	   intended	   to	  benefit	   all’.54	  Here	   they	  dismiss	   the	  possibility	   that	   a	   genuine	  ‘political	   theology’	   might	   have	   underpinned	   the	   processes	   of	   institution-­‐building	  and	  class	   formation	   that	   they	  highlight	  and	  document.	  For	   John	  Lonsdale	   this	   is	  a	  mistake.	   He	   makes	   the	   case	   for	   taking	   seriously	   the	   notion	   that	   Kenyatta	   was	  guided	   by	   his	   own	   ‘moral	   theory	   of	   patronage’	   and	   civic	   virtue.55	  Importantly,	  acknowledging	  Kenyatta’s	  ‘political	  theology’	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  reconcile	  the	  fact	  that	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  the	  government	  was	  attacking	  local	  self-­‐government,	  it	  was	  actively	  encouraging	  a	  movement	  of	  local	  self-­‐help	  known	  as	  harambee.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Himbara,	  Kenyan	  Capitalists,	  p.	  118.	  53	  Hornsby,	  Kenya:	  A	  History	  Since	  Independence,	  p.	  220.	  54	  Branch	  and	  Cheeseman,	  ‘The	  politics	  of	  control',	  p.	  25.	  55	  John	  Lonsdale,	  ‘Jomo	  Kenyatta,	  God	  and	  the	  Modern	  World’,	  in	  Jan-­‐Georg	  Deutsch,	  Peter	  Probst,	  and	  Heike	  Schmidt	  (eds.),	  African	  Modernities:	  Entangled	  Meanings	  in	  Current	  
Debate	  (Oxford,	  2002),	  pp.	  31-­‐65.	  
	  	  
117	  
	   E.	  S.	  Atieno	  Odhiambo	  argues	  that,	  with	  the	  banning	  of	  the	  KPU,	  ‘Kenyatta’s	  type	   of	   ethnicity’	   triumphed	   over	   Oginga	   Odinga’s.56 	  Kenyatta’s	   conception	   of	  Gikuyu	   traditions	   and	   values,	   David	   Throup	   observes,	   had	   evolved	   and	   been	  articulated	   in	   the	   1920s	   and	   1930s	   whilst	   working	   as	   a	   writer	   and	   publisher.	  During	   this	   time	   Kenyatta	   ‘created	   a	   Kikuyu	   subnationalist	   ideology,	   which	  legitimised	   the	   accumulation	   of	   land	   and	   capital…within	   the	   framework	   of	   a	  revitalised	  traditional	  mythology’.57	  This	   ideology,	  Atieno	  Odhiambo	  writes,	  meant	  that	   as	   president,	  Kenyatta	   ‘was	   obligated	   to	   the	  Agikuyu	   in	   specific	  ways,	   but	   to	  Kenya	   in	   general	   ways.	   He	   chose	   to	   be	   self-­‐regarding	   and	   inclusive	   towards	   all	  Gikuyu,	  the	  limit	  of	  his	  moral	  ethnicity,	  and	  to	  be	  other-­‐regarding	  towards	  the	  rest	  of	   the	   Kenyan	   society,	   his	   subjects.’58	  John	   Lonsdale	   takes	   this	   argument	   even	  further	  by	  suggesting	  that	  implicit	  to	  Kenyatta’s	  political	  theology	  was	  a	  belief	  that	  ‘one	  could,	  and	  should,	  do	  rather	  little	  for	  fellow	  Africans	  outside	  one’s	  own	  moral	  community’.59	  Kenyatta’s	   emphasis	   on	   intra-­‐ethnic	   obligation	   found	   expression	   in	  his	   independence	   motto	   harambee.	   Kenyans	   were	   told	   to	   ‘pull	   together’	   and	  mobilise	   local	   resources	   to	   initiate	   development	   projects.	   Kenyatta	  was	   far	  more	  enthusiastic	   about	   this	   kind	   of	   local	   self-­‐help	   than	   he	   was	   about	   local	   self-­‐government.	   Indeed	   the	   vitality	   of	   the	   harambee	  movement,	   particularly	   in	   the	  1970s,	  stood	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  generally	  lethargic	  condition	  that	  most	  county	  councils	  found	  themselves	  in.	  To	  Henry	  Bienen,	  this	  was	  a	  logical	  preference	  for	  the	  regime;	  ‘local	  participation	  through	  concrete	  self-­‐help	  projects’	  did	  not	  contain	  the	  same	   inherent	   challenge	   as	   ‘participation	   in	   competitive	   politics’	   did.60	  It	   also	  focused	  the	  responsibility	  for	  development	  services	  onto	  patrons	  and	  clients	  within	  separate	  moral	  communities	  rather	  than	  the	  state.	  	  
	   Harambees	  generally	  followed	  a	  similar	  formula:	  a	  desired	  project	  such	  as	  a	  school,	   health	   centre,	   or	   agricultural	   service,	   would	   be	   identified	   by	   people	   in	   a	  community.	  A	   fundraising	   committee	  would	   form,	   combining	   local	  politicians	  and	  members	   of	   the	   administration.	   The	   local	   population	   and	   businesses	   would	   be	  expected	   to	   contribute	   small	   donations.	   National	   politicians	   would	   preside	   over	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large	   fundraising	   baraza,	   and	   publicly	   announce	   their	   donations	   to	   the	   project.	  Most	  often,	  harambees	  funded	  the	  capital	  costs	  of	  a	  project;	  recurrent	  costs	  would	  then	   be	   transferred	   to	   local	   or	   central	   government.	   To	   an	   extent	   the	   harambee	  movement	   was	   anti-­‐local	   government,	   as	   it	   tended	   to	   focus	   the	   imaginary	  developmental	   contract	   between	   subject	   and	   citizen	   in	   theatrical	   displays	   of	   a	  relationship	   with	   particular	   individuals,	   usually	   involved	   in	   national	   politics	   and	  often	  co-­‐ethnics,	  rather	  than	  in	  the	  more	  mundane	  and	  bureaucratic	  world	  of	  local	  government.	   Harambee	   was	   neo-­‐patrimonialism	   performed;	   whereas	   county	  councils,	   conventionally,	   required	   a	   more	   detached,	   procedural	   and	   impartial	  approach	  to	  political	  representation	  and	  service	  delivery.	  	  	   The	  Transfer	  of	  Functions	  Act	  made	   it	  much	  harder	   for	   county	   councils	   to	  participate	   in	   local	   patron-­‐client	   networks	   as	   the	   next	   section	   explores.	   By	  removing	   GPT	   funds	   and	   service	   responsibilities	   from	   local	   authorities,	   councils	  were	   only	   partially	   able	   to	   fulfil	   the	   role	   of	   patron.	   Angelique	   Haugerud	  distinguishes	  between	  two	  aspects	  that	  made	  up	  this	  role:	  	  To	   keep	   his	   …	   pyramid	   of	   followers	   intact,	   a	   patron	   distributes	   personal	  favours	   (assisting	   in	   obtaining	   employment,	   commercial	   loans,	   school	  admission,	  trade	  or	  import	  licences,	  land,	  and	  so	  on).	  In	  addition,	  successful	  politicians	   must	   bring	   (or	   appear	   to	   bring)	   to	   their	   constituencies	  improvements	  such	  as	  roads,	  schools,	  health	  centres,	  and	  mains	  water.61	  From	  1970	  county	  councils	  were	  only	  really	  able	  to	  distribute	  personal	  favours,	  but	  even	   this	   incurred	  costs	   that	  had	   to	  be	   financed.	  No	   longer	  providing	  visible	   local	  improvements,	  local	  authorities’	  rent-­‐seeking	  practices	  were	  increasingly	  regarded	  as	  illegitimate	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  communities	  and	  national	  politicians.	  	  
‘What	  in	  God’s	  name	  are	  they	  doing?’:	  Kilifi	  and	  Kakamega	  councils	  
post-­‐1970	  	  In	   the	  wake	   of	   the	   Transfer	   of	   Functions	  Act,	   Goran	  Hyden	   considered	  what	  was	  next	   for	   local	   government	   in	   Kenya,	   asking:	   ‘Will	   the	   local	   authorities	   remain	   as	  they	   are	   –	   with	   no	   important	   and	   attractive	   functions?	   Will	   they	   be	   totally	  abolished?	  Or	  will	   there	  be	  a	  major	  reconstruction	  of	   the	  whole	   local	  government	  system	   in	   Kenya?’62	  This	   section	   seeks	   to	   answer	   these	   questions	   for	   the	   period	  from	  1970	   to	   1978,	   by	   looking	   at	   how	   the	   actions	   of	   Kilifi	   and	  Kakamega	   county	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councils	  altered	  after	  1970.	  The	  primary	  rationale	  for	  the	  transfer	  of	  functions	  had	  been	  to	  address	  the	  growing	  deficits	  in	  councils’	  budgets.	  However,	  this	  trend	  was	  not	   immediately	   reversed	   in	   1970.	   Instead	   councils	   had	   to	   cope	  with	   the	   loss	   of	  their	  main	  revenue	  sources,	  GPT	  and	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  	  level	  of	  government	  grants	  they	  received.	  Despite	  this,	  they	  still	  had	  to	  maintain	  staff	  salaries	  and	  run	  the	  few	  mandatory	  services	  left	  to	  them,	  including	  nursery	  schools,	  cattle	  dips	  and	  market	  centres.	  This	  meant	   that	   in	  order	   to	  subsist,	  even	  at	   the	  most	  basic	   level,	   councils	  were	   forced	   to	   explore	   new	   ways	   to	   collect	   revenue.	   Kilifi	   County	   Council	  approached	   this	   task	   creatively.	   The	   finance	   and	   general	   purposes	   committee	  decided	  in	  1972	  that	  it	  was	  ‘high	  time’	  the	  rates	  of	  all	  licences	  were	  raised,	  and	  thus	  instituted	  a	  uniform	  increase	  of	  50	  percent.63	  They	  furthermore	  decided	  that	  trade	  application	  forms	  could	  be	   ‘another	  source	  of	  revenue’	  so	  resolved	  to	  sell	   them	  at	  five	   cents	   each,	   and	   traders	  were	   charged	   fifty	   cents	  per	  day	   for	   operating	   in	   the	  council’s	   open	   market.64	  On	   top	   of	   this,	   fees	   were	   applied	   to	   a	   myriad	   of	   other	  occupations	   that	   had	  previously	   operated	   outside	   of	   the	   state’s	   control,	   including	  dog	   dealers	   and	   radio	   repairmen.	   For	   some	   the	   charges	   were	   modest,	   but	   for	   a	  significant	  number	  the	  new	  charges	  amounted	  to	  a	  major	  financial	  burden:	  poultry	  keepers	   were	   to	   pay	   fees	   of	   KSH	   500	   per	   year	   as	   were	   hawkers	   in	   clothes	   and	  building	  contractors.65	  	  	   The	   council’s	   weak	   financial	   position	   was	   reflected	   in	   the	   vitality	   of	   the	  committees.	   Meetings	   that	   had	   lasted	   several	   days	   in	   the	   1960s	   tended	   to	   be	  finished	  by	  lunchtime	  from	  1970	  onwards.	  Only	  the	  Trades	  and	  Markets	  Committee	  continued	   to	   have	   a	   lengthy	   list	   of	   agenda	   items	   at	   each	   meeting,	   which	   was	  indicative	   of	   the	   council’s	   post-­‐1970	   financial	   strategy.	  Required	   to	   seek	   out	   new	  revenue	  sources,	  the	  council	  tried	  to	  reposition	  itself	  as	  the	  primary	  gatekeeper	  to	  the	   local	   economy.	   Through	   attempts	   to	   control	   what	   activities	   were	   permitted	  where,	   and	   by	   whom,	   the	   council	   sought	   to	   ensure	   that	   it	   retained	   a	   stock	   of	  patronage	  goods,	  and	  that	  these	  goods	  brought	  an	  economic	  return	  to	  the	  council.	  Thus,	  council	  business	  came	  to	  be	  dominated	  by	  discussions	  over	  access	  to	  trading	  centres	   and	   markets;	   the	   allocation	   of	   plots;	   and	   the	   development	   of	   ranching	  opportunities.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  Trades	  and	  Markets	  Committee,	  the	  Social	  Services	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Committee,	   after	   1970	   found	   it	   had	   very	   little	   business	   to	   attend	   to.	   Indeed	   the	  chairman	   of	   the	   committee	   repeatedly	   pleaded	  with	  members	   in	   1972	   to	   send	   it	  items	   for	   the	   agenda.66	  In	   terms	   of	   ‘development’	   services,	   the	   council’s	   actions	  were	  negligible.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  new	  revenue	  sources	  identified	  in	  1972,	  the	  council	  was	   still	   unable	   to	  provide	   the	   finance	   for	  bursary	  awards	  budgeted	   for	   the	  year,	  and	   could	   only	   just	   meet	   its	   expenditure	   on	   staff	   salaries	   and	   councillors’	  allowances	  which	  ran	  at	  KSH	  109,908	  per	  month.67	  The	  bursary	  allocation	   for	   the	  whole	  year	  had	  been	  KSH	  99,000.68	  	  	   At	  the	  last	  meeting	  of	  1972,	  Kilifi’s	  councillors	  were	  informed	  that	  President	  Kenyatta	   had	   received	   the	   funds	   gifted	   by	   the	   councillors	   a	   few	  months	   earlier.69	  Earlier	   in	   the	   year,	   councillors	   had	   been	   informed	   that	   at	   a	   recent	   meeting	   of	  ALGAK,	  delegates	  had	  decided	  that	  all	  councillors	  across	  the	  country	  should	  donate	  one	  thousand	  shillings	  out	  of	  their	  allowances	  to	  present	  to	  the	  president	  ‘as	  thanks	  for	  his	  generous	  actions	  to	  postpone	  the	  local	  government	  general	  elections	  to	  the	  year	  1974’.70	  The	   circumstances	   that	   led	   to	   the	   extension	  of	   councillors’	   terms	  by	  two	  years	  were	  something	  of	  a	  mystery,	  even	  to	  members	  of	  parliament.	  Trying	  to	  deduce	  why	  the	  ‘the	  ignorant,	  useless,	  councillors’	  were	  allowed	  to	  remain	  in	  office	  and	   collect	   their	   allowances	   for	   a	   further	   two	   years,	   Martin	   Shikuku	   vaguely	  recalled	   that	   a	   ‘delegation’	   had	   called	   on	   the	   president	   early	   in	   1971,	   and	   that	  Kenyatta	  had	  decided	  –	  in	  disregard	  of	  the	  law	  -­‐	  to	  postpone	  the	  election.	  71	  These	  two	   practices,	   of	   sending	   delegations	   to	   the	   president,	   and	   of	   offering	   tributes,	  became	  part	  of	   the	  modus	  operandi	  for	   local	  authorities	   in	   the	   late-­‐Kenyatta	  state.	  Only	   through	   appealing	   directly	   to	   the	   president	   could	   councils	   negotiate	   an	  improvement	  in	  their	  dispensation.	  	  	   When	   the	   elections	  were	   finally	   held	   in	   1974,	   Kilifi	   councillor	   Paul	   Kambi	  Ngala	   assured	   fellow	   members	   that	   ‘there	   would	   be	   no	   doubt	   of	   their	   being	  returned	  to	  the	  offices	  if	  their	  performances	  could	  be	  appreciated	  by	  the	  public’.72	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  Session,	  28	  July	  1971,	  cols.	  2744-­‐2794,	  col.	  2759.	  	  72	  Full	  council	  minutes,	  KCC,	  22	  May	  1974,	  CA/8/72,	  KNA,	  Nairobi.	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Yet	  the	  results	  indicated	  that	  the	  public	  was	  far	  from	  appreciative	  of	  the	  councillors.	  Of	  the	  thirty-­‐three	  sitting	  councillors,	  only	  seven	  were	  re-­‐elected	  in	  1974	  to	  serve	  on	  a	   smaller	   council,	   reduced	   to	   twenty	  members.73	  A	   letter	   to	   the	  Weekly	  Review	  written	   two	   years	   later,	  was	   clear	   on	  why	   ‘during	   elections	  many	   councillors	   are	  merely	   dropped’.74	  Sojon	   arap	  Kirui	  wrote	   that	   council	   services	  were	   ‘almost	   at	   a	  standstill’,	   ‘operating	  perpetual	  overdrafts’,	   to	   the	  point	   that	  most	  county	  councils	  had	  become	  ‘mere	  “employment	  agencies”’.75	  	  ‘This	  situation’	  arap	  Kirui	  wrote,	  ‘had	  tended	  to	  tarnish	  the	  image	  of	  councillors’.76	  	  	  	  	  
Figure	  8:	  Income/expenditure	  by	  department,	  Kakamega	  County	  Council,	  
1974.	  








of	  total	  	  Administration	  	   103,945	   5.3	   1,023,138	   51.9	  Works	  	   -­‐/-­‐	   -­‐/-­‐	   41,432	   2.1	  Councillors	  	   -­‐/-­‐	   -­‐/-­‐	   105,110	   5.5	  Community	  	   41,329	   2	   260,170	   13.2	  Veterinary	  	   74	   -­‐/-­‐	   49,962	   2.5	  Markets	  	   985,235	   50	   264,662	   13.4	  Water	  Supply	  	   11,521	   0.9	   15,718	   1	  Cess	  	   49,296	   2.5	   2,039	   0.2	  Licences	  	   674,333	   34.2	   26,024	   1.3	  Miscellaneous	  	   104,018	   5.1	   5,990	   3.4	  Conservancy	  	   852	   -­‐/-­‐	  	   -­‐/-­‐	   -­‐/-­‐	  Probable	  surplus	  	   -­‐/-­‐	   -­‐/-­‐	   176,361	   8.9	  
Total	  	   KSH	  
1,970,605	  
100%	   KSH	  
1,970,605	  
100%	  In	  Kenyan	  Shillings.	  Source:	  HW/16/67,	  KNA,	  Kakamega.	  	  	  	   The	   argument	   that	   the	   only	   significant	   service	   that	   local	   government	  provided	  was	  as	  an	  ‘employment	  agency’	  appeared	  to	  hold	  some	  truth	  in	  Kakamega.	  Over	  50	  percent	  of	  the	  council’s	  expenditure	  in	  1974	  was	  spent	  on	  salaries	  for	  the	  101	   employees	   and	   allowances	   for	   the	   thirty-­‐eight	   councillors.77	  Expenditure	   on	  councillors’	   allowances	   alone	  accounted	   for	  more	   than	   the	   combined	  expenditure	  on	  public	  works	  and	  veterinary	  services.78	  The	  only	  capital	  programmes	  the	  council	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  KCC	  minutes	  1974,	  Kilifi	  County	  Government	  Archive.	  	  74	  Sojon	  arap	  Kirui	  (letter),	  ‘The	  mess	  in	  our	  councils’,	  Weekly	  Review,	  13	  September	  1976,	  p.	  2.	  	  75	  Ibid.	  	  76	  Ibid	  	  	  77	  Annual	  Report	  KMGCC	  1974,	  HW/16/67,	  KNA,	  Kakamega.	  	  78	  Ibid.	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initiated	  were	  financed	  by	  a	  loan	  from	  the	  Local	  Government	  Loans	  Authority	  and	  the	   National	   Housing	   Corporation.	   As	   in	   Kilifi,	   Kakamega	   County	   Council	   had	  pursued	   a	   similar	   fiscal	   strategy	   since	   1970;	   in	   1974	   80	   percent	   of	   its	   revenue	  derived	   from	   markets	   and	   licences.79	  Yet	   the	   council’s	   attempts	   to	   exert	   greater	  control	  over	  markets	  and	  traders	  did	  not	  go	  unchallenged.	  In	  December	  1975,	  the	  council	  had	  to	  revoke	  its	  decision	  to	   issue	  licences	  to	  hawkers	  selling	  new	  clothes	  after	  shopkeepers	  based	   in	   the	  councils’	  markets	  protested.	  This	  seemingly	   trivial	  dispute	   escalated	   into	   a	   protracted	   struggle	   between	   hawkers,	   shopkeepers,	   the	  council,	  the	  local	  MP	  and	  the	  provincial	  administration.80	  	  	   Shadrack	   Okova,	   MP	   for	   Lurambi	   South	   took	   up	   the	   matter	   of	   hawkers	  passionately.81	  He	   asked	   ‘where	   on	   earth’	   the	   council	   had	   obtained	   ‘authority	   to	  ruin	   the	   businesses	   of	   our	   traders	   who	   have	   put	   a	   lot	   of	   effort	   in	   building	   and	  running	  shops	   in	  various	  markets’.82	  He	  accused	  the	  councillors	  of	  sitting	   in	   ‘ivory	  towers’,	   unaware	   that	   the	   new	   hawkers	   were	   undercutting	   shopkeepers	   in	   the	  markets.	   If	   the	   council	   insisted	   on	   issuing	   licences	   to	   hawkers,	   he	   proposed	  somewhat	   ludicrously	  that	  the	   licence	  fee	  be	  fixed	  at	  KSH	  6,000	  per	  year.	  Early	   in	  1976	   the	   council	   had	   to	   call	   a	   special	   meeting	   to	   discuss	   the	   issue	   further.83	  A	  delegation	  of	  hawkers	  had	  lobbied	  the	  district	  commissioner	  who	  in	  turn	  had	  asked	  the	   council	   to	   ‘possibly	   pardon’	   the	   new	   clothes	   dealers.84	  However,	   the	   council’s	  clerk	  had	  also	  met	  with	  the	  Kenya	  National	  Chambers	  of	  Commerce	  who	  supported	  the	   ban	   on	   hawkers	   in	   new	   clothes	   operating	   in	   the	  market.85	  Over	   the	   following	  months	  rumours	  and	  mutual	  suspicion	  reigned.	  Finally	  the	  government	  decided	  to	  study	  the	  matter	  fully,	  and	  in	  September	  the	  district	  commissioner	  announced	  the	  decision.	   He	   was	   ‘applauded	   when	   he	   informed	   the	   council	   that	   all	   restrictions	  imposed	   on	   hawkers	   licences	   had	   been	   lifted’.86	  In	   1977	   thirty	   new	   items	   of	   fees	  and	  charges	  were	  introduced	  including	  the	  KSH	  1,200/per	  annum	  fee	  for	  hawking	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  Ibid.	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  Full	  council	  minutes,	  KMGCC,	  19	  December	  1975	  to	  31	  March	  1978,	  HW/13/11,	  KNA,	  Kakamega.	  	  81	  Full	  council	  minutes,	  KMGCC,	  19	  December	  1975,	  HW/13/11,	  KNA,	  Kakamega.	  82	  Ibid.	  	  	  83	  Special	  meeting	  minutes,	  KMGCC,	  12	  February	  1976,	  HW/13/11,	  KNA,	  Kakamega.	  	  	  84	  Ibid.	  	  85	  Ibid.	  	  86	  Full	  council	  minutes,	  KMGCC,	  24	  September	  1976,	  HW/13/11,	  KNA,	  Kakamega.	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in	  new	  clothes.87	  Similar	  disputes	  were	  taking	  place	  across	  the	  country	  at	  the	  time,	  as	   different	   elected	   representatives	   tried	   to	   cast	   themselves	   as	   the	   legitimate	  spokesmen	   for	   different	   levels	   of	   entrepreneurship.	  What	   is	   significant	   about	   the	  outcome	  in	  Kakamega,	  is	  that	  it	  was	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  district	  commissioner	  that	  ultimately	  stuck;	  even	  without	  any	  legal	  standing,	  the	  provincial	  administration	  –	  as	  agent	  of	   the	  president	   –	   could	  overrule	   all	   other	  political	   actors	   and	  bureaucratic	  personnel.	  	  
‘An	  incongruous	  assembly	  of	  charlatan	  opportunists’:	  Popular	  
perceptions	  of	  councils	  and	  councillors	  	  The	  measures	  taken	  by	  Kilifi	  and	  Kakamega	  councils	  after	  1970	  to	  remain	  solvent	  were	  replicated	  in	  local	  authorities	  across	  Kenya	  at	  this	  time.	  Such	  actions	  however	  did	   little	   to	   improve	   the	   already	   poor	   reputation	   of	   local	   government.	   Press	  coverage	   of	   civic	   affairs	   in	   the	   1970s	   depicted	   a	   general	   picture	   of	   councils	   in	  complete	   disarray.	   The	   assumption	   evident	   in	   newspaper	   reports	   throughout	   the	  1970s	  was	  that	  councillors	  were,	  at	  best,	  inept,	  and	  at	  worst	  highly	  corrupt.	  Stories	  highlighted	   councils	   in	   financial	   ruin;88	  councils	   where	  workers	  were	   perennially	  unpaid	   and/or	   on	   strike; 89 	  councils	   that	   had	   raised	   rates	   and	   fees	  indiscriminately;90	  and	   councils	   accused	   of	   corruption	   or	   other	   forms	   of	   scandal	  and	  political	  intrigue.91	  Somehow	  it	  was	  permissible	  for	  these	  kinds	  of	  criticisms	  to	  be	  levelled	  at	  local	  government,	  whereas	  similar	  accusations	  –	  which	  were	  equally	  valid	   –	   could	   not	   be	   made	   in	   respect	   of	   central	   government.	   Perhaps	   this	   was	  because	   the	  press	   took	   their	  cue	   from	  national	  politicians;	  parliamentarians	  often	  used	  the	  National	  Assembly	  to	  lambast	  councils	  and	  councillors.	  	  	   The	   substance	   of	   MPs	   criticisms	   generally	   emphasised	   three	   issues.	   First,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  any	  useful	   functions	  remained	  with	  county	  councils	  after	  1970	  was	  repeatedly	  raised.	  In	  this	  way,	  Waruru	  Kanja	  asked	  the	  Minister	  for	  Local	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  collapse’	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Daily	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  ‘Council	  workers	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  strike’,	  Daily	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  1976,	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  threat	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  Daily	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  14	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  p.	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  ‘Threat	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  rates	  boycott	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  Daily	  Nation,	  12	  February	  1976,	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  ‘Council	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  91	  ‘Council	  scandal	  ‘could	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  million’’,	  Daily	  Nation,	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  Daily	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Government	   ‘with	   all	   due	   respect’	   if	   he	   could	   tell	   the	   House	   ‘what	   the	   county	  councils	  do?’92	  Similarly	  the	  member	  for	  Kisumu	  Rural	  admitted	  in	  1973	  that	  ‘when	  we	   took	   over	   the	   functions	   from	   them	   [county	   councils],	   apparently	   nobody	   ever	  thought	   as	   to	   what	   they	   would	   be	   doing	   afterwards’. 93 	  Others	   were	   less	  circumspect;	  MP	   Owala-­‐Orwa	   stated	   baldly	   in	   1971	   that	   ‘the	   county	   councils	   are	  dead’.94	  The	  second	  issue,	  connected	  to	  the	  first,	  concerned	  the	  perceived	  injustice	  of	  councils’	  fiscal	  and	  regulatory	  policies.	  One	  MP	  captured	  the	  national	  mood	  when	  he	   asked	   in	  1973	   ‘for	  how	   long	   is	   the	   county	   council	   going	   to	   continue	   collecting	  taxes	  from	  the	  wananchi	  without	  providing	  any	  service	  to	  them?’95	  Martin	  Shikuku	  offered	  a	  more	  vivid	  illustration	  of	  this	  tension	  between	  taxes	  and	  services.	  He	  told	  a	  story	  of	  an	  ‘old	  woman’	  who	  went	  to	  market	  every	  day	  ‘with	  her	  little	  basket’:	  She	  has	  to	  pay	  the	  entrance	  fee	  and	  this	  is	  very	  painful	  to	  the	  old	  woman.	  Sometimes	  she	  goes	  to	  the	  market	  and	  sits	  there	  and	  she	  does	  not	  buy	  or	  sell	   anything;	   she	  goes	  out	  of	   the	  market,	   having	  paid	  her	  20	   cents	  or	  40	  cents	  and	  then	  she	  goes	  home.	  Then	  the	   following	  market	  day,	  she	  comes	  back	  again	  and	  pays	  20	  cents	  or	  40	  cents	  so	  as	  to	  be	  allowed	  to	  get	  into	  the	  market,	  and	  once	  more	  she	  does	  not	  sell	  anything.	  Now,	  she	  goes	  on	  paying	  this	   fee	  without	   getting	   anything.	  Now,	   this	   is	   all	   right	   as	   far	   as	   the	   local	  council	  is	  concerned,	  but	  what	  do	  the	  people	  in	  that	  local	  council	  area	  get?	  Nothing,	   Mr.	   Speaker,	   because	   the	   money	   has	   been	   consumed	   by	   a	   few	  individuals.96	  	  Shikuku’s	  final	  insinuation	  that	  profits	  were	  being	  ‘consumed’	  by	  individuals	  spoke	  to	   the	   third	   complaint	   commonly	   raised	   in	   parliament,	   that	   councillors	   were	  motivated	  by	  self-­‐interest,	  and	  were	  lacking	  in	  intellect	  and	  moral	  character.	  Thus	  Wilson	  Ndolo	  Ayah	  suggested	  in	  1972	  that	  ‘we	  have	  men	  and	  women	  in	  the	  county	  councils	  who	  have	  no	  interest	  in	  what	  they	  are	  doing’.97	  For	  Ayah,	  councillors	  were	  only	   interested	   in	   becoming	   a	   ‘millionaire’.98	  The	   Member	   for	   Kitui	   East	   on	   the	  other	   hand,	   blamed	   illiteracy	   and	   lack	   of	   education	   for	   the	   poor	   performance	   of	  councillors.	  He	  asked	  the	  House:	  ‘How	  do	  you	  expect	  ignorant	  people	  to	  make	  laws	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for	   our	   councils?...we	   do	   not	  want	   to	   see	   councillors	  who	   know	   nothing	   else	   but	  rearing	  of	  cattle	  and	  who	  can	  neither	  read	  nor	  write	  anything.’99	  	  	   This	   tendency	   to	   ignore	  structural	   issues	  and	   isolate	   the	  problems	  of	   local	  government	   in	   the	   failures	   of	   individuals	   did	   not	   go	   completely	   unchallenged.	  Indeed,	  one	  KANU	  backbencher	  boldly	  asked	  in	  1972:	  ‘How	  can	  we	  tell	  councillors	  that	  it	  is	  wrong	  for	  them	  to	  continue	  doing	  what	  they	  are	  doing	  now,	  that	  pinching	  here	  and	  there	  when	  the	  same	  thing	  is	  happening	  in	  this	  hon.	  House?’100	  The	  press	  was	  careful	  not	  to	  draw	  such	  direct	  comparisons	  between	  the	  actions	  of	  councillors	  and	  national	  politicians,	  and	  yet	  newspapers	  did	  highlight	  the	  central	  government’s	  failure	  to	  develop	  sustainable	  plans	  for	  local	  government.	  Such	  criticisms	  increased	  after	   the	   abolition	   in	   1973	   of	   GPT,	   which	   had	   continued	   to	   serve	   as	   the	   main	  revenue	   source	   for	  municipal	   councils	   after	   1970.	   Direct	   taxation	  was	   ultimately	  abandoned	  in	  favour	  of	  indirect	  taxation;	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  instituted	  a	  sales	  tax	  on	  most	  basic	  commodities	  and	  consumer	  products.	  The	  Weekly	  Review	  in	  1976	  highlighted	  the	  impact	  that	  this	  decision	  had	  had	  on	  councils:	  The	   result	   has	   been	   an	   unsuccessful	   improvisation	   by	   the	   central	  government	   in	  an	  effort	   to	  cope	  with	  the	  deficits	  which	  some	  of	   the	  more	  complex	   local	   government	   authorities	   have	   incurred	   in	   their	   budgeting	  since	   the	   abolition	   of	   GPT.	   It	   is,	   indeed,	   precisely	   because	   the	   central	  government	   has	   no	   ready	   solution	   to	   the	   financial	   problems	   of	   the	   local	  government	   authorities	   that	   it	   has	   tended	   to	   approve	   such	   desperate	  revenue	   raising	   measures	   as	   the	   Nairobi	   city	   council	   embarked	   upon	  recently.101	  The	   fact	   that	   the	   central	   government	   had	   ‘no	   ready	   solution	   to	   the	   financial	  problems’	   of	   local	   authorities	   led	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Local	   Government	   in	   1975	   to	  formally	   request	   consultancy	   assistance	   from	   the	   International	   Monetary	   Fund	  (IMF).	   The	   IMF	   was	   asked	   ‘to	   examine	   and	   review	   the	   whole	   field	   of	   financial	  relationships	  between	  central	  government	  and	  local	  government,	  and	  recommend	  the	   changes	  necessary	   to	   strengthen	   the	   financial	   base	   of	   these	   local	   government	  authorities	  so	  that	  they	  might	  administer	  the	  functions	  presently	  accorded	  to	  them	  by	  the	  central	  government	  more	  effectively.’102	  The	  draft	  interim	  report	  of	  the	  IMF	  group	   began	   by	   stating	   that	   ‘government	   policy	   on	   the	   intended	   role	   of	   local	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authorities	   remains	   to	   be	   clearly	   spelled	   out.’103	  It	   went	   on	   to	   note	   that	   ‘central	  government	   decisions…would	   appear	   to	   have	   contributed	   to	   the	   deterioration	   in	  the	   financial	   position	   of	   local	   bodies’.104	  The	   final	   report	   was	   presented	   to	   the	  government	  at	  some	  point	  in	  1976.	  To	  the	  great	  frustration	  of	  ALGAK,	  its	  contents	  were	   never	   made	   public.105	  Five	   years	   later	   in	   April	   1981	   during	   a	   debate	   in	  parliament,	   it	   was	   claimed	   that	   the	   IMF’s	   recommendations	   were	   ‘still	   being	  studied	  by	  the	  government’.106	  	  	   The	  fact	  that	  technocrats	  at	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Local	  Government	  were	  at	  least	  going	  through	  the	  motions	  of	  trying	  to	  restore	  the	  viability	  of	  local	  government	  was	  symptomatic	   of	   an	   enduring	   tension	   in	   post-­‐colonial	   Kenya	   between	   persistent	  bureaucratic	   norms	   and	   pervasive	   neo-­‐patrimonial	   practices.	   As	   Branch	   and	  Cheeseman	  note,	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  Kenyatta	  regime	  rested	  on	  its	  particular	  mix	  of	   ‘rational-­‐legal’	   and	   ‘charismatic’	   authority.107	  This	  might	  partly	  explain	  why	   the	  government’s	   official	   stance	   towards	   local	   government	   was	   upheld	   so	   doggedly	  throughout	   the	   1970s	   in	   disregard	   of	   the	   system’s	   apparent	   failure.	   The	   shell	   of	  local	   government	   that	   endured	   throughout	   the	  1970s	   allowed	   the	   government	   to	  retain	  certain	  democratic	  credentials,	  important	  to	  both	  domestic	  and	  international	  audiences.	   Thus	   at	   a	   meeting	   of	   ALGAK	   in	   October	   1977,	   the	   Minister	   for	   Local	  Government,	   R.	   S.	   Matano,	   restated	   the	   familiar	   platitudes	   about	   the	   democratic	  foundation	  provided	  by	  local	  government.	  He	  told	  the	  association	  that	  there	  was	  ‘no	  doubt	   that	   the	   government	   is	   committed	   to	   the	   continued	   existence	   of	   a	   strong	  healthy	   local	   government	   system	   in	   this	   country,	   as	   this	   is	   the	   basis	   of	   our	  democracy	   in	  which	   the	  power	  of	   the	  vote	  rather	   than	  the	  sword	   is	  enshrined.’108	  Yet	   the	   fact	   that	   Matano	   held	   this	   post	   was	   indicative	   of	   how	   Kenyatta’s	   inner	  cabinet	  truly	  regarded	  the	  institution.	  Matano	  –	  who	  a	  decade	  earlier	  had	  served	  on	  the	   Hardacre	   Commission	   –	  was	   also	   at	   this	   time	   the	   acting	   secretary	   general	   of	  KANU.	  Although	   theoretically	  powerful,	  Matano	  was	   likely	   chosen	   for	   this	   role	  on	  the	   basis	   that	   he	   did	   not	   have	   the	   skills	   or	   popularity	   to	   organise	   the	   party	   and	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build	  a	  power	  base.	  These	  low	  expectations	  of	  Matano	  were	  confirmed	  in	  1976	  after	  a	   largely	   unsuccessful	   national	   KANU	   recruitment	   drive;	   public	   apathy	   -­‐	   Matano	  dubiously	  claimed	  -­‐	  was	  ‘the	  result	  of	  contentment’.109	  
Conclusion	  	  In	  July	  1978	  the	  Daily	  Nation	  printed	  a	  letter	  of	  complaint	  it	  had	  received	  from	  R.	  J.	  Majaliwa	  concerning	  the	  performance	  of	  Kilifi	  County	  Council:	  	  Since	   the	   take-­‐over	   by	   the	   government	   of	   some	   services	   the	   council	   has	  failed	   to	   find	   alternative	   ways	   of	   getting	   revenue	   apart	   from	   overtaxing	  poor	  Wananchi	   on	   licences…What	   surprises	   the	   taxpayers	   is	   the	   fact	   that	  the	  meagre	  revenue	  that	   is	  collected	  is	  spent	  on	  staff	  salaries	  and	  nothing	  else.110	  	  A	   moral	   critique	   of	   the	   council’s	   apparently	   unjust	   fiscal	   policies,	   this	   kind	   of	  analysis	   had	   become	   pervasive	   by	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1970s.	   After	   the	   transfer	   of	  functions,	   government	   ministers	   did	   not	   refute	   this	   narrative.	   That	   central	  government	   policies	   might	   have	   contributed	   to	   the	   financial	   difficulties	   councils	  faced	  was	  less	  commonly	  suggested;	  	  councillors	  and	  officers	  were	  themselves	  held	  to	  blame.	  Branded	  as	  ignorant	  and	  corrupt,	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  councillors	  inevitably	  eroded,	  as	  councils,	  lacking	  resources	  and	  bound	  by	  bureaucracy,	  found	  themselves	  unable	   to	   replicate	   the	  more	   informal	   approach	   to	   the	   provision	   of	   development	  services	   favoured	   by	   Kenyatta	   which	   were	   dependent	   upon	   access	   to	   the	  president’s	  clientelist	  networks.	  	  	   The	   limited	   resources	   that	   councils	   controlled	   were	   not	   sufficient	   for	  anything	   beyond	   the	   provision	   of	   employment.	   In	   responding	   to	   the	   needs	   and	  demands	  of	  their	  constituents,	  councillors	  only	  had	  their	  allowances	  to	  call	  on.	  Thus	  negotiating	  with	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Local	   Government	   or	   sending	   delegations	   to	   the	  president	  to	  ask	  for	  improved	  conditions	  and	  a	  better	  dispensation	  became	  a	  major	  activity	   for	   councils	   and	   ALGAK	   after	   1970. 111 	  However,	   this	   only	   further	  contributed	  to	  the	  crisis	  of	  legitimacy	  councillors	  were	  facing	  as	  they	  were	  seen	  to	  be	  more	   concerned	  with	   their	   personal	   enrichment	   than	  with	   local	   development.	  Even	   a	   professional	   journal	  wrote	   in	   1974	   that	   ‘councillors	   as	   individuals	   do	   not	  place	   due	   emphasis	   on	   the	   public	   responsibility	   entrusted	   to	   them,	   but	   on	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  5	  April	  1976.	  	  110	  R.	  J	  .Majaliwa	  (letter),	  ‘This	  is	  a	  waste’,	  Daily	  Nation,	  6	  July	  1978,	  p.	  7.	  	  111	  Address	  by	  Minister	  for	  Local	  Government	  to	  ALGAK,	  15	  October	  1976,	  JA/1/3,	  KNA,	  Nairobi.	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imaginary	   benefits	   that	   will	   accrue	   to	   themselves	   as	   persons	   after	   becoming	  councillors.’112	  This	  narrative	  took	  no	  account	  of	  the	  clientelist	  pressures	  placed	  on	  councillors	   ‘from	   below’.	   Yet	   as	   the	   next	   chapter	   will	   show,	   councillors	   were	  constantly	  having	   to	   try	   to	   respond	   to	   the	  needs	  of	   their	   constituents	   and	  ensure	  their	   own	  modest	   advancement.	   After	   1970,	   it	   became	   effectively	   impossible	   for	  councillors	   to	   balance	   these	   two	   demands.	   The	   government	   retained	   the	   shell	   of	  local	  government	  but	  allowed	   the	   institutions	   to	   fail	   financially.	  Daniel	  arap	  Moi’s	  presidency	  did	  not	   lead	  to	   the	  revitalisation	  of	   local	  government	  as	  an	   institution,	  but	   it	   did	   see	   the	   individuals	   occupying	   local	   office	   brought	   into	   the	   president’s	  patron-­‐client	  network	  in	  a	  way	  that	  contrasted	  with	  the	  approach	  and	  neglect	  of	  his	  predecessors.	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  E.	  K.	  Mbogori	  and	  H.	  J.	  Nyamu,	  ‘The	  role	  of	  local	  government	  in	  public	  administration’,	  
The	  Journal	  of	  the	  Kenya	  Institute	  of	  Administration,	  (1974),	  pp.	  9–16,	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Chapter	   Four:	   Co-­‐opting	   councillors:	   Local	   government	   in	  the	  “nyayo”	  state,	  1979-­‐1990	  
Introduction	  	  	  The	  previous	  chapter	  examined	  the	   impact	   that	   the	  Transfer	  of	  Functions	  Act	  had	  on	   the	   capacity	   and	   vitality	   of	   county	   councils.	   It	   placed	   this	   within	   the	   broader	  context	  of	  late	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  when	  state	  power	  was	  systematically	  centralised	  in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   president	   and	   his	   close	   advisors.	   This	   chapter	   looks	   at	   the	  experiences	  of	  county	  councils	  under	  president	  Moi’s	  one	  party	  state.	   It	   shifts	   the	  focus	   from	   official	   policy	   to	   the	   lived	   experiences	   of	   councillors.	   Given	   the	   poor	  public	  reputation	  of	  councillors	  by	  the	  end	  of	  Kenyatta’s	  presidency,	  it	  might	  have	  been	  expected	  that	  local	  government	  would	  slip	  even	  further	  into	  political	  oblivion.	  This	  chapter	  demonstrates	  that	  this	  was	  not	  the	  case;	  councillors	  were	  recognised	  and	   acknowledged	   by	   other	   figures	   of	   authority	   in	   a	  way	   that	   they	   had	   not	   been	  previously.	   And	   even	   whilst	   councils	   as	   institutions	   continued	   to	   lose	   funds	   and	  autonomy,	  councillors	  were	  able	  to	  develop	  new	  strategies	  for	  extracting	  resources	  and	   opportunities.	   These	   made	   it	   possible	   for	   some	   councillors	   to	   regain	   local	  legitimacy,	  as	  they	  could	  once	  again	  contribute	  to	  harambee	  and	  help	  kith	  and	  kin	  in	  various	  ways.	   In	   accounting	   for	   this	   shift	   in	   the	   status	   of	   councillors,	   the	   chapter	  compares	   the	  different	  ways	   that	  Kenyatta	   and	  Moi	   chose	   to	   engage	  with	  district	  level	  politics.	  Whilst	  Kenyatta	  sought	  to	  rule	  through	  regional	  bosses	  and	  provincial	  commissioners,	  Moi	  developed	  multiple	  channels	  and	  institutions	  that	  allowed	  him	  to	   exercise	   greater	   surveillance	   and	   control	   at	   the	   local	   level.	   Resulting	   from	   a	  policy	   ostensibly	   intended	   to	   decentralise	   district	   planning,	   local	   government	   re-­‐entered	  the	  regime’s	   frame	  of	  vision.	  Councillors	  continued	  to	  present	   themselves	  as	  ‘leaders	  of	  the	  grassroots’,	  and	  so	  were	  considered	  useful	  allies	  to	  more	  powerful	  patrons.	  In	  this	  way,	  councillors	  became	  members	  of	  district	  networks	  of	  clientage,	  and	  were	  recognised	  and	  rewarded	  by	  the	  president	  when	  he	  toured	  the	  country.	  	  	  	   The	   chapter	   begins	   by	   considering	   the	   reasons	   why	   people	   continued	   to	  stand	   for	   election	   as	   councillors	   in	   this	   period.	   Given	   the	   state	   of	   decay	   the	   local	  government	  had	  reached	  by	  the	  end	  of	  Kenyatta’s	  presidency,	  it	  is	  not	  self-­‐evident	  why	   candidates	   continued	   to	   seek	   positions	   in	   local	   councils.	   By	   examining	   the	  motivations	   and	   expectations	   of	   councillors,	   the	   section	   reveals	   that	   despite	   both	  the	   limitations	  of	  office	  and	   the	   considerable	  demands	  made	  upon	  councillors	   for	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patronage,	  there	  remained	  a	  sense	  that	  local	  government	  still	  provided	  avenues	  for	  pursuing	  opportunities	  for	  individuals,	  and	  the	  communities	  they	  represented.	  The	  second	   section	   explores	   the	   existing	   literature	   on	   governance	   in	  Moi’s	   one-­‐party	  state.	   In	   particular	   it	   focuses	   on	   changes	   to	   the	   structures,	   relationships	   and	  resources	  existing	  at	  the	  local	  district	  level.	  This	  provides	  the	  necessary	  context	  to	  examine	   the	   case	   studies	   of	   Kilifi	   and	   Kakamega.	   The	   third	   section	   does	   so	   by	  focusing	   on	   the	   different	   relationships	   that	   the	   two	   councils	   had	   with	   national	  politicians,	   and	   the	   impact	   this	   had	   on	   the	   vitality	   of	   local	   government	   in	   the	  respective	   regions.	   It	   is	   argued	   that	   Kakamega’s	   councillors	   benefitted	   from	   the	  tenure	   of	   their	   regional	   ‘big	   man’	   Moses	   Mudavadi	   in	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Local	  Government,	  and	  his	  place	  in	  Moi’s	  inner	  circle.	  By	  contrast,	  Kilifi’s	  councillors	  did	  not	   enjoy	   the	   same	   level	   of	   recognition	   from	   their	   MPs,	   which	   resulted	   in	   fewer	  resources	   trickling	   down	   from	   the	   centre.	   The	   chapter	   argues	   that	   a	   distinction	  emerged	  between	  the	  provincial	  administration’s	  stance	  towards	  local	  government	  and	   that	   of	   members	   of	   parliament;	   this	   provides	   further	   insights	   into	   the	  institutions	   that	  Moi	  strengthened	  and	   those	   that	  he	  weakened	  during	  his	   tenure.	  The	  sense	  of	  insecurity	  amongst	  MPs	  during	  the	  ‘nyayo’	  regime	  put	  a	  strain	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  different	  elected	  leaders	  at	  constituency	  level.	  This	  context	  is	  important	   for	  understanding	  how	  and	  why	   local	  politics	   changed	  after	  1992	  with	  the	  reintroduction	  of	  multi-­‐partyism,	  which	  is	  examined	  in	  Chapter	  Six.	  	  
Life	  as	  a	  councillor:	  Expectations	  and	  realities	  In	   1983	  Walter	   Oyugi	  wrote	   that	   ‘local	   government	   in	   rural	   Kenya	   has	   had	   little	  impact	  on	  the	  people.	  Many	  do	  not	  know	  who	  their	  councillors	  are,	  since	  they	  are	  never	  affected	  by	  the	  activities	  of	  their	  councillors.’1	  This	  section	  offers	  a	  critique	  of	  this	   statement,	   by	   introducing	   councillors	   from	   Kilifi	   and	   Kakamega	   who	   served	  during	   the	   late	   1970s	   and	   1980s,	   whose	   oral	   histories	   will	   be	   drawn	   upon	  throughout	   the	   chapter.	   All	   of	   these	   individuals	   offer	   a	   window	   into	   how	   the	  changes	  effected	  by	  the	  Moi	  regime	  were	  felt	  in	  local	  councils.	  It	  is	  worth	  stressing	  that	  councillors	  were	  themselves	  products	  of	  the	  local	  government	  system,	  shaped	  by	   and	   reflecting	   the	   experiences	   and	   discourses	   encountered	   at	   county	   council	  halls.	   All	   these	  men	   became	   involved	   in	   the	   bundle	   of	   processes	   and	   behaviours	  which	  constituted	  ‘the	  state’;	  their	  recollections	  of	  themselves	  and	  the	  government	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  ‘Local	  government	  in	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are	  thus	  mediated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  generally	  self-­‐identified	  as	  political	  ‘insiders’.	  Contrary	   to	   the	   impression	   offered	   by	   MPs	   during	   debates	   in	   parliament	   in	   the	  1970s,	   the	   experience	   of	   these	   individuals	   shows	   that	   councillors	   could	   be	  motivated	   to	   stand	   for	   a	   complex	   mix	   of	   reasons.	   Councillors	   tended	   to	   cite	  pressure	   from	   their	   community	   and	   elders;	   and	  would	   invoke	   the	   idea	   that	   they	  were	   ‘development	   conscious’	   and	   a	   ‘man	   of	   the	   people’.	   Yet	   as	   this	   section	   also	  shows,	   many	   saw	   local	   government	   as	   providing	   opportunities	   to	   fulfil	   personal	  responsibilities,	  and	  as	  a	  stepping	  stone	  to	  higher	  office,	  and	  more	  lucrative	  posts.	  	  	  	   Narrating	  why	  they	  decided	  to	  stand	  for	  election,	  many	  councillors	  stressed	  that	  the	  idea	  was	  not	  their	  own,	  rather	  they	  were	  encouraged	  to	  stand	  by	  those	  who	  were	   impressed	   by	   the	   initiative	   and	   generosity	   they	   had	   shown	   towards	   their	  community	   when	   outside	   of	   politics.	   In	   this	   way,	   public	   manifestations	   of	  generosity	   were	   commonly	   interwoven	   with	   the	   pursuit	   of	   local	   status.	   Edward	  Indai	   who	   was	   first	   elected	   to	   Kakamega	   County	   Council	   in	   1983	   recalled	   the	  contribution	  he	  made	  whilst	  living	  and	  working	  in	  Kisumu	  to	  his	  home	  area	  on	  the	  weekends:	  	  I	  would	  participate	  in	  activities,	  weekend	  activities	  of	  our	  people	  here.	  We	  were	  doing	  harambee	  you	  know.	  And	  harambee	  was	  the	  activity	  of	  the	  day.	  So	   I	   used	   to	   donate	   to	   schools,	   to	  women	   groups,	   to	   some,	  where	  people	  are…	  in	  hospital,	  if	  a	  lady	  has	  given	  birth	  and	  she	  doesn’t	  have	  how	  she	  can	  be	  kept,	  she	  had	  a	  bill	   I	  could	  pay,	  some	  sort	  of	   things.	  So	  people	  came	  to	  know	  then	  they	  said	  no	  we	  need	  you.	  The	  previous	  councillor	  in	  1983,	  had	  stayed	  in	  the	  council	  for	  some	  time…	  He	   had	   money,	   he	   had	   property	   and	   the	   reason	   why,	   I	   am	   given	   to	  understand,	  he	  was	  boasting	  that	  there	  is	  nobody	  who	  can	  go	  in	  the	  council.	  “I	   am	   the	  man,	   I	  will	  die	   there”.	   So	  when	   I	   came,	   I	   started	  donating	   small	  things	   for	   schools,	   what…desks,	   chairs,	   and	   so	   on..	   then	   people	   said	   no	  maybe	  this	  man	  can	  help	  us	  in	  this	  area.	  So	  they	  had	  to	  elect	  me…2	  	   Indai	  had	  spent	  much	  of	  his	  adult	  life	  outside	  of	  Kakamega.	  Born	  in	  1936,	  he	  had	   left	   the	   district	   after	   school,	   working	   first	   in	   Nairobi	   then	   in	   Kampala,	   then	  again	   in	   Nairobi	   and	   finally	   in	   Kisumu.	   A	   surprising	   number	   of	   Indai’s	   fellow	  councillors	   had	   also	   been	   absent	   from	   the	   local	   political	   scene	   in	   the	   1960s	   and	  1970s.	   Returning	   to	   Kakamega	   after	   relatively	   successful	   careers,	   they	   could	  contribute	   to	   ‘development’	   projects,	   whilst	   bearing	   no	   responsibility	   for	   the	  perceived	  ‘lack	  of	  development’.	  This	  was	  implied	  by	  Lawrence	  Itolondo,	  Kakamega	  councillor	  from	  1983	  to	  1992.	  He	  said	  he	  was	  ‘provoked	  to	  run’	  after	  he	  got	  into	  a	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  Indai,	  interview,	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  2013,	  Webuye	  (Kakamega).	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dispute	  with	   a	   local	   leader.3	  On	   the	   campaign	   trail	   he	   found	   ‘there	  were	  very	   few	  activities	   going	   on’,	   and	   so	   toured	   the	   district	   and	   spoke	   of	   ‘development’.4	  He	  thought	  that	  he	  won	  the	  election	  ‘because	  I	  had	  participated	  in	  various	  activities	  of	  education,	   health	   activities,	   communication	   activities.	   I	   was	   very	   helpful	   to	   the	  community.’5	  A	   similar	   sentiment	   underlay	   Peter	   Kombo’s	   explanation	   of	  why	   he	  was	  elected	  to	  the	  council	  in	  in	  1988.	  A	  famous	  local	  musician	  who	  had	  toured	  the	  country	   in	   the	   1960s	   and	   1970s,	   Kombo	   	   claimed	   that	   ‘people	   convinced	   me	   to	  stand	  and	  that	  is	  why	  I	  tried	  and	  I	  tried	  and	  I	  went	  through…You	  know	  I	  was	  a	  man	  of	  the	  people.	  Because	  of	  music.’6	  	   The	  argument	  that	  councillors	  were	  ‘convinced	  to	  stand’	  was	  commonplace.	  In	  Kilifi,	  councillors	  often	  stressed	  that	  it	  was	  the	  ‘kaya	  elders’	  who	  had	  encouraged	  them	   to	   run	   for	   office,	   again	   because	   they	  were	   impressed	   by	   their	   development	  activities.7	  Kenga	  Chai	  recalled	  his	  election	  in	  1988	  in	  this	  way:	  	  There	   is	   a	   kaya	   called	   kaya	  Kauma	   and	   it	   is	   the	   kaya	   elders	  who	   sat	   and	  looked	   around	   the	   community	   and	   settled	   on	  me	   as	   their	   choice;	   that	   is	  when	  I	  got	  a	  message.	  I	  went	  there	  and	  told	  them	  I	  did	  not	  have	  money	  for	  campaigns	  and	  they	  said	  they	  didn’t	  want	  any	  money	  and	  were	  impressed	  by	  my	  initiatives	  of	  starting	  a	  nursery	  school	  that	  grew	  to	  a	  primary	  school	  now	  called	  Mikuluni….	  Yes	   I	   started	   the	  nursery	   school	  and	   I	  used	   to	  pay	  the	  teacher	  and	  I	  almost	  got	  arrested	  for	  starting	  a	  school	  without	  facilities	  like	   toilets.	  So	  all	   that	  development	   interested	   the	  kaya	  elders	  and	   that	   is	  why	  they	  endorsed	  me.8	  The	  general	  argument	  that	  councillors	  were	  called	  to	  serve	  their	  communities	  after	  having	   distinguished	   themselves	   locally	   through	   their	   good	   works,	   was	   usually	  supplemented	  by	  a	  narrower,	  more	  individualistic	  explanation	  for	  why	  people	  ran	  for	  local	  office.	  Peter	  Kombo	  said	  on	  joining	  Kakamega	  County	  Council	  in	  1988	  his	  aim	  was	  to	  try	  to	  educate	  his	  sons:	   ‘I	  have	  got	  four	  of	  them;	  that	  was	  my	  benefit.’9	  His	  co-­‐councillor	  Lawrence	  Itolondo	  had	  the	  same	  aim	  in	  mind.	  As	  a	  widower	  with	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  Lawrence	  Itolondo,	  interview,	  26	  August	  2013,	  Sigalagala	  (Kakamega).	  4	  Ibid.	  	  5	  Lawrence	  Itolondo,	  interview,	  26	  August	  2013,	  Sigalagala	  (Kakamega).	  	  6	  Peter	  Kombo,	  interview,	  25	  August	  2013,	  Ilesi	  (Kakamega).	  	  7	  ‘Kaya	  elders’	  protect	  sacred	  forest	  clearings	  at	  the	  coast,	  that	  are	  important	  within	  Mijikenda	  ritual,	  traditional	  and	  political	  authority.	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  their	  role	  in	  politics	  see	  Justin	  Willis,	  ‘The	  King	  of	  the	  Mijikenda,	  and	  other	  stories	  about	  the	  kaya:	  heritage,	  politics	  and	  histories	  in	  multi-­‐party	  Kenya’,	  in	  Derek	  Peterson	  and	  Giacomo	  Macola	  (eds.),	  
Recasting	  the	  Past:	  History	  Writing	  and	  Political	  Work	  in	  Modern	  Africa	  (Athens,	  2009),	  pp.	  233-­‐250.	  	  	  	  	  8	  Kenga	  Chai,	  interview,	  19	  January	  2013,	  Kilifi	  town	  (Kilifi).	  	  9	  Peter	  Kombo,	  interview,	  25	  August	  2013,	  Ilesi	  (Kakamega).	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eight	   children,	   he	  was	   disheartened	   to	   find	   on	   joining	   the	   council	   that	   they	  were	  ‘getting	   peanuts’.10	  Nonetheless,	   he	   said	   ‘that	  was	  my	   aim’	   –	   paying	   his	   children’s	  school	  fees	  –	  ‘I	  wanted	  to	  ensure	  they	  all	  lived	  well.	  It’s	  a	  struggle	  to	  get	  fees	  now,	  back	   then	   it	  wasn't	  as	  expensive	  as	   it	   is	  now.	  Unless	  you	  are	  organised	  you	  won't	  educate	  your	   children.11	  Being	  a	   councillor	  was	  one	  way	  of	   getting	   ‘organised’;	   so	  too	   was	   becoming	   part	   of	   the	   local	   KANU	   committee.	   Both	   Morris	   Mangi	   and	  Benson	  Tsoka	  –	  two	  Kilifi	  councillors	  who	  served	  during	  the	  1980s	  –	  had	  positions	  in	   KANU.	   Tsoka	   appeared	   especially	   ‘organised’;	   his	   strategy	   for	   personal	  advancement	   centred	   on	   entering	   the	   world	   of	   ‘politics’	   which	   involved	  apprenticing	  himself	   to	  veteran	  politician	  Marko	  Hare,	  who	  had	  been	  a	  councillor	  intermittently	  since	  the	  1950s.	  	  After	   my	   O-­‐Levels	   I	   joined	   politics	   and	   I	   was	   working	   with	   the	   former	  councillors	   like	  Marko	  Hare,	  who	  by	   that	   time	  was	  having	   three	   locations	  that	   is	   Vitengeni,	   Sokoke	   and	   Mwahera.	   That’s	   why	   1987	   Sokoke	   ward	  [created	  through	  subdivision]	  was	  vacant	  therefore	  I	  contested	  and	  joined	  politics	  that	  year…You	  know	  I	  was	  at	  home,	  I	  was	  doing	  farming	  …	  by	  that	  time	  I	  was	  having	  some	  cattle	  because	  if	  you	  want	  to	  succeed	  you	  have	  to	  do	  something	  that	  is	  useful	  here,	  so	  you	  have	  to	  follow	  the	  councillor	  of	  that	  time	  so	  that	  when	  your	  time	  comes	  and	  by	  that	  time	  I	  was	  the	  chairman	  of	  KANU	  of	  my	  location.12	  	  	   Tsoka	  frames	  the	  path	  to	  councillorship	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  being	  a	  good	  client	  to	  local	  patrons	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  being	  a	  good	  leader.	  A	  ‘leader’	  in	  this	  instance,	  was	  not	  simply	  a	  generous	  patron,	  but	  someone	  who	  took	  pride	  leading	  by	  example,	  and	  upholding	   ‘model’	  behaviour.	  As	  Tsoka	  explained:	   ‘You	  know	  formally	   if	  you	  are	  a	  leader	  -­‐	  a	  chief	  or	  a	  councillor	  -­‐	  you	  have	  to	  put	  more	  effort	  in	  keeping	  of	  livestock,	  therefore	   myself	   I	   was	   a	   farmer.	   You	   have	   to	   cultivate	   and	   keep	   cattle…’13	  This	  association	  between	  being	  a	  good	  leader	  and	  a	  ‘progressive’	  farmer	  had	  its	  roots	  in	  post-­‐war	   development	   discourse.14	  That	   these	   ideas	   continued	   to	   resonate	   with	  prospective	   ‘leaders’	   and	   their	   supporters	   in	   the	   1980s	   reveals	   that	   despite	   the	  informal,	  or	  neo-­‐patrimonial	  character	  of	   the	  state	  under	  Moi,	   ‘normative’	  notions	  of	  political	  leaders	  continued	  to	  exist	  alongside	  clientelist	  expectations.	  Councillors	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  Lawrence	  Itolondo,	  interview,	  26	  August	  2013,	  Sigalagala	  (Kakamega).	  11	  Ibid.	  	  12	  Benson	  Tsoka,	  interview,	  31	  January	  2013,	  Sokoke	  (Kilifi).	  	  	  13	  Ibid.	  	  	  14	  Frederick	  Cooper,	  ‘Modernizing	  bureaucrats,	  backward	  Africans,	  and	  the	  development	  concept’,	  in	  Frederick	  Cooper	  and	  Randall	  Packard	  (eds.),	  International	  Development	  and	  
the	  Social	  Sciences:	  Essays	  on	  the	  History	  and	  Politics	  of	  Knowledge,	  (Berkeley,	  1997),	  pp.	  64-­‐92.	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claimed	  these	  clientelist	  expectations	  came	  as	  a	  shock	  on	  entering	  local	  government	  service.	  And	  yet	  by	  presenting	   themselves	  as	  good	  patrons	  on	   the	   campaign	   trail,	  most	   councillors	  were	   in	   fact	   aware	   of	   the	   expectation	   of	   patronage,	   even	   if	   they	  were	  unprepared	  for	  the	  volume	  and	  frequency	  of	  the	  demands	  made	  upon	  them.	  Edward	   Indai	   found	   that	   ‘every	  morning	   they	  will	   come	   for	   you’,	   ‘they’	   being	   his	  supporters,	   neighbours,	   and	   constituents.15	  At	   the	   end	   of	   Kenyatta’s	   presidency,	  councillors	  were	  receiving	  a	  monthly	  allowance	  of	  between	  four	  and	  five	  hundred	  shillings.16	  This	  was	  increased	  in	  1981	  when	  Stanley	  Oloitiptip,	  newly	  appointed	  as	  Minister	  for	  Local	  Government,	  raised	  the	  monthly	  allowance	  of	  councillors	  to	  KSH	  1,200	  shillings	  and	   	  KSH	  1,400	   for	   committee	  chairman.17	  Despite	   this	   increase	   in	  councillors’	   official	   remuneration,	   the	   councillors	   elected	   in	   1983	   still	   found	   the	  personal	   demands	   on	   them	   very	   difficult	   to	   manage,	   as	   Lawrence	   Itolondo	  explained:	  	  People	  come	  and	  come	  and	  come	  [to	  get	  financial	  assistance].	  School	  fees,	  what	   do	   you	   do?	   But	   you	   see,	   if	   you	   are	   a	   leader	   you	   should	   be	   able	  to…where	  you	  are	  able,	   you	   should	   let	   them	  understand	   that	  you	  are	  not	  refusing,	  you	  don’t	  have	  it	  at	  that	  time.	  So	  if	  you	  think	  you	  are	  getting	  your	  allowance	   next	  week,	   tell	   them	   to	   come.	   But	   if	   you	   are	   very	   hostile,	   they	  start	  talking	  about	  that,	  you	  are	  very	  hostile.18	  	  	   Itolondo’s	   strategy	   of	   being	   transparent	   about	   his	   situation,	   and	   helping	  where	   possible,	   was	   not	   shared	   by	   musician	   Peter	   Kombo:	   ‘When	   he	   comes	  [someone	   looking	   for	   help];	   I	   run	   away.	   Because	   I	   had	   no	   money.	   Because	   they	  [constituents/clients]	  are	  very	  expensive.	   It	  needs	  you	  have	  enough	  money.	  If	  you	  don’t	  have	  enough	  money,	   you	   can’t	  manage.’19	  As	   the	   last	   chapter	  demonstrated,	  councillors’	   ability	   to	  manage	   the	   needs	   of	   their	   supporters	   declined	   significantly	  after	   the	   Transfer	   of	   Functions	   Act.	   This	   chapter	   argues	   that	   this	   shifted	   slightly	  during	   the	   first	   half	   of	   Daniel	   arap	   Moi’s	   presidency,	   when	   councillors	   were	  incorporated	   more	   fully	   into	   the	   executive’s	   patron-­‐client	   networks.	   The	   next	  section	  explains	   further	   the	  changes	  brought	  about	  by	  Moi	  on	  succeeding	   to	  State	  House	  after	  Kenyatta’s	  death	  in	  December	  1978.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Edward	  Indai,	  interview,	  31	  August	  2013,	  Webuye	  (Kakamega).	  16	  ‘Civic	  leaders	  set	  to	  get	  pay	  rises’,	  Daily	  Nation,	  7	  October	  1981,	  p.	  5.	  	  17	  Ibid.	  	  18	  Lawrence	  Itolondo,	  interview,	  26	  August	  2013,	  Sigalagala	  (Kakamega).	  19	  Peter	  Kombo,	  interview,	  25	  August	  2013,	  Ilesi	  (Kakamega).	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‘The	  DC…was	  everything’:	  Restructuring	  the	  state	  under	  Moi	  	  Moi	  came	  to	  power	  in	  the	  knowledge	  that	  a	  section	  of	  powerful	  Kikuyu	  politicians	  and	   businessmen	  were	   opposed	   to	   his	   rule.20	  A	   campaign	   in	   1976	   to	   change	   the	  constitution,	   thereby	   preventing	   Moi,	   the	   vice-­‐president,	   from	   assuming	   the	  presidency,	   had	   been	   quashed	   by	   Kenyatta,	   Charles	   Njonjo	   and	   Mwai	   Kibaki	  (discussed	  further	  in	  Chapter	  Five).21	  Yet	  with	  Kenyatta’s	  death	  on	  22	  August	  1978,	  it	  seemed	  likely	  that	  these	  forces	  would	  marshal	  again	  against	  the	  acting	  president	  before	  an	  election	  was	  called.	  Beyond	  the	  immediate	  factional	  struggles	  over	  state	  power,	  the	  new	  president	  was	  faced	  with	  a	  challenging	  economic	  climate.	  Kenyatta	  had	  enjoyed	  high	  growth	  rates	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  a	  cash	  crop	  boom	  in	  the	  1970s.	  He	  had	   relied	   on	   the	   ‘Africanisation’	   of	   land	   and	   jobs	   to	   build	   coalitions	   and	   co-­‐opt	  regional	  leaders.22	  By	  the	  time	  Moi	  took	  power,	  these	  resources	  had	  been	  depleted.	  Moreover,	   population	   growth,	   land	   shortage,	   youth	   unemployment	   and	  urbanisation	   had	   all	   added	   further	   pressure	   on	   the	   government.	   Throughout	   the	  first	   half	   of	   the	   1980s	   import	   and	   export	   trade	   remained	   significantly	   below	   the	  level	  that	  had	  been	  attained	  during	  much	  of	  the	  1970s.23	  To	  maintain	  his	  position,	  the	  new	  president	  both	  had	  to	  neutralise	  his	  challengers,	  and	   find	  new	  resources,	  coalitions	  and	  strategies	  through	  which	  to	  build	  his	  regime	  and	  consolidate	  power.	  The	   first	   of	   these	   tasks	   was	   seemingly	   achieved	   without	   too	   much	   difficulty.	   In	  October	  1978	  Moi	  was	  elected	  unopposed	  as	  president	  of	  KANU	  and	  thus	  president	  of	   Kenya.	   In	   the	   intervening	   two	   months,	   all	   those	   rumoured	   to	   be	   considering	  challenging	   Moi	   had	   pledged	   their	   loyalty	   to	   him.24	  In	   the	   following	   years,	   Moi	  slowly	  rebalanced	  the	  ethnic	  composition	  of	  key	  posts	  in	  the	  cabinet,	  the	  provincial	  administration	  and	  the	  army.	  Even	  though	  the	  number	  of	  Kalenjin	  in	  key	  positions	  increased	   steadily,	  Moi	   carefully	   retained	   enough	  members	   of	   the	   old	   guard,	   and	  ensured	   that	   new	   allies	   –	   in	   particular	   Luhya	   politicians	   –	   were	   rewarded	   with	  places	  in	  government.25	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  Hodder-­‐Williams,	  ‘Kenya	  after	  Kenyatta’.	  	  21	  David	  Throup,	  ‘Elections	  and	  political	  legitimacy	  in	  Kenya’,	  Africa,	  63:3	  (1993),	  pp.	  371–396.	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  Throup,	  ‘The	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  and	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  of	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  Gertz,	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  liberalization	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   By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s,	  Charles	  Hornsby	  argues,	  Kenya	  had	  become	  a	  ‘near	  feudal	   society’	   wherein	   Moi	   –	   kinglike	   –	   ‘ruled	   an	   apathetic	   population	   through	  force’.26	  This	  characterisation	  of	  Moi’s	  rule,	  as	  more	  autocratic,	  coercive	  and	  indeed	  corrupt	  is	  common	  within	  the	  literature.	  Some,	  including	  Stephen	  Brown	  and	  James	  Kariuki	   go	   as	   far	   as	   to	   categorise	   Moi	   as	   a	   ‘dictator’.27	  In	   contrast,	   Angelique	  Haugerud	   offers	   a	   far	   more	   nuanced	   reading	   of	   local	   state-­‐society	   interactions	  under	  Moi	  which	  emphasises	  the	  performance	  of	  state	  power	  and	  the	  performance	  of	   citizen	   compliance.28	  An	   even	   more	   sympathetic	   analysis	   is	   offered	   by	   some	  scholars	   who	   highlight	   the	   populist	   rhetoric	   and	   reforms	   of	  Moi’s	   first	   term.29	  In	  explaining	  why	  this	  populism	  was	  not	  maintained,	  D.	  P.	  Ahluwalia	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  president	   ‘became	  a	  victim	  of	  the	  unrealistic	  popular	  expectations’	  brought	  on	  by	   regime	   change	   and	   ‘fuelled	   by	   Moi’s	   populist	   policies’.30	  The	   existence	   of	   two	  such	  different	  characterisations	  of	  Moi,	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	   the	   ‘populist’	  and	  on	   the	  other,	  a	  ‘dictator’	  is	  mainly	  explained	  in	  the	  literature	  in	  terms	  of	  different	  periods	  of	   his	   rule.	   Thus	   scholars	   highlight	   certain	   ‘turning	   points’	  which	   led	   to	   a	   further	  tightening	  of	  state	  control,	  most	  notably	  the	  coup	  attempt	  of	  1982,	  and	  the	  judicial	  inquiry	   into	   Charles	   Njonjo	   in	   1983-­‐84.31	  In	   addition,	   the	   worsening	   economic	  climate	  of	  the	  1980s	  is	  often	  highlighted	  as	  an	  important	  factor	  that	  affected	  Moi’s	  style	  of	  governance	  and	  the	  level	  of	  centralised	  control	  exercised	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade.32	  	  	   Taking	   into	   consideration	   the	  different	  perspectives	   and	  vantage	  points	  of	  observers	  also	  helps	  explain	  the	  sometimes	  quite	  contradictory	  accounts	  of	  Moi	  and	  his	  presidency.	  From	  the	  centre	  -­‐	  and	  to	  external	  commentators	  -­‐	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  Kenyatta	   state	   was	   replaced	   by	   a	   more	   corrupt,	   chaotic	   and	   competitive	   regime	  which	   neither	   delivered	   a	   consistent,	   national	   development	   policy,	   nor	   protected	  the	  limited	  democratic	  freedoms	  that	  existed	  within	  the	  one-­‐party	  state.	  Yet	  when	  a	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  Brown,	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‘decentralised’	  view	  is	  taken,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  there	  were	  ‘winners’	  –	  as	  well	  as	  “losers”	  in	   the	   ‘nyayo’	   state,	   and	   that	   rewarding	   loyalty	  was	   a	   consistent	   strategy	   in	  Moi’s	  pursuit	   of	   legitimacy	   and	   security.	   This	  was	  manifest	   in	   the	  way	   that	   the	   pattern	  and	  operation	  of	   clientelist	  networks	   changed.	  Not	  only	  did	  Moi	  move	   to	   redirect	  patronage	   flows	   from	   State	   House	   away	   from	  Murang’a	   to	   the	   Kalenjin	   areas,	   he	  also	  attempted	  to	  weaken	  the	  power	  of	  existing	  regional	  bosses	  in	  order	  to	  create	  ‘his	  own	  personal	  following	  in	  the	  countryside’.33	  This	  was	  evident	  in	  the	  changing	  nature	   of	  harambees,	  which	   increasingly	   came	   to	   be	   used	   for	   large-­‐scale	   projects	  driven	   by	   the	   president	   himself.	   Moi’s	   personal	   share	   of	   overall	   harambee	  contributions	   stood	   at	   just	   under	   one	   percent	   for	  much	   of	   the	   1980s	   and	   1990s,	  which	  was	  noticeably	  more	   than	  Kenyatta	  had	  distributed	  before	  him.34	  Yet	  much	  like	   Kenyatta,	   Moi	   also	   treated	   harambee	   as	   a	   kind	   of	   substitute	   for	   local	  government.	   Speaking	   at	   the	   Kenya	   Institute	   of	   Administration	   in	   1985,	   the	  president	  described	   the	   theory	  of	  harambee	   in	  quite	   similar	   terms	   to	   the	   colonial	  model	   of	   local	   government:	   ‘Harambee	   initiatives	   are	   the	   grassroots	   voice	   of	   the	  people,	   indicating	  what	  they	  want	  and	  what	  they	  are	  prepared	  to	  do	  to	  achieve	  it.	  The	  harambee	  spirit	  is	  one	  that	  we	  must	  take	  seriously	  as	  the	  cornerstone	  for	  local	  resources	  mobilisation.’35	  	  	   Analysing	   the	   changing	   nature	   of	   patron-­‐client	   relationships	   in	   the	   1980s,	  Charles	  Hornsby	   has	   argued	   that	   fewer	   state	   resources	   and	   greater	   demographic	  pressure	   ‘shattered	   the	   stable’	   clientelist	   networks	   of	   Kenyatta’s	   era.36	  Increased	  competition	   for	  scarce	  resources	  made	   it	  harder	   for	  district	  bosses	   to	   ‘deliver	   the	  patronage	  needed	   to	  secure	   their	  positions’.37	  This	  analysis	  overlooks	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  Moi	  interacted	  differently	  with	  his	  clients,	  and	  the	  influence	  this	  had	  on	  his	  public	  reputation.	  Only	  by	  taking	  seriously	  Bethwel	  Ogot’s	  statement	  –	  sycophantic	  though	   it	   may	   have	   been	   -­‐	   that	   central	   to	   Moi’s	   regime	   was	   a	   ‘concern	   for	   the	  common	  man’,	  is	  it	  possible	  to	  reconcile	  the	  critical	  literature	  on	  the	  Moi	  state	  with	  the	  often	  warm	  recollections	  of	  councillors	  and	  other	  political	  clients.38	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   Kenyatta	  had	  delegated	  considerable	  authority	  to	  provincial	  commissioners,	  and	  allowed	  members	  of	  parliament	  to	  build	  up	  their	  own	  personal	  following.	  The	  policies	   introduced	   by	  Moi	  were	   intended	   to	  weaken	   these	   alternative	   centres	   of	  power,	  and	  ensure	  that	  access	  to	  state	  resources	  always	  depended	  on	  presidential	  approval.	  One	  way	  in	  which	  this	  was	  manifest	  was	  through	  the	  attempted	  revival	  of	  the	  party;	  KANU	  came	  to	  be	  used	  as	   ‘an	  instrument	  for	  political	  and	  social	  control	  under	   the	   guidance	   of	   the	   Office	   of	   the	   President.’39	  Jennifer	  Widner	   argues	   that	  KANU	  domination	  of	  public	  life	  was	  so	  pervasive	  that	  Kenya	  had	  effectively	  become	  a	  ‘party-­‐state’	  by	  the	  mid-­‐1980s.	  As	  a	  critique	  to	  Widner,	  Gabrielle	  Lynch	  suggests	  that	  Moi	  ‘added	  the	  party	  to	  a	  growing	  arsenal	  of	  instruments’	  which	  were	  used	  to	  ensure	  executive	  control	  of	  district	  and	  location	  level	  politics.40	  As	  well	  as	  through	  reinvigorating	   the	   party,	   this	  was	   also	   achieved	   through	   greater	   emphasis	   on	   the	  district	  administration.	  	   	  	   Late	  in	  1982,	  Moi	  announced	  a	  new	  policy	  known	  as	  ‘District	  Focus	  for	  Rural	  Development’:	  	  We	  will	  henceforth	  be	   looking	  upon	  each	  district	  as	   the	  basic	  operational	  unit…each	  district	  team	  will	  become	  the	  major	  force	  and	  instrument	  for	  the	  design	   of	   rural	   development.	   This	   will	   create	   for	   the	   people	   and	   their	  chosen	  representative	  a	  whole	  new	  world	  of	  opportunity.41	  	  The	   policy	   had	   been	   proposed	   by	   a	   Working	   Party	   on	   Government	   Expenditure	  which	   recommended	   in	   1982	   that	   the	   decentralisation	   of	   government	   services	  could	  serve	  as	  ‘part	  of	  a	  strategy	  to	  save	  money’.42	  Indeed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  policy,	  the	  national	  development	  plan	  for	  1984	  to	  1988	  committed	  to	  decreasing	  the	  level	  of	  government	  grants	   to	   local	  authorities	   from	  K£9.9	  million	   in	  1983/4	  to	  K£8.56	  million	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  plan.43	  Examining	  the	  evolution	  of	  this	  new	  policy,	  David	  Leonard	   notes	   that	   similar	   recommendations	   had	   been	   made	   by	   officials	   in	   the	  1970s,	  but	  in	  1982	  ‘they	  fell	  on	  different	  ears’.44	  He	  suggests	  that	  because	  of	  Moi’s	  involvement	  in	  KADU	  -­‐	  the	  majimbo	  party	  at	  independence	  -­‐	  he	  was	  more	  inclined	  to	  favour	  a	  policy	  of	  decentralisation.	  Yet	  he	  also	  accepts	  that	  District	  Focus	  did	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Widner,	  The	  Rise	  of	  a	  Party-­‐State,	  p.	  198.	  40	  Lynch,	  I	  Say	  to	  You,	  p.	  117-­‐8.	  41	  Daniel	  arap	  Moi,	  quoted	  in	  Barkan	  &	  Chege,	  ‘Decentralising	  the	  state’,	  p.	  431.	  	  42	  David	  Leonard,	  African	  Successes:	  Four	  Public	  Managers	  of	  Kenyan	  Rural	  Development	  (Berkeley,	  1991),	  pp.	  203-­‐209,	  p.	  204.	  43	  Republic	  of	  Kenya,	  National	  Development	  Plan,	  1984-­‐1988	  (Nairobi,	  1984),	  p.	  174.	  44	  Leonard,	  African	  Successes,	  p.	  204.	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in	  fact	  devolve	  ‘authority	  to	  elected	  local	  governments’.45	  Thus	  despite	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  grassroots	  participation,	   it	  was	  primarily	  an	  exercise	   in	  deconcentration,	  which	  strengthened	  the	  hand	  of	  local	  administrators	  rather	  than	  local	  politicians.	  	  	   District	   Focus	   emerged	   in	   response	   to	   two	   political	   imperatives.	   First,	   as	  Barkan	   and	   Chege	   argue,	   it	   was	   a	   means	   to	   reduce	   the	   power	   of	   provincial	  commissioners	   and	   members	   of	   parliament. 46 	  Second,	   it	   offered	   a	   way	   to	  redistribute	   state	   resources,	   ostensibly	   in	   a	   more	   regionally	   equitable	   and	  responsive	  manner.	  In	  effect,	  it	  allowed	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  multiple	  new	  patronage	  channels.	   District	   Focus	  was	   rolled	   out	   in	   1983	   and	   involved	   the	   rejuvenation	   of	  District	  Development	  Committees	   (DDCs)	  originally	   established	  under	   the	  Special	  Rural	   Development	   Programme	   of	   1967-­‐74.	   The	   revived	   DDCs	   were	   given	   a	   key	  role	   in	   district	   development	   budgeting	   in	   1984,	   and	   from	   this	   point	   onwards,	   all	  development	   projects	   which	   required	   state	   funding	   had	   to	   be	   approved	   and	  accounted	   for	  by	   the	  DDC.	  Locational	  and	  divisional	  committees	  were	  also	  set	  up,	  and	  by	  1986	  any	  project	  under	  review	  in	  the	  DDC	  had	  to	  have	  been	  considered	  and	  approved	  first	  by	  these	  lower	  tier	  committees.47	  Writing	  in	  1987,	  Barbara	  Thomas	  noted	   that	  members	   of	   DDCs	   ‘compete,	   often	   quite	   fiercely,	   for	   the	   limited	   funds	  allocated	   to	   the	   committee	   by	   the	   Provincial	   Development	   Committee’.48	  These	  members	  included	  local	  MPs,	  who	  were	  no	  longer	  able	  to	  lobby	  cabinet	  ministers	  in	  Nairobi,	  and	   instead	  were	   forced	  to	  spend	  more	  time	   in	  their	  districts,	  submitting	  themselves	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  administration.	  The	  hierarchy	  within	  the	  district	  was	  summed	  up	  by	  councillor	  Benson	  Tsoka	  from	  Kilifi	  in	  this	  way:	  	  The	  DC’s	  office	  was	  an	  Office	  of	  the	  President…	  a	  councillor	  could	  not	  hold	  a	  
baraza	   without	   the	   consent	   of	   the	   DC.	   And	   the	   DC	   was	   having	   much	  authority	  and	  was	  everything	   in	   the	  district…	  All	   the	  MPs	  were	  under	  the	  DC	  because	  the	  DC	  was	  the	  boss.	  He	  could	  cancel	  a	  baraza	  or	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	  MP	  or	  a	  minister	  because	  of	  security.	  So	  they	  were	  more	  powerful	  [than	  MPs].49	  The	   outcome	   of	  District	   Focus,	   Barkan	   and	   Chege	   argue,	  was	   that	   it	   ‘reduced	   the	  access	   of	  MPs	  both	   to	   the	   centre	   and	   to	   the	   grassroots.’50	  It	   also	  meant	   that	  MPs’	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  Barkan	  and	  Chege,	  ‘Decentralising	  the	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  47	  Ibid.,	  p.	  446.	  	  48	  Barbara	  Thomas,	  ‘Development	  through	  harambee:	  Who	  wins	  and	  who	  loses?	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  interview,	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  January	  2013,	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  ‘Decentralising	  the	  state',	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access	  to	  development	  resources	  to	  fund	  harambees	  was	  largely	  dependent	  on	  their	  relationship	  and	  standing	  with	  the	  president.	  This	  will	  be	  demonstrated	  later	  in	  the	  chapter	  when	  comparing	  Kilifi	  and	  Kakamega.	  	  	  	   The	   policy	   of	   District	   Focus	   also	   had	   implications	   for	   local	   authorities.	  According	   to	   the	   policy’s	   official	   ‘blue	   book’,	   councils	   were	   expected	   to	   have	   a	  ‘special	   relationship’	   with	   DDCs.51	  The	   clerks	   and	   chairmen	   of	   local	   authorities	  were	  members	  of	  DDCs,	  and	  clerks	  also	  sat	  on	  the	  executive	  committee.	  In	  order	  to	  secure	   funding	   from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Local	  Government,	  councils	  had	   to	  have	   their	  proposed	  projects	  vetted	  first	  by	  the	  DDC.52	  In	  1984,	  out	  of	  105	  projects	  approved	  by	  Kakamega	  DDC,	   thirty-­‐three	  of	   them	  were	   initiatives	  of	   the	   county	   council.53	  A	  further	  control	  was	  introduced	  in	  1987	  which	  stipulated	  that	  ‘[t]he	  methods	  which	  a	  local	  authority	  intends	  to	  use	  for	  raising	  revenue	  from	  within	  the	  district	  should	  have	  the	  concurrence	  of	  the	  DDC	  since	  such	  methods	  may	  have	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  development	  process	  in	  the	  district.’54	  Malcolm	  Wallis	  has	  suggested	  that	  the	  policy	  ‘emphasis	  on	  central	  bureaucracy…further	  marginalised	  the	  position	  of	  local	  government	   within	   the	   development	   planning	   system’.55	  A	   similar	   argument	   was	  made	   by	   Walter	   Oyugi	   who	   wrote	   in	   1993	   that	   ‘there	   is	   no	   evidence	   so	   far	   to	  indicate	   that	   the	   local	   authorities	   have	   benefitted	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   new	  relationships’.56	  Arguably	   however,	   the	   very	   inclusion	   of	   officers	   and	  members	   of	  local	  authorities	  in	  DDCs	  served	  to	  confer	  on	  councillors	  and	  officials	  a	  measure	  of	  significance	   and	   authority	   that	   had	  been	   all	   but	   destroyed	   over	   the	   course	   of	   the	  1970s.	   It	   was	   not	   that	   Moi	   deliberately	   and	   consciously	   sought	   to	   rebuild	   local	  government	   but	   rather	   that	   in	   focusing	   on	   the	   district,	   councils	   inevitably	   re-­‐entered	  the	  government’s	  frame	  of	  vision,	  and	  consequently	  its	  operations.	  	  	   ‘Harambee’	   –	   ‘let’s	   pull	   together’	   –	   had	   been	   Kenyatta’s	   rallying	   cry	   since	  independence.	  Moi	  made	   his	   national	  motto	   ‘nyayo’,	  meaning	   footsteps.	   This	  was	  intended	   to	   reassure	  Kenyans,	  Western	  allies,	   and	   international	   corporations	   that	  Moi	   would	   be	   following	   the	   capitalist	   path	   set	   out	   by	   his	   predecessor.	   For	   local	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authorities,	   ‘nyayo’	   meant	   the	   continuation	   of	   many	   of	   the	   patterns	   of	   informal	  engagement	  between	  councils	  and	  president	  that	  had	  become	  the	  modus	  operandi	  of	  cash-­‐strapped	  local	  authorities	  in	  the	  1970s.	  The	  practices	  of	  sending	  delegations	  to	   State	   House;	   offering	   tributes	   to	   the	   president;	   pledging	   loyalty	   to	   KANU	   and	  Moi;	  and	  relying	  on	  harambees	  to	  fund	  local	  development	  continued	  to	  be	  routine	  in	  the	  1980s.	  Delegations	  were	   sent	   to	  Moi	   or	   senior	  ministers	   to	   try	   to	  negotiate	   a	  better	   settlement	   for	   a	   council.	   These	   efforts	   were	   usually	   rewarded	   with	   some	  kind	  of	  concession	  or	  patronage,	  and	  ultimately	  reinforced	  for	  councillors	  the	  idea	  that	  all	  opportunities	  rested	  on	  the	  goodwill	  of	  Moi.	  	  	   With	   fewer	   financial	   resources	   to	   drawn	   on,	   Moi	   had	   to	   find	   alternative	  ways	   of	   responding	   to	   the	   demands	   of	   this	   deconcentrated	   clientelist	   system.	  Subdividing	  local	  authorities	  was	  one	  strategy	  commonly	  used.	  By	  dividing	  a	   local	  government	   area	   –	   or	   indeed	   a	   district	   –	   new	   elected,	   official	   and	   staff	   positions	  were	   created,	   and	   a	   community	   was	   seemingly	   given	   new	   resources	   to	   control.	  Adept	   at	   making	   something	   out	   nothing,	   Moi	   also	   sanctioned	   the	   informal	   and	  illegal	   allocation	   of	   market	   plots	   and	   trust	   land	   held	   by	   local	   authorities	   to	  councillors	  and	  other	  clients.	  This	  kind	  of	  corruption,	  whilst	  not	  new,	  quite	  possibly	  reached	  a	  new	  scale	  in	  the	  1980s,	  and	  was	  certainly	  conducted	  in	  plainer	  sight.	  For	  councils,	  what	   this	   ultimately	   amounted	   to	  was	   an	   even	   greater	   blurring	   of	   lines	  between	  public	   and	  private	   interests,	   state-­‐	   and	  non-­‐state-­‐led	  development.	   Thus	  although	   the	   bureaucratic	   façade	   of	   local	   government	   was	   upheld,	   informally,	  councillors	   –	   like	  MPs	   –	  were	   forced	   to	   participate	   in	  wider	   clientelist	   networks,	  and	  cooperate	  much	  more	  closely	  with	  members	  of	  the	  administration	  and	  the	  local	  KANU	  hierarchy.	  	  	   District	   Focus	   had	   the	   effect	   of	   reenergising	   local	   political	   actors	   and	   civil	  servants	  by	  making	  a	  locus	  within	  the	  district	  where	  important	  plans	  and	  decisions	  could	   be	  made	   in	   a	   seemingly	   participatory	   and	   consensual	   fashion.	   Yet	  whether	  decisions	  were	   genuinely	   decentralised	   is	   an	   area	   of	   debate,	   and	   the	   influence	   of	  councillors	   and	   council	   officials	   in	   DDCs	   was	   decidedly	   limited.	   Kakamega	  councillor	  Edward	  Indai	  recalled:	  	  We	  had	  District	  Development	  Committee	  where	  we	  were.	  It	  was	  just	  a	  body	  of	  itself,	  but	  we	  could	  get	  somebody	  to	  attend.	  The	  chairman	  is	  the	  DC.	  But	  you	  see	  the,	  you	  can,	  maybe	  you	  have	  moved	  a	  motion	  in	  the	  council,	  it	  has	  been	  accepted	  by	  the	  council	  for	  the	  funding,	  then	  it	  goes	  through	  the	  DDC.	  When	   it	   reaches	   there,	   maybe	   they	   will	   accept	   it	   then	   go	   to	   central	  government	   for	   funding.	   But	   you	   see	   you	  will	   find	   sometimes	   the	  money	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coming	   to	   fund	   the	   project	   you	   have	   initiated	   it	   has	   been	   diverted	   by	  orders…57	  By	  this	  point,	  central	  government	  grants	  to	  county	  councils	  were	  almost	  negligible.	  District	   Focus	   thus	  was	   useful	   to	   councils	   in	   that	   it	   created	   an	   additional	   avenue	  through	  which	  local	  authorities	  could	  attempt	  to	  access	  funding	  for	  projects.	  Within	  DDCs,	   the	   supremacy	   of	   the	   district	   commissioner	   was	   irrefutable,	   and	   even	   in	  councils,	   it	   was	   quietly	   accepted	   that	   the	   DC	   was	   in	   charge.	   Peter	   Kombo	   of	  Kakamega	   said,	   ‘the	   district	   commissioner	   was	   our	   boss.	   He	   was	   a	   member	   of	  appointed	   councillors….	  Actually	  he	   can	   finish	   you.	  He	   can	   finish	   you.	   You	  have	   a	  Local	   Government	   Act,	   then	   if	   you	   mess	   up,	   you	   can	   be	   expelled	   away	   from	   the	  council.’58	  The	  sense	  that	  the	  DC	  had	  the	  power	  to	  unilaterally	  dismiss	  a	  councillor	  either	   by	   invoking	   a	   technicality	   in	   the	   Local	   Government	   Act,	   or	   by	   calling	   on	  superiors	   within	   KANU,	   the	   administration	   or	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Local	   Government	  seemed	   to	   be	   widespread.	   As	   Nyikuli	   Mukaramoja	   said,	   ‘even	   when	   you	   are	   a	  councillor,	   you	   can’t	   talk	   against	   your	   DC.	   You	  must	   give	   respect	   to	   DC’.59	  Those	  who	   did	   not	   respect	   the	   DC,	   Mukaramoja	   claimed,	   would	   be	   reported	   ‘up’,	   then	  ‘when	  you	  are	  working,	  you	  will	   just	  get	  a	  notice	  that	  says	  “we	  regret	  …	  that	  your	  duties	  are	  now	  no	  longer	  required”.’60	  In	  this	  way	  most	  learnt	  the	  lesson	  that:	  ‘As	  a	  councillor,	   if	   you	   want	   to	   succeed,	   live	   well	   with	   the	   local	   administrators;	   seek	  advice	   and	   also	   accommodate	   their	   views	   because	   you	   should	   all	   speak	   in	   one	  voice.’61	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Lawrence	  Itolondo	  admitted	  his	  successful	  career	   in	   the	  council	  was	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  was	  ‘very	  careful	  about’	  his	  relationship	  with	   the	   DC	   –	   ‘we	   worked	   very	   closely,	   I	   had	   to	   follow	   the	   rules	   which	   are	  imposed’.62	  He	  found	  that	  ‘if	  you	  are	  very	  powerful	  and	  they	  like	  you,	  you	  have	  a	  lot	  of	  leeway	  over	  what	  you	  can	  ask	  for	  from	  the	  government.	  They	  may	  not	  refuse.’63	  Itolondo	  was	  aware	  on	  joining	  Kakamega	  County	  Council	  that	  he	  should	  ‘never	  try	  to	   clash	   with	   them’	   [the	   administration]	   and	   so	   instead,	   tried	   to	   ‘accommodate	  them’.64	  This	   sense	   that	   some	   councillors	   and	   district	   commissioners	   had	   a	   close	  rather	  than	  combative	  relationship	  in	  the	  1980s	  is	  consistent	  with	  Malcolm	  Wallis’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Edward	  Indai,	  interview,	  31	  August	  2013,	  Webuye	  (Kakamega).	  58	  Peter	  Kombo,	  interview,	  25	  August	  2013,	  Ilesi	  (Kakamega).	  59	  Nyikuli	  Mukaramoja,	  interview,	  29	  August	  2013,	  Malava.	  60	  Ibid.	  	  61	  Kenga	  Chai,	  interview,	  19	  January	  2013,	  Kilifi	  Town	  (Kilifi)	  62	  Lawrence	  Itolondo,	  interview,	  26	  August	  2013,	  Sigalagala	  (Kakamega).	  	  63	  Ibid.	  64	  Ibid.	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assertion	   that	   district	   commissioners	   considered	   councillors	   useful.	   He	   observes	  that	  DCs	  saw	  ‘the	  maintenance	  of	  local	  government	  as	  being	  of	  importance	  for	  their	  political	   ‘law	  and	  order’	   role’,	   because	   it	   enabled	   them	   ‘to	   keep	   in	   touch	  with	   the	  views	  and	  activities	  of	  local	  leaders’.65	  	   The	  notion	  that	  councillors	  could	  still	  claim	  to	  be	  or	  indeed	  were	  recognised	  as	  local	   leaders	  in	  this	  period	  is	  significant.	  It	  goes	  against	  Oyugi’s	  suggestion	  that	  most	  people	  did	  not	  know	  who	  their	  councillors	  were.66	  His	  argument	  was	  made	  in	  light	   of	   the	   very	   limited	   services	   provided	   by	   county	   councils.	   But	   councillors	  established	   and	   sought	   to	  maintain	   their	   reputations	   not	   necessarily	   through	   the	  councils	   themselves	   but	   through	   the	   unofficial	   duties	   and	   obligations	   that	   came	  with	   being	   a	   councillor;	   through	   supporting	   neighbours	   with	   school	   fees,	   and	  funeral	   costs,	   and	   other	   forms	   of	   assistance	   such	   as	   helping	   people	   get	   identity	  cards,	  and	  interacting	  with	  chiefs	  and	  district	  officers	  on	  behalf	  of	  constituents.	  As	  was	   noted	   earlier,	   such	   ‘obligations’	   were	   for	   some	   councillors	   a	   considerable	  financial	   burden.	   Foremost	   in	   public	   expectations	   of	   councillors	   was	   that	   they	  would	   organise	   and	   donate	   to	   local	   harambees.	   This	   sense	   that	   in	   order	   to	   fulfil	  their	   responsibilities	   councillors	  had	   to	  blur	   the	   lines	  between	   ‘local	   government’	  and	  ‘self-­‐help’	  was	  expressed	  by	  Lawrence	  Itolondo:	  	  You	  would	   start	  with	   the	   council,	   involve	   the	   council,	   then	   come	   to	   your	  community	  and	  organise	  a	  harambee.	  You	  organise	  one,	  people	  come	  and	  donate,	   council	   donates	   some	   shillings,	   then	   you’ve	   started.	   During	   my	  period	   on	   the	   council…how	  many	   secondary	   schools	   were	   started	   in	  my	  period?	   One,	   two,	   almost	   eight!	   And	   they	   were	   started	   on	   a	   harambee	  basis…So	  I	  served,	  we	  started	  delivering	  what	  we	  had	  promised	  people!	  We	  did	   a	   lot	   of	   harambee,	   harambee	   were	   very	   common,	   especially	   for	  education.	  Even	  health	  services.	  Road	  construction	  was	  not	  simple	  because	  it	  was	  not	  easy	  to	  get	  graders	  and	  so	  on	  but	  you	  would	  organise	  people	  to	  carry	  out,	  to	  do	  something	  by	  hand.67	  The	  idea	  that	  ‘you	  would	  start	  with	  the	  council’	  when	  trying	  to	  build	  momentum	  for	  a	  harambee	  was	  demonstrated	  at	  a	  meeting	  of	  Kilifi	  County	  Council	  in	  June	  1989.68	  Councillor	  Harry	  Wamubeyi	  asked	  his	  fellow	  members	  to	  support	  two	  fundraising	  projects	  active	  in	  his	  location.	  The	  first	  was	  for	  a	  church;	  an	  activity	  which	  did	  not	  fall	   under	   the	   remit	   of	   state-­‐led	   development,	   and	   the	   second	  was	   to	   construct	   a	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  Wallis,	  ‘District	  planning',	  pp.	  447-­‐8.	  66	  Oyugi,	  ‘Local	  government	  in	  Kenya’,	  p.	  135.	  	  67	  Lawrence	  Itolondo,	  interview,	  26	  August	  2013,	  Sigalagala	  (Kakamega).	  68	  Full	  council	  minutes,	  KCC,	  26	  June	  1989,	  Kilifi	  County	  Government	  Archive.	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primary	  school,	  technically	  a	  function	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Education	  since	  1970.69	  The	  members	  agreed	  to	  donate	  one	  hundred	  shillings	  each,	  and	  instructed	  the	  treasurer	  to	  withdraw	  the	  funds	  from	  their	  allowances	  and	  divide	  the	  donation	  between	  the	  two	   projects.	   When	   introducing	   the	   proposal,	   Wamubeyi	   noted	   that	   one	   of	   the	  
harambees	  ‘would	  be	  presided	  by	  Hon.	  N.	  K.	  Ngala…and	  the	  other	  meeting	  presided	  by	  Hon.	  M.	  B.	  Keah’.70	  As	  two	  local	  MPs,	  it	  was	  expected	  that	  Ngala	  and	  Keah	  would	  play	  a	  prominent	  role	  in	  the	  public	  event.	  The	  success	  of	  any	  harambee	  was	  usually	  dependent	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  local	  organisers	  and	   ‘important	   leaders	  or	  patrons	   both	   within	   and	   outside	   the	   community’.71	  This	   is	   explored	   in	   the	   next	  section	  by	  examining	   the	   relationship	   that	   councillors	   in	  Kilifi	   and	  Kakamega	  had	  with	  national	  politicians	   in	   the	  1980s,	  and	  the	   influence	   this	  had	  on	  the	  scale	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  activities	  that	  councillors	  were	  able	  to	  engage	  in.	  	  
‘Big	  men’	  and	  ‘little	  men’:	  Kilifi	  and	  Kakamega	  compared	  	  As	  the	  previous	  chapters	  have	  highlighted,	  throughout	  the	  period	  under	  discussion,	  Kilifi	   and	   Kakamega	   county	   councils	   had	   different	   resource	   bases.	   This	   was	   the	  outcome	  of	  environmental,	  demographic	  and	  historical	   factors.	  But	   it	  was	  also	  the	  result	  of	  the	  different	  relationship	  that	  each	  council	  had	  to	  the	  centre.	  This	  section	  demonstrates	  this	  in	  reference	  to	  Kilifi	  MP	  Noah	  Katana	  Ngala’s	  tenure	  as	  Assistant	  Minister	   for	   Local	   Government	   (1979-­‐82),	   and	   Moses	   Mudavadi	   of	   Kakamega’s	  period	   as	   Minister	   for	   Local	   Government	   (1983-­‐89).	   Both	   were	   allies	   of	   Moi	   but	  only	  Mudavadi	   succeeded	   in	   any	  meaningful	  way	   to	   use	   his	   cabinet	   position	   and	  friendship	  with	  the	  president	  to	  ‘assist’	  his	  home	  councils.	  	  	  
Figure	  9:	  Number	  of	  councillors	  returned	  to	  office,	  Kilifi	  County	  Council,	  
1979-­‐1992.	  
	   Figure	  9	  reveals	  the	  high-­‐turnover	  of	  councillors	  on	  Kilifi	  County	  Council	  at	  each	  of	  the	  elections	  held	  between	  1979	  and	  1992.	   In	  1979	  only	  four	  members	  of	  the	  council	  were	  returned	  to	  office.	  Less	  than	  a	  year	  into	  the	  fifteen	  new	  councillors’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Ibid.	  	  70	  Full	  council	  minutes,	  KCC,	  26	  June	  1989,	  Kilifi	  County	  Government	  Archive.	  	  71	  Barbara	  Thomas,	  'Development	  through	  harambee',	  p.	  475.	  
	   1979	   1983	   1988	   1992	  
No.	  of	  councillors	  	   19	   19	   29	   32	  
No.	  served	  on	  previous	  council	  	   4	   7	   9	   5	  	  Source:	  Compiled	  from	  Kilifi	  County	  Council	  minutes,	  Kilifi	  County	  Government	  Archive.	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first	   term,	   a	   corruption	   scandal	   was	   exposed.	   It	   first	   emerged	   when	   councillor	  Emmanuel	  Kombe	  prepared	  a	  confidential	  report	  for	  the	  finance	  sub-­‐committee.	  On	  27	   November	   1980,	   a	   special	   full	   council	   meeting	   was	   held	   for	   the	   members	   to	  discuss	   the	  actions	  of	   the	  council’s	  clerk,	  S.	   J.	  Mulewa.72	  After	  hours	  of	  debate,	   the	  councillors	  presented	  the	  officers	  with	  a	  fifteen	  point	  list	  of	  Mulewa’s	  wrongdoings	  which	  included	  abuses	  related	  to	  the	  council’s	  land,	  funds,	  assets,	  and	  staff,	  as	  well	  as	   the	   all-­‐encompassing	   crime	   of	   ‘making	   the	   Kilifi	   County	   Council	   his	   own	  property’. 73 	  The	   members	   resolved	   to	   dismiss	   the	   clerk	   and	   reclaim	  misappropriated	  land	  and	  funds.	  To	  do	  this,	  they	  concluded	  that	  a	  delegation	  would	  have	   to	   be	   sent	   to	   Nairobi	   to	   discuss	   the	   matter	   with	   the	   minister.74	  On	   18	  December	  1980	  a	  delegation	  consisting	  of	  three	  councillors	  and	  two	  officials	  called	  on	   the	   Minister	   for	   Local	   Government	   Stanley	   Oloitiptip	   and	   Assistant	   Minister	  Katana	  Ngala	  in	  Nairobi	  to	  lobby	  on	  five	  issues.	  Along	  with	  the	  clerk,	  the	  delegation	  also	  sought	  to	  have	  its	  annual	  grant	  increased;	  an	  outstanding	  loan	  converted	  into	  a	  grant;	  an	  agreement	   that	  councillors	  as	  well	  as	  chairmen	  would	  be	  entitled	   to	  car	  loans;	   and	  ministry	   approval	   for	   higher	   fees	   and	   charges	   for	   1981.75	  Two	   weeks	  later,	   the	   delegation	   reported	   back	   to	   the	   council.76	  The	   minister	   had	   approved	  Mulewa’s	  dismissal,	  but	  on	  every	  other	  issue	  had	  been	  more	  circumspect.	  	  	   Although	  the	  delegation	  had	  not	  secured	  any	  concrete	  concessions	  from	  the	  minister	   in	   person,	   the	   assembled	   councillors	   praised	   their	   efforts,	   and	  expectations	  were	  high	  that	  good	  news	  would	  be	  forthcoming.77	  The	  fact	  that	  Kilifi’s	  MP	   Katana	   Ngala	   had	   been	   present	   may	   have	   given	   the	   members	   hope	   that	   he	  would	   personally	   intervene	   and	   lobby	   on	   his	   council’s	   behalf.	   Elected	   in	   1974	   to	  represent	  Kilifi	  North,	  Katana	  Ngala	  was	  the	  eldest	  son	  of	  Ronald	  Ngala,	   the	   latter	  described	  by	  Hornsby	  as	  ‘the	  only	  national-­‐level	  Mijikenda	  leader’	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  early	   1970s.	  78	  Ngala	   junior	   never	   established	   for	   himself	   either	   the	   kind	   of	   local	  following	   or	   national	   stature	   that	   his	   father	   had	   had,	   and	   as	  George	  Gona	  writes,	  ‘during	   his	   term	   as	   MP	   of	   the	   area	   he	   came	   under	   increasing	   scrutiny	   from	   an	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  Special	  full	  council	  minutes,	  KCC,	  27	  November	  1980,	  Kilifi	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  Ibid.	  74	  Full	  council	  minutes,	  KCC,	  8	  December,	  1980,	  Kilifi	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  Government	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  Special	  meeting	  minutes,	  KCC,	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  December	  1980,	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  Ibid.	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emerging	   elite	   in	   the	   area	   for	   his	   lacklustre	   performance.’79	  The	   council	  was	   also	  dismayed	  by	  his	   lack	  of	   interest	   in	   local	  affairs.	   In	   the	   first	   full	   council	  meeting	  of	  1981,	  the	  minutes	  noted	  that	  ‘[t]he	  chairman	  was	  disappointed	  by	  the	  Members	  of	  Parliaments’	  failure	  to	  turn	  up	  though	  he	  had	  officially	  invited	  them.’80	  Two	  months	  later	   and	   the	   chairman	   once	   again	   ‘informed	   the	   members	   that	   he	   had	   officially	  invited	   the	   Members	   of	   Parliament	   for	   Kilifi	   district	   so	   that	   they	   together	   could	  discuss	  the	  ways	  and	  means	  of	  improving	  the	  district	  but	  unfortunately	  all	  had	  not	  turned	   up.’81	  The	   next	   MP	   to	   attend	   a	   council	   meeting	   was	   Francis	   Tuva	   the	  representative	   for	   Malindi	   South	   who	   was	   the	   Assistant	   Minister	   for	   Urban	  Development	  and	  Housing	  at	  the	  time.	  During	  his	  visit	  in	  October	  1981	  he	  told	  the	  members	   ‘that	   MPs	   were	   always	   prepared	   to	   attend	   council	   meetings	   whenever	  they	  were	  invited	  in	  writing	  of	  the	  issues	  needing	  their	  attention	  and	  advice’	  [sic].82	  Yet	   this	   statement	  did	  not	   tally	  with	   the	  council’s	  experience.	  Katana	  Ngala	  never	  visited	  the	  council	  during	  his	  tenure	  in	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Local	  Government,	  and	  to	  the	  councillors,	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  that	  their	  MP	  was	  acting	  with	  their	  interests	  in	  mind.	  Indeed	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  new	  constituency	  was	  created	  for	  Ngala	  in	  the	  election	  of	  1988	  (Bahari)	  signalled	  his	  very	  weak	  position	  within	  the	  local	  politics	  of	  Kilifi.83	  	  	   Without	   active	   patrons	   taking	   an	   interest	   in	   the	   council	   -­‐	   injecting	   it	  with	  resources	  and	  recognising	  it	  within	  the	  local	  area	  -­‐	  Kilifi	  County	  Council	  continued	  to	   stagnate.	  The	   fierce	   contests	   that	   took	  place	   in	  other	   local	   authorities	  between	  councillors	   and	   staff,	   and	   between	   members	   over	   committee	   positions	   did	   not	  regularly	   feature	   in	   Kilifi	   in	   the	   1980s.	   The	   peaceable	   nature	   of	   the	   council	   was	  explained	   by	   Loyce	   Thoya,	   a	   nursery	   school	   supervisor	   who	   had	  worked	   for	   the	  council	   for	   twenty-­‐nine	  years.	  Thoya	   commented	   that	   ‘fighting	  would	   come	  when	  you	  have	  things	  that	  you	  want	  to	  divide,	  but	   if	  you	  come	  and	  you	  have	  nothing	  to	  divide,	  then	  you	  just	  talk	  and	  go.’84	  A	  similar	  sentiment	  was	  expressed	  by	  Councillor	  Tsoka,	   who	   on	   joining	   in	   the	   council	   in	   1988	   found	   that	   ‘by	   that	   time,	   they	  [councillors	   and	   council	   staff]	  were	   just	   co-­‐operating.	   You	   know	  most	   councillors	  were	  not	  educated,	  and	  if	  you	  are	  not	  educated,	  then	  you	  can	  do	  nothing	  other	  than	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  Full	  council	  minutes,	  KCC,	  29	  January	  1981,	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  Full	  council	  minutes,	  KCC,	  24	  March	  1981,	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  Full	  council	  minutes,	  KCC,	  29	  October	  1981,	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  Government	  Archive.	  	  83	  Gona,	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  political	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  84	  Loyce	  Thoya,	  interview,	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expectation	  because	  of	  the	  illiteracy.’85	  By	  this	  Tsoka	  meant	  that	  he	  and	  most	  of	  his	  fellow	   councillors	   struggled	   to	   negotiate	   opportunities	   for	   themselves	   and	   their	  constituents	  because	  they	  did	  not	  have	  the	  education	  or	  literacy	  skills	  necessary	  to	  navigate	   local	   government	   bureaucracy.	   A	   similar	   sentiment	   was	   expressed	   by	  Kenga	   Chai	   when	   asked	   about	   how	   decisions	   on	   staff	   appointments	   were	   made:	  ‘Truly	  speaking	  during	  that	  time,	  we	  did	  not	  know	  what	  was	  happening	  but	  I	  know	  posts	  were	  advertised	  and	  the	  DO	  [district	  officer]	  was	  also	  involved.86	  	  	   Tsoka	   -­‐	   who	   had	   apprenticed	   himself	   to	   an	   elder	   councillor	   since	   leaving	  school	   -­‐	   found	   the	   realities	   of	   life	   as	   a	   councillor	   disappointing.	  He	   only	   chose	   to	  serve	  one	   term,	   and	   in	  1992	  applied	   instead	   to	  be	   the	  area	   chief.	  The	   incumbent,	  Charles	  Parsi,	  had	  reached	  retirement	  age;	   the	  two	  swapped	  positions	  with	  Tsoka	  becoming	  the	  location	  chief,	  and	  Parsi	  the	  local	  councillor.	  To	  Tsoka,	  the	  provincial	  administration	  offered	  the	  kind	  of	  job	  security	  that	  elected	  office	  had	  lacked:	  	  You	   know,	   if	   you	   are	   leaders	   you	   have	   to	   focus,	   because	   politics	   is	   not	  reliable	  in	  life.	  But	  if	  you	  are	  a	  chief,	  you	  are	  also	  a	  leader,	  but	  the	  chief	  is	  more	  powerful	  than	  the	  councillor	  because	  that	  is	  a	  government	  sector.	  It	  is	  the	  coordination.	  And	  if	  you	  are	  a	  chief,	  your	  job	  is	  secured	  because,	  right	  now,	  you	  are	  a	  councillor,	  in	  the	  next	  five	  years	  the	  community	  can	  refuse	  to	  give	  you	  their	  votes.	  What	  shall	  you	  do?	  So	  I	  thought	  as	  a	  youth	  I	  can	  be	  employed	  as	  a	  government	  man	  so	  that	  I	  can	  serve	  my	  family,	  government	  and	  community	  at	  large.87	  Here	   Tsoka	   expresses	   the	   difficulties	   he	   encountered	   trying	   to	   pursue	   personal	  accumulation	  and	  community	  leadership	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  the	  county	  council.	  Although	  he	  had	   tried	  during	  his	   five	  years	   in	  office	   to	  use	  his	   ‘common	  sense’	   to	  acquire	  plots	  and	  get	   jobs	   for	  his	  supporters,	  he	  ultimately	  concluded	  that,	   ‘at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  day,	  you	  give	  more	   than	  you	  get’.88	  The	   internal	   limitations	  of	   the	   local	  government	   system	   were	   compounded	   by	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   district’s	   leaders	   to	  lobby	   on	   the	   council’s	   behalf	   at	   the	   centre,	   and	   to	   ensure	   that	   state	   patronage	  reached	   Kilifi’s	   grassroots.	   For	   these	   reasons,	   by	   the	   early	   1990s,	   Kilifi	   County	  Council	   remained	   largely	   peripheral	   to	   the	   district’s	   political	   and	   development	  agenda.	  Yet	  in	  Kakamega	  this	  was	  not	  the	  case.	  	  	  	   On	   succeeding	   to	   the	   presidency,	   Moi	   attempted	   to	   construct	   ‘a	   new	  Kalenjin-­‐centric	   state,	   based	   upon	   a	   precarious	   alliance	   between	   ...[his]	   Kalenjin	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  19	  January	  2013,	  Kilifi	  Town	  (Kilifi).	  87	  Benson	  Tsoka,	  interview,	  31	  January	  2013,	  Sokoke	  (Kilifi).	  	  88	  Ibid.	  	  
	  	  
148	  
and	   Moses	   Mudavadi’s	   Abaluhya’.89	  The	   two	   had	   first	   become	   acquainted	   in	   the	  1950s	   whilst	   they	   both	   worked	   in	   the	   North	   Rift;	   Moi	   as	   a	   head	   teacher	   and	  Mudavadi	   as	   a	   district	   education	   officer.	   The	   connection	   formed	   at	   that	   time	  became	   something	   of	   a	   Kenyan	   political	   legend,	   and	   was	   often	   called	   upon	   to	  explain	   ‘Mudavadi’s	  preeminent	  position	   in	   the	   inner	  sanctum	  of	  President	  Daniel	  arap	  Moi’s	  State	  House	  and	  power	  structure’.90	  Moi	  appointed	  Mudavadi	  as	  Minister	  for	   Local	   Government	   in	   1983,	   which	   had	   not	   been	   ‘such	   an	   illustrious	   ministry	  until	   Mudavadi	   took	   over’.91	  That	   a	   key	   ally	   and	   close	   confidant	   was	   given	   this	  ministerial	  post	  arguably	  provides	  further	  evidence	  of	  Moi’s	  greater	  interest	  in	  local	  government	  compared	  to	  his	  predecessor.	  	  	   In	   order	   to	   understand	   the	   politics	   of	   Kakamega	   County	   Council	   in	   the	  1980s,	   the	   influence	  of	  Mudavadi	  has	  to	  be	  accounted	  for;	  as	  Peter	  Kombo	  said	   in	  reference	  to	  Mudavadi’s	  death	   in	  1989,	   ‘that	   is	  why	  we	   lost	  everything’.92	  Looking	  back,	  former	  council	  chairman	  Lawrence	  Itolondo	  regretted	  that	  he	  and	  his	  fellow	  councillors	  had	  not	  fully	  appreciated	  Mudavadi	  and	  what	  he	  did	  for	  the	  community:	  	  	  We	  didn't	   understand	  him.	   If	  we'd	  have	  understood	  him,	  we'd	  have	   gone	  further.	  He	  believed	   in	  his	  base	  home,	   even	   though	  he	  was	  a	  minister	   for	  the	  government.	  But	  he	  had	  a	   lot	  of	  opposition	   from	  people	   like	  Shikuku,	  Nabwera,	  Angatia	  and	  so	  on…So	  when	  he	  came	  to	  Kakamega,	  he	  made	  sure	  that	  some	  councils	  were	  created,	  to	  bring	  closer	  development	  to	  the	  people,	  like	  Malava,	  Mumias,	  even	  Vihiga…	  So	  even	  us	  at	   the	  council,	   I	   remember	  when	   you	  went	   to	   the	   council	   they	   had	   no	   lorry,	   nothing.	   But	   eventually	  through	   the	   Minister	   of	   Local	   Government	   we	   bought	   two	   lorries,	   we	  bought	  two	  graders	  for	  roads	  in	  the	  district.	  He	  was	  very	  handy	  at	  that	  time,	  but	  we	  didn't	  realise.	  We	  only	  realised	  at	  the	  time	  he	  died	  in	  1989.’93	  The	  idea	  that	  ‘closer	  development’	  could	  be	  achieved	  through	  creating	  new	  councils	  is	  worth	  noting.	  The	  theory	  and	  language	  of	  ‘closer	  administration’	  in	  Kenya	  had	  its	  origins	  in	  -­‐	  and	  was	  widely	  associated	  with	  -­‐	  the	  ‘Mau	  Mau’	  Emergency.	  Yet	  despite	  this	   connection,	   grassroots	   campaigns	   for	   ‘closer	   administration’	   had	   galvanised	  communities	  across	  Kenya	  since	  independence	  who	  considered	  that	  a	  new	  district,	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  Hornsby	  and	  Throup,	  ‘Elections	  and	  political	  change	  in	  Kenya’,	  p.	  175.	  	  	  90	  ‘Moi	  and	  Mudavadi:	  A	  history	  of	  old	  family	  ties’,	  The	  Standard,	  10	  February	  2013,	  accessed	  online	  at:	  http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000077014/moi-­‐and-­‐mudavadi-­‐a-­‐history-­‐of-­‐old-­‐family-­‐ties.	  	  91	  Barrack	  Muluka,	  ‘Patriarch’s	  footprint	  in	  the	  sands	  of	  time’,	  The	  Standard,	  2	  February	  2014,	  accessed	  online	  at:	  http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000103714/patriarch-­‐s-­‐footprint-­‐in-­‐the-­‐sands-­‐of-­‐time.	  	  92	  Ibid.	  93	  Lawrence	  Itolondo,	  interview,	  26	  August	  2013,	  Sigalagala	  (Kakamega).	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location,	   council	   or	   ward	   would	   empower	   local	   voices	   and	   bring	   additional	  resources.	  To	  Moi	  and	  his	   inner	  circle,	  approving	  these	  requests	  had	  a	  short-­‐term	  political	   logic	   of	   appeasing	   local	   constituents.	   But	   in	   the	   long-­‐term,	   the	   effects	   of	  subdivision	  have	  been	  questionable.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  local	  authorities,	  the	  practice	  led	  to	   a	   surge	   in	   the	   number	   of	   small,	   uneconomic	   authorities	   that	   had	   neither	   the	  capacity	  nor	   the	  resources	   to	  provide	  even	  the	  most	  basic	  services	  such	  as	  refuse	  collection.94	  In	   1963	   there	   were	   forty	   districts	   and	   forty-­‐five	   local	   councils	   in	  Kenya.95	  By	   the	   time	   the	   new	   constitution	   was	   passed	   in	   2010	   there	   were	   265	  districts	  and	  175	   local	  authorities.96	  The	  great	  majority	  of	   these	  new	  districts	  and	  councils	  were	  created	  after	  1992,	  but	  the	  pattern	  and	  logic	  underlying	  this	  practice	  had	  been	  established	  during	  the	  era	  of	  the	  one-­‐party	  state.	  	  	  	  
Figure	  10:	  Growth	  in	  number	  of	  local	  government	  authorities,	  1963-­‐2010.	  
Type	  of	  authority	  	  	   1963	   1982	   1991	   2010	  County	  Councils	  	   38	   38	   39	   67	  City	  &	  Municipal	  Councils	  	   7	   10	   20	   46	  Town	  &	  Urban	  Councils	  	   ..	   24	   39	   62	  
Total	  	   45	   72	   98	   175	  Source:	  Figures	  from	  1963,	  1982	  and	  1991	  from	  John	  Cohen	  (1993);	  2010	  figures	  from	  Rocaboy	  et	  al	  (2013),	  p.	  166.	  	  	  	  	   When	   Mudavadi	   entered	   parliament	   in	   1979	   there	   were	   seven	   local	  authorities	  in	  Western	  Province.97	  By	  1988,	  the	  minister	  had	  created	  a	  further	  four	  local	  authorities	  for	  his	  home	  province,	  and	  two	  urban	  councils	  had	  been	  upgraded	  to	   town	   council	   status.98	  As	   in	   other	  parts	   of	  Kenya,	   the	   growth	   in	   the	  number	  of	  local	   authorities	   in	  Western	   Province	   in	   the	   1980s	   mainly	   occurred	   through	   the	  creation	  of	  urban	  councils.	  Establishing	  new	  authorities	  was	  one	  way	  for	  Mudavadi	  to	   lessen	   the	   competition	   for	   resources	  between	   the	   sixteen	  Luhya	   sub-­‐clans	   and	  respond	   to	   demands	   from	   his	   own	   Maragoli	   constituency	   based	   around	   Vihiga.	  Rather	   than	  bringing	  new	  resources,	   the	  subdivision	  of	   local	  authorities	  primarily	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  Hornsby,	  Kenya:	  A	  History	  Since	  Independence,	  p.	  445.	  	  95	  John	  Cohen,	  ‘Importance	  of	  public	  service	  reform:	  The	  case	  of	  Kenya’,	  JOMAS,	  31:3	  (1993),	  pp.	  449-­‐476.	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  Kempe	  Ronald	  Hope,	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Development	  in	  Kenya	  (New	  York,	  2012),	  p.	  183	  97	  The	  seven	  local	  authorities	  in	  1979	  were:	  Kakamega	  Municipal	  Council,	  Bungoma	  County	  Council,	  Kakamega	  County	  Council,	  Bungoma	  Town	  Council,	  Webuye	  Town	  Council,	  Busia	  County	  Council,	  and	  Busia	  Urban	  Council.	  	  98	  The	  four	  new	  local	  authorities	  were:	  Mumias	  Urban	  Council,	  Luanda	  Urban	  Council,	  Vihiga	  Town	  Council	  and	  Kapsokwony	  Urban	  Council.	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offered	   a	   way	   to	   share	   existing	   resources	   differently,	   with	   the	   addition	   of	   some	  extra	   central	   government	   funding.	  One	  of	   the	  main	  benefits	  of	   establishing	  a	  new	  council	   was	   that	   it	   created	   new	   local	   elected	   offices,	   and	   additional	   employment	  opportunities.	   The	   responsibility	   for	   and	   control	   of	   councils’	   staff	   establishments	  was	  a	  fiercely	  coveted	  and	  contested	  duty	  across	  the	  local	  government	  system.	  This	  led	  to	   frequent	  wrangles	  between	  clerks	  and	  councillors,	  and	  between	  councillors	  aligned	   to	   different	   council	   officials.	   One	   of	   the	   local	   authorities	   created	   out	   of	  Kakamega	   County	   Council	   was	   Vihiga	   Urban	   Council.	   Established	   in	   1981,	   it	   was	  elevated	   to	   a	   town	   council	   in	   1986	   and	   a	   municipal	   council	   in	   1991.	   Bernard	  Chahihu	  was	  employed	  as	  the	  council’s	  clerk	  from	  1988.	  The	  antagonism	  between	  the	  councillors	  and	  clerk’s	  office	  was	  soon	  revealed	  to	  the	  new	  employee	  who	  had	  not	  worked	  in	  local	  government	  before:	  	  There	  was	  a	  kind	  of	  mutual	  hostility	  and	   in	  some	  cases	  mutual	  contempt.	  Councillors	  were	  usually	  very	  happy	   to	  get	   rid	  of	   their	   clerks,	   in	  a	   simple	  vote	  of	  no-­‐confidence.	  There	  was	  a	  very	  high-­‐turnover	  of	  town	  clerks	  in	  our	  local	   authorities.	   So	   people	   developed	   also	   some	   methods	   of	   survival.	  Occasionally	  you	   find	  some	  clerks	  simply...taking	  orders	   literally	   from	  the	  councillors.	  And	  that	  was	  dangerous	  because	  the	  councillors	  were	  not	  the	  most	   informed	   people,	   those	   were	   elected	   people,	   they	   were	   rabble-­‐rousers,	   noise-­‐makers,	   and	   if	   you	  were	   not	   able	   to	   tell	   them	   off,	   chances	  were	  you	  would	  make	  some	  very,	  very	  awkward	  mistakes	  that	  would	  later	  on	   embarrass	   you.	   Embarrass	   everybody.	   So	   the	   relationship	  wasn’t	   very	  healthy,	   it	   wasn’t	   mutually	   beneficial.	   But	   eventually	   I	   got	   to	   know	   how	  they	  thought	  and	  acted,	  thank	  God	  they	  never	  voted	  me	  out.99	  Chahihu’s	   disdain	   for	   the	   less-­‐educated	   councillors	   was	   intensified	   by	   their	  constant	  requests	  for	  him	  to	  create	  employment	  opportunities	  for	  their	  supporters.	  The	   fact	   that	   ‘the	   effectiveness	   of	   a	   councillor	   seemed	   to	   be	   determined	   by	   how	  many	   people	   he	   was	   able	   to	   employ’,	   soon	   became	   his	   ‘biggest	   headache’.100	  Councillor	   Mukaramoja	   claimed	   that	   by	   his	   time,	   vacant	   positions	   were	   not	  advertised,	   instead	   councillors	   rotated	   filling	   the	   posts	   with	   their	   relatives	   and	  friends.	   He	   explained:	   ‘you	   know	   during	   those	   days	   you	   just	   fight	   to	   get	   your	  relative	   or	   your	   friend	  when	   there	   is	   a	   job.	   You	   see,	   you	   have	   to	  work	   hard…	   So	  during	   that	   time	  we	  were	  not	  advertising,	  we	  were	   just	   recommending’.101	  Rather	  than	   having	   a	   general	   duty	   to	   create	   employment	   for	   anyone	   residing	   in	   the	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  Bernard	  Chahihu,	  interview,	  27	  August	  2013,	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  Ibid.	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council’s	  area,	  most	  councillors	  considered	  themselves	  personally	  responsible	  only	  for	  ‘their	  people’;	  their	  family	  and	  friends.	  	   The	   importance	   of	   prioritising	   family	   and	   clan	   when	   negotiating	  employment	  opportunities	  was	  underlined	  by	  Lawrence	  Itolondo:	  	  Yes	  in	  this	  world,	  for	  God,	  you	  must	  clean	  your	  house	  first.	  For	  you	  to	  help	  another	  person	   you	  must	   be	   able	   to	   help	   your	  people	   first,	   then	  help	   the	  outsiders.	   That	   thing	  was	   there,	   I	   would	   not	   have	   seen	   a	   relative	  who	   is	  qualified,	  and	  who	  wants	  a	  job,	  and	  it’s	  there,	  let	  him	  come	  and	  get	  it!102	  In	   consequence,	  most	   councils	  were	   overstaffed	   and	   salaries	   tended	   to	   dominate	  recurrent	  expenditure.	  Excluding	  the	  hundreds	  of	  nursery	  teachers	  on	  the	  county’s	  payroll,	   in	   1985,	   Kakamega	   County	   Council	   had	   272	   employees.103	  Just	   over	   a	  decade	   earlier,	   the	   council’s	   annual	   report	   recorded	   only	   101	   employees.104	  This	  expansion	   in	   the	   council’s	   labour	   force	   was	   partly	   the	   outcome	   of	   new	   workers	  employed	  in	   local	  authority	  markets.	  Since	  1970	  when	  markets	  became	  central	   to	  all	   county	   councils’	   revenue	   raising	   capacities,	   the	   number	   of	   market	   attendants	  had	   increased	   significantly.	  The	  use	  of	   employment	  as	   a	   form	  of	  patronage	  was	  a	  political	   strategy	   that	   Mudavadi	   embraced;	   he	   was	   widely	   known	   for	   only	  employing	  his	  co-­‐ethnic	  Maragoli	  and	  Luhya.105	  Although	  flagrantly	  nepotistic,	  such	  practices	   endeared	   him	   to	   his	   supporters,	   including	   councillor	   Edward	   Indai:	   ‘He	  was	   helpful	   to	   his	   people.	  He	   employed	   so	  many	  people	   in	   the	  ministry,	   in	   every	  ministry	  he	  went	  he	  employed	  many	  of	  his	  tribesmen.’106	  	   In	   1985	   the	   government	   introduced	   a	   constitutional	   amendment	   which	  brought	  senior	  local	  government	  officers	  under	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  Public	  Service	  Commission	   (PSC).	   The	   inclusion	   of	   local	   government	   officers	   in	   the	   PSC	   was	  intended	   to	   ensure	   that	   qualified	   personnel	   rather	   than	   people	   of	   the	   ‘right’	  ethnicity	  were	  engaged	  by	  councils.	  The	  move	  was	  also	  designed	  to	  protect	  officers	  from	  councillors	  bent	  on	  enacting	   retribution	  when	   their	  demands	  were	  not	  met.	  Edward	  Indai,	  and	  his	  fellow	  councillors,	  sometimes	  resorted	  to	  extreme	  measures	  to	   censure	   the	   Kakamega	   County	   Council’s	   clerk:	   ‘You	   see	   sometimes	   the	  relationship	  was	  bad.	  It	  is	  one	  time	  when	  I	  was	  there…	  councillors	  came	  and	  locked	  the	  door,	   they	  put	  on	   a	   very	  big	  padlock	   and	   they	   said	   [to	   the	   clerk]	   “you	   cannot	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  interview,	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  August	  2013,	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  (Kakamega).	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come	  in	  here”!’107	  When	  chief	  officers	  came	  under	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  PSC	  in	  1985,	  this	  started	  to	  change;	  Indai	  regretted	  that	  councillors	  then	  had	  ‘no	  authority’,	  and	  could	   not	   ‘sack	   the	   town	   clerk’.108	  Yet	   even	   with	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   PSC,	   chief	  officers	  could	  still	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  pressure	  from	  councillors.	  They	  were	  obliged	  to	  act	   on	   the	   instructions	   of	   the	   minister	   or	   the	   president,	   even	   when	   these	  instructions	   violated	   the	   law,	   or	   were	   contrary	   to	   the	   ‘public	   good’.	   A	   particular	  example	  of	  this	  remembered	  by	  Bernard	  Chahihu	  occurred	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  when	  Chahihu	   was	   on	   annual	   leave.	   On	   a	   tour	   of	   Western	   Province,	   President	   Moi	  summoned	  all	  the	  region’s	  councillors	  to	  State	  Lodge.	  During	  the	  meeting	  one	  of	  the	  councillors	  called	  out	  from	  the	  crowd:	  ‘We	  councillors	  don’t	  have	  security	  of	  tenure.	  We	  get	  voted	  in,	  then	  voted	  out,	  and	  it’s	  like	  we	  never	  actually	  did	  anything.	  So	  after	  that	   there’s	   nothing	   to	   show	   for	   our	   service.	   How	   do	  we	   get	   on?’109	  According	   to	  Chahihu,	   the	   president	   resolved	   that	   the	   acting	   clerk	   should	   see	   that	   all	   the	  councillors	   received	   a	   parcel	   of	   public	   land.	   On	   his	   return	   to	  work,	   Chahihu	  was	  dismayed	   to	  discover	   that	   the	  allotted	   land	  was	   in	  an	  area	  where	   the	  council	  had	  planned	   to	   build	   rental	   houses	   on	   to	   increase	   its	   revenue.	   The	   district	  commissioner	   advised	   Chahihu	   not	   to	   challenge	   the	   decision,	   since	   it	   had	   been	  sanctioned	  by	  the	  president.	  	  	   This	  episode	  is	  representative	  of	  broader	  trends	  apparent	  throughout	  much	  of	  Moi’s	  presidency.	  That	  Moi	  yielded	  to	  the	  councillors’	  demands,	  demonstrated	  a	  willingness	   to	   appease	   ‘grassroots	   politicians’	   which	   had	   not	   been	   shared	   by	   his	  predecessor.	  He	  used	  multiple	  channels	  of	  patronage	  to	  try	  to	  maintain	  a	  degree	  of	  local	   legitimacy	  without	  allowing	  powerful	  rivals	  to	  emerge.	  Although	   ‘corruption’	  was	  not	  new,	   it	  was	  reaching	  new	  hands,	  and	  often	  came	   in	  new	  forms.	  The	  most	  common	  form	  by	  this	  period	  was	  land.	  Acquiring	  and	  selling	  land	  and	  market	  plots	  was	  one	  of	   the	  main	  ways	   that	   councillors	   could	   access	   additional	   resources	   that	  allowed	   them	   to	   fulfil	   their	   patrimonial	   obligations.110	  With	   the	   cash	   generated	  through	   this	   trade,	   supplemented	   by	   their	   allowances,	   councillors	   could	   organise	  and	   contribute	   to	   harambees.	   To	   those	   in	   higher	   office,	   this	   kind	   of	   initiative	  provoked	   mixed	   feelings.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   members	   of	   parliament	   had	   to	  encourage	   ‘self-­‐help’	  and	  grassroots	  development,	  but	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  effective	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  Ibid.	  	  108	  Ibid.	  	  109	  Bernard	  Chahihu,	  interview,	  27	  August	  2013,	  Mbale	  (Vihiga).	  	  110	  Lawrence	  Itolondo,	  interview,	  26	  August	  2013,	  Sigalagala	  (Kakamega).	  
	  	  
153	  
councillors	   represented	   a	   threat.	   This	   ambivalence	  was	   implied	  by	  Clerk	  Bernard	  Chahihu	   who	   explained:	   ‘The	   politician	   in	   this	   country	   has	   never	   been	   for	  enlightened	   leadership	   at	   the	   grassroots.	   It’s	   a	   pity…	   they	   want	   them	   to	   build	  schools,	   to	   build	   roads,	   but	   they	   don’t	  want	   to	   be	   challenged.’111	  Councillor	   Peter	  Kombo	  agreed:	   ‘MP	  actually	  is	  a	  tough	  man.	  He	  doesn’t	  cooperate	  with	  councillors	  because	  he	  believes	  that	  if	  he	  works	  with	  councillors,	  in	  future	  they	  will	  overthrow	  him	   because	   they	   are	   close	   to	   people.’ 112 	  Parliamentarians’	   anxieties	   about	  ambitious	   councillors	   were	   not	   unfounded.	   Nyikuli	   Mukaramoja	   often	   found	  himself	  ‘thinking	  of	  the	  top	  post’	  when	  he	  toured	  his	  ward	  and	  met	  his	  supporters.	  He	  asked	  himself	  ‘if	  I	  have	  been	  here	  why	  can’t	  I	  try	  this	  other	  post?’113	  	  	   Most	   councillors	   claimed	   that	   it	   was	   because	   of	   their	   popularity	   	   and	  legitimacy	  with	  local	  communities	  that	  MPs	  were	  anxious	  of	  their	  ambitions.	  In	  this	  way,	  Morris	  Mangi	   of	   Kilifi	   stressed	   that	   his	   ‘public	   rallies	   exceeded	   those	   of	   the	  MP’.114	  There	  was	  a	  tension	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  local	  and	  national	  leaders.	  As	  was	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Three,	  since	  independence	  MPs	  had	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  both	  responsive	  to	  the	  demands	  coming	  from	  below,	  and	  had	  to	  try	  to	  limit	  and	  manage	  those	   expectations.	   Councillors	   were	   less	   burdened	   with	   that	   responsibility,	   and	  were	  free	  to	  ‘speak’	  for	  the	  ‘wananchi’,	  whatever	  their	  demands.	  Councillors	  such	  as	  Edward	   Indai	   concluded	   that	  MPs	   actively	   sought	   to	   limit	   the	   resources	   reaching	  councillors:	  	  You	   see	   those	   people	   who	  were	   letting	   down	   the	   councillors	   were	  MPs.	  MPs	  feared	  councillors…So	  MP	  feared	  if	  councillors	   	  are	  on	  the	  ground,	  meet	  people	  all	  the	  time,	  are	  with	  the	  community	  all	  the	  time,	  and	  if	  we	  give	  them	  more	  money,	  you	  will	  go	  there	  for	  one	  term	  then	  the	  councillor	  will	  [unseat	  you].	  You	  see,	  that	  was	  the	  thing.115	  Such	  anxiety	  and	  mutual	  suspicion	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  define	  the	  relationship	  between	  Moses	  Mudavadi	  and	  Kakamega	  County	  Council.	  Peter	  Kombo,	  the	  same	  councillor	  who	  described	  Mudavadi	  as	  a	  ‘dictator’	  concluded	  that	  he	  ‘was	  actually	  a	  good	  man.	  When	  you	  send	  him	  a	  letter	  requesting	  him	  to	  push	  you	  up,	  he	  will	  just	  help	  you’.116	  Mudavadi	   used	   his	   influence	   to	   increase	   opportunities	   in	   Kakamega,	   thereby	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preserving	   and	   improving	   his	   own	   position.	   He	   recognised	   that	   local	   authorities	  were	  part	  of	  the	  region’s	  clientelist	  networks	  and	  so	  used	  his	  discretion	  as	  minister	  to	   intervene	   in	   council	   business.	   The	   most	   memorable	   example	   of	   this	   cited	   by	  councillors	  occurred	  in	  1988	  when	  Mudavadi	  blocked	  Lawrence	  Itolondo’s	  election	  as	   council	   chairman.	  After	  being	  elected	  by	  his	  peers,	   Itolondo	  and	  his	   colleagues	  were	   called	   to	   Mudavadi’s	   house	   in	   Vihiga.	   There	   he	   instructed	   them	   to	   replace	  Itolondo	  with	  a	  different	  councillor.	  Peter	  Kombo	  recounted	  the	  incident	  in	  similar	  terms	  to	  Itolondo:	  	  So	  when	  the	  time	  came,	  he	  [Mudavadi]	  sent	  the	  DC	  to	  come	  and	  tell	  us	  to	  meet	   him.	  When	  he	   came,	   actually	   he	  was	   a	  man	   of,	   let	  me	   say	   he	  was	   a	  dictator.	   He	   was	   a	   dictator…	   But	   we	   had	   to	   change	   from	   the	   person	   we	  elected	  and	  we	  replaced	  with	  his	  person;	  we	  were	  forced…He	  told	  us	  if	  we	  don’t	  follow	  his	  views	  he	  can	  actually	  break	  up	  the	  council.’117	  Itolondo	   recalled	   how	   Mudavadi	   had	   demanded	   deference	   from	   the	   assembled	  councillors,	  proclaiming:	  ‘I'm	  the	  Minister	  for	  Local	  Government,	  and	  what	  I	  expect	  from	  you,	  is	  for	  you	  to	  respect	  me.	  Everybody	  all	  over	  the	  country	  respects	  what	  I	  say.	  The	  president	  is	  number	  one,	  and	  I'm	  number	  two.	  So	  the	  local	  government	  is	  mine.’118	  The	  given	  explanation	  for	  why	  Mudavadi	  preferred	  a	  candidate	  other	  than	  Itolondo,	  was	  that	  the	  other	  ‘had	  had	  his	  education	  in	  America’.119	  The	  disgruntled	  councillors	   suspected	   the	   real	   reason	   was	   that	   the	   installed	   councillor	   was	   a	  Maragoli	   like	  Mudavadi.	   For	   several	  months	   the	   council	   could	   not	   decide	   how	   to	  proceed:	  	  We	  talked,	  and	  talked,	  and	  talked.	  And	  I	  realised	  the	  Local	  Government	  Act,	  the	  Minister	  with	  a	  stroke	  of	  a	  pen	  they	  can	  dissolve	  that	  council.	  Because	  he	  would	   just	   announce	   that	   he	   has	   dissolved	  Kakamega	   County	   Council.	  People	   did	   not	   understand	   that,	   but	  when	   I	   realised	  what	   he	  was	   talking	  about	  at	  the	  meeting...	  That	  was	  Moses	  Mudavadi.	  When	  he	  wanted	  me	  to	  reply,	   I	   made	   up	  my	  mind,	   I	   didn't	   even	   consult	   my	   fellow	   councillors.	   I	  learned	   that	   he	   can	   dissolve	   this	   council,	   and	   if	   he	   dissolves	   this	   council	  that	   these	   people	   [the	   councillors]	   have	   campaigned	   for,	   with	   the	   few	  money	  they	  had,	  they'd	  go	  home	  because	  of	  me,	  and	  because	  of	  me	  -­‐	  that's	  not	   fair.	   I	   said	   to	   the	   minister,	   I've	   heard	   all	   that	   you've	   talked,	   but	   its	  unfortunate	  that	  the	  election	  was	  done,	  and	  I	  won.	  But	  for	  the	  interests	  of	  the	   county	   council	   and	   the	   people	   of	   Kakamega	   I	   am	   stepping	   from	   the	  chairmanship	  now.	  So	  I	  stepped	  down.120	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117	  Ibid.	  	  118	  Lawrence	  Itolondo,	  interview,	  26	  August	  2013,	  Sigalagala	  (Kakamega).	  	  119	  Ibid.	  	  120	  Ibid.	  	  
	  	  
155	  
Itolondo’s	  decision	  to	  step	  aside	  was	  ultimately	  made	  after	  realising	  that	  his	  fellow	  councillors	  -­‐	  who	  had	  used	  their	  money	  to	  campaign	  -­‐	  would	  have	  no	  opportunity	  to	  regain	  their	  funds	  if	  the	  council	  was	  dissolved.	  Yet	  added	  to	  this	  calculation	  was	  the	  suggestion	  that	  Itolondo	  sacrificed	  himself	  for	  the	  good	  of	  the	  community.	  This	  characteristic	   slippage	   between	   private	   and	   public	   interests	   imaginatively	   linked	  the	  needs	  of	   individual	  councillors	  with	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  the	  whole	  community.	  A	  year	  later	  Moses	  Mudavadi	  died,	  an	  election	  was	  called,	  and	  Itolondo	  took	  back	  the	  chairmanship.	  	  
Conclusion	  	  This	  chapter	  has	  examined	  how	  the	  position	  of	  councillors	  altered	  after	  Daniel	  arap	  Moi	   succeeded	   to	   the	   presidency.	   It	   has	   argued	   that	   whilst	   representative	  institutions	  were	  systematically	  weakened	  and	  neglected	  in	  the	  late-­‐Kenyatta	  state,	  under	  Moi’s	   presidency,	   councils	   –	   like	  KANU	  –	   found	   themselves	   reincorporated	  into	  the	  state’s	  architecture	  and	  became	  part	  of	  the	  ‘arsenal	  of	  instruments’	  used	  by	  the	   president	   to	   exercise	   control	   and	   reward	   support.121	  Although	   councils	   as	  institutions	  remained	  without	  significant	  funds	  or	  functions,	  the	  revival	  of	  District	  Development	   Committees	   served	   to	   expand	   the	   number	   of	   avenues	   available	   to	  councils	   when	   trying	   to	   secure	   funding	   for	   a	   project.	   Throughout	   this	   period,	  
harambees	  remained	  integral	  to	  the	  unofficial	  duties	  of	  councillors.	  The	  expectation	  that	   councillors	   would	   organise	   and	   contribute	   to	   fundraising	   efforts	   put	  considerable	  strain	  on	  councillors	  who	  found	  it	  difficult	  to	  balance	  their	  individual	  needs	   and	   responsibilities	   with	   those	   of	   their	   wider	   community.	   To	   meet	   these	  responsibilities,	  councillors	  relied	  on	  the	  patronage	  of	  Moi	  and	  his	  close	  allies,	  who	  permitted	   them	   to	   appropriate	   land,	   and	   on	   occasions	   dispensed	   cash	   hand-­‐outs.	  Working	   well	   with	   the	   administration	   was	   essential,	   and	   conflicts	   were	   fought	  between	  councillors	  and	  officers,	  rather	  than	  between	  councils	  and	  the	  government.	  	  	   The	   dynamic	   between	   councils	   and	   members	   of	   parliament	   also	   shifted	  during	  this	  period.	  In	  previous	  decades,	  it	  had	  been	  clear	  where	  MPs	  stood	  in	  local	  clientelist	   hierarchies.	   Put	   in	   a	  more	   insecure	   position	   by	  Moi	   in	   the	   1980s,	  MPs	  became	   anxious	   about	   the	   local	   legitimacy	   that	   councillors	   claimed	   to	   enjoy.	   For	  some,	   this	   led	  to	  a	  distancing	  between	  councils	  and	  MPs.	  Kilifi	  County	  Council	  did	  not	   benefit	   from	   Katana	   Ngala’s	   tenure	   in	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Local	   Government.	   By	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contrast,	  Moses	  Mudavadi	   -­‐	   secure	   in	   the	   knowledge	   that	   he	  was	   the	   ‘president’s	  number	  two’	  –	   fostered	  a	  close	  relationship	  with	  councillors	   in	  Western	  Province,	  and	  used	  them	  to	  strengthen	  his	  position	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  Luhya	  leaders.	  	  	   The	  contrast	  between	  Kilifi	  and	  Kakamega	  was	  not	  only	  the	  product	  of	  the	  individual	  dynamics	  between	  the	  two	  councils	  and	  their	  MPs,	  but	  rather	  also	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  reflecting	   the	  different	  economic	  positions	  of	   the	   two	  case	  studies.	   In	   this	  way,	  the	  comparison	  confirms	  Barbara	  Thomas’	  observation	  that	  in	  poorer	  areas	  in	  the	  1980s,	  ‘the	  links	  between	  patron	  and	  local	  community	  were	  not	  as	  strong	  as	  in	  the	  more	  affluent	  locations,	  and	  the	  momentum	  for	  projects	  and	  project	  assistance	  generated	   by	   patrons	   was	   not	   as	   great.’ 122 	  Noting	   that	   this	   correlated	   with	  population	  densities,	   communication	   infrastructure,	  and	  organisational	   capacities,	  Thomas	   also	   added	   that	   poorer	   locations	  were	   less	   effective	   at	  making	   ‘the	   same	  level	  of	  demand	  upon	   the	  members	  of	  parliament	  and	  other	  patrons	  as	  wealthier	  communities’.123	  This	  further	  explains	  why	  Kilifi’s	  councillors	  appeared	  less	  able	  to	  balance	   the	   competing	   demands	   of	   councillorship	   when	   compared	   with	   their	  Kakamega	   peers.	   The	   next	   chapter	   develops	   this	   argument	   further	   in	   relation	   to	  Nakuru	   Municipal	   Council	   where	   both	   the	   relative	   wealth	   of	   the	   town,	   and	   the	  power	   of	   its	   MPs	   ensured	   that	   councillorship	   remained	   a	   viable	   political	   career	  throughout	  this	  period.	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Chapter	  Five:	  ‘The	  capital	  of	  Kenyan	  politics’:	  Nakuru	  Municipal	  Council,	  1970	  –	  1990	  	  	  Were	   there	   council	   officials	   who	   had	   allocated	   themselves	   with	   council	  houses?	   Were	   there	   councillors	   who	   had	   done	   the	   same?	   Were	   there	  council	  houses	  which	  were	  allocated	  to	  relatives	  of	  either	  council	  officials	  or	  councillors	  through	  favouritism?	  Were	  there	  some	  plots	  dished	  out	  in	  a	  similar	  manner?	  Ask	   any	  mwananchi	   in	   any	  urban	   area	   in	  Kenya	   and	   the	  chances	   are	   that	   all	   the	   questions	   listed	   above	   can	   be	   answered	   by	   the	  word	  “yes”.1	  
Introduction	  	  Turning	   to	  Nakuru	  Municipal	  Council,	   this	   chapter	  examines	  how	   the	  politics	   and	  performance	   of	   local	   government	   in	   urban	   areas	   differed	   from	   the	   experience	   in	  county	  councils	  after	  the	  transfer	  of	  functions.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  arguments	  developed	  over	   the	  previous	   two	  chapters,	   it	  poses	  a	  number	  of	   related	  questions.	  First,	  did	  town	  councillors	  approach	  local	  government	  service	  with	  different	  expectations	  to	  their	  rural	  counterparts,	  and	  did	  the	  institutions	  of	  municipal	  councils	  offer	  better	  opportunities	   for	   members	   to	   meet	   their	   personal	   and	   communal	   obligations?	  Second,	   how	   effectively	   did	   Nakuru	   Municipal	   Council	   function	   as	   a	   service	  provider?	   Given	   that	   unlike	   county	   councils,	   urban	   local	   authorities	   remained	  responsible	   for	   delivering	   key	   services	   within	   their	   areas	   of	   jurisdiction,	   what	  challenges	   did	   the	   council	   face	   administering	   its	   mandated	   functions?	   Third,	   the	  chapter	   considers	   the	   different	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   Kenyatta	   and	   Moi	   regimes	  interacted	   with	   Nakuru	   town	   and	   its	   elected	   leaders.	   Whilst	   neither	   Kilifi	   nor	  Kakamega	  figured	  particularly	  prominently	   in	   the	  government’s	  hierarchy	  of	   local	  constituencies,	   Nakuru	   by	   contrast	   played	   an	   important	   role	   in	   national	   politics	  under	  both	  presidents.	  How	  this	  impacted	  on	  the	  municipal	  council,	  and	  individual	  councillors	  is	  considered	  throughout.	  	  	   It	   is	   shown	   that	   municipal	   councillors	   were	   able	   to	   combine	   an	   ethos	   of	  service	  with	  a	  strategy	  for	  personal	  accumulation	  in	  a	  way	  that	  proved	  difficult	  for	  their	  rural	  equivalents.	  The	  resources	  available	  in	  Nakuru	  offered	  opportunities	  for	  civic	   leaders	   to	   increase	   their	   business	   interests	   and	   local	   status,	   whilst	   still	  maintaining	  an	  acceptable	  standard	  of	  local	  services.	  There	  were	  close	  connections	  between	  municipal	  councillors	  and	  other	  political	  and	  business	   leaders	  within	  the	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wider	  Nakuru	   area,	  who	   formed	   something	   like	   a	   property-­‐owning	   class;	   despite	  their	  personal	  rivalries	  there	  was	  a	  sense	  that	  they	  were	  connected	  by	  a	  shared	  set	  of	   interests.	   In	   the	   mid-­‐1970s,	   these	   broader	   political	   networks	   came	   under	  considerable	  pressure	  and	  scrutiny	  as	   fraught	  divisions	  between	  elites	  within	   the	  Kikuyu	  community	  played	  out	   in	   the	   town.	  Nakuru	  became	  the	   ‘centre	  of	  some	  of	  the	  most	  tumultuous	  political	  events’	  of	  this	  period,	  and	  when	  Moi	  succeeded	  to	  the	  presidency,	  he	  co-­‐opted	  leaders	  of	  the	  municipal	  council,	  as	  part	  of	  his	  strategy	  to	  secure	   ‘the	   capital	   of	   Kenyan	   politics’. 2 	  The	   close	   relationship	   between	   the	  president	  and	  a	  core	  group	  of	  councillors	  in	  the	  1980s	  allowed	  members	  to	  access	  resources	   at	   a	   time	   when	   the	   council’s	   own	   funds	   and	   assets	   had	   been	   largely	  depleted.	  Although	  Nakuru	  Municipal	  Council	  had	  managed	  to	  withstand	  the	  fiscal	  pressures	   it	   faced	   for	  much	   longer	   than	   its	   rural	   counterparts,	   by	   the	   end	   of	   the	  1980s	   decades	   of	   poor	   planning	   on	   the	   part	   of	   central	   government	   had	   left	   the	  council	  weakened	  institutionally	  and	  financially.	  	  	   The	   evidence	   presented	   in	   this	   chapter	   corresponds	  with	   Patricia	   Stamp’s	  observations	  about	  councillors	  who	  served	  on	  Thika	  Municipal	  Council	   in	   the	   late	  1960s	  and	  1970s.	  Stamp	  wrote	  that	  ‘individual	  human	  histories	  intertwine	  to	  make	  up	   the	   history	   of	   the	   [council],	   which	   in	   turn	   is	   connected	  with	   and	   responds	   to	  events	  in	  the	  province’s	  and	  Kenya’s	  history.’3	  Stamp	  devotes	  a	  considerable	  part	  of	  her	   analysis	   to	   the	   ‘struggle	   over	   the	   town	   as	   a	   resource	   for	   petty	   bourgeois	  advancement’.4	  Although	   she	   argues	   that	   councillors	   had	   ‘little	   loyalty	   to	   their	  constituents’	  and	  were	  primarily	  motivated	  by	  the	  prospect	  of	  profiting	  from	  their	  position,	   she	   also	   suggests	   that	   ‘one	   should	  not	   overstress	   the	   self-­‐interest	   of	   the	  councillors	  either’.5	  In	  order	  to	  unpack	  the	  tensions	  between	  ‘profit’	  and	  ‘service’,	  it	  is	  first	  necessary	  to	  examine	  the	  resources	  that	  municipal	  councils	  controlled,	  and	  the	   dynamic	   between	   revenue	   and	   services	   that	   existed	   in	   urban	   centres.	   This	   is	  important	   for	   understanding	   why	   the	   politics	   of	   municipal	   councils	   were	   more	  closely	   scrutinised	   by	   the	   centre.	   The	   chapter	   thus	   begins	   by	   examining	   the	  financial	   position	   of	   the	   council	   in	   the	   late-­‐Kenyatta	   period,	   describing	   how	   the	  institution	   and	   resources	   it	   controlled	   were	   used	   by	   councillors	   and	   officers	   to	  expand	   their	   own	   clientelist	   networks.	   The	   fact	   that	   municipal	   councillors	   had	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access	   to	   and	   controlled	   significant	   resources	   made	   their	   loyalty	   of	   greater	  significance	  to	  national	  politicians	  than	  in	  the	  case	  of	  county	  councils.	  Furthermore,	  that	   Nakuru	   had	   a	   large	   population,	   poised	   between	   the	   two	   most	   politically	  powerful	  ethnic	  blocs	   in	   the	  country,	  also	  gave	  the	   town	  a	  political	  significance	  of	  its	   own.	   The	   interplay	   between	   Nakuru	   and	   national	   politics	   in	   the	   1970s	   is	  considered	   in	   the	   second	   section	   of	   the	   chapter.	   It	   examines	   the	   attempts	   by	  different	   factions	   within	   the	   regime	   to	   determine	   the	   trajectory	   of	   the	   nation’s	  political	  future	  through	  control	  over	  Nakuru’s	  civic	  and	  parliamentary	  leaders.	  The	  final	   section	   examines	   the	   council’s	   experience	   during	   Moi’s	   one-­‐party	   state;	  although	  it	  was	  seen	  primarily	  as	  a	  ‘Kikuyu	  town’,	  Moi	  moved	  to	  co-­‐opt	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  municipal	  council	  to	  ensure	  stability	  was	  maintained,	  and	  guarantee	  that	  the	  district’s	   ‘history	   of	   radicalism’	   was	   conclusively	   over.6	  Those	   councillors	   who	  deviated	   from	   the	   party	   line	   soon	   found	   themselves	   subject	   to	   the	   unflinching	  discipline	   of	   the	   Nakuru	   KANU	   chairman,	   who	   controlled	   the	   district	   at	   the	  president’s	  behest.	  	  
The	  scale	  of	  services	  in	  Nakuru	  Town	  	  Presenting	   the	   annual	   estimates	   for	   the	   1970	   financial	   year,	   the	   chairman	   of	  Nakuru’s	   finance	   committee	   praised	   the	   ‘very	   adequate	   reserve’	   in	   the	   council’s	  General	   Fund. 7 	  Councillor	   Chepkoigat	   went	   on	   to	   observe	   that	   ‘it	   might	   be	  appropriate	   to	   query	   the	  necessity	   of	   presenting	   a	   balanced	  budget,	   as	   from	  past	  results	   we	   have	   averaged	   improvement	   in	   excess	   of	   K£40,000	   per	   year.’8	  The	  council’s	   secure	   financial	   position	   had	   been	  maintained	   in	   the	   1960s	   despite	   the	  many	   changes	   the	   town	   had	   undergone.	   For	   Nakuru,	   the	   1960s	   was	   a	   time	   of	  transition.	  As	  Chapter	  Two	  described,	   the	  town	  had	  been	   ‘the	  capital	  of	   the	  White	  Highlands’	   during	   much	   of	   the	   colonial	   era.	   This	   changed	   rapidly	   in	   the	   years	  immediately	   after	   independence,	   when	   the	   number	   and	   dominance	   of	   European	  and	  Asian	  residents	  diminished	  quickly.	  The	  first	  African	  mayor	  of	  Nakuru,	  Geoffrey	  Kamau	   celebrated	   this	   fact	   in	   the	   last	  meeting	   of	   the	   council	   in	   1969	   before	   the	  general	   election,	   noting	   that:	   ‘Nakuru	   used	   to	   be	   known	   as	   the	  white	   and	   brown	  man’s	   town	   during	   the	   colonial	   regime.	   It	   was	   never	   dreamt,	   therefore,	   that	   an	  African	  face	  would	  appear	  along	  the	  main	  streets	  of	  the	  town	  carrying	  on	  any	  form	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  ‘Seeking	  to	  establish	  peace’,	  Weekly	  Review,	  20	  November	  1998,	  p.	  8.	  	  7	  Budget	  meeting	  minutes,	  NMC,	  13	  November	  1969,	  GY1/171,	  KNA,	  Nakuru.	  	  	  8	  Ibid.	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of	  business.’9	  The	  1960s	  had	  seen	  a	  substantial	  expansion	   in	  African	  commerce	   in	  the	   town	   following	   from	  the	  government’s	  policy	  of	   ‘Africanisation’.	  Coupled	  with	  this	  was	  a	  more	  general	  easing	  of	   the	  regulations	  affecting	  African	  entrepreneurs,	  and	   an	   expansion	   in	   the	   availability	   of	   loans	   to	   small	   businesses.10	  The	   gradual	  transfer	   of	   ownership	   of	   industry	   from	  Asian	   to	  African	   hands,	   together	  with	   the	  departure	  of	  many	  white	  settlers	  in	  the	  district	  had	  altered	  the	  town’s	  demographic.	  The	  change	  had	  not	  apparently	  damaged	  the	  economy:	  Nakuru	  was	  celebrated	  as	  a	  ‘boom	   town’.11	  It	   was	   a	   major	   agricultural	   market	   centre	   that	   had	   new	   local	  industries	   and	   a	   growing	   population,	   all	   of	   which	   contributed	   to	   the	   municipal	  council’s	   relative	   wealth.	   Taking	   stock	   of	   his	   six	   years	   in	   office,	   mayor	   Geoffrey	  Kamau	   reminded	   the	   members	   that	   through	   their	   efforts	   they	   had,	   since	   1963,	  	  managed	   to	   double	   the	   number	   of	   schools	   in	   the	   town,	   build	   four	   new	   housing	  estates,	  attract	  new	  industries,	  and	  were	  in	  the	  final	  stages	  of	  completing	  the	  new	  Town	  Hall,	  all	  thanks	  to	  the	  ‘rates	  and	  taxes’	  of	  Nakuru	  citizens.’12	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1960s	  therefore,	  the	  financial	  picture	  in	  Nakuru	  contrasted	  starkly	  with	  that	  in	  the	  country’s	  county	  councils.	  	   The	   Hardacre	   Commission	   reported	   that	   in	   1965,	   the	   combined	   surplus	  balance	   of	   Kenya’s	   six	   municipal	   and	   one	   city	   council	   had	   totalled	   over	   K£1.5	  million.13	  In	  comparison,	  county	  councils	  had	  a	  combined	  net	  deficit	  of	  K£98,000	  in	  the	  same	  year.14	  Explaining	  the	  difference	  between	  municipal	  and	  county	  finances,	  the	  report	  highlighted	  a	  number	  of	   	   factors.	   It	  noted	  that	  municipal	  councils	  were	  able	   to	   levy	   site	   rates,	   and	   that	   income	  generated	   this	  way	   accounted	   for	   slightly	  more	  than	  that	  obtained	  through	  GPT.	  This	  meant	  that	  municipal	  councils	  were	  not	  reliant	   on	   government	   grants,	   which	   constituted	   just	   3.5	   percent	   of	   municipal	  councils’	   revenues,	   compared	   with	   33	   percent	   in	   county	   councils.15	  The	   report	  highlighted	   that	   ‘income	   producing	   services’,	   which	   included	   housing	   and	   water,	  were	  in	  most	  cases	  financially	  self-­‐supporting.16	  In	  addition,	  education	  expenditure	  was	  not	  as	  great	  in	  the	  municipalities.	  Yet	  despite	  these	  important	  differences,	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Special	  council	  minutes,	  NMC,	  19	  November	  1969,	  GY1/171,	  KNA,	  Nakuru.	  10	  Frank	  Furedi,	  ‘The	  development	  of	  anti-­‐Asian	  opinion	  among	  Africans	  in	  Nakuru	  District,	  Kenya’,	  African	  Affairs,	  73:292	  (1974),	  pp.	  347–158.	  11	  ‘Nakuru:	  A	  boom	  town’,	  Daily	  Nation,	  8	  August	  1971,	  p.	  32.	  12	  Special	  council	  minutes,	  NCM,	  19	  November	  1969,	  GY1/171,	  KNA	  Nakuru.	  	  	  13	  Report	  of	  the	  Local	  Government	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry,	  p.	  36.	  14	  Ibid.,	  p.	  33.	  	  15	  Ibid.,	  p.	  36.	  16	  Ibid.,	  p.	  36.	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Hardacre	   report	   also	   stressed	   that	   municipal	   councils	   were	   exhibiting	   a	   similar	  trend	  to	  counties,	  with	  annual	  expenditure	  exceeding	  revenue.	  	  	   The	  decision	  to	  not	  include	  municipal	  councils	  in	  the	  reforms	  of	  1970	  must	  have	   been	  made	   in	   light	   of	   their	   financial	   self-­‐sufficiency.	   Yet	   in	   the	   decade	   that	  followed,	   the	   trends	   that	   Hardacre	   had	   highlighted	   continued,	   and	   were	  compounded	   by	   a	   series	   of	   government	   actions	   that	   were	   undertaken	   without	  regard	   to	   the	   financial	   implications	   these	  would	   have	   on	  municipal	   councils.	   The	  IMF’s	  1975	  report	  on	   local	  government	   finances	  examined	  the	  position	  of	  Nakuru	  Municipal	   Council.17	  Its	   findings,	   summarised	   in	   Figures	   11	   and	   12,	   revealed	   that	  recurrent	   expenditure	   had	   risen	   each	   year	   without	   a	   corresponding	   increase	   in	  revenue.	   Expenditure	   on	   Nakuru’s	   general	   fund	   had	   grown	   at	   an	   average	   of	   17	  percent	   for	   each	   year	   from	   1971	   to	   1974.	   In	   explaining	   this	   trend,	   the	   IMF	  underlined	   the	   adverse	   impact	   that	   the	   abolition	   of	   GPT	   in	   1973	   had	   had	   on	  municipal	  councils,	  which	  was	  replaced	  by	  a	  compensating	  grant,	  scheduled	  to	  be	  phased	  out	  by	  1980.	  In	  Nakuru,	  GPT	  had	  accounted	  for	  30	  percent	  of	  total	  revenue	  in	  1972.	   In	   the	   short	   term,	   the	   council	  was	  buffered	  against	   the	  worst	   impacts	  of	  this	   decision	   due	   to	   a	   significant	   expansion	   of	   the	  municipal	   boundaries	   in	   1972.	  This,	   combined	  with	   the	  1974	   increase	   in	   the	  site	   levy	   from	  5	   to	  5.5	  percent,	  had	  increased	  revenue	  flows.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  overall	  budgetary	  position	  of	  the	  council	  had	  worsened	  since	  1970.	  A	  contributing	  factor	  had	  been	  a	  rise	  in	  teachers’	  salaries.	  As	   the	   IMF	  noted	   ‘these	   increases	   are	   negotiated	   at	   the	   central	   government	   level	  and	   are	   beyond	   the	   control	   of	   local	   authorities’. 18 	  In	   1975	   teachers’	   salaries	  accounted	  for	  40.4	  percent	  of	  total	  recurrent	  expenditure,	  and	  71.4	  percent	  of	  the	  education	  budget.	  The	  number	  of	  teachers	  employed	  by	  the	  municipal	  council	  had	  grown	   from	   195	   in	   1971	   to	   402	   in	   1975;	   central-­‐government	   mandated	   salary	  increases	  for	  these	  teachers	  represented	  over	  80	  percent	  of	  the	  rise	  in	  expenditure	  on	   the	   general	   account.	   Over	   the	   same	   period,	   the	   number	   of	   council	   workers	  increased	   far	   more	  modestly	   from	   1,008	   to	   1,060.	   The	   government’s	   decision	   to	  abolish	  school	  fees	  for	  standards	  one	  to	  four,	  announced	  in	  December	  1973,	  and	  to	  provide	   free	   health	   care	   including	   drugs	   and	   dressings,	   also	   had	   serious	  consequences	   on	   the	   council’s	   general	   fund.	   The	   financial	   implications	   of	   these	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policies	   had	   not	   been	   studied	   nor	   discussed	   with	   councils	   before	   they	   were	  announced;	   part	   of	   a	   general	   pattern,	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	  Three,	   of	   government	  directives	  introduced	  under	  Kenyatta	  without	  any	  forewarning.	  	  
Figure	  11:	  Expenditure,	  Nakuru	  Municipal	  Council,	  1971-­‐75.	  	  
Expenditure	  
items	  	   1971	   1972	   1973	   1974	   1975	  Education	   163,410	  	   193,567	   224,765	   395,660	   354,860	  Administration	   75,950	  	   68,693	   45,770	   41,525	   58,255	  Public	  Health	   101,040	   133,826	   162,870	   185,265	   195,310	  Social	  Services	   800	   8,097	   39,160	   51,505	   68,375	  Works	   107,280	   121,249	   189,060	   199,145	   200,865	  Housing	   16,540	   14,285	   -­‐/-­‐	   -­‐/-­‐	   -­‐/-­‐	  	  
TOTAL	  	   466,020	   529,717	   661,625	   783,100	   877,665	  In	  Kenyan	  Pounds.	  Source:	  	  IMF	  Draft	  Interim	  Report,	  1975	  p.	  110.	  JA/13/1,	  KNA,	  Nairobi.	  	  
Figure	  12:	  Revenue,	  Nakuru	  Municipal	  Council,	  1971-­‐75.	  	  
Revenue	  items	  	   1971	   1972	   1973	   1974	   1975	  Rates	   107,910	   108,343	   120,983	   240,000	   250,000	  GPT	   168,240	   147,734	   169,947	   100,000	   149,310	  Education	  Grant	   -­‐/-­‐	   -­‐/-­‐	   -­‐/-­‐	   180,000	   20,000	  Fees	  and	  charges	   213,180	   225,319	   275,065	   242,905	   305,895	  Surplus	  deficit	  (-­‐)	   23,310	   -­‐58,321	   -­‐95,630	   -­‐182,195	   -­‐152,460	  Capital	  expenditure	   49,487	   22,670	   81,995	   21,194	   31,500	  
TOTAL	  	   489,330	   481,396	   565,995	   600,905	   725,865	  In	  Kenyan	  Pounds.	  Source:	  JA/13/1,	  KNA,	  Nairobi.	  The	   IMF	  experts’	   report	  was	  never	  made	  public	  and	   there	   is	  no	  evidence	   that	   the	  recommendations	   to	   increase	   government	   grants	   and	   add	   further	   sources	   of	  revenue,	   were	   ever	   acted	   upon.19	  In	   the	   long-­‐term,	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   Ministry	   of	  Local	  Government	  to	  provide	  a	  coherent	  programme	  for	  municipal	  council	  finances	  was	   to	   have	   severe	   consequences,	   as	   will	   become	   clear	   later	   in	   the	   chapter.	   The	  growing	   deficit	   in	   the	   council’s	   general	   fund	  was	   not	   replicated	   in	   the	   other	   two	  major	   accounts,	   the	   housing	   and	   water	   funds.	   The	   council	   estimated	   that	   the	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  IMF	  Draft	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  Report,	  1975	  p.	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1974/5	  	  financial	  year	  would	  end	  with	  a	  surplus	  of	  K£40,895	  in	  the	  water	  fund,	  and	  K£28,485	   surplus	   in	   the	   housing	   fund. 20 	  By	   1978	   the	   general	   fund	   had	   an	  accumulated	   deficit	   of	   -­‐£371,803. 21 	  The	   chairman	   of	   the	   finance	   committee	  admitted	   that	   the	   council	   had	   only	  managed	   to	   escape	   ‘being	   declared	   bankrupt’	  thanks	  to	  the	  accumulated	  surpluses	  in	  the	  housing	  and	  water	  funds	  that	  together	  came	  to	  K£396,385.	  Yet	  still	  the	  chairman	  dismally	  noted	  that	  ‘1978	  appears	  to	  be	  our	   turning	  point	   from	  bad	   to	  worse.’22	  The	  housing	   fund’s	   revenue	  derived	   from	  rents	  on	  council	  properties.	  In	  1976	  the	  council	  was	  landlord	  to	  4,832	  housing	  units	  ranging	   in	   size	   across	   twenty-­‐one	   housing	   estates.23	  These	   included	   single-­‐room	  ‘bachelor’	   accommodation	   to	   three-­‐bedroomed	   ‘family-­‐style’	   housing,	   with	   rents	  ranging	  from	  twenty	  shillings	  to	  460	  shillings	  a	  month	  .	  Housing	  development	  had	  been	  a	  priority	   for	   the	  government	  and	   the	   council	   since	   independence.	  Nakuru’s	  population	  had	   risen	   from	  roughly	  38,000	   in	  1962	   to	   just	  under	  93,000	  by	  1979;	  costs	  of	  constructing	  adequate,	  affordable	  and	  well-­‐planned	  housing	  for	  this	  urban	  workforce	   took	   up	   a	   considerable	   share	   of	   the	   council’s	   capital	   expenditure	  throughout	  Kenyatta’s	  presidency.24	  Capital	  costs	  were	  usually	  financed	  by	  external	  loans	   from	   the	   National	   Housing	   Corporation,	   the	   Housing	   Finance	   Company	   of	  Kenya,	   and	   the	   Local	   Government	   Loans	   Authority.25	  Housing	   development	   took	  various	   forms:	   Nakuru	   Municipal	   Council	   built	   rental-­‐purchase	   properties,	  mortgage	   housing	   and	   provided	   several	   site	   and	   service	   schemes.	   Each	   of	   these	  offered	  different	  patronage	  opportunities	  to	  councillors.26	  	  	   In	   every	   respect,	   the	   activities	   of	   municipal	   councils	   were	   on	   a	   different	  order	   to	   their	   county	   council	   counterparts.	   As	   Richard	   Stren	   notes,	   by	   1973,	  municipal	   councils	   were	   spending	   2.76	   times	   as	   much	   on	   capital	   and	   recurrent	  expenditures	  as	  they	  had	  been	  spending	  a	  decade	  earlier	  at	  independence.27	  Out	  of	  this	   total	   of	   K£19,686,000	   for	   all	   municipal	   councils,	   the	   two	   largest	   items	   of	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  Budget	  meeting	  minutes,	  NMC,	  18	  November	  1974,	  GY2/223,	  KNA,	  Nakuru.	  	  21	  Budget	  meeting	  minutes,	  NCM,	  17	  October	  1977,	  GY1/255,	  KNA,	  Nakuru.	  	  22	  Ibid.	  	  	  23	  Social	  services	  and	  housing	  committee	  minutes,	  NMC,	  28	  September	  1976,	  GY1/244,	  KNA,	  Nakuru.	  	  24	  Rose	  Obudho,	  ‘The	  post-­‐colonial	  urbanisation	  process’,	  in	  William	  Ochieng	  and	  Robert	  Maxon	  (eds.),	  An	  Economic	  History	  of	  Kenya	  (Nairobi,	  1992),	  pp.	  405-­‐444,	  p.	  407,	  p.	  410.	  	  25	  M.	  S.	  Muller,	  Local	  Authority	  Housing	  in	  Kenya	  (Nairobi,	  March	  1978).	  26	  Stamp,	  ‘Governing	  Thika’.	  	  27	  Richard	  Stren,	  Housing	  the	  Urban	  Poor	  in	  Africa	  (Berkeley,	  1978),	  p.	  43.	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expenditure	  were	   education	   (18	  percent)	   and	  housing	   (16	  percent).	  28	  In	   addition	  to	  these	  key	  services,	  Nakuru	  Municipal	  Council	  was	  also	  responsible	  for	  the	  town’s	  roads,	  health	  centres,	  water	  and	  sewerage	  systems,	  markets	  and	  bus	  parks.	   It	   ran	  canteens	   and	   beer	   halls,	   supervised	   the	   racetrack,	   and	   was	   responsible	   for	   the	  town’s	   mortuary	   and	   cemetery.	   Despite	   the	   increasingly	   difficult	   position	   the	  council	   was	   in	   financially,	   throughout	   the	   1970s	   and	   1980s	   it	   remained	   at	   the	  centre	   of	   urban	   life	   through	   residents’	   reliance	   on	   the	   council’s	   services.	  Consequently,	  the	  reputation,	  resources	  and	  influence	  of	  local	  councillors	  were	  far	  greater	  in	  towns,	  where	  time	  served	  on	  the	  council	  was	  often	  used	  as	  a	  platform	  to	  expand	   individual	   business	   interests	   and	   to	   run	   for	   higher	   office,	   as	   the	   next	  sections	  explore.	  	  
Figure	  13:	  Occupations	  of	  elected	  councillors,	  Kilifi	  and	  Nakuru,	  1968.	  
Nakuru	  MC	   Number	   	   Kilifi	  	  CC	  	   Number	  	  Trader	   4	   	   Trader	   3	  Businessman	  	   4	   	   Businessman	   2	  Clerk	  	   5	   	   Clerk	  	   1	  Salesman	  	   3	   	   Shop-­‐keeper	   2	  Doctor	   1	   	   Farmer	   12	  Accountant	   1	   	   KANU	  official	   2	  Laboratory	  assistant	   1	   	   Auctioneer	   1	  Bodyguard	   1	   	   Hotel-­‐keeper	   1	  Total	  	   20	   	   Total	  	   20	  	  Source:	  Republic	  of	  Kenya,	  Kenya	  Gazette,	  9	  August	  1968,	  Vol.	  LXX	  -­‐	  No.	  36	  (Nairobi,	  1968),	  p.	  823.	   	   Source:	  Kilifi	  DC	  to	  Coast	  PC,	  3	  August	  1968,	  CA/8/72,	  KNA,	  Nairobi.	  	  
Called	  to	  serve	  and	  accumulate:	  Councillorship	  in	  the	  town	  	  Just	  as	  the	  resources	  controlled	  by	  municipal	  councils	  were	  far	  greater	  than	  those	  available	   to	   county	  councils,	   the	  profile	  of	   the	  average	  councillor	  differed	  also.	  As	  previous	   chapters	   have	   discussed,	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   background	   of	   county	  councillors	  was	   in	  most	   cases	  not	   entirely	  dissimilar	   to	   that	  of	   their	   constituents.	  Generally	  motivated	  both	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  accumulate	  and	  to	  serve,	  after	  the	  transfer	  of	   functions	   it	   became	   increasingly	  hard	   for	   county	   councillors	   to	   fulfil	   these	   two	  expectations.	  For	  municipal	  councillors,	  balancing	  these	  two	  demands	  proved	   less	  difficult,	   at	   least	   for	   a	  while.	   Importantly,	   the	   fact	   that	   Nakuru	  Municipal	   Council	  managed	   to	  uphold	  a	  decent	   level	   of	   local	   services	   throughout	   this	  period,	  meant	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  Ibid.,	  p.	  43.	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that	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  council,	  and	  the	  authority	  and	  status	  of	  office	  bearers	  was	  more	  secure.	  Recalling	  their	  time	  in	  office,	  many	  of	  Nakuru’s	  councillors	  focused	  on	  recounting	   the	   services	   they	  had	   rendered.	  After	   a	   career	   as	   a	   banker	   in	  Nairobi,	  councillor	   Barrack	   Okul	   moved	   to	   Nakuru	   where	   he	   was	   ‘upset	   by	   the	   services’	  provided	  by	  the	  municipal	  council.29	  He	  was	  elected	  in	  1983,	  and	  served	  for	  several	  years	  as	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  finance	  committee.	  Okul	  framed	  his	  legacy	  primarily	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  services	  he	  provided	  during	  his	  nine	  years	  in	  office:	  	  	  So	  we	  built	  primary	  schools,	  fifteen	  of	  them,	  and	  five	  secondary	  schools.	  We	  built	  three	  hospitals	  and	  one	  market.	  And	  tarmacked	  the	  main	  road	  passing	  through	  the	  main	  street,	  up	  to	  now	  it	  is	  still	  there.	  Then	  we	  also	  tarmacked	  KANU	  street	  going	  down.	  And	  I	  was	  happy	  during	  our	  time,	  during	  my	  time,	  the	  municipal	  council	  of	  Nakuru	  in	  education	  was	  number	  one	  or	  number	  two	  in	  Kenya.30	  By	  quantifying	  his	  achievements	   in	   this	  way,	  Okul	   revealed	  an	  enduring	  notion	  of	  service	   that	   rested	   on	   the	   delivery	   of	   visible	   development	   outputs.	   Yet	   as	   will	  become	  clear	   later	   in	   this	   chapter,	   the	  precise	  ways	   in	  which	   these	   services	  were	  provided	   often	   diverged	   quite	   significantly	   from	   conventional	   local	   government	  procedure.	  	  	   Councillor	   Isaac	  Kirubi,	  who	  was	  elected	   in	  1968	  and	  served	  as	   the	  mayor	  between	  1970	  and	  1974	  also	  emphasised	  the	  concrete	  achievements	  of	  his	  time	  in	  office:	  	  Well	  I	  think	  I	  did	  a	  reasonable	  job,	  because	  I	  developed	  quite	  a	  number	  of	  housing	   estates	  which	   are	  here.	   I	   also	   started	   tenant	  purchasing	  housing.	  Nakuru	  was	  very	  clean,	  better	  than	  it	  is	  now.	  Roads	  were	  very	  good,	  and	  we	  increased	  the	  number	  of	  tarmac	  [sic],	  we	  increased	  the	  number	  of	  markets,	  wholesale	  and	  resale,	  and	  we	  built	  council	  estates.31	  Kirubi	   had	   been	   educated	   at	   Alliance	   High	   School,	   the	   first	   secondary	   school	   in	  Kenya	  to	  admit	  Africans.	  Included	  in	  its	  alumni	  were	  a	  great	  number	  of	  Kenyatta’s	  cabinet	  ministers.	  After	  school,	  Kirubi	  studied	  medicine	  at	  Makerere	  University	   in	  Uganda.	   In	   the	  early	  1960s	  he	  established	  a	  medical	  practice	   in	  Nakuru,	  which	  he	  continued	  to	  operate	  throughout	  his	  tenure	  as	  a	  councillor.	  Although	  in	  a	  sense	  one	  of	  the	  most	  educated	  of	  Nakuru’s	  councillors,	  as	  Figure	  13	  shows,	  most	  of	  Kirubi’s	  fellow	  members	  either	  identified	  as	  part	  of	  a	  professional	  or	  entrepreneurial	  class.	  This	   is	   significant	   for	   understanding	   how	   councillors	   could	   extract	   opportunities	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  Barrack	  Okul,	  interview,	  19	  March	  2013,	  Nakuru	  Town.	  30	  Ibid.	  	  	  31	  Isaac	  Kirubi,	  interview,	  10	  May	  2013,	  Nakuru	  Town.	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from	  their	  positions.	  Most	  councillors	  either	  entered	  local	  government	  as	  property-­‐owners,	  or	  used	  their	  time	  in	  office	  to	  acquire	  land	  or	  buildings.	  During	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	   finance	   committee	   in	   December	   1968,	   the	   town	   clerk	   presented	   one	   sitting	  councillor’s	  request	   for	  a	   loan	  from	  the	  council	  and	  National	  Housing	  Corporation	  to	   build	   a	   private	   house.32	  Similar	   applications	   had	  been	   received	   in	   the	  past	   and	  the	   committee	   accepted	   in	   principle	   that	   the	   council	   could	   guarantee	   such	   loans.	  Able	  to	  access	  loans,	  councillors	  also	  had	  the	  power	  to	  allocate	  vacant	  plots.	  It	  was	  relatively	  common	  for	  municipal	  councillors	  to	  establish	  during	  or	  after	  their	  time	  in	  office	   a	  hotel	  or	  housing	   complex,	   or	  other	   form	  of	  business.	  This	   ranged	   from	  modest	  enterprises	  such	  as	  those	  of	  councillor	  Nelson	  Ndegwa,	  who	  during	  his	  ten	  years	  on	  the	  council	  opened	  a	  petrol	  station	  and	  set	  up	  a	  taxi	  business,	  to	  far	  more	  lucrative	   ventures	   such	   as	   the	   hotels	   owned	   by	   mayors	   Joseph	   Thuo	   and	   Daniel	  Kanyi.	  	  	   The	  control	  of	  rental	  housing	  was	  a	  key	  resource	  that	  allowed	  councillors	  to	  accumulate	  both	  capital	  and	  influence	  within	  the	  town.	  To	  councillors,	  the	  value	  of	  this	  resource	  increased	  in	  time	  both	  as	  the	  housing	  shortage	  intensified	  and	  as	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  council’s	  other	  services	  declined.	  Thus	  in	  1983,	  against	  the	  advice	  of	  the	   town	   clerk	   and	   treasurer,	   the	   councillors	   rejected	   a	   proposal	   to	   raise	   rents	  across	   the	   housing	   estates,	   even	   though	   they	   were	   calculated	   as	   sitting	   below	  market	   rates.33	  In	   1980,	   a	   year	   after	   leaving	   office,	   former	   councillor	   Benson	  Karuku	   blew	   the	   whistle	   on	   the	   scale	   of	   corruption	   in	   housing	   allocation.34	  The	  
Daily	   Nation	   reported	   his	   allegations	   that	   councillors	   and	   officials	   were	  manipulating	  residents	  of	  the	  Old	  Pangani	  estate	  who	  were	  due	  to	  be	  rehoused	  as	  part	  of	  a	  USAID	  funded	  redevelopment:	  	  	  Coun.	   Karuku	   alleged	   that	   some	   councillors	   were	   allocating	   the	   tenant-­‐purchase	   houses	   to	   themselves,	   their	   relatives	   and	   friends,	   while	   the	  former	   residents	   of	   the	   estate	   were	   being	   left	   out.	   He	   also	   claimed	   that	  some	   of	   the	   councillors	  were	   buying	   houses	   at	   cheap	   prices	   through	   the	  back	   door	   from	   residents	   who	   have	   been	   allocated	   plots.	   He	   said	   the	  councillors	  then	  rented	  the	  houses	  to	  other	  people	  and	  made	  huge	  profits.	  Coun.	  Karuku	  said	  other	  councillors	  were	  also	  approaching	  some	  of	  the	  200	  residents	  who	  are	   to	  be	  allocated	  with	  houses,	  when	   they	  are	   completed,	  and	  offering	  to	  buy	  them.35	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  Finance	  committee	  minutes,	  NMC,	  17	  December	  1968,	  GY1/161,	  KNA,	  Nakuru.	  	  33	  NMC	  finance	  committee	  minutes,	  18	  March	  1983,	  Nakuru	  County	  Government	  Archive.	  	  34	  ‘Councillors	  are	  accused’,	  Daily	  Nation,	  13	  May	  1980,	  p.	  3.	  	  35	  Ibid.	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  It	   is	   clear	   from	   Karuku’s	   statement	   that	   he	   regarded	   the	   actions	   of	   his	   peers	   as	  immoral	   if	   not	   illegal	   -­‐	   despite	   the	   apparently	   guiltless	   reflections	   of	   former	  councillors	   decades	   later.	   Those	   interviews	   insisted	   that	   ‘corruption’	   was	  something	   distinct	   from	   the	   practices	   common	   during	   their	   era.	   It	  was	   seen	   as	   a	  crime	  of	  other	  men,	  who	  came	  earlier	  or	  later	  in	  the	  municipal	  council’s	  history,	  and	  who	  used	   their	   time	   in	  office	   to	  enrich	   themselves.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   those	  who	  claimed	  that	  they	  used	  their	  position	  to	  access	  opportunities	  for	  others	  insisted	  that	  this	   was	   legitimate	   behaviour,	   and	   evidence	   of	   their	   good	   leadership.	   Councillor	  Okumu	  served	  as	  the	  chairman	  of	   the	  housing,	  stores	  and	  allocation	  committee	   in	  the	   1980s.	   He	  was	   remembered,	   he	   claimed,	   for	   ‘the	  way	   I	   was	   giving	   houses’.36	  ‘Because	   I	   was	   following	   the	   right	   channels,	   I	   was	   not	   giving,	   because	   this	   is	   a	  friend’s	  daughter	  or	  what,	  ok	  I	  used	  to,	  of	  course,	  think	  of	  my	  campaigners,	  but	  not	  too	  much,	   the	  way	   some	   people	   are	   doing	   it	   now.’37	  Even	   by	   following	   ‘the	   right	  channels’,	   he	   could	   still	   ‘think	   of	   [his]	   campaigners’,	   providing	   the	   favours	   he	  offered	   were	   not	   excessive.	   This	   kind	   of	   behaviour,	   Okumu	   insisted,	   was	  permissible.	   His	   colleague,	   George	   Kamotho	   explained	   this	   informal	   agreement	  more	  fully:	  	  	  Now	  what	  we	  did	  in	  our	  time,	  we	  were	  given	  five	  plots,	  each	  councillor,	  not	  by	  secret,	  open,	  then	  you	  were	  told,	  because	  you	  have	  people	  behind	  you,	  you	   allocate	   this	   plot	   to	   them	   instead	   of	   coming	   to	   us,	   then	   that	   is	   what	  happened.	   I	   was	   given	   five	   plots	   and	   I	   divided	   to	   my	   supporters	   to	   the	  needy	  person	   if	   I	   can	   see	  your	  position	   I	   give	   it	   to	   you,	   I	   only	   retain	  one,	  then	  I	  give	  to	  my	  daughter,	  so	  this	  was	  our	  system.38	  	   This	   ‘system’	   differed	   fundamentally	   from	   the	   procedures	   set	   out	   by	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Local	   Government.	   In	   a	   circular	   sent	   out	   in	   1983,	   following	   from	   a	  similar	   instruction	   three	   years	   earlier,	   the	  ministry	   reiterated	   the	   inviolability	   of	  the	   system	   of	   plot	   allocation	   committees.39	  Councillors	   were	   told	   that	   they	   were	  ‘expected	   to	   act	   with	   honesty,	   integrity	   and	   impartiality	   in	   dealing	   with	   plot	  allocation’.40	  ‘[T]he	  slightest	  abuse	  of	  responsibility’	  the	  circular	  underlined	  ‘would	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  Benson	  Okumu*,	  interview,	  12	  April	  2013,	  Nakuru	  Town.	  	  37	  Ibid.	  	  38	  George	  Kamotho*,	  interview,	  20	  March	  2013,	  Nakuru	  Town.	  	  39	  Ministry	  of	  Local	  Government	  circular	  no.	  19/82,	  19	  January	  1983,	  Nakuru	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  Government	  Archive.	  	  40	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be	   disastrous	   to	   local	   authorities’. 41 	  Yet	   as	   ‘corruption’	   often	   involved	   the	  complicity	   of	   council	   officials,	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Lands,	   and	   the	   provincial	  administration,	  this	  rhetorical	  rejection	  of	  corruption	  was	  not	  supported	  by	  actual	  sanctions.	  Clearly,	  the	  illegal	  and	  irregular	  practices	  that	  occurred	  at	  the	  municipal	  council	   were	   not	   unique	   to	   Nakuru,	   but	   rather	   were	   replicated	   across	   Kenya’s	  public	   institutions	  at	   this	   time.	  Yet	   in	  Nakuru	  these	  practices	  were	  exercised	  with	  particular	   ease	   because	   of	   the	   town’s	   unique	   political	   context.	   The	   next	   section	  examines	  the	  role	  that	  civic	   leaders	  played	  in	  district	  politics,	  and	  the	  significance	  of	  district	  politics	  for	  national	  elites.	  	  	  
‘A	  virtual	  state	  within	  a	  state’:	  Nakuru	  and	  national	  politics,	  1970-­‐78	  As	  many	   powerful	   Kikuyu	   figures	   gravitated	   around	   Nakuru,	   where	   they	  came	  to	  zealously	  hover	  around	  Kenyatta,	  they	  acquired	  awesome	  political	  power	   and	   influence	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   Nakuru	   became	   a	   virtual	   state	  within	  a	  state,	  with	  Kenyatta’s	  cronies	  keeping	  an	  iron	  grip	  on	  local	  affairs,	  often	  in	  utter	  disregard	  of	  the	  law.	  Indeed,	  during	  Kenyatta’s	  time,	  Nakuru	  had	  the	  most	  arrogant	  and	  intolerant	  administrators	  and	  politicians…42	  In	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  Kenyatta’s	  presidency,	  Nakuru	  ‘consistently	  made	  headlines	  as	  the	   centre	   of	   some	   of	   the	   most	   tumultuous	   political	   events	   in	   the	   country’s	  history’.43	  The	  municipal	  council	  was	  not	  immune	  from	  the	  effects	  of	  these	  events.	  Yet	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	  precisely	  deconstruct	   the	   interplay	  between	  national	  and	  civic	  politics.	  Part	  of	  the	  difficulty	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  Nakuru	  district	  was	  the	  site	  of	  two	  connected	   but	   distinct	   conflicts.	   The	   first	   was	   between	   so-­‐called	   ‘radical’	  parliamentarians,	  and	  the	  government.	  With	  the	  dissolution	  of	  the	  KPU,	  the	  issues	  of	   landlessness	  and	  uneven	  development	  were	   taken	  up	  by	  a	  group	  of	  backbench	  MPs,	   led	   by	   Kikuyu	   businessman	   and	   former	   detainee	   J.	   M.	   Kariuki.	   The	   second	  conflict	   took	   place	   within	   the	   establishment,	   and	   was	   primarily	   a	   succession	  struggle	   between	   those	   allied	   to	   Vice-­‐President	   Moi	   and	   those	   who	   supported	  Njoroge	   Mungai’s	   campaign	   to	   take	   over	   from	   his	   uncle,	   Jomo	   Kenyatta.	   This	  broader	  politics	  was	  felt	  in	  Nakuru	  where	  different	  factions	  within	  the	  ruling	  party	  competed	   for	   control	   over	   the	   town’s	  KANU	  branch,	  parliamentary	   seats,	   and	   the	  municipal	  council.44	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  Moi’s	  relationship	  with	  Nakuru	  and	  the	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  Ibid.	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  ‘Hot	  bed	  of	  Kenya	  politics’,	  Weekly	  Review,	  6	  October,	  1995,	  p.	  10.	  43	  ‘Isaiah	  Mathenge’,	  Weekly	  Review,	  28	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  1993,	  pp.	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municipal	   council	   after	   1978	   it	   is	   important	   to	   consider	   the	   legacies	   of	   these	  struggles.	  	  	   After	  the	  KPU	  was	  banned	  in	  1969,	  there	  arose	  within	  KANU	  a	  strong	  group	  of	  backbench	  MPs	  who	  vocally	  challenged	  the	  economic	  policies	  and	  development	  model	  the	  government	  had	  followed	  since	  independence.	  Forty	  apparently	  ‘radical’	  MPs	  entered	  parliament	  in	  the	  elections	  of	  1969.	  They	  criticised	  the	  government’s	  close	  relationship	  with	  Western	  powers,	  and	  its	  emphasis	  on	  growth	  at	  the	  expense	  of	   a	   more	   redistributive	   politics.45	  As	   David	   Throup	   has	   commented,	   ‘Kenya’s	  parliament	  has	  never	  been	  so	  outspoken,	  nor	  more	  effective	  as	  a	   legislative	  check	  upon	   the	   executive,	   than	   during	   the	  middle	   years	   of	   Kenyatta’s	   presidency.’46	  Yet	  whereas	  the	  KPU	  had	  been	  seen	  largely	  as	  a	  Luo	  party,	  the	  same	  could	  not	  be	  said	  of	  KANU’s	  new	  backbenchers.	  A	  multi-­‐tribal	  alliance,	   leading	   figures	   in	   the	  unofficial	  parliamentary	  opposition	  group	  included	  Kalenjin	  John	  Seroney	  and	  Luhya	  Martin	  Shikuku.	  In	  1974	  J.	  M.	  Kariuki	  was	  elected	  to	  represent	  Nyandarua	  North.	  Kariuki,	  a	  former	  detainee	   and	   successful	  Kikuyu	  businessman,	   had	  become	   the	   ‘heir	   to	   the	  populist	  cause’	  since	  the	  KPU’s	  proscription	  in	  1969.47	  As	  Rok	  Ajulu	  argues,	  due	  to	  his	  ethnicity,	  J.M.,	   ‘was	  capable	  of	  subverting	  Kikuyu	  sub-­‐nationalism	  from	  within’,	  thus	  posed	  ‘the	  most	  serious	  political	  threat	  to	  the	  Kenyatta	  coalition.’48	  	  	   In	  Nakuru,	  Mark	  Mwithaga	  was	  the	  leader	  of	  this	  more	  radical	  strand	  within	  KANU.49	  Speaking	  in	  the	  National	  Assembly	  in	  1970,	  Minster	  for	  Local	  Government,	  Dr	  Kiano,	  likened	  Mwithaga	  to	  Napoleon,	  ‘because	  Napoleon	  was	  a	  very	  small	  man	  and	  he	  defeated	  the	  whole	  of	  Europe,	  and	  in	  this	  House,	  we	  have	  been	  very	  much	  aware	  of	  his	  presence	  –	  Mr.	  Mwithaga	  –	  despite	  his	  size.’50	  Mwithaga	  had	  become	  the	  MP	  for	  Nakuru	  town	  in	  1966	  after	  stepping	  down	  from	  the	  municipal	  council	  a	  year	   earlier.	   During	   the	   ‘little	   general	   election’	   he	   defeated	   his	   KPU	   challenger	  Achieng’	   Okeno	   gaining	   over	   a	   thousand	   more	   votes.	   Although	   Mwithaga	   stood	  against	   a	   KPU	   candidate,	   he	   was	   not	   unsympathetic	   to	   the	   cause	   of	   land	  redistribution	   in	   the	   district.	   Indeed	   during	   his	   parliamentary	   career,	   Mwithaga	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  Session,	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increasingly	  became	  known	  as	  an	  advocate	   for	   former	   ‘squatters’	  working	  closely	  with	   the	  Nakuru	  District	  Ex-­‐Freedom	  Fighters	  Organization	   (NDEFFO),	  one	  of	   the	  land-­‐buying	   companies	   of	   this	   era.	   Re-­‐elected	   in	   1969,	  Mwithaga	   defeated	   all	   his	  opponents	  including	  mayor	  Kamau	  who	  gained	  a	  dismal	  fifteen	  votes.51	  	  	  	  	  
Figure	  14:	  Photograph	  of	  President	  Kenyatta	  by	  Lake	  Nakuru	  
	  	  
From	   left	   to	   right:	   Mayor	   Geoffrey	   Kamau,	   President	   Kenyatta,	   Vice-­‐President	   Moi,	   Mark	  
Mwithaga,	  Kimunya	  Kamana	  taken	  late	  1960s.	  Source:	  Kimunya	  Kamana	  personal	  collection.	  	  	   The	   president’s	   insistence	   that	   there	   could	   be	   no	   ‘free	   things’	   in	   an	  independent	   Kenya	   jarred	   with	   the	   scale	   of	   private	   accumulation	   by	   Kenyatta’s	  inner	   circle	   witnessed	   at	   the	   time.	   Of	   particular	   significance	   was	   the	   rise	   of	   a	  voluntary	   association	   known	   as	   GEMA	   (Gikuyu,	   Embu,	   and	   Meru	   Association)	  which	  was	  ‘ostensibly	  established	  to	  further	  the	  social	  welfare	  of	  its	  members	  and	  to	   protect	   the	   cultural	   traditions	   of	   the	   ethnic	   communities’.52	  In	   reality,	   GEMA	  became	  an	  immensely	  powerful	  private	  investment	  fund	  whose	  members	  included	  business	   leaders	   and	   their	   political	   allies	  most	   of	  whom	  had	   ties	   to	   the	   Kenyatta	  family.	  The	  substance	  of	  the	  ‘radicals’’	  critique	  was	  bolstered	  in	  1972	  by	  the	  report	  of	   the	   International	  Labour	  Organization,	  which	  highlighted	  regional	  variations	   in	  employment	   and	   ‘development’,	   confirming	   ‘the	   privileged	   position	   of	   Central	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Province’	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  areas	  of	  the	  country.53	  The	  ‘populist’	  cause	  resonated	  strongly	   in	  Nakuru	  where	   the	   transfer	   of	   settler	   land	   into	  African	  ownership	  had	  tended	  to	  reproduce	  the	  district’s	  inequality	  rather	  than	  reverse	  it.	  As	  Frank	  Furedi	  noted,	  in	  1974	  ‘of	  those	  Africans	  that	  owned	  land	  91	  per	  cent	  held	  only	  21	  percent	  of	   the	   total	   –	   each	   holding	   less	   than	   three	   acres.	   At	   the	   other	   end	   of	   the	   social	  hierarchy,	  2	  percent	  of	  the	  owners	  held	  69	  percent	  of	  total	  land’.54	  	  	   GEMA’s	   organising	   secretary,	   Kihika	   Kimani,	   controlled	   the	   Ngwataniro	  Farmers	   Company,	   one	   of	   the	   biggest	   land	   buying	   companies	   of	   the	   district.	  55	  Throughout	  the	  1970s,	  Kimani	   ‘led	  the	  war	  on	  everything	  anti-­‐establishment,	  real	  or	   imagined’.56	  In	   his	   struggle	   to	   ensure	   that	   Nakuru	   did	   not	   become	   a	   radical	  stronghold	  of	  opposition,	  Kimani	  clashed	  repeatedly	  with	  Mwithaga.	  The	  company	  was	  used,	  by	  Kimani	  and	  others,	  as	  a	  ‘platform	  to	  win	  parliamentary	  and	  civic	  seats	  in	   Nakuru	   district	   and	   to	   gain	   access	   to	   central	   state	   politics.’57	  In	   1972	   Kimani	  successfully	   ousted	   Mwithaga	   as	   leader	   of	   the	   district	   KANU	   branch.	   Mwithaga’s	  Nakuru	   Town	   seat	   was	   challenged	   in	   the	   general	   election	   of	   1974	   by	   municipal	  councillor	  Amos	  Kabiru	  Kimemia,	  an	  ally	  of	  Kimani’s.	  Between	  Mwithaga,	  Kimemia	  and	   a	   third	  Kalenjin	   candidate,	   the	   election	  was	   close,	   but	  Mwithaga	   retained	  his	  seat,	   gaining	   309	   more	   votes	   than	   Kimemia.’ 58 	  Nakuru	   town	   was	   the	   only	  constituency	   in	   the	  district	   that	  was	  not	   taken	  by	   an	   ally	   of	  Kimani’s	   in	   the	  1974	  general	  election.	  Kimani	  himself	  had	  been	  elected	  as	  MP	  for	  Nakuru	  North	  after	  his	  opponent,	   Koigi	   wa	   Wamwere	   was	   held	   in	   custody	   for	   a	   large	   portion	   of	   the	  campaign	  period.59	  	  	   The	   tension	   and	   division	   in	   the	   town	   after	   the	   election	   surfaced	   at	   a	  ‘Kenyatta	  Day’	  party	  held	  on	  22	  October	  at	  the	  Old	  Town	  Hall.	  The	  event	  was	  closed	  down	   by	   the	   police	   after	   crowds	   tried	   to	   ‘close	   in	   on	   Mr	   Mwithaga’.60	  Earlier,	  Mwithaga	  had	  reportedly	  ‘referred	  to	  some	  “richmen”,	  who	  were	  trying	  to	  confuse	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the	  affairs	  of	  Nakuru	  because	  of	  their	  riches’.61	  Incidents	  involving	  the	  police	  would	  become	  more	  common	  for	  Mwithaga	  and	  his	  allies	  in	  the	  following	  years.	  One	  such	  incident	  occurred	  a	   few	  weeks	   later	  when	  the	  recently	  ousted	  mayor	   Isaac	  Kirubi	  was	  arrested	   ‘for	  mutilating	  a	  5/-­‐	  note’.62	  Kirubi	  had	  lost	  the	  mayoral	  race	  to	  Silas	  Mburu	  Gichua,	  a	  newcomer	  to	  the	  council,	  who	   ‘owed	  [his]	  political	  achievements	  to	  Kimani’s	   patronage’.63	  Reporting	   the	   arrest,	   the	  Daily	  Nation,	  wrote	   that	  Kirubi	  had	   been	   involved	   ‘in	   a	   political	   argument	   related	   to	   recent	   political	   changes	   in	  Kenya’	  when	  the	  supposed	  crime	  took	  place.64	  He	  was	  refused	  bail	  but	  was	  released	  after	   the	   charge	   was	   overturned	   by	   the	   High	   Court.	   Later	   that	   month	   he	   was	  arrested	  again	  for	  driving	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  alcohol.	  65	  Kirubi’s	  difficulties	  with	  the	   security	   services	   fitted	   with	   a	   broader	   pattern	   whereby	   ‘overzealous	   state	  officials…	  framed	  radical	  politicians	  with	  trumped	  up	  charges’.66	  These	  ‘[f]rame-­‐ups	  and	   stage-­‐managed	   confessions	   …	   occurred	   frequently	   in	   Nakuru’,	   especially	  between	  1974	  and	  1978.67	  	  	   On	  the	  evening	  of	  1	  March	  1975,	  J.	  M.	  Kariuki	  disappeared.	  Earlier	  that	  day	  a	  bomb	  had	  exploded	  on	  a	  bus	  travelling	  to	  Mombasa,	  killing	  seventeen	  people.68	  The	  next	  day	  the	  remains	  of	  a	  body	  were	  discovered	  in	  the	  Ngong	  Hills	  outside	  Nairobi.	  This	   information	   was	   not	   made	   public	   for	   another	   ten	   days.	   During	   that	   time,	  stories	   linking	   Kariuki	   to	   the	   bombing	   and	   to	   ‘subversive’	   activities	   in	   Lusaka	  emerged	   in	   the	   newspapers. 69 	  Yet	   despite	   these	   attempts	   to	   undermine	   his	  reputation,	   many	   believed	   that	   J.	   M.’s	   assassination	   had	   been	   sanctioned	   by	   ‘the	  Family’.	   A	   parliamentary	   select	   committee	   made	   up	   of	   many	   of	   J.	   M.’s	   allies,	  including	   Mwithaga,	   was	   called	   to	   examine	   the	   murder.	   The	   committee’s	   report	  suggested	   ‘that	  members	  of	   the	  police	   force	  under	  Family	   control	  may	  have	  been	  involved	   in	   the	  murder’.70	  It	   identified	  Nakuru	  mayor	  Mburu	  Gichua	   as	  worthy	  of	  further	  investigation.	  Later	  Mwithaga	  recalled	  that	  several	  months	  before	  Kariuki’s	  disappearance,	   Gichua	   and	   Kariuki	   had	   been	   at	   a	   hotel	   in	   Nakuru	   when	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Ibid.	  62	  ‘Ex-­‐mayor	  charged	  with	  mutilating	  a	  5/-­‐	  note’,	  The	  Daily	  Nation,	  12	  November	  1974,	  p.	  3.	  	  63	  ‘Mungiki	  saga’,	  Weekly	  Review,	  20	  November	  1998,	  pp.	  5-­‐7.	  	  64	  ‘Ex-­‐mayor	  charged’.	  	  65	  ‘Nakuru’s	  ex-­‐mayor	  out	  on	  bond’,	  Standard,	  18	  November	  1974,	  p.	  2.	  	  66	  ‘Mungiki	  saga’,	  Weekly	  Review,	  20	  November	  1998,	  pp.	  5-­‐7.	  	  67	  Ibid.	  	  68	  Ibid.	  	  69	  Branch,	  Kenya:	  Between	  Hope	  and	  Despair,	  p.	  114.	  70	  Widner,	  The	  Rise	  of	  a	  Party-­‐State,	  p.	  105.	  
	  	  
173	  
president’s	  son,	  Peter	  Muigai	  Kenyatta,	  and	  Mayor	  Gichua	  threatened	  them,	  saying:	  “You	  have	  brought	  trouble	  here	  from	  Nyandarua	  [J.	  M.’s	  constituency]	  Be	  warned:	  This	  is	  Nakuru	  and	  we	  can	  finish	  you	  at	  any	  time!”71	  	   The	   crackdown	   on	   ‘radicals’	   continued	   throughout	   1975.	   Wanjohi	   writes	  that	   Mwithaga’s	   election	   had	   been	   seen	   by	   GEMA	   as	   ‘a	   direct	   defiance	   of	   the	  government	  by	  the	  electorate’.	  72	  In	  retaliation,	  they	  ‘placed	  the	  entire	  town	  under	  a	  police	  rule	  of	  the	  most	  brutal	  type.’73	  In	  July	  1975,	  Mwithaga’s	  election	  was	  nullified	  by	   the	   High	   Court	   after	   a	   petition	  was	   received	   from	   the	   GEMA	   candidate	   Amos	  Kiberu	  Kimemia.74	  On	  the	  night	  of	  the	  by-­‐election,	  Mwithaga	  was	  jailed	  and	  charged	  with	  a	  number	  of	  offenses	   including	  assault,	   theft	  and	  property	  damage.75	  Despite	  being	  imprisoned,	  Mwithaga	  still	  triumphed	  over	  Kimemia,	  and	  another	  by-­‐election	  was	   held.	   A	   Kalenjin,	   William	   Komen,	   was	   finally	   elected	   because,	   according	   to	  Mwithaga,	  ‘his	  family	  had	  campaigned	  for	  him	  whilst	  he	  was	  incarcerated’.76	  	  	   By	   the	   end	   of	   1975,	   the	   government’s	   crusade	   against	   the	   ‘radicals’	   was	  complete.	   J.	   M.	   was	   dead,	   and	   Seroney	   had	   been	   detained,	   along	   with	   Martin	  Shikuku,	   Mark	  Mwithaga	   and	   several	   others.	   Yet	   with	   the	   defeat	   of	   the	   informal	  opposition,	   the	   GEMA	   elite’s	   attention	   turned	   to	   the	   question	   of	   Kenyatta’s	  successor	   and	  how	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   presidency	  never	   left	  Kikuyu	  hands.	  Again,	  Kihika	  Kimani	  played	  a	  leading	  role,	  spearheading	  a	  campaign	  in	  1976	  to	   ‘change-­‐the	   constitution’	   so	   as	   to	   prevent	   Vice-­‐President	   Moi	   succeeding	   to	   State	   House.	  Nakuru	  was	   ‘the	   launching	   pad’	   for	   this	  movement,	   which	   ultimately	   failed	   after	  Attorney-­‐General	   Charles	   Njonjo	   issued	   a	   statement	   saying	   that	   discussion	   of	  Kenyatta’s	   death	   would	   be	   treated	   as	   treason.77	  There	   was	   also	   a	   ‘final	   plan’	   to	  assassinate	   Moi	   and	   his	   allies	   on	   Kenyatta’s	   death	   which	   Gabrielle	   Lynch	  documents.78	  It	  was	  believed	  that	  a	  police	  unit	   in	  the	  Rift	  Valley,	  ostensibly	  tasked	  with	   tackling	   stock	   theft,	   trained	   for	   this	   mission	   from	   1974.79	  Yet	   although	   the	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‘Kiambu	   elite’	   was	   suspected	   of	   masterminding	   this	   scheme,	   ‘ultimately	   the	   plot	  came	  to	  nothing’.80	  	  	  	  
Figure	  15:	  Photograph	  of	  Mayor	  Mburu	  Gichua	  welcoming	  President	  
Kenyatta	  to	  Nakuru,	  10	  March	  1976.	   	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Source:	  320	  KEN	  1556/139,	  KNA,	  Nairobi.	  
	  	   Kenyatta’s	  death	  in	  August	  1978	  signalled	  the	  end	  of	  the	  monopoly	  that	  the	  GEMA	   elite	   had	   enjoyed	   over	   Nakuru’s	   politics	   since	   1975.	   ‘Dismantling’	   Kihika	  Kimani’s	   ‘regime	   in	   the	   district	   became	   the	   number	   one	   political	   priority	   of	   the	  Kalenjin	   political	   elite	   who	   took	   over	   the	   reins	   of	   power	   from	   Kenyatta’.81	  This	  included	   Kimani’s	   influence	   in	   the	   municipal	   council;	   Mburu	   Gichua,	   the	   Weekly	  
Review	  recalled,	   ‘was	   the	   first	   to	   go’.82	  In	  December	  1978,	  divisions	   in	   the	   council	  were	  made	  public,	  after	  a	  group	  of	   thirteen	  councillors	   tried	  to	  call	  an	  emergency	  meeting	  which	  they	  claimed	  was	  blocked	  by	  the	  mayor,	  town	  clerk	  and	  Ministry	  of	  Local	  Government.83	  In	  February	  1979	  the	  council	  passed	  a	  unanimous	  vote	  of	  no	  confidence	  in	  the	  mayor.	  Gichua	  was	  accused	  by	  a	  ‘group	  of	  eleven’	  of	  a	  number	  of	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petty	  abuses	   including	  using	   the	  council’s	  ceremonial	  car	   for	  unofficial	  duties	  and	  not	   paying	   for	   petrol;	   a	   demonstration	   that	   accusations	   of	   corruption	   could	   be	  powerful	   tools	   against	   those	   who	   lacked	   political	   protection.84	  Alongside	   Gichua,	  the	   town	   clerk	   was	   also	   turned	   on	   by	   the	   councillors	   and	   was	   suspended,	   then	  dismissed	  in	  early	  1979.85	  At	  the	  general	  elections	  later	  that	  year,	  Kimani	  and	  all	  his	  allies	   lost	   their	   seats.	   ‘[W]ith	   the	   slate	   cleaned	   in	   Nakuru’,	   the	   Weekly	   Review	  observed,	  ‘a	  new	  era	  is	  about	  to	  dawn	  in	  the	  area,	  an	  era	  that	  may	  bring	  unity	  and	  peace	  where	  chaos	  has	  reigned	  in	  the	  past	  five	  years.’86	  The	  next	  section	  considers	  the	   ways	   in	   which	   this	   prediction	   was	   fulfilled	   over	   the	   following	   decade.	   It	   is	  shown	   that	   although	  Moi	   succeeded	   in	   stabilising	   the	   ‘capital	   of	   Kenyan	   politics’,	  this	  did	  not	  in	  turn	  lead	  to	  peace,	  unity	  and	  an	  end	  to	  chaos.	  87	  Instead,	  these	  tussles	  continued	  within	  the	  ruling	  party,	  which	  became	  much	  more	  involved	  in	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  municipal	  council.	  	  
All	  the	  president’s	  men:	  	  Moi	  and	  the	  municipality	  	  With	  Kihika	  Kimani’s	  downfall,	   an	  opportunity	  arose	  within	   the	  district	   for	  a	  new	  power-­‐broker	   to	   emerge.	   A	   relatively	   unknown	   figure	   came	   forward;	   Kariuki	  Chotara,	   then	   the	   KANU	   vice-­‐chairman	   for	   Nakuru	   district.	   In	   1979,	   Chotara	  was	  nominated	   to	   Naivasha	   Urban	   Council	   and	   replaced	   Kimani	   as	   district	   KANU	  chairman.	   In	   1983,	   he	   was	   nominated	   to	   parliament,	   where	   he	   stayed	   until	   his	  death	  in	  1988.	  Chotara,	  the	  Weekly	  Review	  notes,	  was	  ‘arguably	  the	  most	  powerful	  power-­‐broker	   the	   district	   has	   ever	   produced.88	  Chotara’s	   ascent	   to	   power	   shifted	  the	   balance	   of	   power	   within	   the	   Kikuyu	   community.	  With	   a	   few	   exceptions,	   ‘the	  leaders	  of	  the	  post-­‐independence	  Kikuyu	  community	  had	  always	  come	  from	  loyalist	  backgrounds’,	   whereas	   Chotara	   was	   a	   former	   Mau	   Mau	   leader,	   and	   ‘had	   no	  connections	  to	  the	  business	  elite	  and	  to	  “establishment”	  politics.’89	  His	  position	  was	  sustained	  with	  the	  patronage	  of	  the	  president,	  hosting	  regular	  harambees	  under	  the	  guise	   of	   Nakuru’s	   KANU	   youth	  wing.	  90	  	  Chotara	   used	   the	   party	   to	   tightly	  monitor	  and	  discipline	  councillors	   in	   the	  distrct.	   In	  doing	  so,	  Moi	  and	  Chotara	  cultivated	  a	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core	  group	  of	   clients	  who,	   through	   their	  unstinting	   support	   for	   the	  president	  and	  the	  party,	  were	  able	  to	  stay	  in	  office	  for	  extended	  periods.	  	  	   That	   the	   municipal	   council	   -­‐	   and	   Nakuru	   town	   more	   broadly	   -­‐	   were	  effectively	  co-­‐opted	  by	  the	  regime	  is	  worth	  highlighting,	  particularly	  in	  light	  of	  the	  contrasting	  experience	  of	  other	  urban	  authorities	  in	  the	  1980s.	  Nairobi	  City	  Council,	  which	  like	  Nakuru	  had	  been	  used	  as	  a	  platform	  by	  Kikuyu	  politicians	  to	  launch	  their	  careers	   and	   extend	   their	   business	   empires,	  was	   taken	   over	   by	   a	   government-­‐run	  commission	   in	   March	   1983,	   and	   elected	   local	   government	   only	   returned	   to	   the	  capital	   in	  1992.91	  That	   this	   fate	  was	   avoided	   in	  Nakuru	  was	  arguably	  because	   the	  councillors	   –	   in	   particular	   the	   long-­‐serving	   mayor	   and	   deputy,	   Daniel	   Kanyi	   and	  Raphael	  Korir	  –	  always	  sung	  ‘the	  same	  tune	  as	  their	  district	  chairman.’92	  Yet	  similar	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  county	  councils	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  favour	  of	  the	   president	   did	   not	   prevent	   the	   deepening	   erosion	   of	   the	   municipality’s	  institutional	   capacity	   and	   official	   resources.	   The	   financial	   decline	   of	   Nakuru	  Municipal	   Council	   continued,	   making	   it	   more	   and	  more	   dependent	   on	   hand-­‐outs	  from	   the	   president,	   and	   increasingly	   reliant	   on	   harambees	   to	   deliver	   services.	  Famed	  once	  as	   the	   ‘cleanest	   town	   in	  East	  Africa’,	  Nakuru’s	  descent	   into	  a	   state	  of	  neglect	  in	  the	  1980s	  –	  which	  continued	  after	  1992	  –	  was	  a	  visible	  manifestation	  of	  the	  council’s	  chronic	  incapacity.93	  As	  this	  situation	  worsened,	  the	  ‘peace’	  of	  the	  first	  half	  of	   the	  decade	  started	   to	  give	  way	   to	   suspicion.	  From	  1986,	  Nakuru	  was	  once	  again	   scrutinised	   as	   a	   potential	   site	   of	   opposition	   and	   radicalism	   linked	   to	   the	  emergence	   of	   ‘Mwakenya’;	   a	   group	   of	   dissidents	   committed	   to	   overthrowing	   the	  government.94	  Nakuru	   councillors	   again	   became	   embroiled	   as	   municipal,	   district	  and	  national	  politics	  intersected	  in	  sometimes	  perplexing	  ways.	  	  	   In	  the	  election	  of	  1979	  roughly	  half	  of	  Nakuru’s	  municipal	  councillors	  were	  returned	  to	  office.95	  Four	  years	  later	  there	  was	  even	  less	  of	  a	  turnover	  in	  the	  town’s	  civic	   representatives,	   with	   ‘only	   two	   former	   councillors	   …	   dethroned’. 96 	  The	  electoral	  success	  of	  Nakuru’s	  councillors	  in	  1983	  was	  somewhat	  atypical.	  In	  Kisumu,	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more	   than	   three	   quarters	   of	   the	   incumbents	   were	   ‘ousted	   en	   masse’.97	  Indeed	   a	  great	  number	  of	  councillors	  in	  Nakuru	  remained	  in	  office	  throughout	  the	  1980s	  and	  chose	   to	   retire	   only	   in	   1992	   with	   the	   reintroduction	   of	   multi-­‐partyism.	   The	   real	  contests	   took	   place	   before	   the	   elections	   when	   candidates	   fought	   for	   the	   KANU	  nomination.	  This	  process	  of	  clearing	  candidates	  was	  controlled	  by	  Chotara;	  in	  1983	  he	   disqualified	   many	   civic	   and	   parliamentary	   candidates,	   then	   two	   years	   later	  instructed	   them	   to	   return	   their	   KANU	   life	   membership	   certificates.98	  Councillor	  Barrack	  Okul	  recognised	  that	  most	  of	  those	  who	  succeeded	  in	  becoming	  councillors	  did	  so	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  loyalty	  to	  the	  party,	  rather	  than	  on	  their	  skills	  or	  vision:	  	  We	  had	  one	  party,	  we	  had	  one	  party	  state	  which	  was	  KANU,	  and	  once	  you	  were	  nominated,	   it	  was	  as	  good	  as	  you	  are	  elected.	  And	   the	  main	  agenda	  was	   not,	   what	   are	   you	   going	   to	   do,	   it	   is	   how	   you	   know	   how	   to	   speak,	  orators,	   they	   can	   talk	   a	   lot	   and	   do	   very	   little.	   And	   that	   is	   how	   you	   know	  because	   you	   are	   being	   elected	   just	   around	   their	   areas,	   so	   the	  main	   issue	  was	  not	  development,	  no.	  It	  was	  just,	  how	  you	  cope	  with	  your	  friends	  and	  where	  you	  come	  from.	  Where	  you	  come	  from	  also	  mattered	  in	  that	  time.99	  The	   question	   of	   ‘where	   you	   came	   from’	   was	   more	   complicated	   in	   Nakuru	   town,	  where	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   urban	   residents	   continued	   to	   identify	   with	   ancestral	  homes.	   The	   politics	   of	   the	   1970s	   described	   above,	   whilst	   primarily	   a	   struggle	  between	   GEMA	   and	   the	   ‘radicals’,	   was	   also	   on	   one	   level,	   a	   struggle	   between	  ‘northern’	   and	   ‘southern’	   Kikuyu.	   This	   rivalry	   between	   those	   who	   came	   from	  around	  Nyeri,	   in	   the	  northern	  part	  of	  Central	  Province,	  and	  those	  who	  came	  from	  Kiambu	   and	   Murang’a	   in	   the	   south	   added	   another	   layer	   of	   complexity	   to	   the	  political	  networks	  of	  the	  time.	  Moi’s	  presidency	  did	  not	  bring	  a	  systematic	  reversal	  of	   the	   power	   balance	   between	  Kikuyu	   and	  Kalenjin	   in	   the	   district.	   The	  municipal	  council	   remained	   dominated	   by	   southern	   and	   northern	   Kikuyu,	   as	   did	   most	   of	  Nakuru’s	  parliamentary	  seats.	  Although	  Chotara	  -­‐	  and	  by	  implication	  his	  supporters	  –	  was	  later	  described	  as	  a	  ‘Kalenjin	  proxy’,	  the	  degree	  of	  collaboration	  that	  existed	  between	  politicians	  of	  different	  ethnicities	  in	  the	  district	  is	  significant	  in	  light	  of	  the	  apparent	  fracturing	  of	  such	  consensus	  after	  1991.100	  	  	   Nakuru’s	   municipal	   councillors	   benefitted	   from	   the	   proximity	   of	   the	  president.	  In	  the	  1970s,	  Moi	  had	  purchased	  a	  three	  thousand	  acre	  farm	  at	  Kabarak,	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only	   twenty-­‐five	   kilometres	   from	   the	   town. 101 	  This	   allowed	   him	   –	   like	   his	  predecessor	   –	   to	   use	   Nakuru	   as	   a	   ‘strategic	   operations	   centre’.	  102	  Moi	   played	   a	  visible	  and	  active	  role	  in	  town	  life.	  Indeed	  councillor	  Barrack	  Okul	  recalled	  that	  the	  council	   ‘had	   a	   lot	   of	   interaction	   [with	   Moi].	   Because	   any	   function,	   he	   had	   to	   be	  there…	  Occasionally	  we	   used	   to	   be	   called	   if	   there	  was	   a	   problem	   to	   Kabarak,	   his	  home.	  Or	   to	  State	  House	  here	   for	  discussion	  and	  a	  briefing.’103	  All	   in	  all,	  he	  kept	  a	  ‘very	  close	  eye’	  on	  the	  council.104	  Late	  in	  1980,	  the	  councillors	  decided	  to	  capitalise	  on	   the	   president’s	   presence	   in	   the	   district,	   and	   invited	   him	   to	   act	   as	   the	   guest	   of	  honour	  for	  a	  harambee	  it	  was	  arranging.105	  The	  council	  was	  trying	  to	  raise	  fourteen	  million	  shillings	  to	  fund	  the	  construction	  of	  seventy	  new	  classrooms.	  The	  harambee	  fund	  drive	  was	  evidence	  of	  the	  council’s	  faltering	  ability	  to	  render	  its	  basic	  services.	  In	   the	  past,	   the	   council	   had	   relied	   on	   external	   loans	   to	   fund	   capital	   development.	  But	   in	   the	   final	   years	   of	   Kenyatta’s	   presidency,	   it	   became	   increasingly	   difficult	   to	  acquire	   these	   loans,	   which	   resulted	   in	   a	   decline	   in	   school	   construction.	   As	   the	  town’s	   population	   continued	   to	   grow,	   the	   impacts	   of	   this	   this	   lack	   of	   investment	  became	  more	  serious.	  Unable	  to	  fund	  the	  construction	  from	  its	  existing	  revenue,	  the	  municipal	   council	   set	   about	   organising	   an	   ambitious	   harambee,	   chaired	   by	   the	  district	  commissioner.	  Every	  section	  of	  society	  was	  expected	  to	  contribute.	  Council	  staff	   ‘donated’	   KSH	   64,000	   out	   of	   their	   wages	   and	   an	   extra	   twenty	   shillings	   was	  added	   to	   all	   council	   and	   government	   licence	   applications.	   Even	   school	   children	  were	   requested	   to	   give	   twenty-­‐five	   shillings	   each.106	  All	   businesses	   in	   the	   town	  were	   asked	   to	   donate;	   the	   Pyrethrum	   Board’s	   donation	   was	   pitched	   at	   200,000	  shillings,	   whilst	   local	   watch	   dealers	  were	   expected	   to	   give	   one	   hundred	   shillings	  each.107	  	  	   School	  construction	  was	  for	  councillor	  Okul	  a	  standout	  success	  of	  his	  time	  in	  office.	   He	   attributed	   this	   achievement	   to	   the	   councillors’	   superior	   organisational	  skills	  and	  the	  cooperation	  and	  goodwill	  of	  parents,	  rather	  than	  to	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  council	  as	  a	  bureaucratic	  and	  service	  providing	  institution:	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And	   I’m	  happy,	   during	  my	   time,	  we	  built	   seventeen	  primary	   schools,	   five	  secondary	   schools	   –	   without	   assistance,	   only	   through	   the	   donation	   that	  each	   child	   coming	   to	   school	   to	   pay	   this.	   And	   the	   parent	   understood	   and	  agreed,	   because	   we	   couldn’t	   wait	   for	   local	   authority,	   because	   the	   local	  authority	  had	  no	  money,	  the	  municipal	  council	  had	  no	  money.108	  This	   categorical	   repudiation	   of	   the	   council’s	   institutional	   capacity	   is	   all	   the	  more	  revealing	  coming	  from	  the	  former	  chairman	  of	  the	  finance	  committee.	  Okul	  admits	  that	  an	  effective	  councillor	  was	  one	  who	  could	  persuade	  people	  to	  participate	  more	  regularly	  and	  generously	  in	  harambees,	  rather	  than	  in	  the	  work	  of	  the	  committees.	  The	  pressure	  to	  donate	  to	  self-­‐help	  projects	  was	  greatest	  when	  Moi	  himself	  was	  the	  host.	  In	  1983	  the	  municipal	  council	  gave	  KSH	  20,000	  to	  a	  fundraising	  campaign	  for	  the	  Rift	  Valley	  Provincial	  Hospital,	   being	   led	  by	   the	  president.109	  Councillors	  were	  responsible	   for	  collecting	  donations	  from	  their	  constituents	  to	   fund	  an	  upgrade	  of	  the	   facility,	   which	   was	   run	   by	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Health.	   This	   was	   a	   politics	   of	  personalised	   relationships,	   through	   which	   councillors	   used	   council	   resources	   to	  establish	   themselves	   as	   petty	   patrons,	   but	   also	   used	   their	   position	   to	   extract	   the	  resources	  needed	  for	  service	  provision.	  The	  council’s	  donation	  was	  made	  in	  spite	  of	  the	   fact	   that	   Okul	   anticipated	   that	   1984	   would	   financially,	   ‘be	   the	   most	   difficult	  year’,	   since	   the	   government	   had	   withdrawn	   grants-­‐in-­‐aid.110	  A	   month	   earlier	   the	  councillors	  had	  authorised	  a	  donation	  of	  KSH	  5,000	  to	  be	  presented	  by	  the	  mayor	  and	   his	   deputy	   to	   the	   president	   at	   his	   constituency	   in	   Baringo.111	  The	   minutes	  record	   no	   details	   regarding	   what	   the	   ‘harambee’	   was	   raising	   money	   for,	   yet	   the	  approval	  of	  the	  Minister	  for	  Local	  Government	  and	  permanent	  secretary	  was	  noted.	  That	  an	   increasing	  share	  of	   the	  council’s	  meetings,	   its	   financial	  resources,	  and	  the	  work	   of	   officials	   was	   being	   taken	   up	   organising	   and	   participating	   in	   harambees,	  including	  those	  for	  projects	  outside	  of	  the	  municipality,	  reveals	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  service	  provision	  had	  come	  to	  occupy	  an	  ambivalent	  space	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	   actors.	  Whilst	   this	   had	   been	   the	   case	   in	   county	   councils	   for	   some	   time,	   this	  kind	  of	  theatrical	  politics	  was	  more	  recent	  in	  Nakuru.	  	  	   The	   fact	   that	   Moses	   Mudavadi,	   Minister	   for	   Local	   Government,	   permitted	  these	   donations	   is	   not	   surprising.	   Never	   a	   technocrat,	   the	   president’s	   self-­‐styled	  number	  two	  encouraged	  councillors	  to	  engage	  in	  harambees	  and	  patronage	  politics.	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Mayor	   Kanyi	   believed	   that	   the	   council	   succeeded	   in	  minimising	   the	   effects	   of	   its	  negative	  financial	  trend	  because	  the	  ministry	  was	  always	  co-­‐operative.	  Speaking	  of	  Mudavadi,	  he	  commented	  ‘Also,	  that	  minister	  thought	  my	  work	  was	  good,	  he	  said,	  “if	  you	  think	  it’s	  good,	  go	  ahead	  and	  pass	  it	  and	  carry	  on	  with	  the	  work,	  I	  will	  come	  and	  approve	  later”.’112	  Looking	  back,	  councillor	  Okumu	  was	  less	  positive	  about	  the	  impact	  that	  the	  understanding	  between	  Kanyi	  and	  Mudavadi	  may	  have	  had	  on	  the	  council:	   ‘it	   would	   be	   better	   for	   the	   council	   to	   be	   independent.	   Why	   I	   say	   is	  because…I	   think	   you	  understand	   that	   there	   are	   some	   councillors	  who	   are	   getting	  more	  pay	  than	  the	  others,	  and	  why?	  It’s	  because	  maybe	  the	  mayor	  is	  known	  to	  the	  minister,	   and	   that’s	   why	   he	   approves	   the	   budget.’113	  Compared	   to	   some	   of	   his	  colleagues,	   mayor	   Kanyi	   was	   less	   obviously	   qualified	   to	   manage	   Kenya’s	   fourth	  largest	  town.	  He	  left	  school	  at	  a	  relatively	  young	  age	  and	  went	  to	  work	  on	  an	  orange	  farm	  and	  later	  as	  a	  milk	  seller.	  He	  started	  his	  own	  small	  business	  in	  town,	  then	  was	  elected	   to	   the	   council	   in	   1974.	   In	   Daniel	   Kanyi,	   Moi	   found	   a	   willing	   ally.	   Kanyi	  repeated	  the	  ‘Nyayo	  philosophy’	  of	  ‘love,	  peace,	  and	  unity’	  at	  council	  meetings,	  and	  would	   frequently	   tell	  members	   ‘to	   forget	   tribalism,	  nepotism	  and	  sectionalism’.114	  Thirty	   years	   later,	   Kanyi	   continued	   to	   use	   this	   language	   to	   describe	   the	   work	   of	  councillors:	  	  Once	  you	  come	  in	  you	  take	  care	  of	  the	  town,	  forget	  politics,	  politics	  comes	  in	  only	  when	  you	  are	  electing	  the	  mayor.	  Thereafter	   it	   is	  development.	  So	  we	  developed.	  I	  am	  proud	  to	  have.	  Even	  now	  when	  I	  go	  to	  the	  Council,	  the	  workers	   there	   really	   love	   me.	   Yeah,	   they	   say,	   nowadays	   sometimes	   we	  don’t	  get	  our	  salaries,	  not	  during	  my	  time.’115	  	  Kanyi	  contradicted	  this	  claim	  that	  ‘politics’	  only	  arose	  during	  the	  mayoral	  election,	  when	  describing	  how	  personal	  and	  policy	  differences	  were	  resolved,	  off	  the	  record	  and	  outside	  of	  the	  council	  hall.	  The	  night	  before	  full	  council	  meetings,	  Kanyi	  hosted	  a	  ‘caucus’	  at	  his	  residence,	  where	  the	  members	  would	  go	  through	  each	  agenda	  item	  until	  an	  agreement	  was	  reached.116	  Councillor	  Okul	  remembered	  that	  ‘anybody	  who	  [had]	  a	  serious	  problem	  [would]	  express	   it	   there.’117	  This	  meant	   that	   for	   the	  most	  part,	  full	  council	  meetings	  were	  a	  mere	  formality.	  When	  disagreements	  could	  not	  be	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solved	   in	   this	   way,	   the	   district	   or	   provincial	   commissioner	   would	   intervene,	   as	  Councillor	  George	  Kamotho	  recalls:	  ‘The	  DC	  was	  a	  nominated	  councillor,	  he	  used	  to	  represent	  the	  government,	  and	  he	  would	  say,	  “this	  is	  what	  the	  government	  wants”.	  Sometimes	  it	  became	  difficult	  for	  us,	  even	  for	  a	  mayor,	  or	  deputy	  mayor	  to	  say	  no	  to	  what	  the	  DC	  said’.118	  	  	   The	   efficacy	   of	   this	   system	   for	   disciplining	   councillors	   began	   to	   crack	   in	  1985.	  From	  then	  on,	   the	  petty	  rivalries	  between	  councillors	  became	  more	  serious	  as	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  municipal	  council	  and	  the	  district	  KANU	  branch	  became	  more	  closely	  intertwined.	  It	  began	  in	  January	  1985	  when	  three	  KANU	  officials,	  including	  two	  sitting	  councillors,	  were	  suspended	  ‘for	  allegedly	  abusing	  their	  party	  office’.119	  A	  month	  later	  the	  full	  council	  sat	  to	  consider	  the	  suspensions.	  Councillor	  Kamotho	  wisely	  noted	  that	  as	  ‘the	  item	  on	  the	  agenda	  was	  the	  first	  of	  its	  kind	  to	  be	  discussed	  by	  this	  council…it	  was	  difficult	  for	  the	  members	  to	  know	  how	  to	  go	  about	  it’.120	  His	  fellow	  members	   agreed	   and	   finally	   the	   two	   accused	   were	   invited	   to	   speak.	   Both	  men	  recited	   their	  history	  with	   the	  party	  and	   the	  council,	   Joseck	  Thuo	  having	   first	  been	  elected	  in	  1963	  and	  Benson	  Karuku	  in	  1967.	  Thuo	  recalled	  that	  on	  11	  January,	  he	   had	   ‘convened	   a	   meeting	   of	   the	   sub-­‐branch	   party	   officials’	   in	   his	   capacity	   as	  Nakuru	   town	   divisional	   chairman.121	  At	   the	   meeting	   he	   was	   suspended	   from	   the	  party,	  for	  reasons	  not	  stated.	  Thuo	  said	  he	  had	  ‘direct	  loyalty	  to	  His	  Excellency	  the	  President’,	  with	  Karuku	   going	   one	   step	   further	   proclaiming	  he	  was	   a	   ‘true	  Nyayo	  man	  by	  blood’.122	  Unsure	  how	  to	  proceed,	  the	  council	  decided	  to	  grant	  the	  accused	  two	  months	  to	  clarify	  their	  situation	  with	  KANU	  headquarters.	  	  	   Five	   months	   later,	   divisions	   in	   the	   council	   again	   drew	   national	   press	  attention	   after	   Councillor	   Joseph	   Miano	   held	   a	   press	   conference	   at	   which	   he	  accused	  Kariuki	  Chotara	  ‘of	  bullying	  councillors	  in	  the	  area’.123	  Miano	  had	  written	  a	  letter	   to	   the	  managing	   director	   of	   a	   local	   company,	   Holman	   Brothers,	   to	   make	   a	  complaint	   about	   one	   of	   their	   employees	   -­‐	   a	   fellow	   councillor	   -­‐	   Josephat	  Mwaniki.	  After	   this	   emerged,	   Chotara	   instructed	   Miano	   to	   apologise	   in	   writing.	   Instead,	  Miano	  held	  a	  press	  conference	  where	  he	  criticised	  Chotara.	  Miano	  quickly	  realised	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his	   error	  and	   retracted	  his	   statement.	  Yet	   the	  damage	  had	  been	  done.	  At	   a	  KANU	  rally	   attended	   by	   Mayor	   Kanyi	   and	   MP	   Amos	   Kimemia,	   Chotara	   ‘sat	   back	   and	  listened	   to	   leaders	   castigate	   his	   critics	   and	   also	   heap	   praises	   on	   him’.124	  This	  continued	   in	   the	   municipal	   council.	   At	   the	   first	   meeting	   in	   June,	   Kanyi	   ‘strongly	  disassociated	  himself	  and	  the	  entire	  council	  from	  the	  utterances	  of	  one	  member	  of	  the	   council	   against	   the	   Nakuru	   district	   KANU	   Chairman.’125	  Another	   councillor	  added	  that	  on	  reading	  Miano’s	  remarks	  in	  a	  newspaper	  he	  had	  been	  ‘shocked	  that	  the	   said	  member	   had	   dragged	   other	   councillors	   into	   the	   issue.’126	  The	   councillors	  unequivocally	  aligned	  themselves	   to	  Chotara,	   in	   the	  knowledge	   that	   their	  political	  fortunes	  rested	  entirely	  on	  the	  favour	  of	  the	  KANU	  chairman.	  	  	   There	   was	   however,	   one	   councillor	   who	   did	   not	   quake	   at	   the	   idea	   of	  invoking	  Chotara’s	  wrath.	  Kimunya	  Kamana	  had	  been	  a	  long-­‐serving	  staff	  member	  of	   the	   municipal	   council,	   rising	   to	   the	   position	   of	   Deputy	   Housing	   and	   Estates	  Officer,	  before	  he	  became	  a	  councillor.	  Prior	  to	  this,	  he	  had	  been	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  Nakuru	   District	   Ex-­‐Freedom	   Fighters	   Organization	   (NDEFFO).	   In	   July	   1986	   the	  
Weekly	  Review	   reported	   the	   ‘strange’	   news	   that	   Kamana,	   acting	   as	   KANU	   branch	  organising	  secretary,	  had	  ‘suspended’	  nine	  members	  of	  the	  municipal	  council	  from	  the	  party,	   including	   the	  mayor	   and	  deputy	  mayor,	   ‘both	  of	  whom’	   the	  paper	  note	  ‘appeared	   to	   be	   in	   the	   good	   books	   of	   the	   KANU	   hierarchy	   in	   the	   district.’127	  This	  appearance	   was	   confirmed	   when	   Moi	   directed	   that	   Kamana	   be	   disciplined,	  describing	   his	   actions	   as	   ‘outrageous	   and	   malicious’.128	  Two	   days	   later,	   Chotara	  announced	   that	   Kamana	   had	   been	   suspended	   from	   KANU.	   The	   reasons	   for	  Kamana’s	   statement	   were	   never	   fully	   explicated,	   but	   the	   consequences	   became	  clear	   in	   January	   the	   following	  year	  when	  he	  was	  detained	  and	   later	   charged	  with	  taking	   an	   oath	   of	   allegiance	   to	   Mwakenya	   and	   was	   sentenced	   to	   four	   and	   a	   half	  years	   in	   jail,	  which	  he	  spent	  at	   the	   ‘nyayo	  house	   torture	  chambers’	  with	  scores	  of	  other	  political	  prisoners.129	  It	  had	  appeared	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  1986	  that	  Kamana	  would	  be	  pardoned	  by	  Chotara.130	  His	  suspension	  from	  the	  party,	  along	  with	  that	  of	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Thuo,	  Karuku	  and	  Mark	  Mwithaga	  had	  been	  lifted	  by	  the	  chairman.131	  But	  then	  he	  was	  detained,	  and	  during	  his	  hearing	  he	  accused	  Chotara	  of	  also	  having	  taken	  the	  oath	   to	  Mwakenya.132	  Kanyi	   used	   the	   first	  meeting	   of	   1987	   to	  make	   clear	   that	   he	  condemned	   Kamana,	   disassociating	   himself	   and	   the	   entire	   council	   ‘from	   the	  activities	  of	  the	  imprisoned	  member’.133	  He	  ‘said	  it	  was	  shocking	  to	  learn	  that	  such	  a	  person	   lived	   amongst	   us’. 134 	  1987,	   Kanyi	   stressed,	   would	   be	   “The	   Year	   of	  Discipline”.135	  	  	   Kanyi’s	   public	   disavowal	   of	   Kamana	  was	   a	   performance	   probably	   enacted	  for	   the	   benefit	   of	   the	   district	   commissioner.	   The	   seditious	   councillor	   had	   cast	   a	  shadow	  over	  the	  loyalty	  of	  the	  entire	  membership,	  the	  costs	  of	  which	  were	  clear	  to	  all	   gathered:	   ‘You	  were	   to	   be	   loyal	   to	   the	  President,	   that	  was	   lazima	   -­‐	   that	  was	   a	  must.	  Because	   if	  you	  were	  not	   loyal	   to	   the	  president,	   then	  nothing,	  you	  would	  get	  nothing	  that	  would	  uplift	  your	  council.’136	  The	  favour	  of	  the	  president	  was	  essential	  for	   ‘uplifting	   the	   council’,	   and	   making	   councillorship	   into	   a	   viable	   -­‐	   let	   alone	  profitable	   -­‐	   activity.	   The	   council’s	   official	   resources	   had	   continued	   to	   decline	  throughout	   the	   1980s,	   leaving	   the	   institution	   effectively	   bankrupt,	   as	   Figure	   16	  shows.	  In	  the	  four	  years	  between	  1984	  and	  1988	  the	  deficit	  on	  the	  general	  fund	  had	  grown	   from	   K£438,597	   to	   K£1,104,629.	   The	   water	   fund	   was	   also	   running	   on	   a	  deficit,	  with	  only	   the	  housing	   fund	  continuing	   to	  produce	  a	  surplus,	  ensuring	   that	  the	  council	  was	  not	  declared	  bankrupt.	  If	  the	  councillors	  were	  not	  able	  to	  access	  the	  patronage	  resources	  of	  Chotara	  and	  Moi,	   then	   their	  capacity	   to	  act	  as	   leaders	  and	  patrons	  would	  be	  vastly	  restricted.	  Despite	  Kanyi’s	  assurances	  that	  his	  council	  was	  loyal,	  he	  nevertheless	  went	  on	  to	   lose	  his	  seat	  as	  mayor.	   In	  1988,	  Kariuki	  Chotara	  died,	   and	   in	   the	  months	   that	   followed	  Kanyi	  was	   replaced	  by	  his	  deputy,	  Raphael	  Korir	  who	  became	  the	   first	  Kalenjin	   to	   lead	  Nakuru	   town.	  There	   followed	  a	   ‘quiet	  political	  season’	   in	  Nakuru	  which	   lasted	  until	   the	  early	  1990s,	  as	   the	  next	  chapter	  explores.137	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  ‘Olive	  branch:	  suspended	  officials	  get	  another	  change’,	  Weekly	  Review,	  1	  August	  1986,	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Review,	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  minutes,	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  January	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Figure	  16:	  Annual	  budget	  estimates,	  Nakuru	  Municipal	  Council,	  1984-­‐89.	  	  	   	  	   General	  Fund	  	   	  	  
	   Income	  	   Expenditure	  	   Accumulated	  surplus/deficit	  
1984/85	   £1,224,915	   £1,227,021	   -­‐£438,597	  
1986/87	   £1,742,851	   £1,724,900	   -­‐£495,066	  
1988/89	  	   £2,486,665	   £2,678,428	   -­‐£1,104,629	  
	  	   	  	   Water	  Fund	  	   	  	  
1984/85	   £258,087	   £243,289	   £145,637	  
1986/87	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
1988/89	  	   £762,250	   £699,966	   -­‐£168,077	  
	  	   	  	   Housing	  Fund	   	  	  
1984/85	   -­‐	   -­‐	  	  	   £800,805	  
1986/87	   £680,540	   £554,292	   -­‐	  
1988/89	  	   £864,164	   £717,323	   £1,475,093	  
	  	   	  	   All	  Funds	  	   	  	  
1984/85	   £1,767,370	   £1,716,453	   £597,845	  
1986/87	   -­‐	   -­‐	   £815,847	  
1988/89	  	   -­‐	   -­‐	   £202,387	  Source:	  Minutes	  of	  annual	  budget	  meetings,	  21	  December	  1984,	  29	  August	  1986	  	  and	  21	  June	  1988,	  all	  from	  Nakuru	  County	  Government	  Archive.	  	  
Conclusion	  	  For	  much	   of	   the	   1970s	   and	   1980s,	   Kihika	   Kimani	   and	   Kariuki	   Chotara	   ‘bestrode	  Nakuru	   like	   colossuses,	   anointing	   their	   protégés	   to	   leadership	   positions	   in	   the	  district	  and	  building	  little	  kingdoms	  of	  their	  own.’138	  The	  municipal	  council	  was	  one	  of	  those	  kingdoms.	  The	  councillors	  who	  enjoyed	  the	  patronage	  and	  support	  of	  these	  district	  bosses	  were	  able	  to	  use	  their	  positions	  and	  access	  to	  extract	  opportunities	  for	   themselves	   and	   their	   supporters.	   Those	   who	   crossed	   these	   political	   masters	  often	  found	  themselves	  detained,	  excluded	  from	  KANU	  or	  denied	  leadership	  within	  the	   council.	   Cultivating	   such	   clientelist	   networks	   only	   became	  more	   important	   as	  the	  council’s	  official	  resources	  declined.	  The	  town’s	  growing	  population	  continually	  placed	   the	   council	   in	   a	   position	  where	   demand	   for	   services	   outstripped	   available	  resources.	  The	  actions	  –	  or	  inaction	  –	  of	  the	  central	  government	  compounded	  this	  fiscal	   crisis.	   In	   time,	   the	  municipal	   council	  was	   forced,	   like	   counties	   had	   been,	   to	  find	  alternative	  ways	  of	  meeting	  popular	  demands.	  This	  arrangement,	  which	  relied	  on	   harambees,	  Moi’s	   patronage,	   and	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Local	   Government	   turning	   a	  blind	   eye,	   supplemented	   the	   council’s	   ‘official’	   efforts.	   Together	   this	   enabled	   the	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council	   to	  go	  on	  providing	  services	  whilst	  councillors	  attended	   to	  advancing	   their	  reputations	  as	  good	   leaders.	  As	   the	  next	  chapter	  will	   show,	   this	  way	  of	  governing	  the	  town	  could	  not	  could	  not	  be	  maintained	  after	  1990.	  The	  lives	  of	  councillors	  and	  the	  work	   of	   the	   council	   became	   inordinately	   harder	  when	  Nakuru	  officially	   came	  under	  the	  control	  of	  an	  opposition	  party.	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Chapter	  Six:	  ‘Anything	  but	  civic’:	  Multi-­‐party	  local	  government,	  1990-­‐2002	  	  	  Councillors	   have	   little	   to	   show	   for	   their	   election	   in	   1992,	   but	  most	   have	  fought,	  some	  physically,	  each	  other,	  plotted	  to	  overthrow	  their	  mayors	  and	  chairpersons	   or	   simply	   made	   their	   meetings	   anything	   but	   civic,	   indeed	  ungovernable.	   The	   burning	   issues	   that	   affect	   an	   increasing	   hapless	  electorate	   have	   yet	   to	   be	   addressed…	   local	   authorities	   operate	   under	   the	  strangulating	   fetters	   of	   the	   Central	   Government…	   Even	   if	   the	   Ministry	  frustrates	  most	  authorities,	  these	  civic	  leaders	  have	  not	  demonstrated	  that	  they	  can	  come	  up	  with	   functional	   ideas	   to	  raise	  and	  collect	  revenue,	  keep	  urban	   areas	   clean,	   provide	   clean	   drinking	  water,	   residential	   housing,	   the	  list	  is	  endless.	  From	  where	  the	  electorate	  stands,	  the	  on-­‐going	  elections	  in	  local	  authorities	  are	  sad	  and	  empty	  rituals.1	  
Introduction	  At	   the	  start	  of	   the	  1990s,	  after	  more	   than	   twenty	  years	  of	   institutional	  decay	  and	  neglect,	  prospects	  for	  the	  future	  of	  local	  authorities	  in	  Kenya	  looked	  bleak.	  Since	  the	  Hardacre	  Commission	  of	  1966	  and	  the	  Transfer	  of	  Functions	  Act	  of	  1970	  there	  had	  been	  very	   little	  sustained,	  high-­‐level	   interest	   in	  the	  viability	  of	   local	  authorities	  as	  service	   providers.	   Lacking	   funds	   and	   functions,	   councillors	   –	   particularly	   in	   rural	  authorities	   –	   pursued	   their	   individual	   and	   communal	   interests	   largely	   outside	   of	  the	   confines	   of	   council	   offices.	   The	   return	   of	   multi-­‐party	   democracy	   to	   Kenya	   in	  1992	   however,	   had	   a	   	   demonstrable	   impact	   on	   the	   way	   the	   central	   government	  engaged	  with	  local	  authorities.	  In	  turn,	  this	   led	  national	  politicians	  to	  take	  a	  much	  greater	   interest	   in	   the	   politics	   and	   policies	   underpinning	   the	   local	   government	  system.	  This	  chapter	  considers	  these	  struggles	  for	  control	  at	  the	  local	  level,	  and	  the	  way	  this	  influenced	  and	  intersected	  with	  national	  politics.	  Increased	  competition	  at	  both	  the	  national	  and	  local	  level	  encouraged	  a	  new	  frenzy	  of	  patronage	  politics	  and	  violence.	   Within	   this	   overall	   trend	   there	   were	   significant	   regional	   variations.	   In	  some	   areas,	   additional	   resources	   flowed	   into	   the	   hands	   of	   councillors	   whilst	   in	  other	   areas,	   the	   regime	   simply	   authorised	   another	   round	   of	   plunder	   of	   public	  resources.	   The	   chapter	   uses	   the	   case	   studies	   to	   explore	   the	   changing	   dynamic	  between	   the	   government	   and	   an	   opposition	   council	   (Nakuru),	   a	   KANU	   council	  (Kilifi)	  and	  a	  ‘swing’	  council	  (Kakamega).	  Whilst	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  concerning	  this	  period	  emphasised	  the	  regime’s	  attempts	  to	  undermine	  –	  sometimes	  violently	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–	   the	   evolution	   of	   pluralistic	   politics,	   this	   chapter	   seeks	   to	   show	   that	   even	   the	  compromised	  form	  of	  multi-­‐party	  democracy	  that	  emerged	  at	  this	  time	  altered	  the	  way	  the	  local	  state	  worked,	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  the	  centre.	  	  	   In	  their	  extensive	  analysis	  of	  the	  1992	  election,	  Throup	  and	  Hornsby	  devote	  remarkably	   little	   attention	   to	   the	   contests	   for	   local	   government	   office	   in	   the	   136	  councils	   that	   existed	   at	   the	   time.2	  Whilst	   they	   provide	   considerable	   detail	   and	  discussion	  of	  the	  candidates	  who	  competed	  at	  constituency	  level,	  the	  authors	  focus	  more	  on	  the	  personalities	  than	  on	  their	  place	  in	  local	  networks	  of	  power.	  This	  fits	  with	  much	   of	   the	   literature	   that	   focuses	   on	   the	   post-­‐1992	   era,	   which	   appears	   to	  assume	   that	   developments	   and	   trends	   at	   local	   level	   correlated	   directly	   with	  national	   politics.	   In	   this	   way,	   the	   outcome	   of	   parliamentary	   and	   presidential	  elections	  has	  been	  seen	  fundamentally	  as	  an	  embodiment	  of	  Kenya’s	  specific	  ethnic	  composition	  and	  distribution.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  analysis	  is	  found	  in	  Walter	  Oyugi’s	  article	  on	  the	  1992	  election.	  Examining	  the	  role	  of	  ethnicity	  in	  the	  electoral	  process,	   Oyugi	   presents	   a	   straightforward	   portrait	   of	   the	   interplay	   between	   local	  and	  national	  politics,	  writing:	  	  The	   1992	   contest	  was	   perceived	   differently	   by	   key	   ethnic	   actors.	   For	   the	  incumbent	   ruling	   coalition	   –	   the	   Kalenjin	   and	   their	   kinsmen	   in	   the	   Rift	  Valley,	  it	  involved	  the	  defence	  of	  the	  existing	  structure	  of	  privilege…For	  the	  former	   rulers	   –	   the	   Kikuyu	   –	   it	   presented	   an	   opportunity	   for	   politico-­‐economic	  ‘resurrection’.	  For	  the	  others	  (the	  Luo	  and	  the	  Luhya	  especially),	  1992	  was	  their	  turn	  “to	  eat	  also”.3	  This	   preoccupation	  with	   ethnic	   voting,	   or	  what	   Lonsdale	   calls	   ‘political	   tribalism’	  has	   been	   a	   dominant	   feature	   of	   the	   post-­‐1992	   literature,	   and	   was	   tied	   to	   the	  emergence	   of	   ethnic,	   electoral	   violence	   in	   1992,	   1997,	   2007-­‐08.4	  This	   work	   has	  tended	  to	  look	  at	  ‘the	  dynamics	  of	  how	  ethnicity	  gets	  polarised	  “from	  above”	  within	  the	  struggle	   for	  state	  power’.5	  	  But	   this	   focus	  on	  national	  elites	  denies	   local	  actors	  agency	   and	   obscures	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   individuals	   and	   groups	   jockey	   for	   power	  and	  influence	  in	  sub-­‐national	  spaces.	  Yet	  control	  of	  these	  local	  networks	  of	  power	  became	   of	   even	   greater	   importance	   to	   elites	   competing	   for	   national	   power.	   As	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Throup	  and	  Hornsby,	  Multi-­‐Party	  Politics	  in	  Kenya,	  p.	  450.	  	  	  3	  Walter	  Oyugi,	  ‘Ethnicity	  in	  the	  electoral	  process:	  the	  1992	  general	  elections	  in	  Kenya’,	  
African	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Science,	  2:1	  (1997),	  pp.	  41-­‐69,	  p.	  49.	  	  4	  John	  Lonsdale,	  'Moral	  ethnicity	  &	  political	  tribalism',	  in	  Preban	  Kaarsholm	  and	  Jan	  Hultin	  (eds.),	  Inventions	  and	  Boundaries:	  Historical	  &	  Anthropological	  Approaches	  to	  Ethnicity	  &	  
Nationalism	  (Roskilde,	  1994),	  pp.	  131–50.	  5	  Jacqueline	  Klopp,	  'Can	  moral	  ethnicity	  trump	  political	  tribalism?	  The	  struggle	  for	  land	  and	  nation	  in	  Kenya',	  African	  Studies,	  61:2	  (2002),	  pp.	  269–94.	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Karuti	   and	  Cowen	  show	   in	   their	   examination	  of	   the	  1997	  election,	  understanding	  the	  form	  politics	  took	  in	  Kenya	  after	  1992,	  requires	  looking	  beyond	  tribal	  or	  ethnic	  explanations,	   to	   an	   incorporation	   of	   the	   local	   and	   ‘its	   interplay	   with	   the	  commanding	  heights	  of	  state	  power’.6	  They	  suggest	  that	  multi-­‐partyism	  brought	  to	  the	  fore	  the	  kinds	  of	  communal,	   local	  politics,	  that	  had	  previously,	   ‘played	  a	  major	  part	   in	   intra-­‐party	   electoral	   contest’	   in	   Kenya.7	  Accessing	   and	   analysing	   such	  communal	  politics,	  Southall	  and	  Wood	  suggest,	  ‘requires	  local	  knowledge,	  not	  easily	  available’.8	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason,	  they	  argue,	  that	  local	  government	  politics	  has	  been	  overlooked	  in	  most	  studies	  on	  Kenya’s	  democratic	  transition.9	  	  	   Part	  of	  the	  difficulty	  in	  this	  kind	  of	  work,	  both	  practically	  and	  intellectually,	  is	  the	  inherently	  messy	  and	  often	  seemingly	  petty	  ways	  in	  which	  local	  competition	  manifests	   itself.	  Attempts	   to	   situate	  political	   struggles	  over	   local	   government	   in	   a	  broader,	  national	  political	  picture	  are	  therefore	  rare.	  Tom	  Wolf’s	  paper	  on	  the	  1992	  election	  is	  unusual	  in	  that	  it	  does	  consider	  the	  experiences	  of	  local	  authorities.	  Wolf	  examines	  the	  rewards	  and	  reprisals	  that	  befell	  councillor	  candidates	  who	  stood	  in	  KANU	  and	  non-­‐KANU	  zones	  in	  1992.10	  He	  argued	  that	  precisely	  because	  of	  the	  lack	  of	   domestic	   and	   international	   media	   interest	   in	   local	   government	   affairs,	   the	  electoral	  experience	  of	  local	  authorities	  provided	  a	  more	  honest	  picture	  of	  the	  state	  of	   democracy	   at	   that	   time.	   Given	   that	   ‘no	   one	   outside	   the	   locality	  will	   ever	   know	  about	   such	   events,	   [local	   government	   politics]	   provides	   space	   for	   actions	   which	  more	   genuinely	   reflect,	   perhaps,	   the	   real	   values	   and	   intentions	   of	   both	   regime	  operatives	  and	  members	  of	  local	  communities.’11	  	  	   In	   cataloguing	   the	   experiences	   of	   different	   candidates,	   Wolf	   identified	   a	  pattern	   of	   financial	   rewards	   that	   were	   bestowed	   upon	   KANU	   activists	   and	  opposition	  defectors,	  and	  financial	  sanctions	  for	  political	  opponents.	  He	  notes	  that	  pro-­‐opposition	   parties	   –	   without	   access	   to	   government	   resources	   –	   had	   more	  limited	  instruments	  at	  their	  disposal:	  these	  included	  social	  ostracism,	  and	  threats	  of	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  Cowen	  and	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  Kanyinga,	  'The	  1997	  elections	  in	  Kenya:	  the	  politics	  of	  communality	  and	  locality',	  in	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  and	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  (eds.),	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  Party	  Elections	  in	  
Africa	  (New	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  2002),	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  Ibid.	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  and	  Wood,	  'Local	  government	  and	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  return	  to	  multi-­‐partyism	  in	  Kenya'.	  	  9	  Ibid.	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  Thomas	  Wolf,	  ‘Paying	  the	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  The	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  gains	  and	  losses	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  government	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  in	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  paper	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  Studies	  Association,	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  Ibid.,	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physical	   violence.	   In	   conclusion,	  Wolf	   observed	   that	   the	   ‘widespread	   hounding	   of	  individuals	  at	  such	  a	  low	  tier	  in	  the	  system	  does	  seem	  directly	  associated	  with	  the	  recent	   move	   to	   pluralism.’12	  This	   violence	   he	   argued,	   should	   not	   be	   seen	   as	   an	  outcome	   of	   	   ‘ideologically-­‐based’	   competition,	   but	   rather	   as	   ‘a	   crucial	   part	   of	  political	   entrepreneurship	   and	   clientage-­‐building’,	   as	   well	   as	   ‘the	   more	   general	  process	  of	  in-­‐group	  self-­‐definition’.13	  	  	   Wolf’s	  emphasis	  on	   ‘political	  entrepreneurship’	   is	  significant.	  Literature	  on	  the	   post-­‐1990	   era	   has	   identified	   that	   politics	   became	   more	   violent,	   ‘tribal’,	   and	  expensive,	  but	   it	   is	  the	  rise	   in	   ‘ethnic	  violence’	  that	  has	  tended	  to	  attract	  the	  most	  scholarly	   interest.	   This	   chapter	   shows	   that	   understanding	   the	   sometimes	   violent	  ways	   in	   which	   ethnic	   competition	   was	   manifest	   after	   1990	   requires	   greater	  attention	  to	  the	  struggles	  to	  access	  patronage	  resources	  at	  local	  and	  national	  level.	  This	  argument	  is	  in	  keeping	  with	  Roger	  Southall’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  1997	  elections.14	  After	   the	  opposition	   failed	  again	   in	  1997	   to	   field	  a	  common	  candidate	  and	  unseat	  Moi,	  Southall	  proposed	   that	   ‘the	  real	  conundrum	  of	  Kenyan	  politics’,	  was	  why	   the	  opposition	   ‘who	  are	   scarcely	  divided	  by	  anything	   resembling	  a	  political	  principle,	  found	   it	   impossible	   to	   coalesce’.15	  The	   answer,	   Southall	   offered,	   had	   to	   lie	   ‘in	   the	  minutiae	   of	   ethnic	   politics…	   the	   web	   of	   patronage-­‐client	   relations,	   and	   the	  realisation	   of	   individual	   politicians	   that	   membership	   of	   the	   political	   class	   brings	  access	  to	  the	  spoils	  system.’16	  	  	   Demands	   on	   the	   state’s	   ‘spoils	   system’	   grew	   immensely	   in	   the	   1990s,	   as	  politics	   became	   infinitely	   more	   expensive.	   This	   is	   clear	   from	   the	   increasing	  frequency	  of	  harambees:	  in	  1991	  there	  were	  ninety-­‐seven	  reported	  harambees,	  the	  following	  year	  –	  which	  ended	  with	  an	  election	  –	  203	  harambees	  took	  place.17	  The	  amount	   collected	   also	   grew	   enormously;	   between	   1991	   and	   1992	   the	   value	   of	  
harambee	  contributions	   increased	  six-­‐fold.18	  This	  pattern	  was	   repeated	   in	   the	   run	  up	  to	  the	  1997	  election.	  Moi	  was	  ‘the	  principal	  patron’,	  with	  his	  donations	  forming	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  Roger	  Southall,	  'Moi’s	  flawed	  mandate:	  the	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  in	  Kenya',	  ROAPE,	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  (1998),	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  Ibid.	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  Ibid.,	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  Anne	  Waiguru,	  ‘Corruption	  and	  patronage	  politics:	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  in	  Kenya’,	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  Charles	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  et	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5	   percent	   of	   the	   decade’s	   total	   collections,	   up	   from	   one	   percent	   in	   the	   1980s.19	  Consequently,	   ‘the	   governing	   elite	   had	   an	   insatiable	   desire	   for	   funds’.20 	  Thus	  although	   donors	   had	   reasoned	   that	   multi-­‐party	   democracy	   would	   lead	   to	   a	  reduction	  in	  corruption,	  in	  fact,	  the	  reverse	  was	  probably	  true.	  	  	   The	   first	   section	   of	   the	   chapter	   briefly	   details	   the	   emergence	   in	   1990	  of	   a	  sustained	  campaign	  for	  political	  change	  in	  Kenya,	  and	  examines	  the	  impact	  this	  had	  on	   the	   regime.	   It	   looks	   at	   the	  domestic	   and	  external	   factors	   that	   led	  Moi	   to	   allow	  opposition	   parties	   to	   form,	   and	   outlines	   the	   support	   bases	   of	   the	   various	   parties	  that	  contested	  the	  1992	  election.	  The	  section	  also	  introduces	  William	  ole	  Ntimama	  who	   served	   as	   the	   Minister	   for	   Local	   Government	   from	   1989	   to	   1995.	   A	   regime	  hardliner,	   Ntimama	   took	   an	   uncompromising	   position	   towards	   anti-­‐KANU	   forces,	  and	   used	   his	   ministerial	   post	   to	   intervene	   in	   local	   politics	   around	   the	   country,	  nowhere	  more	  so	  than	  in	  his	  own	  area	  of	  Narok.	  Ntimama	  figured	  in	  a	  renewed	  call	  for	  majimboism	  –	  discussed	  briefly	  in	  the	  chapter	  -­‐	  which	  emerged	  from	  sections	  in	  KANU,	  partly	  in	  a	  response	  to	  multi-­‐partyism	  and	  the	  perceived	  threat	  this	  posed	  to	  certain	  communities’	   land	  rights.	  The	  following	  section	   looks	  at	  Nakuru	  Municipal	  Council	   and	   considers	   the	   way	   the	   government’s	   approach	   towards	   the	   town	  changed	  when	   it	   came	   under	   opposition	   control.	   All	   of	   the	  main	   political	   parties	  enjoyed	  some	  level	  of	  support	  in	  Nakuru	  town.	  In	  the	  council,	  this	  led	  to	  a	  period	  of	  extreme	  volatility	  where	  mayors	  were	  under	  constant	  attack	  from	  within	  the	  ranks	  of	   councillors.	   The	   third	   section	   compares	   the	   experience	   of	   Nakuru	   -­‐	   the	  ‘opposition	   town’	   -­‐	   with	   that	   of	   a	   ‘swing	   council’	   –	   Kakamega	   –	   and	   a	   KANU	  stronghold,	  Kilifi.	  Western	  Province	  was	  divided	  after	  1992	  between	  KANU	  and	  the	  opposition.	  In	  the	  years	  that	  followed,	  KANU	  attempted	  to	  win	  back,	  through	  force	  and	   co-­‐option,	   opposition	   MPs	   and	   councillors.	   In	   this	   context,	   where	   multiple	  leaders	   jostled	   for	   influence,	   Kakamega’s	   councillors	   found	   themselves	   with	   an	  array	  of	  possible	  patrons	  all	  intent	  on	  winning	  their	  support.	  This	  contrasted	  with	  the	  experience	  in	  Kilifi,	  where	  the	  return	  of	  multi-­‐partyism	  had	  little	  impact	  on	  the	  almost	   entirely	   KANU	   council,	   except	   insofar	   as	   councillors	   expected	   greater	  recognition	  and	  rewards	  from	  the	  state.	  The	  final	  section	  examines	  the	  factors	  that	  led	  the	  government	  to	  design	  and	  adopt	  a	  local	  government	  reform	  programme	  in	  1997.	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The	   1990s	   saw	   international	   financial	   institutions	   strongly	   advocating	   for	   public	  sector	   reforms	   in	   Africa,	   with	   a	   particular	   emphasis	   on	   decentralisation.	   This	  context	  is	  important.	  However,	  to	  understand	  why	  the	  government	  was	  receptive	  to	  this	  message	  –	  which	  appeared	  to	  run	  counter	  to	  the	  logic	  of	  centralised	  politics	  -­‐	  	  it	  is	   necessary	   to	   explore	   the	   profound	   effect	   that	   the	   return	   of	   competitive,	   plural	  politics	   had	   firstly	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	   local	   and	   central	   politicians,	   and	  secondly	  between	  politicians	  and	  their	  publics.	  	  
The	  return	  of	  multi-­‐partyism	  	  ‘All	   in	   all,	   it	   was	   a	   most	   eventful	   year’,	   noted	   the	  Weekly	   Review	   at	   the	   close	   of	  1990.21	  Indeed,	  1990	  proved	  a	  decisive	  moment	   in	  Kenya’s	  political	  history,	  and	  a	  turning	   point	   for	   the	   one-­‐party	   state.	  Whilst	  Moi’s	   control	   over	   state	   institutions	  was	   as	   strong	   as	   ever,	   the	   regime’s	   credibility	   was	   crumbling	   in	   the	   face	   of	   a	  collapsing	   economy.	   The	   government’s	   increasingly	   authoritarian	   approach	   to	  dissent	  in	  the	  final	  years	  of	  the	  1980s	  led	  a	  number	  of	  leading	  politicians	  to	  defect	  from	   KANU.	   The	   introduction	   of	   ‘queue	   voting’	   in	   the	   1988	   general	   election	   had	  served	  as	  a	  catalyst	  for	  the	  opposition	  movement.22	  The	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  from	   1989	   symbolised	   a	   new	   era	   of	   opportunity;	   in	   Kenya	   and	   across	   Africa,	  commentators	  wrote	  of	   ‘new	  winds	  of	  change’	  and	  a	   ‘Second	  Liberation’.23	  Both	  to	  activists	  within	  Kenya	   and	   to	  Kenya's	   foreign	   partners,	  Moi’s	   style	   of	   governance	  was	   becoming	   harder	   to	   justify	   as	   democracy	  movements	   swept	   parts	   of	   Eastern	  Europe	   and	   Africa.	   A	   series	   of	   crises	   in	   1990	   further	   weakened	   the	   regime’s	  credibility	  and	  bolstered	  the	  confidence	  of	  those	  championing	  political	  reform,	  not	  only	   politicians,	   but	   also	   leading	   religious	   figures,	   the	   Law	   Society	   of	   Kenya,	   and	  sections	  of	  the	  media.	  	  	   In	   February	   1990,	   Foreign	  Minister	   Dr	   Robert	   Ouko	  was	   discovered	   dead	  near	  his	  home	  in	  Kisumu.	  Arguably,	  the	  ‘most	  powerful	  and	  securely	  ensconced	  Luo	  Minister’	   at	   the	   time,	  Ouko’s	  murder	   served	  as	   a	   catalyst	  which	  propelled	   reform	  minded	   politicians	   to	   openly	   campaign	   for	   multi-­‐party	   democracy.24	  The	   main	  figures	   in	   the	   initial	  movement	  were	   Kenneth	  Matiba,	   a	   former	   cabinet	  minister,	  and	  Charles	  Rubia,	  who	  had	  become	  rich	  and	  powerful	  during	  his	  tenure	  as	  Mayor	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  'A	  tumultuous	  year',	  Weekly	  Review,	  21	  December	  1990,	  p.	  4.	  22	  Oyugi,	  ‘Ethnicity	  in	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  electoral	  process’,	  p.	  46.	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  Stephen	  Riley,	  'Africa’s	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  of	  change’',	  The	  World	  Today	  48:7	  (1992),	  pp.	  116–19.	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of	   Nairobi	   in	   the	   1960s.	   Their	   campaign	   quickly	   ‘transformed	   the	   long-­‐repressed	  underground	  movement	   for	  multi-­‐party	  democracy	   into	   a	  mass	  movement	  which	  for	  the	  first	  time	  threatened	  the	  government’s	  control’.25	  For	  this,	  they	  soon	  found	  themselves	  detained,	  as	  did	  Raila	  Odinga,	  son	  of	  Oginga	  Odinga.	  Under	  considerable	  pressure	   to	  reform,	  a	  KANU	  review	  committee	  was	  set	  up,	   the	  members	  of	  which	  ‘were	  eventually	  sufficiently	  chastened	  to	  recommend	  a	  number	  of	  limited	  political	  reforms.’26	  Yet	  in	  spite	  of	  these	  serious	  challenges	  to	  the	  regime,	  few	  commentators	  would	  have	  predicted	   that	   just	   two	  years	   later,	  Kenyans	  would	  go	   to	   the	  polls	   for	  the	  first	  multi-­‐party	  national	  elections	  since	  1963.	  	  	   Moi’s	   decision	   in	   December	   1991	   to	   allow	   opposition	   parties	   to	   legally	  register	  was	  a	  response	  both	  to	  domestic	  and	  international	  circumstances.	  The	  final,	  decisive	   turning	   point	   came	   in	   November	   1991	   at	   a	   meeting	   of	   the	   donor	  Consultative	  Group	   for	  Kenya	   in	  Paris.	   Long	   tolerant	  of	  Moi’s	   excesses,	   the	  donor	  group	   –	   in	   the	   new	   post-­‐Cold	   War	   world	   -­‐	   found	   itself	   less	   patient	   with	   the	  government,	   and	   its	   resistance	   to	   implement	   economic	   and	  political	   reforms.	  The	  Group	  told	  the	  Kenyan	  representatives	  that	  future	  aid	  would	  be	  contingent	  on	  the	  enactment	   of	   political	   reforms.	   Given	   that	   in	   the	   1991/92	   fiscal	   year,	   ‘aid	   agency	  resources	  [had]	  comprised	  73.6	  percent	  of	  the	  total	  capital	  budget’,	   it	  was	  not	  too	  surprising	  when,	  a	   couple	  of	  weeks	  after	   the	  meeting,	  Moi	   repealed	  Section	  2A	  of	  the	  constitution,	  allowing	  opposition	  parties	  to	  legally	  form.	  27	  	  	  	   Profiling	  and	  characterising	  the	  different	  opposition	  parties	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  can	  be	  problematic.	  As	  Haugerud	  points	  out:	  ‘opponents	  of	  the	  Moi	  regime…formed	  fragile,	  shifting	  coalitions	  that	  had	  quite	  disparate	   ideological	  and	  historical	  roots.’28	  Mid-­‐way	  through	  1991	  a	  coalition	  of	  veteran	  politicians,	  Kikuyu,	  Luhya,	  and	  Luo,	  came	  together	  to	  form	  the	  Forum	  for	  the	  Restoration	  of	  Democracy	  (FORD).	   Over	   the	   course	   of	   1992	   FORD	   split	   into	   two	   wings,	   which	   eventually	  registered	  as	  different	  parties	  and	  fielded	  separate	  candidates.	  Ford	  Asili	  –	  meaning	  ‘original’	  in	  KiSwahili	  –	  was	  led	  by	  Kenneth	  Matiba	  and	  Martin	  Shikuku	  and	  mainly	  drew	  its	  support	  from	  areas	  in	  southern	  Kikuyuland,	  Nairobi	  and	  parts	  of	  Western	  Province.	   Ford	   Kenya	   was	   run	   by	   Oginga	   Odinga,	   and	   was	   composed	   of	   a	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‘multitribal	  alliance	  of	  the	  younger	  and	  more	  radical	  professionals’.29	  A	  third	  group	  entered	   the	  opposition	  maelstrom,	   the	  Democratic	  Party	   (DP)	   led	  by	   former	  vice-­‐president	   Mwai	   Kibaki,	   whose	   defection	   from	   KANU	   was	   a	   serious	   blow	   to	   the	  regime.	  The	  DP	  found	  its	  support	  amongst	  the	  business	  elite	  that	  had	  thrived	  under	  Kenyatta	  and	  from	  Kibaki’s	  northern	  Kikuyu	  base	  around	  Nyeri.	  	  	   The	  breakdown	   into	   regional	   factions	   critically	   hampered	   the	   opposition’s	  ability	  to	  challenge	  the	  regime.	  At	  the	  start	  of	  1992,	  the	  opposition	  looked	  certain	  to	  prevail.	   But	   divided,	   the	   three	   parties	   proved	   unable	   to	   unseat	   KANU	   and	   Moi.	  Although	   the	   incumbent	   received	   only	   36.4	   percent	   of	   the	   vote	   in	   the	   December	  elections	  of	  1992,	  that	  was	  sufficient	  to	  hold	  off	  his	  main	  challengers	  Matiba,	  Kibaki	  and	  Oginga	  Odinga,	  who	  gained	  24,	  19.5	  and	  17.5	  percent	  of	  the	  vote	  respectively.	  An	   amendment	   had	   been	   passed	   by	   the	   National	   Assembly	   in	   April	   1992	   which	  required	  the	  winning	  presidential	  candidate	  to	  receive	  25	  percent	  of	  the	  vote	  in	  at	  least	   five	   provinces.30	  As	   Julie	   MacArthur	   notes,	   this	   provision	   was	   intended	   to	  ‘slow	   the	   opposition	   movements	   by	   ensuring	   they	   would	   need	   more	   than	   just	   a	  majority	   of	   the	   popular	   vote	   and	   hence	  would	   not	   be	   able	   to	  merely	   rely	   on	   the	  large	   ethnic	   percentages	   of	   Mwai	   Kibaki’s	   Kikuyu	   or	   Oginga	   Odinga’s	   Luo.’31	  It	  worked;	   Moi	   was	   the	   only	   candidate	   to	   get	   over	   25	   percent	   in	   more	   than	   three	  provinces,	  and	  he	  gained	  over	  a	  half	  a	  million	  more	  votes	   than	  Matiba,	  his	  closest	  rival.32	  The	  parliamentary	  results	  showed	  clear	  regional	  patterns:	  KANU	  dominated	  the	   Rift	   Valley,	   North-­‐Eastern	   and	   Coast	   Provinces,	   and	   did	   well	   in	  Western	   and	  Eastern	  Provinces;	   FORD-­‐Kenya	   led	   in	  Nyanza;	   FORD-­‐Asili	   in	  Nairobi	   and	  Central	  Province;	  and	  DP	  was	  strongest	  in	  Central,	  winning	  some	  seats	  in	  Eastern.	  	  	  	   Forced	  by	  circumstances,	  Moi	  remained	  resistant,	  both	  before	  and	  after	  the	  elections,	   to	   meaningfully	   opening	   up	   political	   space.	   Having	   warned	   the	  international	  community	  that	  Kenya	  risked	  descending	  into	  tribal	  violence	  with	  the	  advent	   of	   multi-­‐partyism,	   he	   –	   or	   at	   least	   his	   supporters	   –	   went	   on	   to	   actively	  encourage	  such	  violence.	  Clashes	  in	  the	  Rift	  Valley	  and	  along	  its	  western	  border	  and	  at	   the	   coast	   throughout	   1992	   bespoke	   the	   beginning	   of	   politically	   instrumental,	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  Journal	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  pp.	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‘ethnic’,	  electoral	  violence	  in	  Kenya,	  which	  would	  again	  feature	  at	  the	  polls	  in	  1997	  and	  2007.33	  The	  politics	  of	  land	  and	  belonging	  which	  underlay	  the	  ‘clashes’	  of	  1991-­‐92	  were	  as	  much	  about	  patronage	  and	  the	  control	  of	  state	  resources	  as	  they	  were	  about	   notions	   of	   autochthony	   and	   identity,	   as	   Jacqueline	   Klopp	   has	   clearly	  demonstrated.34	  Klopp	  explores	   the	  case	  of	  North	  Narok	  to	  show	  how	  William	  ole	  Ntimama,	   the	   local	  MP,	   when	   threatened	   by	   the	   rise	   of	   opposition	   parties	   in	   the	  early	   1990s,	   articulated	   inflammatory,	   anti-­‐Kikuyu	   rhetoric	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	  weaken	   the	  appeal	  of	  his	   challengers	  and	   legitimise	   the	  use	  of	   violence.	  A	   former	  chairman	  of	  Narok	  County	  Council	  and	  Minister	   for	  Local	  Government	   from	  1989,	  Ntimama	  as	  a	  figure,	  exemplifies	  how	  national	  figures	  could	  be	  deeply	  embedded	  in	  local	   politics;	   simultaneously	   wielding	   tremendous	   power	   whilst	   being	   ever	  vulnerable	   to	   challenge	   and	   defeat,	   as	   other	   patrons	   with	   access	   to	   different	  resources	  sought	  to	  win	  the	  support	  of	  local	  clients.35	  	  	   Moi’s	  selection	  of	  Ntimama	  to	  replace	  Moses	  Mudavadi	  as	  Minister	  for	  Local	  Government	  after	  his	  death	  in	  1989	  was	  to	  have	  serious	  repercussions	  on	  how	  the	  ministry	  was	  governed	  and	  its	  approach	  to	  councils	  across	  Kenya.	  After	  his	  election	  as	  an	  MP	  in	  1988,	  Ntimama	  quickly	  established	  a	  reputation	  for	  himself;	  the	  Weekly	  
Review	  described	  him	   in	  1990	  as	   ‘a	  well	  known	  hawk,	  both	   in	  matters	  of	  national	  politics	   and	   in	   his	   own	   backyard.’36	  Ntimama	  was	   one	   of	   a	   group	   of	   Kalenjin	   and	  Maasai	  KANU	  hard-­‐liners	  who	  resurrected	  a	  campaign	  for	  majimbo	  as	  a	  response	  to	  multi-­‐partyism.37	  In	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s	  the	  debate	  about	  majimbo	  encompassed	  a	  range	   of	   voices	   with	   slightly	   different	   motivations	   and	   interests.	   The	   1990s	  iteration	  of	   the	  majimbo	  debate	  was	  narrowly	   focused	  on	   land	   rights	   at	   the	   coast	  and	   in	   particular	   in	   the	   Rift	   Valley,	   where	   the	   desire	   to	   defend	   ‘KAMATUSA’	  (Kalenjin,	   Maasai,	   Turkana,	   and	   Samburu)	   interests	   from	   Kikuyu	   ‘outsiders’	  galvanised	  communities.38	  Ntimama’s	  support	  for	  majimbo	  -­‐	  even	  whilst	  serving	  in	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Local	  Government	  -­‐	  was	  public	  knowledge	  and	  was	  widely	  regarded	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  190-­‐198.	  
	  	  
195	  
as	   driven	   by	   an	   exclusionary	   approach	   to	   land.	   Dubbed	   both	   a	   ‘tribalist’	   and	   a	  fighter	   against	   the	   ‘recolonisation	   of	  Maasailand’,	   Ntimama	   sanctioned	   the	   use	   of	  violence	   as	   a	   tool	   to	   ethnically	   cleanse	   Narok	   and	   ensure	   his	   own	   electoral	  success.39	  	  	   Ntimama	  was	  as	  inclined	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  affairs	  of	  local	  authorities	  as	  he	  was	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  Narok.	  After	  the	  1992	  election	  ‘a	  power	  struggle	  between	  the	  local	   councils	   and	   the	   central	   government’	   took	   shape	   targeting	   specifically	   those	  authorities	   that	   had	   come	   under	   opposition	   control.40	  Whilst	   a	   comprehensive	  breakdown	   of	   the	   local	   government	   results	   was	   never	   released,	   the	   pattern	   of	  support	   broadly	   mirrored	   the	   parliamentary	   results.41 	  Most	   notable	   were	   the	  results	  of	   the	  municipal	   councils.	   The	  opposition	   took	   control	   of	  Nairobi,	  Nakuru,	  Kisumu,	  and	  Kitale,	  along	  with	  all	  of	  the	  urban	  authorities	  in	  Central	  Province.42	  In	  opposition,	  these	  councils	  had	  to	  contend	  with	  a	  hostile	  ministry,	  whilst	  also	  having	  to	  defend	   their	  majority	   against	   the	   concerted	   efforts	   of	  KANU	  activists	   to	   retake	  control.	  In	  Nakuru,	  as	  the	  next	  section	  discusses,	  this	  kind	  of	  politicking	  appears	  to	  have	  taken	  up	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  councillors’	  time,	  to	  the	  overall	  detriment	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  municipal	  services.	  	  
‘When	  we	  were	  in	  opposition	  it	  was	  so	  hostile	  in	  Kenya’:	  Nakuru	  
Municipal	  Council	  after	  1992	  	  In	  the	  run	  up	  to	  the	  elections	  of	  1992,	  the	  fragile	  political	  peace	  that	  had	  existed	  in	  Nakuru	  town	  broke	  down.	  As	  the	  previous	  chapter	  described,	  many	  of	  the	  Kikuyu	  councillors	   who	   sat	   on	   the	   municipal	   council	   throughout	   the	   1980s	   enjoyed	   a	  cordial,	   cooperative	   relationship	   with	   the	   president.	   This	   enabled	   the	   council	   to	  continue	   to	  provide	   at	   least	   some	   services	   in	   spite	   of	   	   their	  near	  bankruptcy.	  But	  from	   the	   early	   1990s,	   stories	   began	   to	   emerge	   with	   increasing	   regularity,	   of	  disputes	   between	   councillors,	   officers,	   the	   ministry	   and	   the	   administration.43	  In	  1990,	   competition	   between	   councillors	   over	   the	   committee	   chairmen	   positions	  marked	  a	  breakdown	  in	  the	  council’s	  internal	  relations;	  ethnic	  divisions	  came	  to	  the	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  'A	  cast	  of	  powerful	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  Weekly	  Review,	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  October	  1994,	  pp.	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  Review,	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  Stren,	  Mohamed	  Halfani	  and	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  Malombe,	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  Southall	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  Wood,	  'Local	  government'.	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  Ibid.	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  elections',	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fore,	  which	  in	  time,	  became	  manifest	  in	  the	  opposition	  parties	  that	  gained	  traction	  in	   the	   town.44	  Nakuru	   from	   1991	   became	   a	   major	   battleground	   in	   the	   struggle	  between	   the	   ruling	   party	   and	   multiple	   opposition	   forces.	   The	   Ministry	   of	   Local	  Government,	   under	   Ntimama’s	   command,	   deliberately	   moved	   to	   undermine	   and	  weaken	  the	  power	  of	  opposition	  councillors	  in	  the	  town,	  which	  was	  seen	  from	  the	  centre	   as	   an	   opposition	   stronghold.	  No	   longer	   able	   to	   access	   state	   patronage,	   the	  council	  was	   even	   less	   able	   to	   execute	   its	  mandated	   functions,	   leading	   to	   growing	  discontent	  amongst	  residents.	  	  	   In	   September	  1992,	   the	  Weekly	  Review	   looked	   forward	   to	   the	   forthcoming	  elections	   in	  Nakuru,	  speculating	  on	  the	  impact	  that	  multi-­‐partyism	  would	  have	  on	  the	   way	   politics	   worked	   in	   the	   district.45	  ‘All	   the	   factors	   that	   make	   the	   district	   a	  political	   furnace’	   it	   wrote,	   had	   ‘set	   the	   stage	   for	   an	   intriguing	   set	   of	   battles’.46	  ‘Tribalism,	   radical	   politicians,	   power-­‐brokers,	   and	   king-­‐makers’	   were	   the	   factors	  highlighted	  by	  the	  Review,	  but	  it	  could	  have	  also	  included	  reference	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  four	  of	  the	  major	  political	  parties	  enjoyed	  some	  level	  of	  support	  in	  the	  district.47	  With	   KANU,	   DP,	   Ford-­‐A,	   and	   Ford-­‐K	   all	   competing	   for	   control	   of	   the	   municipal	  council	   and	   the	   district’s	   parliamentary	   seats,	   it	   was	   no	   longer	   the	   case	   that	  individual	   ‘power-­‐brokers	   and	   king-­‐makers’	   could	   determine	   who	   was	   able	   to	  access	   state	   patronage.48	  Most	   of	   the	   sitting	   councillors	   -­‐	   	  whose	   political	   careers	  had	   been	   built	   on	   their	   connections	   within	   KANU	   –	   chose	   not	   to	   stand	   for	   re-­‐election	   in	  1992.	  For	   former	  mayor	  Daniel	  Kanyi,	   the	  decision	  was	  simple:	   ‘It	  was	  clear	   if	   I	   remained	   in	   KANU	   I	  would	   not	  make	   it,	   and	   there	  was	   no	  way	   I	  would	  defect	  to	  DP	  though	  it	  was	  my	  people’s	  party.	  I	  would	  not	  be	  at	  peace	  because	  Moi	  was	  my	  friend,	  while	  DP	  belonged	  to	  my	  people.49	  That	  he	  calculated	  his	  options	  in	  this	   way	   reveals	   how	   firmly	   the	   lines	   were	   drawn	   in	   Nakuru	   between	   different	  ethnic	  communities	  and	  their	  corresponding	  parties.	  	  	   In	   the	   election	   for	   the	  Nakuru	  Town	   constituency,	   Ford-­‐Asili	   candidate	  Dr	  Lwali	  Oyondo	  won	  with	  45	  percent	  of	  the	  vote	  to	  KANU’s	  16	  percent,	  with	  both	  and	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  Review,	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DP	  receiving	  14	  percent	  of	  the	  vote.50	  This	  breakdown	  was	  mirrored	  in	  the	  winners	  of	   the	   nineteen	   elected	   seats	   on	   the	  municipal	   council:	   FORD-­‐A,	   twelve;	   FORD-­‐K,	  two;	  KANU,	  four;	  and	  DP,	  one.51	  This	  balance	  between	  the	  parties	  however	  altered	  soon	  after	   the	  election	  when	  Ntimama	  nominated	  a	   further	   six	  KANU	  councillors,	  including	  the	  immediate	  former	  mayor	  Raphael	  Korir.	  In	  every	  local	  authority,	  the	  minister	  nominated	  additional	  KANU	  councillors	  who	  were	  often	  former	  members,	  or	   those	   who	   had	   lost	   the	   popular	   vote.	   When	   it	   came	   to	   electing	   the	   mayor	   or	  chairman,	   these	   additional	   KANU	   members	   in	   many	   councils	   swung	   the	   balance	  back	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   government.	   In	   Nakuru,	   the	   Ford-­‐Asili	   candidate	   beat	   the	  KANU	  opponent	  by	  one	  vote.52	  The	  new	  mayor	  of	  Nakuru	   town	  was	  ex-­‐councillor	  Kimunya	   Kamana	   who	   had	   been	   jailed	   in	   1987	   for	   allegedly	   being	   a	   member	   of	  ‘Mwakenya’.	  Kamana’s	  ascent	  to	  power	  signalled	  to	  the	  establishment	  –	  both	  within	  KANU	   and	   the	   Democratic	   Party	  which	   included	  many	   former	   GEMA	  members	   –	  that	  Nakuru	  Municipal	  Council	  was	  firmly	  against	  the	  governing	  regime.	  	  	  	   It	  did	  not	  take	  long	  before	  the	  council	  was	  embroiled	  in	  a	  confrontation	  with	  the	   administration	   and	   KANU.	   In	  May	   1993,	   six	   hundred	   kiosks	   at	   the	  municipal	  market	  were	  demolished,	  leading	  to	  violent	  protests	  in	  the	  town.	  Who	  was	  behind	  the	   demolition	   order	   became	   a	   subject	   of	   intense	   speculation,	   accusation	   and	  counter-­‐accusation.53	  The	   council	   claimed	   that	   KANU	   youth-­‐wingers	   had	   carried	  out	  the	  move	  at	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  provincial	  administration.54	  The	  KANU	  district	  chairman	   insisted	   that	   the	  bulldozing	  was	   the	  work	  of	   the	  municipal	   council,	   and	  had	   been	   ordered	   by	   Mayor	   Kamana.	   The	   incident	   became	   a	   subject	   of	   national	  controversy,	  seen	  by	  the	  opposition	  as	  symptomatic	  of	  the	  government’s	  nefarious	  approach	  since	   the	  election	   towards	   the	  opposition,	  and	  opposition	  held	  councils.	  Mwai	  Kibaki	   toured	   the	  demolition	   site,	   and	  Kenneth	  Matiba,	   leader	   of	   Ford-­‐Asili	  accused	  the	  government	  of	  trying	  to	  ‘dissolve	  the	  council’.55	  When	  councillors	  tried	  to	   arrange	   an	   informal	   meeting	   to	   discuss	   the	   demolitions,	   the	   clerk	   refused	   to	  sanction	  it.56	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  Weekly	  Review,	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   The	   mysterious	   kiosks	   demolition	   came	   just	   over	   a	   month	   after	   reports	  emerged	  of	  a	  controversial	  circular	  sent	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Local	  Government	  to	  all	  local	   authorities.	   The	  Weekly	   Review	   claimed	   that	   the	   circular	   ‘clarified’	   that	   the	  position	   of	   council	   chairman	   or	  mayor	  was	   ‘merely	   ceremonial’,	   stating	   that	   ‘[i]n	  some	  local	  authorities,	  mayors	  and	  council	  chairman	  have	  appointed	  themselves	  to	  executive	  offices	  which	  do	  not	  exist.’57	  Chairmen	  were	  instructed	  that	  they	  were	  not	  permitted	  to	  act	  or	  comment	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  council	  ‘without	  the	  express	  written	  authority’	  of	   their	  clerks,	  who	  were	  of	  course,	  appointed	  by	  central	  government.58	  Furthermore	  the	  circular	  detailed	  cuts	  to	  the	  ‘perks	  enjoyed	  by	  civic	  heads’,	  which	  included	  limiting	  their	  access	  to	  official	  transport,	  telephones	  and	  offices.59	  News	  of	  the	  circular,	   the	  Weekly	  Review	   reported,	   ‘outraged	  most	  councillors	   in	  opposition	  parties,	  who	  [saw]	  it	  as	  essentially	  designed	  to	  pull	  the	  rug	  from	  under	  the	  feet	  of	  opposition-­‐run	   local	   authorities.’ 60 	  Ford	   Asili	   organising	   secretary	   described	  Ntimama’s	   actions	   as	   a	   ‘clear	   manifestation	   of	   the	   KANU	   government’s	  undemocratic	   creed’,	  whilst	   Ford-­‐K	   secretary	   general	   suggested	   that	   the	  minister	  ‘was	  taking	  away	  through	  the	  back	  door	  what	  the	  recent	  general	  elections	  gave	  to	  the	  people’s	  representatives’.61	  Public	  outrage	  over	  the	  circular	  led	  the	  minister	  to	  give	  a	  live	  television	  address	  to	  ‘dispel	  rumours’.62	  In	  spite	  of	  this,	  the	  Daily	  Nation	  concluded	   that	   ‘the	  minister	   is	   trying	   to	   use	   chicanery	   to	   achieve	  what	   his	   party	  failed	  to	  achieve	  through	  the	  ballot	  box.’63	  	   The	   council’s	   view	   of	   the	   government	   did	   not	   improve	   in	   the	   year	   that	  followed.	   By	   June	   1994,	   the	   council	   was	   owed	   KSH	   119	   million	   by	   its	   debtors,	  including	   several	   government	   departments.64	  Mayor	   Kamana	   publicly	   suggested	  that	   the	   council’s	   operations,	   and	   its	   efforts	   to	   collect	   revenue	   were	   being	  ‘frustrated’	  by	  the	  government	  because	  he	  was	  an	  opposition	  mayor.65	  But	  Kamana	  was	  not	  to	  remain	  for	  much	  longer	  in	  the	  mayor’s	  parlour.66	  In	  August	  1994,	  he	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  'Stirring	  up	  a	  hornet’s	  nest',	  Weekly	  Review,	  2	  April	  1993,	  pp.	  8-­‐9.	  58	  Ibid.	  59	  ‘Cut	  ‘em	  down	  to	  size’,	  Weekly	  Review,	  26	  March	  1993,	  p.	  12.	  	  60	  Ibid.	  61	  'Opposition	  up	  in	  arms	  against	  local	  govt	  minister',	  Daily	  Nation,	  24	  March	  1993,	  p.	  22.	  62	  'Ntimama’s	  circular	  is	  an	  example	  of	  doublespeak',	  Daily	  Nation,	  26	  March	  1993,	  p.	  6.	  63	  	  Ibid.	  	  64	  ‘Nakuru	  owed	  Sh119m’,	  Daily	  Nation,	  9	  June	  1994,	  p.	  4.	  	  65	  Ibid.	  	  66	  	  Ibid.	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replaced	  by	  a	  KANU	  councillor,	  Michael	  Rotich.67	  	  Rotich	  got	  the	  support	  of	  KANU’s	  four	   elected	   and	   six	   nominated	   councillors,	   along	   with	   two	   members	   of	   the	  opposition.	   Closely	   linked	   to	   the	   Kalenjin	   kingmakers	   of	   the	   district,	   Rotich	  encountered	  serious	  opposition	  during	  his	  tenure	  as	  mayor.	  A	  group	  of	  councillors	  calling	  themselves	  the	   ‘Club	  18’	   ‘relentlessly	  battled	  to	  eject	  him	  from	  the	  mayor’s	  parlour’,	   and	   on	   one	   occasion	   were	   forcefully	   removed	   from	   the	   council	   by	   the	  police.68	  Curiously,	   the	   leader	   of	   the	   ‘club’	   was	   fellow	   KANU	   councillor,	   Alicen	  Chelaite.69	  Chelaite	  succeeded	  as	  mayor	  of	  Nakuru	  after	  the	  elections	  of	  July	  1996;	  she	  too,	  was	  quickly	  subject	  to	  a	  ‘brutal	  and	  cruel…political	  assault’.70	  	   Born	   in	   Baringo	   in	   1945,	   Chelaite	   worked	   as	   a	   typist	   then	   secretary	   in	   a	  series	   of	   government	   offices	   throughout	   the	   1960s	   and	   1970s.	   In	   1979	   she	   was	  nominated	   to	   Nakuru	  Municipal	   Council	   to	   represent	  women’s	   interests.71	  As	   the	  provincial	  chair	  of	  ‘maendeleo	  ya	  wanawake’,	  a	  women’s	  development	  organisation,	  Chelaite	  was	  known	   to	   the	  district	  KANU	  branch.	  But	  Chelaite’s	   relationship	  with	  the	   ruling	   party	   was	   not	   without	   conflict.	   She	   resigned	   from	   maendeleo	   ya	  
wanawake	   when	   the	   organisation	   became	   officially	   affiliated	   with	   KANU	   in	   the	  1980s.72	  She	   remained	   in	  KANU	  after	  1992,	   but	   found	  herself	   often	   in	  battle	  with	  nominated	  councillors,	  especially	  after	  she	  won	  the	  mayoral	  seat	  and	  defeated	  her	  rival	  Michael	  Rotich:	  It	  was	  between	  me	  and	  another	  man…	  we	  were	  all	   from	  one	  party	  KANU,	  but	   the	   councillors	   from	   the	   opposition	   party	   they	   backed	   me,	   and	   the	  other	   one	   remained	  with	  KANU	  members	   and	   they	  were	   in	   the	  minority.	  And	  they	  were	  always	  consulting	  president	  and	  saying,	  “we	  cannot	  be	  ruled	  by	   a	   woman.	   President	   please	   help	   us,	   please	   give	   us	   money	   to	   buy	   the	  councillors	  from	  opposition,	  not	  to	  vote	  for	  this	  woman…”	  Moi	  gave	  money,	  but	   because	   of	   grace	   of	   God,	   I	   defeated	   him.	   I	   emerged	   the	   winner	   with	  many	  votes.73	  	  After	   just	   a	  month	   in	  office	  however,	  Chelaite	   also	   found	  herself	   subject	   to	  attack	  from	  within	  KANU.	  A	  meeting	  was	  held	  at	  a	  Nakuru	  hotel	  owned	  by	  former	  mayor	  Raphael	  Korir	  (1988-­‐92)	  at	  which	  Chelaite	  was	  removed	  from	  her	  position	  as	  KANU	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  'Mayor	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  foul	  play',	  Daily	  Nation,	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  August	  1994,	  p.	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  postponed:	  Ntimama	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  mayoral	  elections	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  Weekly	  
Review,	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  1996,	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  'Her	  worship	  the	  Mayor',	  Weekly	  Review,	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  July	  1996,	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  'Besieged',	  Weekly	  Review,	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  September	  1996,	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  5-­‐6.	  71	  Alicen	  Chelaite,	  interview,	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  April	  2013,	  Rongai	  (Nakuru).	  72	  Alicen	  Chelaite,	  interview,	  22	  April	  2013,	  Rongai	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  Ibid.	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district	  women’s	  leader,	  having	  earlier	  been	  ousted	  as	  Rift	  Valley	  representative	  of	  
maendeleo	   ya	   wanawake	   at	   the	   intervention	   of	   KANU.	   According	   to	   the	   Weekly	  
Review,	   opposition	   to	   the	   new	   mayor	   came	   from	   the	   province’s	   ‘Kalenjin	  kingmakers’	  who	  objected	   to	  her	   ‘anti-­‐corruption’	   crusade	  within	   the	   council;	   the	  fact	  that	  she	  had	  ‘climbed	  the	  political	  ladder	  without	  seeking	  the	  patronage	  of	  the	  power	  barons’	  in	  the	  province;	  and	  her	  ‘bipartisan	  appeal	  in	  Nakuru’.74	  She	  held	  the	  post	  until	  the	  general	  elections	  of	  1997	  when	  she	  ran	  for	  the	  parliamentary	  seat	  of	  Nakuru	  Town,	  losing	  to	  David	  Manyara	  Njuki,	  DP.	  	  	   The	   rapid	   turnover	   of	   mayors	   in	   Nakuru	   after	   1992	   bespoke	   a	   general	  anxiety	   amongst	   councillors	   that	   mayors	   were	   ‘eating’	   and	   ‘eating	   alone’.75	  Many	  new	   councillors	   entered	   local	   government	   to	   discover	   the	   resources	   of	   the	   local	  state	  much	  depleted.	  Ironically,	  the	  belief	  that	  their	  KANU	  predecessors	  had	  already	  plundered	   the	  council	  may	  have	   led	   to	  an	  escalation	   in	  corruption.	  Particularly	   in	  urban	  areas,	  the	  1990s	  saw	  a	  rise	  in	  irregular	  dealings	  in	  public	  land,	  as	  one	  of	  the	  few	   remaining	   resources	   available	   to	   distribute. 76 	  In	   the	   struggle	   to	   access	  patronage,	   the	   new	   demands	   and	   discipline	   of	   party	   politics	   were	   quickly	  abandoned.	  Even	  the	  most	  organised	  party,	  KANU,	   failed	  to	  avoid	  descending	   into	  internecine	  battles	  at	  district	  level.	  The	  unstable	  and	  ephemeral	  nature	  of	  political	  parties	   since	   1992	   has	   continued	   to	   reflect	   the	   overarching	   logic	   of	   Kenya’s	   neo-­‐patrimonial	  system.77	  In	   local	  authorities,	   the	  role	  of	   the	  town	  clerk	  as	  gatekeeper	  to	   the	   spoils	   system	   was	   strengthened	   from	   1992.	   This	   was	   discovered	   by	  councillor	  Silas	  Wachira	  on	  joining	  the	  municipal	  council:	  	  	  especially	   the	   areas	   that	  were	   being	   dominated	   by	   opposition,	   there	  was	  some	   fear,	   because	   you	   could	   not	   be	   able	   to	   interact	   well	   with	   the	  government,	  so	  the	  DC,	  the	  PC,	  the	  president,	  all	  these	  people	  belonged	  to	  ruling	  party.	  And	  because	  by	   then,	  when	  we	  were	   in	  opposition	   it	  was	  so	  hostile	  in	  Kenya,	  nobody	  wanted	  to	  hear,	  especially	  the	  ruling	  government,	  they	  didn’t	  want	  to	  hear	  people	  who	  were	  in	  the	  opposition.	  So	  it	  became	  so	  hard	  for	  you	  to	  even	  get	  an	  access	  of	  even	  anything	  else	  over	  and	  above	  your	  salary	  because	  the	  town	  clerk,	  basically	  was	  from	  the	  ruling	  party	  so	  there’s	  no	  way	  he	  could	  deal	  with	  you,	  and	  he	  knows	  dealing	  with	  you	  will	  mean,	  mean	  the	  government	  to	  sack	  him	  or	  transfer	  him	  from	  that	  place.	  So	  it	  was	  a	  bit	  difficult,	  so	  somehow	  maybe	  the	  only	  thing	  people	  could	  do	  by	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  'Besieged'.	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  Silas	  Wachira,	  interview,	  12	  April	  2013,	  Nakuru	  Town.	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  Roger	  Southall,	  'The	  Ndungu	  report:	  Land	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  graft	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  ROAPE,	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  (2005),	  pp.	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  Cheeseman,	  Gabrielle	  Lynch	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  ‘Democracy	  and	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that	  time	  …	  maybe	  land,	  a	  few	  plots	  here	  and	  there,	  somebody	  sometimes	  you	  ask	  for	  a	  plot	  you	  are	  given	  one,	  then	  instead	  of	  using	  that	  one	  plot	  to	  build,	  you	  sell,	  and	  maybe	  you	  can	  get	  one	  every	  year	  or	  two	  years.	  So	  those	  are	  the	  things	  that	  are	  normally	  helping	  us	  to	  survive	  or	  to	  go	  through.78	  	  	   As	  Chapter	  Five	  described,	  under	   the	  Local	  Government	   (Amendment)	  Act	  	  of	  1984,	  the	  minister	  alone	  was	  empowered	  to	  appoint	  and	  dismiss	  senior	  officers	  in	   all	   local	   authorities.	   No	   longer	   subject	   to	   sanction	   by	   councillors,	   clerks	   and	  treasurers	   enjoyed	   a	   level	   of	   impunity,	   which	   only	   increased	   after	   1992	   when	  senior	   officers	   became	   even	  more	   important	   as	   the	  ministry’s	   ‘eyes	   and	   ears’.	   In	  Nakuru,	   councillors	   believed	   the	   town	   clerk	   to	   be	   responsible	   for	   corruption	   and	  incompetence	   amongst	   the	   senior	   staff,	   leading	   -­‐	   they	   argued	   -­‐	   to	   the	   council’s	  financial	   woes.79	  Relations	   hit	   an	   all	   time	   low	  when	   the	   ‘Group	   of	   18’	  mentioned	  earlier	   -­‐	   which	   included	   some	   KANU	  members	   -­‐	   tried	   to	   sue	   the	   town	   clerk	   and	  deputy	   treasurer.	   In	   January	   1997,	   the	   clerk	   was	   finally	   transferred,	   yet	   for	  residents	   of	   the	   town,	   years	   of	   infighting	   had	   had	   serious	   consequences	   on	   the	  quality	  of	  urban	  services,	  as	  the	  Daily	  Nation	  reported:	  	  Lack	  of	  water,	  frequent	  power	  failure,	  poor	  roads	  …	  and	  rising	  insecurity	  in	  the	   town	  will	   undoubtedly	   remain	  major	   impediments	   to	   investment	   and	  other	   economic	   activities…Would	   be	   investors	   in	   Nakuru	   town	   have	  blamed	   the	   situation	   on	   laxity,	   corruption	   and	   infighting	   between	   the	  councillors	  and	  the	  former	  clerk.	  The	  outgoing	  clerk,	  as	  the	  chief	  executive	  of	   the	   council,	   had	   no	   time	   for	   the	   councillors.	   The	   town	   clerk	   who	  was	  expected	  to	  guide	  the	  councillors	  in	  committee	  meetings,	  spent	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  his	  time	  trying	  to	  save	  his	  skin	  from	  the	  wrath	  of	  the	  councillors.	  On	  their	  part,	  the	  councillors	  spend	  most	  of	  their	  time	  fighting	  the	  town	  clerk.	  As	  the	  war	   intensified	   at	   the	   Town	   Hall,	   the	   morale	   of	   workers	   continued	   to	  decline	  as	  corruption	  and	  indiscipline	  took	  root.80	  The	  sense	  of	  Nakuru	  as	  a	  town	  in	  decline	  came	  across	  clearly	  in	  this	  and	  other	  press	  reporting.	  In	  reality	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  municipal	  council	  extended	  far	  beyond	  the	  actions	   of	   the	   town	   clerk.	   Throughout	   the	   1980s,	   the	   council	   had	   managed	   to	  negotiate	  its	  chronic	  fiscal	  crisis	  thanks	  to	  the	  patronage	  of	  the	  president.	  Yet	  after	  1992,	  it	  became	  increasingly	  apparent	  that	  years	  of	  financial	  mismanagement	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  investment	  had	  left	  the	  town’s	  infrastructure	  in	  a	  state	  of	  dereliction.	  An	  on-­‐going	  water	  supply	  crisis	  was	  one	  of	  the	  more	  serious	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  council’s	  incapacity	   was	   manifested.	   A	   range	   of	   narratives	   were	   called	   on	   to	   explain	   the	  town’s	  water	   shortage,	  with	   the	   relative	   significance	   of	   corruption,	   incompetence	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  Silas	  Wachira,	  interview,	  19	  March	  2013,	  Nakuru	  Town.	  	  79	  	  'Council	  riddled	  with	  graft	  -­‐	  leaders',	  Daily	  Nation,	  10	  October	  1995,	  p.	  16.	  80	  	  Francis	  Mureithi,	  'Daunting	  task	  for	  new	  clerk',	  Daily	  Nation,	  28	  January	  1997,	  p.	  7.	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and	   central	   government	   obstruction	   emphasised	   differently	   by	   councillors,	  residents	   and	   government	   officials.	   A	   statement	   from	   a	   group	   of	   FORD	   Asili	  councillors	   in	   1995	   attributed	   the	   problems	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   two	   of	   the	   council’s	  boreholes	  were	  situated	  on	  plots	  that	  had	  been	  allocated	  to	  the	  daughter	  of	  a	  senior	  minister	   and	   a	   former	   mayor. 81 	  They	   claimed	   that	   the	   plot	   owners	   had	  disconnected	  the	  water,	  although	  they	  offered	  no	  explanation	  why.82	  The	  council’s	  minutes,	   which	  were	   prepared	   by	   officials,	   recorded	   that	   all	   of	   the	   town’s	   water	  sources	   –	   mainly	   boreholes	   -­‐	   were	   underperforming	   and	   in	   need	   of	   repair	   and	  maintenance.83	  But	  financing	  such	  works	  was	  not	  easy.	  In	  August	  1993,	  the	  council	  had	  budgeted	  that	  its	  water	  fund	  would	  end	  the	  next	  financial	  year	  with	  a	  surplus	  of	  K£17,833,	   estimating	   annual	   revenue	   and	   expenditure	   to	   meet	   K£2,575,410	   and	  K£2,557,577	   respectively. 84 	  However,	   less	   than	   a	   year	   later,	   Mayor	   Kamana	  announced	  that	  government	  departments	  still	  owed	  the	  council	  KSH	  50	  million	   in	  unpaid	  water	  bills,	   roughly	   equivalent	   to	  K£2,500,000.85	  Kamana	  even	   threatened	  to	   disconnect	   the	   provincial	   hospital’s	   water	   supply	   to	   force	   the	   government	   to	  settle	  its	  debts.86	  	  	   The	  town’s	  unresolved	  water	  shortage	  might	  have	  been	  one	  of	  the	  factors	  in	  the	  electorate’s	  mind	  at	  the	  local	  elections	  of	  December	  1997.	  The	  Democratic	  Party	  won	  thirteen	  seats,	  KANU	  won	  four,	  and	  the	  National	  Development	  Party	  and	  Ford	  Asili	  each	  gained	  one	  councillor.87	  With	   just	   two	  exceptions,	   the	  municipal	  council	  was	  made	   up	   of	   entirely	   new	  members.	   This	   resounding	   rejection	   of	   the	   former	  councillors	   however,	   did	   not	   lead	   to	   an	   improvement	   in	   the	   council’s	   internal	  relations	   nor	   its	   service	   provision.	   The	   second	   term	   of	   multi-­‐partyism	   was	   also	  marked	  by	  wrangling	  between	  mayors,	  accusations	  of	  corruption	  directed	  against	  the	  town	  clerk	  and	  serious	  water	  shortages.	  The	  infighting	  seen	  in	  KANU	  in	  92-­‐97	  was	   then	   repeated	   within	   the	   Democratic	   Party.	   The	   perception	   that	   there	   was	  nothing	   left	   for	   the	   councillors	  who	  came	   in	   in	   the	  1990s	   continued.	  Yet	   this	  was	  not	   the	   view	   taken	   by	   the	   press	   and	   many	   Nakuru	   residents,	   who	   watched	  dismayed,	  as	  ‘corruption,	  nepotism	  and	  incessant	  feuds’	  reached	  a	  crescendo	  in	  late	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  'Council	  riddled	  with	  graft	  -­‐	  leaders',	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  16.	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  Ibid.,	  p.	  16.	  83	  Special	  meeting	  minutes,	  NMC,	  18	  March	  1993,	  Nakuru	  County	  Government	  Archive.	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  Budget	  meeting	  minutes,	  NMC,	  5	  August	  1993,	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  Government	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  ‘Shortage	  of	  water	  worsens’,	  Daily	  Nation,	  24	  May	  1994,	  p.	  17.	  	  86	  ‘Nakuru	  owed	  Sh119m’,	  Daily	  Nation,	  9	  June	  1994,	  p.	  4.	  	  87	  ‘DP	  selects	  councillors’,	  Daily	  Nation,	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  February	  1998,	  p.	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2000.88	  The	  Daily	  Nation	   alleged	   that	   ‘nearly	   all	   vacant	   public	   land	  was	   allocated	  [mid	   2000]	   to	   various	   private	   developers	   with	   the	   blessing	   of	   the	   councillors.’89	  Furthermore,	   ‘the	   councillors	   drew	   the	   wrath	   of	   residents	   when	   they	   allocated	  themselves	   sixty-­‐four	   stalls	   at	   the	   main	   matatu	   terminus’. 90 	  In	   2000,	   the	  municipality’s	   water	   supply	   was	   privatised	   through	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   Nakuru	  Quality	  Water	   and	   Sanitation	   Services	   (NAQWASS),	  whose	   shareholders	   included	  sitting	  councillors	  and	  senior	  officers.	  NAQWASS	  –	  a	  trial	  project	  supported	  by	  GTZ,	  the	   German	   government’s	   development	   organisation	   -­‐	   did	   not	   last	   for	   long:	  councillors	  were	   forced	   to	   relinquish	   their	   shares	  after	   the	   supply	  was	   sabotaged	  and	   diverted.91	  After	   five	   months	   the	   president	   ordered	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Water	  Resources	   to	   take	   over	   the	   supply	   after	   visiting	   Nakuru	   and	   being	   petitioned	   by	  residents.92	  For	   councillor	  Gitu	  Kuria	   the	   failure	  of	   the	  water	   company	  was	   easily	  explained:	   ‘Politics.	  You	  see	  we	  were	   in	   the	  opposition,	  Nakuru	  Municipal	  Council	  by	  that	  time,	  it	  was	  opposition.	  The	  government	  does	  not	  want	  to	  hear,	  its	  opposing	  government,	  which	   had	   gone	   along	  with	   the	   project…they	   are	   not	   seeing	   donors,	  the	  donors	  are	  helping	  the	  Kenyans,	  the	  society,	  our	  people,	  they	  don’t	  see	  it,	  they	  see	   it	   politically’.93	  Blaming	   the	   government	   for	   all	   of	   the	   council’s	   woes	   was	   an	  obvious	  way	  to	  absolve	  councillors	  of	  any	  responsibility.	  But	  by	  comparing	  Nakuru	  with	   Kilifi	   and	   Kakamega,	   it	   is	   apparent	   that	   whilst	   the	   central	   government	   was	  without	  doubt	  partisan	  in	  its	  treatment	  of	  local	  authorities,	  even	  KANU	  councillors	  struggled	  to	  access	  the	  resources	  they	  expected	  to	  receive	  for	  remaining	  loyal	  to	  the	  party.	  	  
‘Moi	  became	  very	  handy	  after	  1992’:	  KANU	  in	  Kakamega	  and	  Kilifi	  	  The	   level	   of	   contestation	   witnessed	   in	   Nakuru	   was	   not	   matched	   in	   many	   places	  other	  than	  Nairobi.	   Indeed	  in	  some	  regions	  of	  Kenya,	   the	  transition	  to	  multi-­‐party	  politics	   proceeded	   far	   less	   dramatically.	   At	   the	   coast,	   it	   was	   only	   in	   Mombasa	  Municipal	   Council	   that	   opposition	   parties	   gained	   some	   traction.	   Elsewhere	   in	   the	  province,	  KANU	  continued	  to	  dominate	  local	  government.	  In	  Kilifi,	  the	  twenty-­‐seven	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  16	  November	  2000,	  p.	  8	  	  89	  Ibid.	  90	  Ibid.	  	  91	  Samuel	  Owour	  and	  Dick	  Foeken,	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  Reforms	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  Gitu	  Kuria,	  interview,	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  March	  2013,	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councillors	   elected	   in	   1992,	  were	   a	   combination	   of	   new	  members	   and	   old-­‐hands	  including	  one	  councillor	  who	  had	  been	  a	  member	  of	   the	  council,	  on	  and	  off,	   since	  1961.94	  Only	   two	   councillors	   were	   not	   members	   of	   KANU	   and	   both	   represented	  wards	   in	   Rabai.	   With	   the	   eight	   nominated	   KANU	   councillors,	   the	   opposition	  councillors	   were	   completely	   overcome.	   The	   new	   chairman,	   Ramos	   Mwachiru,	  ended	  the	  first	  meeting	  of	  the	  council	  in	  March	  1993	  by	  encouraging	  members	  to	  be	  leaders	   in	   the	   location	   and	   sub-­‐location	   meetings	   of	   the	   District	   Development	  Committees. 95 But,	   the	   chairman	   conceded	   ‘chiefs	   are	   not	   willing	   to	   invite	  Councillors	  in	  some	  meetings	  because	  they	  regard	  councillors	  as	  mere	  politicians.’96	  One	  ward	  where	  this	  was	  not	  a	  problem	  was	  Sokoke.	  The	  new	  councillor,	  Charles	  Pasi,	   was	   the	   retired	   local	   chief	   who	   had	   served	   since	   1971. 97 	  On	   reaching	  retirement	   age,	   Pasi	   had	   run	   for	   the	   council	   and	   supported	   the	   incumbent	  councillor	  Benson	  Tsoka	   in	  his	  bid	  to	  become	  the	  chief.	  Despite	  a	   long	  career	  as	  a	  civil	   servant,	   Pasi	   had	   become	   interested	   in	   politics	   at	   a	   young	   age,	   serving	   as	  Ronald	  Ngala’s	  driver	  in	  the	  1960s.	  	  	  	   That	   it	  was	  possible	   to	  move	  between	  the	  positions	  of	  chief	  and	  councillor	  suggested	   that	   the	   authority	   symbolised	   by	   ‘government’	   -­‐	   in	   all	   its	   forms	   -­‐	  continued	  to	  appeal	  to	  many	  aspiring	  individuals	  at	  the	  coast.	  In	  the	  run	  up	  to	  the	  elections,	  Moi	  had	  attempted	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  ruling	  party’s	  commitment	  to	  the	  region	   by	   establishing	   the	   Coast	   Development	   Authority	   (CDA).	   The	   Coast	  Development	   Authority	   created	   a	   special	   economic	   zone	   at	   the	   coast,	   and	   was	  responsible	   for	   coordinating	   all	   development	   projects	   in	   the	   province.98	  As	   a	  gesture,	  the	  CDA	  was	  intended	  to	  shore	  up	  support	  for	  the	  ruling	  party	  in	  a	  region	  that	   scored	   poorly	   on	   many	   development	   indicators.	   An	   even	   more	   self-­‐serving	  gesture	  was	  the	  creation	  in	  1990	  of	  Kilifi	  Town	  Council,	  carved	  out	  of	  the	  existing	  local	   authority.	  As	  Chapter	  Four	  discussed,	   the	   creation	  of	  new	  districts	   and	   local	  authorities	  and	  the	  	  upgrading	  of	  existing	  councils	  was	  a	  hallmark	  of	  Moi’s	  methods	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s,	  and	  was	  –	  in	  the	  economic	  context	  of	  the	  time	  -­‐	  one	   of	   the	   few	   routes	   available	   to	   the	   regime	   in	   its	   efforts	   to	   court	   grassroots	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  of	  26	  June	  1992	  with	  25	  February	  1993,	  KCC,	  Kilifi	  County	  Government	  Archive.	  	  95	  ‘Kilifi	  special	  council	  minutes’,	  9	  March	  1993,	  Kilifi	  County	  Council	  Archive.	  	  96	  Ibid.	  	  	  97	  Charles	  Pasi,	  interview,	  23	  January	  2013,	  Kilifi	  Town.	  98	  Coast	  Development	  Authority	  Act,	  1990.	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support.99	  This	  process	  created	  jobs	  which	  were	  an	  important	  form	  of	  patronage.100	  Then	   again,	   given	   that	   communities	   were	   often	   expected	   to	   pay	   for	   the	   new	  administrative	   buildings	   through	   harambee,	   the	   overall	   benefits	   of	   bringing	  government	   ‘closer	   to	   the	   people’	   were	   often	   quite	   limited.101	  Nonetheless	   the	  strategy	   still	   appealed,	   and	   was	   replicated	   at	   lower	   levels.	   Kenga	   Chai,	   Kilifi	  councillor	  from	  1988	  to	  1997,	  counted	  the	  subdivision	  of	  his	  location	  in	  Kauma	  as	  one	   of	   the	   great	   achievements	   of	   his	   tenure.102	  But	   the	   creation	   of	   Kilifi	   Town	  Council	  removed	  valuable	  resources	  from	  the	  control	  of	  the	  county	  council,	  notably	  revenue	   and	   urban	   land.	   For	   councillors	   such	   as	   Kenga	   Chai,	   this	   made	   it	   even	  harder	   to	   sustain	   clientelist	   networks.	   Coming	   from	   a	   more	   humble	   background	  than	   Charles	   Pasi,	   Chai’s	   pre-­‐council	   career	   consisted	   of	   working	   as	   a	   houseboy,	  shopkeeper	  and	  vegetable	  seller.	  He	  came	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  local	  kaya	  elders	  after	   having	   set	   up	   a	   nursery	   school	   on	   his	   own.	   They	   supported	   him	   in	   his	  campaign	  to	  become	  to	  become	  a	  councillor	   in	  1988.	  But	   in	  1997	  he	  did	  not	  have	  the	  resources	  or	  inclination	  to	   ‘buy	  the	  voters’	  during	  the	  KANU	  nominations,	  and	  so	  did	  not	  contest	  the	  election.103	  	  	   As	   the	   coast	   was	   a	   safe	   KANU	   zone,	   the	   regime	   did	   not	   need	   to	   channel	  resources	  to	  win	  seats.	  By	  contrast,	  in	  ‘swing’	  constituencies,	  such	  as	  Kakamega,	  the	  government	  actively	  sought	  to	  buy	  back	  support	  for	  the	  ruling	  party	  after	  1993.	  The	  amendment	  that	  required	  the	  winner	  of	  the	  presidential	  race	  to	  win	  25	  percent	  of	  the	   vote	   in	   five	   provinces	   had	   greatly	   enhanced	   the	   significance	   of	   Western	  Province	   within	   the	   national	   poll.	   Three	   months	   before	   the	   election,	   the	  Weekly	  
Review	   noted	   that	   as	   Moi,	   Odinga	   and	   Kibaki	   could	   each	   rely	   on	   their	   ‘home	  provinces’	  of	   the	  Rift	  Valley,	  Nyanza	  and	  Central,	  Western	  Province	  was	   ‘expected	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  provinces	  that	  [would]	  tip	  the	  scale’.104	  Luhya	  ‘unity’	  however	  did	  not	  prevail	  at	   the	  election.	  Moi	  did	  win	   the	  presidential	  vote	  with	  40.9	  percent	   to	  Matiba’s	   36.3	   percent	   and	   Odinga’s	   17.9	   percent,	   but	   the	   province’s	   twenty	  parliamentary	   seats	  were	   split	  between	  KANU,	  which	  won	   ten	  constituencies	  and	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  Mai	  Hassan,	  ‘A	  state	  of	  change:	  district	  creation	  in	  Kenya	  after	  the	  beginning	  of	  multi-­‐party	  politics’,	  paper	  presented	  at	  Kenya	  at	  Fifty	  Conference,	  John	  Hopkins	  University,	  26-­‐27	  September	  2013.	  	  100	  Anne	  Bigsten	  and	  Karl	  ove	  Moene,	  ‘Growth	  and	  rent	  dissipation:	  the	  case	  of	  Kenya’,	  
Journal	  of	  African	  Economies,	  5:2	  (1997),	  pp.	  177-­‐198,	  p.185-­‐187.	  	  101	  Hornsby,	  Kenya:	  A	  History	  Since	  Independence,	  p.	  586.	  	  102	  Kenga	  Chai,	  interview,	  19	  January	  2013,	  Kilifi	  Town,	  held	  in	  KiSwahili.	  	  103	  Ibid.	  	  104	  ‘A	  changing	  political	  scenario’,	  Weekly	  Review,	  30	  October	  1992,	  p.	  12-­‐13.	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FORD	   Asili	   and	   Ford	   K,	   who	   took	   seven	   and	   three	   seats	   respectively. 105 	  In	  Kakamega	  district,	  Ford	  Asili	  won	  five	  out	  of	  the	  seven	  constituencies,	  with	  KANU	  taking	  the	  other	  two.	  Two	  years	  later	  however,	  only	  one	  opposition	  MP	  remained	  in	  Kakamega.	   Four	   high-­‐profile	   defections	   had	   seen	   Apili	   Wawire	   (Lugari),	   Javan	  Ommani	  (Lurambi),	  Japeth	  Shamalla	  (Shinyalu)	  and	  Magwaka	  Ashiono	  (Ikolomani)	  cross	   the	   floor	   -­‐	   presumably	   having	   been	   bought	   off	   -­‐	   then	   returned	   to	   office	   as	  KANU	  members	  after	  by-­‐elections.	  A	  similar	  process	  occurred	  in	  Kakamega	  County	  Council,	  as	  Councillor	  Lawrence	  Itolondo	  recalls:	  	  So	  when	  multi-­‐partyism	  came	   in	  1992,	  FORD	  Asili	   swept	   the	  council	  also,	  the	   elected,	   we	   were	   only	   those	   old	   KANU	   people,	   we	   only	   went	   back	   -­‐	  three	  of	  us.	  The	  rest	  were	  opposition…	  I	  was	  in	  KANU.	  But	  we	  campaigned	  here,	   it	   was	   hot…So	   I	   didn't	   want	   to	   go	   for	   the	   chairmanship	   because	   I	  knew	  as	  KANU	  I	  would	  not	  win	  as	  KANU.	  But	  it	  didn't	  take	  long.	  After	  two	  years	   we,	   KANU,	   were	   able	   to	   recapture	   that	   seat…	   We	   were	   able	   to	  manipulate	   the	   FORD	   Asili	   people.	   Moi	   was	   a	   very	   shrewd	   politician.	   He	  meant	  what	  he	  was	  saying.	  He	  was	  the	  president,	  so	  he	  wanted	  to	  marshal	  the	  support	  of	  his	  party	  as	   the	  president.	   	  And	  that's	  how	  he	  managed.	   In	  1992	   he	   would	   not	   have	   won.	   Like	   in	   Kakamega,	   it	   was	   …MPs	   were	   all	  FORD	  Asili.	  It	  was	  only	  Dr	  Wameyo	  that	  was	  in	  KANU.	  And	  Angatia…	  So	  Moi	  become	  very	  handy	  after	  1992.106	  The	   president	   ‘marshalled	   support’	   for	   KANU	   by	   distributing	   hand-­‐outs	   to	   his	  supporters.107 	  Councillor	   Peter	   Kombo	   was	   one	   beneficiary	   of	   the	   president’s	  patronage.	  First	  elected	  in	  1988,	  Kombo	  lost	  his	  seat	  in	  1992.	  He	  regained	  it	  in	  1997	  after	  Moi	  gave	  him	  KSH	  50,000	  –	  roughly	  $800	  at	  the	  time	  –	  which	  made	  him	  ‘very	  strong’	  in	  his	  campaign.108	  Explaining	  why	  he	  was	  given	  the	  funds,	  Kombo	  said:	  ‘He	  knew	  that	  if	  you	  are	  a	  KANU	  man	  and	  you	  are	  a	  campaigning,	  you	  will	  campaign	  for	  him,	  so	  you	  should	  be	  given	  something.’109	  	  	   However,	   not	   all	   could	   be	   won	   back	   to	   the	   ruling	   party.	   Councillor	   John	  Mugalla,	   a	   close	   school	   friend	  of	   rising	  KANU	  star	   Joshua	  Angatia,	   broke	  with	   the	  party	   after	   the	   death	   of	   his	   nephew	   during	   the	   ethnic	   clashes	   along	   the	   border	  between	  Kakamega	  and	  Nandi	  in	  1991-­‐92.110	  Having	  served	  since	  1988	  as	  a	  KANU	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  Throup	  and	  Hornsby,	  Multi-­‐Party	  Politics,	  pp.	  625-­‐627.	  	  106	  Lawrence	  Itolondo,	  interview,	  26	  August	  2013,	  Sigalagala	  (Kakamega).	  107	  Musambayi	  Katumanga,	  ‘By	  ballot,	  pesa	  or	  rungus:	  the	  dialectics	  of	  the	  1997	  electoral	  politics	  in	  Western	  Province	  and	  Trans	  Nzoia	  District	  of	  Kenya’,	  in	  Marcel	  Rutten,	  Alamin	  Mazrui	  and	  Francois	  Grignon	  (eds.),	  Out	  for	  the	  Count:	  The	  1997	  General	  Elections	  and	  
Prospects	  for	  Democracy	  in	  Kenya	  (Kampala,	  2001),	  pp.	  513-­‐	  534,	  p.	  523.	  	  108	  Peter	  Kombo,	  interview,	  25	  August	  2013,	  Ilesi	  (Kakamega).	  109	  Ibid.	  	  	  110	  John	  Mugalla,	  interview,	  26	  August	  2013,	  Kakamega	  County,	  (KiSwahili).	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sub-­‐branch	   chairman,	   his	   defection	   to	   FORD-­‐Asili	   was	   not	   taken	   lightly	   by	   the	  district	  branch.	  Mugalla	  was	  summoned	  by	  a	  district	  officer	  and	  taken	  to	  Kakamega	  town	  to	  meet	  with	  the	  DC	  and	  Angatia,	  who	  tried	  to	  persuade	  him	  to	  return	  to	  the	  party,	  offering	   land	  and	  money	   for	  his	   supporters.	  Mugalla	   refused,	  believing	   that	  the	  money	  and	  land	  would	  never	  materialise.	  The	  need	  for	  a	  cautious	  approach	  to	  the	   president’s	   promises	   was	   confirmed	   by	   councillor	   Edward	   Indai,	   who	  explained:	  	  	  	  when	  multiparty	  was	   coming…	   the	   president	  would	   say	   “I	   am	   coming	   to	  Kakamega,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  see	  all	  the	  councillors	  there.”	  So	  when	  he	  comes	  to	  Kakamega,	   “how	  many	  councillors	  are	  here?…	  Are	  you	   the	  chairman?	   I	  am	  authorizing	  you	   to	  give	  every	  councillor	  one	  plot.”	  And	  you	  know	  you	  would	  be	  given	  those	  plots	  and	  you	  see	  the	  allotment	  is	  difficult.	  He	  is	  just	  trying	  to	  play	  you…Thereafter	  you	  regret.111	  	  	   The	  promise	  of	  plots	  was	  not	  only	  made	  in	  ‘swing’	  constituencies	  or	  before	  elections.	  In	  1994	  whilst	  staying	  at	  State	  House	  Mombasa,	  Moi	  directed	  that	  Kilifi’s	  councillors	  should	  all	  be	  allocated	  plots..112	  In	  May	  1997,	  with	  the	  general	  and	  local	  elections	  in	  sight,	  Kilifi’s	  clerk	  was	  pressed	  by	  a	  number	  of	  councillors	  to	  fulfil	  the	  overdue	  promise.	  It	  was	  suggested	  to	  the	  clerk	  that	  ‘the	  plot	  allocated	  to	  the	  council	  for	  a	  hotel	  site	  appeared	  excessive	  for	  that	  purpose,	  the	  same	  should	  be	  re-­‐planned	  so	   that	   the	   extra	   portion	   be	   allocated	   to	   the	   sitting	   councillors.’113	  The	   clerk	  commented	  that	  it	  would	  be:	  	  prudent	  to	  dispose-­‐of	  part	  of	  the	  plot	  to	  realise	  funds	  to	  enable	  the	  council	  to	   settle	   its	   financial	   obligations	   and	   to	   facilitate	   the	   development	   of	   the	  remaining	  plot	  as	  intended.	  He	  advised	  that,	  whilst	  it	  would	  be	  improper	  to	  stand	  in	  the	  way	  of	  the	  process	  of	  implementing	  the	  aforementioned	  award,	  it	  would	  be	   in	  the	  greater	  public	   interest	   to	  spare	  a	  reasonable	  portion	  of	  the	   plot	   for	   the	   benefit	   of	   the	   Council	   to	   facilitate	   the	   revitalisation	   of	   its	  administration	  and	  to	  enhance	  its	  capacity	  to	  render	  efficient	  services.114	  	  The	  clerk’s	  advice	  was	  rebuffed;	  of	  the	  fifty	  acres	  in	  question,	  the	  members	  resolved	  to	  keep	  six	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  council,	  allocating	  the	  remainder	  to	  themselves	  and	  others.	  Also	  present	  at	  the	  meeting	  was	  the	  council’s	  Senior	  Administrative	  Officer,	  Stephen	  Vinya,	  who	  remembered	  that:	  	  the	   councillors	   by	   that	   time	   could	   not	   know	   the	   value	   of	   land.	   So,	   the	  grabbing	  was	  not	  there.	  	  But	  it	  came	  a	  time	  when	  the	  president	  said	  when	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  Edward	  Indai,	  interview,	  31	  August	  2013,	  Webuye	  (Kakamega).	  	  	  112	  Special	  meeting	  minutes,	  KCC,	  27	  May	  1997,	  Kilifi	  County	  Government	  Archive.	  	  113	  Ibid.	  	  114	  Ibid.	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he	   came	   here,	   that	   he	   could	   not	   want	   to	   see	   poor	   councillors,	   so	   every	  councillor	  should	  work	  hard,	  to	  make	  sure,	  that	  he	  has	  something,	  together	  with	  something	  to	  give	  to	  his	  electorate.	  So	  everybody	  of	  course	  had	  to	  look	  for	  his	  ways	  and	  means	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  he	  had	  something.	  But	  when	  they	  were	  doing	  that,	  of	  course	  they	  had	  to	  interact	  with	  what	  was	  happening	  in	  other	   local	   authorities.	   And	   they	   happened	   to	   learn	   that	   people	   were	  getting	  plots,	  sell	  them,	  get	  money!	  And	  of	  course,	  by	  that	  time	  everybody	  now,	  Kilifi	  County	  Council	  having	  all	  the	  beaches,	  beach	  plots	  they	  started	  of	   course	   getting	   plots,	   in	   the	   proper	   way.	   Because	   grabbing	   could	   be	  something	  else.	  But	   they	  had	   to	  apply,	   and	   they	  had	  chances	  of	   course	   to	  see	  the	  president	  all	  the	  time,	  so	  they	  had	  to	  look	  for	  plots,	  plan	  for	  them,	  get	  those	  papers…	  then	  they	  take	  them	  to	  the	  president.115	  	   Vinya’s	   claim	   that	   councillors	   acquired	   plots	   ‘in	   the	   proper	   way’	   was	   not	  supported	   by	   the	   findings	   of	   the	   Report	   of	   the	   Commission	   of	   Inquiry	   into	   the	  
Illegal/Irregular	   Allocation	   of	   Public	   Land	   published	   in	   2004.116	  	   Known	   as	   the	  Ndung’u	   report,	   the	   commission	   provided	   extensive	   details	   on	   the	   patterns	   and	  mechanics	  of	  ‘land	  grabbing’	  under	  presidents	  Kenyatta	  and	  Moi.	  And	  importantly,	  it	   showed	   ‘the	   extent	   to	   which	   illegal	   or	   irregular	   transactions	   in	   public	   land	   in	  Kenya	   [were]…made	   possible	   through	   administrative	   and	   professional	  corruption.’117	  Thus	   the	   complicity	   of	   council	   clerks	   and	   administrative	   officers,	  such	  as	  Stephen	  Vinya,	  was	  vital.	  The	  scale	  of	  ‘land-­‐grabbing’	  in	  local	  authorities	  by	  elected	   members	   and	   officials	   was	   highlighted	   in	   the	   report.118	  	   Councils	   were	  responsible	  for	  trust	  land	  which	  was	  held	  ‘on	  behalf	  of	  the	  	  local	  inhabitants’.119	  The	  report	  found	  that:	  	  The	  illegal	  allocation	  of	  Trust	  land	  and	  other	  lands	  reserved	  for	  the	  use	  of	  communities	  is	  a	  sad	  testimony	  to	  the	  dismal	  failure	  of	  local	  authorities	  in	  terms	   of	   governance.	   Instead	   of	   playing	   their	   role	   as	   custodians	   of	   local	  resources	   including	   land,	   county	   and	   municipal	   councils	   have	   posed	   the	  greatest	   danger	   to	   these	   resources.	   Records	   reveal	   that	   most	   illegal	  allocations	   of	   lands	   within	   their	   jurisdictions	   were	   sanctioned	   by	   the	  councils.	  In	  fact,	  the	  most	  pronounced	  land	  grabbers	  in	  these	  areas	  where	  the	  councillors	  themselves…	  The	  corruption	  within	  central	  government	  has	  been	   replicated	   at	   the	   local	   level	   through	   the	   activities	   of	   county	   and	  municipal	   councils.	   The	   human	   conflicts	   within	   local	   communities	   over	  resources	  are	  a	  reflection	  of	  this	  failure	  of	  local	  government.120	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  Stephen	  Vinya,	  interview,	  1	  February	  2013,	  Kilifi	  town.	  	  116	  Republic	  of	  Kenya,	  Report	  of	  the	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  into	  the	  Illegal/Irregular	  
Allocation	  of	  Public	  Land	  (Nairobi,	  2004).	  117	  Ambreena	  Manji,	  ‘The	  grabbed	  state:	  Lawyers,	  politics	  and	  public	  land	  in	  Kenya’,	  JOMAS,	  50:	  3	  (2012),	  pp.	  467-­‐	  492,	  p.	  469.	  	  118	  Republic	  of	  Kenya,	  Report	  of	  the	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  into	  the	  Illegal/Irregular	  
Allocation	  of	  Public	  Land	  (Nairobi,	  2004).	  119	  Ibid.,	  p.	  32.	  120	  Ibid.,	  p.	  147.	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   Mid-­‐way	  through	  the	  decade,	  the	  ‘failure	  of	  local	  government’	  was	  a	  fact	  few	  would	   dispute.121	  What	   was	   surprising	   however,	   was	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   reform	  programme	   designed	   to	   rectify	   some	   of	   the	   endemic	   problems	   affecting	   local	  authorities.	   This	  was	   surprising	   because	   it	   seemed	   to	   run	   counter	   to	   the	   logic	   of	  politics.	   Moi	   had	   been	   able	   to	   stay	   in	   power	   in	   1992	   by	   ensuring	   that	   those	   in	  opposition	   –	   particularly	   at	   the	   local	   level	   –	   remained	   excluded	   from	   state	  patronage.	  KANU’s	  majority	  in	  local	  authorities	  increased	  in	  the	  years	  that	  followed,	  as	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  access	  to	  the	  spoils	  system	  depended	  on	  party	  affiliation.	  For	  this	  to	  work,	  it	  was	  necessary	  that	  local	  authorities	  remained	  weak	  financially,	  and	  that	   they	   continued	   to	   lack	   any	   form	   of	   autonomy	   from	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Local	  Government.	  Furthermore,	  the	  weak	  auditing	  capacity	  of	  councils	  was	  useful	  in	  that	  it	  allowed	  corruption	  and	  land-­‐grabbing	  to	  proceed	  without	  being	  brought	  formally	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  central	  government	  officials.	  The	  reforms	  introduced	  in	  the	  final	  years	  of	  Moi’s	  presidency	  were	  ostensibly	  intended	  to	  address	  these	  issues.	  Yet	  as	  the	  next	  section	  discusses,	  there	  was	  also	  a	  political	  logic	  to	  the	  policies	  developed,	  which	  reflected	  Kenya’s	  strained	  relations	  with	  its	   international	  creditors,	  and	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  central	  and	  local	  political	  patrons.	  	  
The	  road	  to	  reform	  	  Presenting	   the	   1997/98	   budget,	  Minister	   for	   Finance,	  Musalia	  Mudavadi	   –	   son	   of	  Moses	   –	   announced	   plans	   for	   the	   ‘Kenya	   Local	   Government	   Reform	   Programme’	  (KLGRP).122	  After	   decades	   of	   government	   inaction,	   this	   programme	   –	   whilst	   not	  fundamentally	  transformative	  –	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  a	  decisive	  turning	  point	  for	  local	  government,	  both	  for	  councils	  as	  service	  providers,	  and	  for	  councillors	  as	  providers	  of	  patronage.	  This	  section	  examines	  the	  road	  to	  reform,	  asking	  what	  factors	  led	  the	  government	  to	  finally	  focus	  on	  the	  longstanding	  problems	  affecting	  local	  authorities.	  Whilst	   no	   single	   explanation	   can	   account	   for	   this	   development,	   it	   is	   argued	   here	  that	   donor	   pressure	   for	   ‘decentralisation’	   came	   at	   an	   opportune	   moment	   in	   the	  1990s,	   when	   it	   offered	   the	   government	   a	   policy	   instrument	   with	   which	   it	   could	  negotiate	   a	   range	   of	   different	   political	   and	   fiscal	   problems	   that	   had	   become	  particularly	  acute	   in	  the	  multi-­‐party	  era.	  The	  first	  of	  these	  was	  urban	  governance;	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  ‘Poor	  services	  blamed	  by	  councils	  on	  corruption’,	  Daily	  Nation,	  16	  May	  1997,	  p.	  20;	  ‘Civic	  bodies	  must	  be	  made	  efficient’,	  Daily	  Nation,	  18	  October	  1997,	  p.	  6.	  	  122	  Republic	  of	  Kenya,	  Official	  Report,	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  Seventh	  Parliament,	  Seventh	  Session,	  19	  June	  1997,	  pp.	  994-­‐1019,	  p.	  1018.	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Kenya’s	  opposition-­‐controlled	  municipal	  councils	  were	  used	  after	  1992	  to	  critique	  the	  government	  by	  highlighting	  the	  appalling	  state	  of	  urban	  services.	  The	  situation	  in	   the	   country’s	   major	   towns	   was	   regularly	   decried	   in	   the	   national	   press.123	  Although	   Kenya’s	   newspapers	   had	   for	   decades	   admonished	   local	   authorities	   for	  their	  ineptitude	  and	  corruption,	  the	  tenor	  of	  these	  accusations	  increased	  after	  1992	  when	  a	  more	  liberal	  media	  environment	  allowed	  for	  regular	  features	  that	  revealed	  the	   scale	   of	   corruption	   and	   land-­‐grabbing	   across	   the	   regime.	   Against	   these	  criticisms	   of	   local	   government,	   there	   arose	   a	   counter-­‐defence	   of	   councillors	   from	  political	   elites.	   As	   this	   chapter	   has	   demonstrated,	   competitive	   party	   politics	  dramatically	   destabilised	   district	   politics	   throughout	   the	   country,	   which	   in	   turn	  made	   members	   of	   parliament	   more	   dependent	   on	   local	   political	   actors.	   As	   the	  balance	   of	   power	   shifted	   ever	   so	   slightly	   in	   the	   favour	   of	   	   these	   ‘leaders	   of	   the	  grassroots’	  the	  need	  to	  provide	  more	  resources	  for	  councillors	  became	  apparent	  to	  MPs.	  Yet	  in	  the	  resource-­‐scarce	  context	  of	  the	  1990s,	  only	  donors	  were	  in	  a	  position	  to	  provide	  additional	  funding	  to	  the	  country’s	  growing	  number	  of	  local	  authorities.	  World	   Bank	   	   assistance	   was	   forthcoming;	   ‘decentralisation’	   was	   again	   in	   vogue	  amongst	   international	   development	   practitioners	   and	   international	   financial	  institutions.	   The	   coincidence	   of	   all	   these	   factors	   led	   to	   the	   beginning	   of	   a	   reform	  process	   that	   key	   stakeholders,	   in	   particular	   the	   Association	   of	   Local	   Government	  Authorities	   of	   Kenya	   (ALGAK),	   had	   been	   desperately	   seeking	   for	   over	   twenty	  years.124	  	  	  	   Speaking	  at	  a	  workshop	  on	  local	  government	  in	  March	  1996,	  former	  mayor	  of	  Nakuru	  Raphael	  Korir	  proclaimed	  that	  ‘[l]ocal	  authorities	  will	  go	  down	  in	  history	  as	   havens	   of	   corruption,	   nepotism,	   tribalism	   and	   ceaseless	  wrangles’.125	  Since	   the	  early	  1990s,	  Kenya’s	  urban	  residents	  and	  their	  political	  leaders	  had	  been	  staunchly	  calling	   for	   an	   overhaul	   of	   urban	   service	   delivery.	   This	   campaign	   began	   in	   1993	  when	  a	  convention	  was	  held	  –	  drawing	  over	  a	  thousand	  participants	  –	  on	  the	  theme	  ‘the	   Nairobi	   We	   Want’.126	  This	   mass	   meeting	   on	   ‘the	   problems	   of	   public	   service	  management’,	  was	   later	   replicated	   in	  Kisumu.	  As	  Stren	  et	  al	  note,	   ‘[b]y	   the	  end	  of	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  For	  example	  see:	  ‘New	  study	  focuses	  on	  Kenya’s	  urban	  rot’,	  Daily	  Nation,	  13	  March	  1995,	  p.	  27-­‐28.	  ‘Urban	  shame	  rooted	  in	  archaic	  framework’,	  Business	  Week,	  28	  October	  1997,	  p.	  2.	  	  124	  Minutes	  ALGAK	  AGM	  1969-­‐1980,	  JA/17/2,	  JA/17/3,	  JA/17/4,	  JA/1/5,	  JA/13,	  KNA,	  Nairobi.	  	  125	  'Outdated	  laws	  killing	  civic	  bodies	  -­‐	  KANU	  man',	  Daily	  Nation,	  19	  March	  1996,	  p.	  23.	  126	  ‘Creating	  the	  Nairobi	  we	  want’,	  Weekly	  Review,	  30	  July	  1993,	  pp.	  7-­‐9.	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1993,	  Kenya’s	  urban	  elites	  had	  begun	  to	  mobilise	  themselves	  to	  reverse	  the	  decay	  in	  urban	  life’.127	  At	  the	  election	  a	  year	  earlier,	  opposition	  candidates	  had	  dominated	  municipal	   authorities.	   Although	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   in	   some	   of	   these	   councils	  shifted	  back	  in	  KANU’s	  favour	  over	  the	  following	  years,	  the	  fact	  that	  Kenya’s	  towns	  were	   being	   used	   as	   platforms	   to	   criticise	   the	   government	   has	   to	   be	   considered	  when	   understanding	   why	   a	   programme	   of	   local	   government	   reform	   was	   finally	  designed	  and	  implemented	  in	  Moi’s	  last	  term	  in	  office.	  	   Ostensibly	  in	  response	  to	  the	  criticisms	  emanating	  from	  the	  country’s	  urban	  centres,	   Moi	   appointed	   a	   commission	   of	   inquiry	   into	   local	   government	   mid	   way	  through	   1995.	   The	   commission’s	   seven	   terms	   of	   reference	   ranged	   from	   the	  extremely	   vague	   instruction	   ‘to	   enquire	   generally	   or	   in	   particular	   into	   any	   other	  matter	  (related)’,	  to	  the	  specific	  direction	  to	  consider	  dividing	  Nairobi	  City	  Council	  into	   boroughs.128	  Included	   in	   the	   seven	  was	   the	   instruction	   to	   look	   at	   the	   ‘future	  structure,	   powers,	   legal	   frame-­‐work,	   functions,	   financing	   and	   staffing	   of	   local	  authorities’;	  in	  essence,	  the	  whole	  local	  government	  system.129	  Yet	  this	  was	  not	  how	  the	   commission’s	   mandate	   was	   presented	   in	   the	   press.	   Indeed	   rather	   than	   a	  complete	   examination	  of	   the	  problems	  affecting	   local	   authorities,	   the	   commission	  was	   widely	   seen	   as	   established	   to	   recommend	   upgrading	   the	   four	   main	  municipalities	  (Mombasa,	  Kisumu,	  Nakuru	  and	  Eldoret),	  to	  city	  status.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	   Daily	   Nation	   reported	   in	   July	   1995	   that	   Attorney	   General	   Amos	   Wako	   had	  ‘officially	   launched	   the	   Commission	   of	   Inquiry	   on	   the	   elevation	   of	   	   four	  municipalities’.130	  Seen	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   regime’s	   intermittent	   stand-­‐offs	   with	  these	  municipal	  councils,	  the	  commission	  appears	  as	  a	  half-­‐hearted	  gesture	  aimed	  at	  appeasing	  opposition	  councillors	  with	  the	  prize	  of	  city	  status.	  	  	   Just	   under	   thirty	   years	   after	   the	   Hardacre	   Commission	   had	   toured	   the	  country,	   the	   exercise	   was	   repeated.	   The	   ‘Omamo	   Commission’	   led	   by	   Odongo	  Omamo	   was	   expected	   to	   report	   its	   findings	   and	   recommendations	   in	   December	  1995.	   Yet	   as	   1996	   drew	   on,	   to	   the	   dismay	   of	   local	   and	   central	   government	  stakeholders,	   the	  report	  remained	  undisclosed.	  Speaking	   in	  parliament	   in	  October	  1996,	   leader	   of	   the	   Democratic	   Party,	   Mwai	   Kibaki,	   lambasted	   KANU’s	   habit	   of	  burying	   government	   reports,	   sardonically	   asking	   what	   had	   also	   happened	   to	   the	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‘sensitive’	  report	  on	  ‘devil	  worship’,	  which	  he	  concluded	  must	  still	  be	  being	  read	  by	  the	   ‘holy	   spirits’. 131 	  Although	   the	   full	   report	   was	   never	   made	   public,	   a	   brief	  summary	   isolating	   a	   series	   of	   issues	  was	   released.	   The	   fifteen	   points	   highlighted	  resembled	   the	   commission’s	   terms	   of	   reference	   in	   their	   vagueness	   and	  specificity. 132 	  A	   short	   paragraph	   recommended	   a	   reversal	   in	   the	   transfer	   of	  functions,	   whilst	   a	   much	   longer	   section	   outlined	   a	   proposal	   to	   establish	   a	  ‘presidential	   competitive	   award	   and	   initiative’	   to	   encourage	   councils	   to	   focus	   on	  keeping	   their	   areas	   clean. 133 	  Readers	   expecting	   to	   find	   useful	   insights	   and	  recommendations	   may	   have	   been	   prepared	   for	   their	   disappointment	   at	   the	  preamble	  which	  praised	  the	   ‘positive	  political	  culture	  of	  multi-­‐party	  democracy	  at	  the	   grassroots’.134	  Regarding	   the	   issue	   of	  municipal	   upgrades,	   the	   report	   noted	   a	  broad	  desire	  amongst	  Kenyans	  for	  improved	  services,	  concluding	  that	  ‘to	  meet	  the	  people’s	   expectations,	   the	   four	   municipalities	   should	   perform	   better’	   by	   getting	  ‘greater	  support	  and	  commitment	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  central	  government’.135	  	  	   The	   weak	   substance	   of	   the	   summary	   report	   suggested	   either	   that	   the	  government’s	   interest	   in	   local	   authorities	   remained	   superficial,	   or	   that	   the	  commissioners	  had	  simply	  not	  undertaken	  the	  task	  thoroughly	  enough.	  Either	  way,	  even	  though	  the	  Omamo	  Commission	  did	  not	  produce	  a	  valuable,	  public	  document,	  its	   establishment	  did	  have	   the	  effect	  of	  bringing	   the	  problems	  of	   local	   authorities	  into	  sharper	   focus,	  particularly	   for	  members	  of	  parliament.	  A	   few	  weeks	  after	   the	  commission	   began	   its	   work,	   a	   KANU	   MP	   tabled	   a	   motion	   to	   have	   councillors’	  allowances	   paid	   from	   the	   central	   government’s	   consolidated	   fund.	   Debate	   on	   the	  proposal	  revealed	  a	  profound	  shift	  in	  the	  way	  that	  MPs	  viewed	  local	  councillors.136	  Whereas	   before	   1992,	   many	   MPs	   had	   either	   been	   dismissive	   of	   councillors	   or	  fearful	   of	   their	   ambitions,	   after	   1992,	  MPs	  were	   forced	   to	   realise	   that	   councillors	  played	   an	   important	   role	   as	   brokers	   between	   vote-­‐seeking	   parliamentarians	   and	  the	   electorate.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   competitive,	   multi-­‐party	   politics,	   the	   reciprocal	  relationship	  between	  patron	  and	  client	  swung	  further	  in	  the	  favour	  of	  clients,	  who	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found	  themselves	  –	  more	  so	  than	  ever	  before	  -­‐	  in	  a	  position	  to	  choose	  their	  patron.	  The	  mover	  of	  the	  motion,	  Rotino	  began	  thus:	  	  All	  of	  us,	  as	  Members	  of	  Parliament,	  depend	  very	  much	  on	  these	  civil	  leaders	  because	  they	  are	  the	  people	  who	  are	  at	  the	  grassroots.	  They	  are	  the	  people	  who	  liaise	  with	  the	  electorate.	  They	  are	  the	  people	  who,	  when	  we	  go	  down	  to	  our	  constituencies,	  give	  us	  the	  insight	  on	  what	  is	  going	  on	  with	  the	  local	  communities…Every	   weekend,	   we	   have	   Harambees	   and	   other	   functions	  within	  the	  community	  and	  they	  are	  our	  contacts	  as	  Members	  of	  Parliament.	  They	  are	  the	  people	  who	  we	  depend	  on.137	  	  Opposition	   MP	   Obochwa	   seconded	   the	   motion	   he	   argued	   that	   ‘we	   need	   to	  strengthen	   our	   local	   authorities	   and	   in	   so	   doing,	   the	   councillors	   need	   to	   be	   paid	  handsomely	   so	   that	   they	   can	  attend	   to	   their	  duties.’138	  Speaking	   in	   support	   of	   the	  motion	  an	  assistant	  minister	  in	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  President,	  MP	  Sunkuli,	  made	  clear	  that	   those	   ‘duties’	   included	   contributing	   to	  harambees.	  He	  went	   on	   to	   stress	   that	  ‘councillors	  require	  this	  money’;	  a	  message	  he	  believed	  should	  not	  be	  lost	  because	  of	   ‘people	   who	   will	   quote	   Lancaster	   House	   conference	   and	   the	   colonial	   days’.139	  Sunkuli’s	  forceful	  insistence	  that	  leadership	  and	  nation-­‐building	  in	  Kenya	  required	  different	   things	   from	   those	   imagined	   before	   and	   at	   independence	   challenged	   the	  received	  wisdom	  of	   the	   ‘local	  government	  model’	   that	  continued	  to	   inform	  official	  thinking.	  Over	  the	  next	   fifteen	  years,	   the	   issue	  of	  councillors’	  remuneration	  would	  resurface	  again	  and	  again,	  representing	  a	  more	  fundamental	  questioning	  about	  the	  fiscal	   relationship	   between	   centre	   and	   local	   authorities,	   which	   will	   be	   discussed	  further	   in	   the	   final	   chapter.	   The	   debate	   ended	  with	   the	  motion	   delayed	   until	   the	  Omamo	  Commission	  reported.	  	  	   By	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  the	  ‘problems’	  of	  local	  government	  were	  many	  and	  varied.	  Together	   these	   domestic	   conditions,	   Paul	   Smoke	   argues,	   ‘provided	   opportunities	  for	   reform’.140	  The	   realisation	   that	   the	   central	   government	   had	   been	   forced	   to	  burden	   the	   debt	   of	   local	   authorities,	   ‘which	   had	   for	   years	   failed	   to	   repay	  international	   donor	   loans’	   likely	   only	   strengthened	   the	   argument	   in	   favour	   of	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reform.141	  	  This	  argument	  was	  being	  made	  by	  the	  international	  community	  in	  many	  African	   countries	   in	   the	   era	   of	   structural	   adjustment.142	  The	   focus	   of	   Kenya’s	  creditors	  shifted	  in	  the	  1990s	  from	  an	  emphasis	  on	  economic	  liberalisation	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  political	  pluralism	  towards	  greater	  attention	  on	  public	  sector	  reforms	  and	   decentralisation.	   ‘Decentralisation’,	   was	   seen	   ‘as	   one	   of	   the	   major	   tools	   to	  improve	   public	   service	   delivery’.143	  The	   first	   signs	   of	   renewed	   donor	   interest	   in	  decentralisation	   in	   Kenya	   came	   in	   the	   late	   1980s	   with	   the	   ‘Small	   Towns	  Development	  Project’,	  a	  capacity-­‐building	  scheme	  focused	  on	  twenty	  town	  councils,	  which	   was	   supported	   by	   the	   German	   Organization	   for	   Technical	   Cooperation	  (GTZ). 144 	  The	   success	   of	   this	   led	   to	   the	   Kenya	   Local	   Government	   Reform	  Programme;	   designed	   and	   implemented	   initially	   in	   collaboration	   with	   the	  World	  Bank.	  A	  technical	  secretariat	  was	  established	   in	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Local	  Government	  in	   1995;	   an	   advisor	   to	   the	   programme	  described	   it	   as	   a	   ‘comprehensive	   effort	   to	  rationalise	   central-­‐local	   fiscal	   relations,	   improve	   local	   government	   financial	  management	  and	  revenue	  mobilisation,	  and	  enhance	  participation	   in	   local	   service	  delivery.’145	  Although	   technically	   based	   in	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Local	   Government,	   the	  involvement	   of	   the	   minister	   appeared	   minimal.	   Indeed,	   Francis	   Lotodo,	   who	  replaced	  ole	  Ntimama	  in	   January	  1997	  was	  reported	  as	  saying	  three	  months	   later	  that	   ‘[s]omebody	   somewhere	  must	   give	  me	   a	   solution’	   to	   the	   problems	   affecting	  local	   authorities,	   suggesting	   that	   he	   was	   oblivious	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   team	   of	  consultants	  at	  the	  Harvard	  Institute	  for	  International	  Development	  were,	  that	  year,	  busily	  preparing	  reports	  to	  inform	  the	  long-­‐awaited	  reform	  process.	  146	  	  	   In	  June	  1997,	  Mudavadi	  ended	  his	  budget	  speech	  by	  outlining	  a	  number	  of	  new	   measures	   designed	   to	   improve	   the	   revenue	   sharing	   arrangements	   between	  central	   and	   local	   governments.	   These	   were	   not	   initially	   introduced	   under	   the	  banner	   of	   the	   KLGRP,	   nor	   was	   the	   World	   Bank’s	   involvement	   in	   designing	   the	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reforms	   mentioned.	   Nevertheless	   the	   plans	   detailed	   by	   Mudavadi	   were	   the	  beginnings	  of	  the	  KLGRP,	  which	  until	  2004	  was	  funded	  by	  the	  World	  Bank,	  followed	  by	   the	   UK’s	   Department	   for	   International	   Development	   (2004-­‐2006)	   and	   the	  European	  Union	  (2006-­‐2010).	  The	  first	  item	  outlined	  by	  the	  minister	  was	  the	  Road	  Maintenance	  Levy,	  which	  was	   to	  be	  raised	  by	  28	  percent.	  Local	  authorities	  would	  receive	   20	  percent	   of	   the	   funds	   collected,	   and	   this	  would	   rise	   to	   50	  percent	   over	  time.	  In	  addition,	  the	  government	  committed	  to	  providing	  K£8.5	  million	  that	  year	  to	  local	   authorities	   as	   a	   contribution	   in	   lieu	   of	   rates.	   Mudavadi	   also	   announced	   his	  intention	  to	  amend	  the	  Trade	  Licensing	  Act	  so	  as	  to	  phase	  out	  central	  government’s	  role	  in	  local	  licencing,	  to	  allow	  for	  a	  move	  towards	  a	  Single	  Business	  Permit,	  under	  the	  responsibility	  of	  local	  authorities.	  Arguably	  the	  most	  important	  item	  elucidated	  by	   the	   minister	   was	   the	   announcement	   that	   a	   new	   devolved	   fund	   would	   be	  introduced	  from	  the	  1999/2000	  financial	  year.	  The	  Local	  Authority	  Transfer	  Fund	  (LATF)	  would	   initially	  allocate	  5	  percent	  of	  annual	   income	   tax	  collections	   to	   local	  authorities.	   These	   ‘miscellaneous’	   aspects	   of	   the	   budget	   did	   not	   attract	   much	  parliamentary	  or	  press	  attention.	  However,	  their	  impact	  over	  the	  following	  decade	  was	   immense.	   Of	   all	   the	   reforms	   introduced	   as	   part	   of	   the	   KLGRP,	   LATF	   was	   of	  greatest	  consequence	  for	  councillors,	  as	  the	  next	  chapter	  explains.	  	  
Conclusion	  	  In	  many	  ways,	  by	   the	  end	  of	  Moi’s	  presidency	   in	  2002,	   local	  authorities	  were	   in	  a	  more	   secure	   position	   than	   they	   had	   been	   for	   over	   thirty	   years.	   The	   reforms	  introduced	   from	   1998	   onwards	   were	   the	   outcome	   of	   a	   complex	   mix	   of	   factors,	  internal	  and	  external	  to	  Kenya.	  Just	  as	  the	  ideas	  of	  the	  metropole	  in	  the	  1940s	  had	  led	  to	  an	  ambitious	  programme	  for	  local	  government	  in	  colonial	  Kenya,	  so	  too	  were	  the	   reforms	   of	   the	   1990s,	   in	   part,	   dependent	   on	   international	   institutions	   who	  advocated	   	   the	   decentralisation	   of	   service	   delivery	   and	   greater	   community	  participation.	   National	   politicians	   are	   likely	   to	   have	   seen	   the	   appeal	   of	  decentralisation	   in	   slightly	   different	   terms	   to	   the	   international	   community.	   Since	  1992,	   politics	   had	   become	   more	   competitive	   and	   consequently	   more	   expensive.	  Members	   of	   parliament	   needed	   councillors	   to	   shore	   up	   local	   support	   and	  councillors	  needed	  resources	  to	  give	  to	  harambees	  to	  maintain	  their	  own	  legitimacy.	  The	   shortage	   of	   resources	   was	  manifest	   across	   Kenya’s	   local	   authorities,	   in	   both	  opposition	   and	   government	   controlled	   councils,	   municipals	   and	   counties.	   Whilst	  the	  politics	  of	  each	  local	  authority	  were	  unique	  and	  complex,	  the	  struggle	  to	  access	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and	   control	   the	   local	   state’s	   limited	   resources	   manifested	   itself	   in	   remarkably	  familiar	  ways.	  These	  struggles,	  which	  often	  played	  out	  in	  public,	  had	  degraded	  the	  reputation	  of	  councillors,	  particularly	  as	  they	  came	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  performance	  of	   councils,	   notably	   those	   in	   urban	   areas,	   was	   the	   subject	   of	   intense	   popular	  criticism.	   For	   national	   politicians,	   reforming	   the	   fiscal	   relationship	   between	   the	  central	  government	  and	  local	  authorities,	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  number	  of	  devolved	  funds	  was	  a	  means	  to	  provide	  councillors	  with	  some	  of	  the	  resources	  they	  needed	  to	   fulfil	   their	   responsibilities	   to	   their	   constituents	   and	   their	   patrons.	   The	   final	  chapter	  explores	  how	  successfully	  this	  worked	  out	  in	  practice.	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Chapter	  Seven:	  Kenya	  reborn	  -­‐	  or	  ‘the	  same	  old	  glorified	  councillors	  of	  yore’?	  
	  As	  the	  dust	  settles	  on	  the	  recently	  concluded	  elections,	  if	  at	  all	  the	  dust	   will	   settle,	   Kenyans	   have	   to	   wake	   up	   to	   the	   reality	   of	  devolved	   government.	   Cynics	   and	   optimists	   are	   agreed	   on	   one	  thing:	  the	  government	  is	  in	  mashinani	  (the	  grassroots).	  Finally	  the	  wish	  by	  the	  majority	  of	  Kenyans	  to	  have	  the	  government	  on	  their	  doorsteps	  has	  been	  fulfilled.1	  
Introduction	  	  On	  4	  March	  2013	  Kenyans	  went	  to	  the	  polls	  in	  the	  first	  elections	  held	  under	  a	  new	  constitution.	   Their	   ballot	   papers	   listed	   candidates	   for	   four	   new	   political	   offices:	  governor,	   senator,	   members	   of	   county	   assemblies	   (MCAs),	   and	   women’s	  representative.	  No	  longer	  on	  the	  ballot	  were	  local	  government	  aspirants.	  Under	  the	  new	  constitution,	   	   local	  authorities	  were	  dissolved,	  and	  their	  staff	  and	  assets	  were	  taken	  over	  by	  new	  sub-­‐national	  authorities:	  county	  governments.	  Fifty	  years	  after	  Kenyan	   independence,	   British-­‐style	   local	   government	   was	   finally	   abandoned	   in	  favour	   of	   a	   different	   system	   of	   devolved	   government.	   This	   concluding	   chapter	  considers	   the	   pathway	   to	   local	   government’s	   replacement.	   It	   looks	   at	   the	   new	  system	  and	  how	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  debates	  over	  and	  experiences	  of	   local	  authorities	  discussed	   in	   previous	   chapters.	   The	   design	   of	   devolution	   represents	   a	   major	  departure	   from	   the	   colonial	   local	   government	   model,	   yet	   in	   practice,	   early	  observation	   suggests	   that	   county	   governments	   and	   MCAs	   are	   operating	   and	  behaving	   in	  much	   the	   same	  way	   as	   their	   local	   authority	   predecessors	   did	   before	  them.	  	  	   Writing	   in	   the	  East	  African	   in	   2005,	  Bosire	  Ogero	   recalled	   that	   in	  1997	   all	  political	   parties	   had	   agreed	   on	   the	   need	   to	   strengthen	   local	   government.2	  ‘Where	  then	  did	  we	  lose	  the	  focus’	  he	  asked,	  ‘what	  …	  do	  we	  do	  with	  the	  local	  authorities	  in	  Kenya?	  Do	  they	  serve	  any	  role?	  Do	  we	  abolish	  them?	  If	  we	  are	  to	  retain	  them,	  what	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Tom	  Odhiambo,	  ‘Political	  and	  cultural	  centres	  must	  move	  closer	  together	  for	  true	  devolution’,	  Daily	  Nation,	  12	  May	  2013,	  accessed	  online	  	  at:	  http://www.nation.co.ke/lifestyle/lifestyle/Political-­‐and-­‐cultural-­‐centres-­‐must-­‐move-­‐together-­‐for-­‐devolution/-­‐/1214/1850092/-­‐/ryrrjgz/-­‐/index.html.	  	  2	  Bosire	  Ogero,	  'Local	  authorities	  are	  in	  a	  mess	  -­‐	  don’t	  abolish	  them!',	  The	  East	  African,	  3	  January	  2005,	  accessed	  online	  at:	  http://allafrica.com/stories/200501040755.html.	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role	   should	   they	  play?’.	  3	  Ogero’s	   concern	   that	   local	  government	   reform	  had	   fallen	  off	  the	  government’s	  agenda	  was	  not	  without	  reason.	  In	  the	  same	  year	  that	  Musalia	  Mudavadi,	  Minister	  of	  Finance	  announced	  plans	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  programme	  of	  local	  government	  reform	  (1997),	  the	  government	  also	  agreed	  to	  begin	  a	  process	  of	  constitutional	   review.	   Over	   the	   next	   twelve	   years,	   these	   two	   processes	   became	  entangled.	   Not	   dissimilar	   to	   the	   events	   of	   1960-­‐63,	   efforts	   to	   implement	   local	  government	   reform	  were	   side-­‐lined	  by	  a	  broader	  public	  debate	  about	  devolution,	  
majimbo	   and	   a	   new	   constitutional	   order.	   The	   first	   half	   of	   the	   chapter	   considers	  these	   two	  developments.	   It	   begins	   by	   exploring	   the	   impacts	   that	   the	  Kenya	   Local	  Government	  Reform	  Programme	  (KLGRP)	  had	  on	  councillors	  and	  the	  institutions	  of	  local	   government,	   arguing	   that	   although	   Local	   Authority	   Transfer	   Fund	   (LATF)	  improved	  the	  situation	  for	  councillors,	  it	  was	  in	  no	  way	  transformative;	  councillors	  still	  struggled	  to	  meet	  their	  own	  expectations	  and	  those	  of	  their	  supporters.	  Public	  rhetoric	  about	  local	  authorities	  remained	  highly	  critical,	  even	  after	  Kibaki	  came	  to	  power	   in	   2002,	   promising	   to	   professionalise	   local	   government.	   The	   chapter	   then	  turns	   to	   the	   process	   of	   constitutional	   	   review,	  which	   concluded	   in	  August	   2010	   -­‐	  over	  a	  decade	  after	   it	  began	  -­‐	  when	  a	  national	  referendum	  was	  held	  and	  Kenyans	  voted	   in	  support	  of	  a	  new	  constitution.	   It	  had	   taken	  a	  change	  of	  government,	   two	  rejected	  draft	  constitutions,	  and	  a	  national	  crisis	   for	  the	  political	  elite	  and	  Kenyan	  public	   to	   come	   to	   an	   agreement	   on	   the	   future	   structure	   of	   executive	   power	   and	  devolution	  of	  government.	  	  	   The	  second	  half	  of	  the	  chapter	  critically	  considers	  the	  disjuncture	  between	  popular	  expectations	  of	  devolved	  government,	  and	  what	   is	  known	  of	  the	  way	  that	  the	  local	  state	  in	  Kenya	  has	  historically	  worked	  in	  practice.	  Differences	  between	  the	  old	   and	   new	   systems	   are	   drawn	   out,	   to	   show	   what	   aspects	   of	   the	   colonial	   local	  government	   ‘model’	  have	  been	  retained,	  and	  what	  has	  been	  discarded.	  This	  offers	  important	   insights	   into	   the	   interplay	   between	   peoples’	   expectations	   of	   the	   state,	  and	   the	   potential	   this	   has	   to	   shape	   not	   only	   the	   way	   the	   state	   ‘works’,	   but	   also	  crucially,	   how	   these	   norms	   can	   become	   institutionalised.	   Previous	   chapters	   have	  highlighted	   three	   main	   criticisms	   of	   local	   authorities,	   broadly	   related	   to	   local	  government	   financing;	   the	   powers	   and	   autonomy	   of	   councils;	   and	   the	   personnel	  (elected	   and	   official),	   who	   occupied	   positions	   in	   local	   councils.	   Examining	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Ibid.	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details	  of	   the	  present	  system,	   it	  might	  appear	   that	  many	  of	   the	  enduring	   tensions	  over	   finance	   and	  powers	   to	   have	  been	   resolved.	   Popular	   critique	  has	   encouraged	  the	   creation	   of	   a	   new	  model;	   a	  model	   it	   is	   argued,	  which	   better	   reflects	   common	  ideas	   and	   expectations	   of	   the	   central	   government’s	   responsibility	   to	   local	   leaders	  and	   the	   constituencies	   they	   represent.	   County	   governments	   are	   now	   reliably	   and	  generously	  funded	  by	  the	  centre.	  Their	  powers	  and	  autonomy	  are	  enshrined	  in	  the	  law.	  Yet	  there	  is	  one	  clear	  continuity	  between	  the	  old	  and	  new	  system,	  that	  is,	  the	  kinds	   of	   people	   who	   occupy	   local	   political	   office,	   and	   most	   importantly,	   the	  contradictory	   demands	   made	   upon	   them	   by	   their	   supporters.	   Like	   councillors,	  MCAs	  continue	  to	  represent	  and	  serve	  those	  who	  they	  live	  amongst.	  As	  such,	  these	  ‘leaders	   of	   the	   grassroots’,	   are	   likely	   to	   find	   themselves	   faced	   with	   many	   of	   the	  same	  dilemmas	  and	  disappointments	  as	   their	   forbearers	  were.	  What	   they,	  and	  all	  the	  councillors	  discussed	  in	  this	  thesis	  reveal,	  is	  the	  profound	  tension	  that	  exists	  in	  Kenya	  between	  a	   legal-­‐rational	  model	  of	  government,	  and	  a	  patrimonial	  one.	  This	  tension	  is	  particularly	  discernible	  when	  councillors	  are	  considered.	  They	  show	  that	  patronage	  politics	  has	  not	  –	  as	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  implies	  –	  been	  cultivated	  only	  or	  primarily	  by	  national	  elites	  intent	  on	  securing	  their	  ethnic	  constituencies.	  Rather,	  the	  continuing	  salience	  of	  a	  neo-­‐patrimonial	  logic	  confirms	  the	  considerable	  agency	  of	  Kenya’s	  citizens,	  whose	  longstanding	  demand	  for	  greater	  resources	  to	  be	  placed	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  local	  leaders	  has	  finally	  been	  granted.	  	  	  
Reform	  in	  action	  :	  ‘we	  were	  jobless…when	  LATF	  came,	  things	  got	  
improvement’	  Reviewing	   progress	   made	   in	   implementing	   the	   Kenya	   Local	   Government	   Reform	  Programme,	  Paul	  Smoke	  concluded	   in	  2004	   that	  Kenya	  was	   ‘finally	  moving	   in	   the	  right	  direction	  after	  many	  years	  of	  rhetoric	  and	  minimal	  action.’4	  He	  noted	  that	  ‘key	  central	  government	  players	  that	  once	  all	  but	  ignored	  local	  governments’,	  were	  now	  ‘pushing	  reforms	  and	  raising	  popular	  expectations.’5	  This	  positive	  assessment	  came	  five	   years	   after	   the	   Local	   Authority	   Transfer	   Fund	   Act	   was	   passed	   in	   December	  1998.6	  Beginning	  from	  the	  next	  financial	  year,	  local	  authorities	  were	  legally	  entitled	  to	  receive	  5	  percent	  of	  national	  revenue	  collected	  through	  income	  tax.	  In	  addition,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Paul	  Smoke,	  ‘Kenya:	  Erosion	  and	  reform	  from	  the	  center’,	  in	  Dele	  Olowu	  and	  James	  Wunsch	  (eds.),	  Local	  Governance	  in	  Africa:	  The	  Challenges	  of	  Democratic	  Decentralisation	  (Boulder,	  2004),	  pp.	  211-­‐236,	  p.	  231.	  	  5	  Ibid.	  p.	  231.	  6	  Local	  Authority	  Transfer	  Fund	  Act,	  1998.	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the	   Road	   Maintenance	   Levy	   and	   government	   Contributions	   in	   Lieu	   of	   Rates	  (CILORs)	  further	  formalised	  and	  strengthened	  the	  intergovernmental	  fiscal	  transfer	  system.	   The	   impact	   this	   had	   on	   local	   government	   finances	   was	   immediate.	   By	  2003/04	  central	  government	  transfers	  constituted	  32.5	  percent	  of	  local	  authorities’	  revenues,	  growing	  to	  42.86	  percent	  by	  2007/08.7	  This	  influx	  of	  funds	  had	  a	  positive	  impact	   on	   councillors;	   as	   Peter	   Kombo	   of	   Kakamega	   remembers,	   ‘LATF	   changed	  [things].	  Because	  we	  were	  jobless.	  When	  LATF	  came	  things	  got	  improvement…	  We	  were	  councillors	  but	  no	  money.	  But	  when	  LATF	  came	  we	  actually	  did	  a	  lot.’8	  	  	   LATF	  was	  established	  to	  ‘improve	  local	  service	  delivery’;	  ‘enhance	  economic	  governance’;	  ‘strengthen	  stakeholder	  participation’	  and	  ‘‘eliminate	  local	  authorities’	  outstanding	   debts’.9	  There	   were	   formal	   restrictions	   governing	   the	   use	   of	   LATF	  funds.	  In	  order	  to	  receive	  its	  disbursement,	  councils	  had	  to	  prepare	  a	  budget,	  with	  no	  more	   than	   45	   percent	   spent	   on	   personal	   emoluments,	   at	   least	   10	   percent	   on	  repair	   and	   maintenance	   and	   20	   percent	   on	   ‘anti-­‐poverty	   policies’.10	  In	   reality,	  whether	   these	   restrictions	   were	   consistently	   enforced	   appears	   doubtful.	   Indeed,	  the	   formal	   objectives	   of	   LATF	   were	   poorly	   met.	   In	   2005,	   Kenya’s	   Institute	   of	  Economic	   Affairs	   continued	   to	   decry	   the	   ‘all	   round	   poor	   performance	   of	   local	  authorities’.11	  Claims	   that	   councillors	   had	   misappropriated	   LATF	   funds	   quickly	  emerged.12	  For	   MP	   Musa	   Sirma,	   such	   actions	   were	   understandable:	   ‘councillors	  have	  never	  had	  a	  way	  of	  earning	  a	   living’,	  he	   told	   the	  House,	   ‘[a]n	  hungry	  person	  will	   have	   to	   look	   for	   a	   way	   of	   taking	   that	  money.’13	  Festo	   Shisanya,	   a	   nominated	  councillor	  in	  Kakamega	  explained	  one	  of	  the	  means	  by	  which	  councillors	  accessed	  such	  funds:	  	  The	   council	  was	   to	  be	   given	   some	  money	   to	   run	   it.	  We	  used	   to	   call	  that	   money	   LATF…	   And	   when	   you	   want	   to	   start	   projects,	   like	   you	  want	   to	   start	   to	   make,	   you	   want	   to	   make	   good	   where	   our	   local	  women	  are	  drawing	  water,	  some	  road	  or	  paths	  …then	  we	  were	  to	  ask	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Rocaboy,	  Vaillancourt	  and	  Hugounenq,	  ‘Public	  Finances	  of	  Local	  Government	  in	  Kenya’,	  p.	  195.	  	  	  8	  Peter	  Kombo,	  interview,	  25	  August	  2013,	  Ilesi	  (Kakamega).	  	  	  9	  Morris	  Odhiambo,	  Winnie	  Mitullah,	  Kichamu	  Akivaga,	  Management	  of	  Resources	  by	  Local	  
Authorities:	  The	  Case	  of	  Local	  Authority	  Transfer	  Fund	  in	  Kenya	  (Nairobi,	  2005),	  p.	  64.	  	  10	  Rocaboy	  et	  al,	  ‘Public	  Finances	  of	  Local	  Government	  in	  Kenya’.	  	  11	  Institute	  of	  Economic	  Affairs,	  ‘What	  next	  for	  Kenya’s	  local	  authorities?’,	  Bulletin	  of	  the	  
Institute	  of	  Economic	  Affairs,	  59	  (2005),	  pp.	  1-­‐8,	  p.	  1.	  	  12	  Republic	  of	  Kenya,	  Official	  Report,	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  Eighth	  Parliament,	  Sixth	  Session,	  13	  June	  2002,	  p	  .1115-­‐1133,	  p.	  1120.	  	  13	  Republic	  of	  Kenya,	  Official	  Report,	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  Ninth	  Parliament,	  Third	  Session,	  24	  November	  2004,	  pp.	  4501-­‐4521,	  p.	  4502.	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people	   to	   come	   here	   or	   at	   the	   chief’s	   centre	   to	   form	   another	  committee	  which	  we	   call	   LASDAP	   [Local	  Authority	   Service	  Delivery	  Action	  Plan]	  …Then,	   there,	   you	   can	   call	   all	  wananchi	  to	   come	   there.	  They	  start	  debating	  “our	  first	  priority	  is	  road”,	  or	  “our	  first	  priority	  is	  water”,	  or	   “our	   first	  priority	   is	  a	   school”…	   just	   like	   that.	  Then	  when	  they	  have	  listed	  all	  those	  priorities,	  they	  are	  taken	  to	  the	  full	  council	  meeting.	  Each	  ward	  is	  bringing	  its	  arrangements.	  Then	  they	  say,	  okay,	  for	   Iguhu	  now	  we	  are	   going	   to	  make	   this	   road,	   from	   this	   end	  up	   to	  that	   end	   you,	   will	   spend	   this	   much…the	   problems	   we	   used	   to	   go	  through	  are	  that,	  you	  identify	  about	  KSH	  500,000	  to	  make	  the	  road,	  but	  what	   they	  will	  do,	   the	  councillors,	   they	  have	  got	   interest	   in	   that	  money.	   They	   go	   to	   hire	   the	   contractors,	   then	   a	   contractor	   is	   asked	  “how	  much	  can	  you	  charge	  us	  for	  doing	  this	  work”,	  he	  says	  “we	  want	  KSH	  300,000.”	  The	  councillor	   tells	  him	  “no	  make	   it	  KSH	  450,000	  so	  that	  the	  rest	  you	  give	  me,	  it	  is	  me	  who	  is	  giving	  you	  this	  job”.	  So	  you	  see	  LASDAP	  money	  was	  spent	  in	  that	  manner.	  You	  see	  there	  was	  no	  ward,	   there	  was	   no	   councillor,	  who	  was	   transparent.	   There	  wasn’t,	  and	  that	  money	  could	  not	  do	  the	  actual	  work	  it	  is	  meant	  to	  do.	  No,	  no,	  no.	  That	  is	  what	  I	  saw.14	  This	   description	   suggests	   two	   ways	   in	   which	   LATF	   improved	   the	   situation	   for	  councillors.	  First,	  as	  Shisanya	  explained,	  a	  shrewd	  councillor	  could	  often	  find	  a	  way	  to	  misappropriate	  funds,	  providing	  the	  means	  for	  their	  own	  self-­‐advancement,	  and	  the	   resources	   required	   to	   meet	   the	   personal	   demands	   placed	   on	   them	   by	   their	  constituents.	   Second,	   it	   created	   a	   means	   for	   local	   development	   projects	   –	  spearheaded	  by	  councillors	  –	  to	  be	  publicly	  funded.	  In	  the	  past,	  similar	  small-­‐scale	  initiatives	  tended	  to	  be	  build	  through	  harambee	  placing	  financial	  responsibility	  on	  locally	  elected	  leaders	  rather	  than	  local	  or	  national	  government.	  LATF’s	  success	  in	  this	  regard	  arguably	  contributed	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  similar	  scheme	  at	  constituency	  level.	   The	   Constituency	   Development	   Fund	   (CDF)	   established	   in	   2003,	   was	  designed	  to	  ‘replace	  harambee	  as	  the	  focus	  of	  local	  development’.15	  CDF	  was	  one	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  policy	  innovations	  of	  Kibaki’s	  government,	  and	  its	  creation	  was	  intended	   to	   de-­‐politicise	   the	   culture	   and	   practice	   of	   harambees.	   Yet	   as	   Nic	  Cheeseman	   notes,	   whilst	   CDF	   may	   have	   ‘modified	   the	   structure	   of	   patronage	   in	  Kenya’,	   it	   did	  not	   alter	   ‘its	  basic	   logic’.16	  Instead	   it	   formalised	  and	   legitimised	   this	  logic,	   by	   creating	   a	   bureaucratic	   system	   that	   provided	   all	   MPs	  with	   resources	   to	  perform	  their	  role	  as	  patron.	  This	  is	  important,	  and	  will	  be	  discussed	  further	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  chapter.	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  Festo	  Shisanya,	  interview,	  27	  August	  2013,	  Khayega	  (Kakamega).	  	  15	  Nic	  Cheeseman,	  ‘Kenya	  since	  2002:	  The	  more	  things	  change	  the	  more	  they	  stay	  the	  same’,	  in	  Abdul	  Raufu	  Mustapha	  and	  Lindsay	  Whitfield	  (eds.),	  Turning	  Points	  in	  African	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  (Suffolk,	  2009),	  pp.	  94-­‐113,	  p.	  104.	  	  	  16	  Ibid.,	  p.	  105.	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   Even	   with	   LATF,	   councillors	   still	   struggled	   to	   satisfy	   the	   needs	   of	   their	  neighbours.	   Levi	   Ahindukha	   who	   joined	   Kakamega	   County	   Council	   in	   1997	  considered	  the	  financial	  resources	  of	  the	  council	  insufficient	  to	  enable	  him	  to	  have	  enough	  of	  a	  tangible	  impact	  in	  his	  ward:	  	  [the	   council]	   could	   not	   pay	   us	   well	   so	   that	   we	   can	   also	   do	   many	  things,	   projects	   at	   home.	   What	   can	   you	   do	   with	   seven	   thousand	  shillings?	   What	   can	   you	   do	   with	   eleven	   thousand	   shillings	   at	   that	  time?	  Because	  they	  did	  not	  have	  good	  sources	  of	  income.	  …	  there	  was	  no	   money	   coming,	   it	   was	   coming,	   but	   very	   little	   in	   terms	   of	   local	  authority	   transfer	   fund,	   LATF,	   it	   was	   very	   little.	   The	   highest	   they	  could	   give	   was	   about	   30,000	   shillings	   to	   one	   ward.	   That’s	   why	  we	  could	  not	  manage	  to	  do	  a	  lot	  of	  progress	  in	  our	  areas.17	  	  The	   implication	   in	   Ahindukha’s	   statement	   is	   that	   he	   expected	   the	   council	   to	   be	  provided	  with	  the	  resources	  it	  needed,	  so	  that	  councillors	  could	  take	  an	  active	  part	  in	   their	   wards’	   development,	   and	   ‘do	   a	   lot	   of	   progress’.	   This	   conception	   of	   a	  councillor’s	   role	   was	   little	   altered	   from	   the	   ideas	   expressed	   by	   Pekeshe	   Ndeje,	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Two.	  Not	  only	  were	  local	  authorities	  still	  failing	  to	  participate	  adequately	  in	  the	  theatrical	  politics	  of	  development,	  but	  they	  also	  could	  not	  provide	  their	  members	  with	  real	  opportunities	  to	  advance	  economically.	  Aggrey	  Atira,	  who	  served	   on	   Kakamega	   with	   Ahindukha,	   admitted	   that	   he	   was	   drawn	   to	   local	  government	  by	  the	  belief	  that	  it	  would	  provide	  him	  with	  the	  means	  to	  improve	  his	  financial	  situation:	  	  	  I	  used	  to	  think	  that	  the	  salary	  would	  be	  good	  when	  I	  join	  the	  council.	  I	  was	   expecting	   so	   many	   things	   including	   plots	   but	   they	   were	   not	  there…	  Many	  councillors	  have	  left	  the	  council	  poor.	  They	  went	  there	  walking	  and	  left	  there	  walking.	  Those	  who	  have	  left	  the	  council	  with	  something	  are	  those	  who	  were	  doing	  some	  form	  of	  business…Others	  were	  sleeping,	  just	  depending	  on	  their	  council	  allowance.	  Those	  ones	  just	  left	  the	  council	  empty-­‐handed.18	  	   Kilifi’s	  councillors	  saw	  the	  introduction	  of	  LATF	  as	  a	  way	  to	  ensure	  they	  did	  not	   leave	   ‘empty-­‐handed’.	   During	   the	   last	   meeting	   of	   1999,	   they	   were	   presented	  with	   a	   supplementary	  budget	  which	  outlined	   roughly	  how	   they	  were	   expected	   to	  spend	  the	  KSH	  11,083,93	  (approximately	  $189,000)	  the	  council	  had	  been	  allocated	  through	  LATF.19	  The	  thirty-­‐one	  councillors’	  first	  thought	  was	  to	  try	  to	  increase	  their	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  Levi	  Ahindukha,	  interview,	  26	  August	  2013,	  Kakamega	  Town.	  	  18	  Aggrey	  Atira,	  interview,	  25	  August	  2013,	  Butsotso	  (Kakamega).	  	  19	  Minutes	  full	  council,	  KCC,	  30	  December	  1999,	  Kilifi	  County	  Council	  Archive.	  For	  1999/2000	  financial	  year,	  LATF	  disbursements	  constituted	  two	  percent	  of	  national	  income	  tax	  rather	  than	  the	  five	  percent	  specified	  in	  the	  LATF	  Act.	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allowances	  to	  at	  least	  KSH15,400	  per	  month.	  This	  hurriedly	  added	  agenda	  item	  was	  refused	  by	  the	  clerk,	  who	  maintained	  that	  the	  council	  did	  not	  have	  the	  funds.20	  	  	   Previous	   chapters	   have	   explored	   differences	   between	   the	   profile	   and	  opportunities	   accorded	   to	   county	   and	   municipal	   councillors.	   Yet	   the	   steady	  degradation	   of	   municipal	   councils’	   institutional	   capacities,	   assets	   and	   financial	  resources	  meant	  that	  even	   in	  towns	  such	  as	  Nakuru,	  by	  the	   late	  1990s,	   it	  was	  not	  appreciably	   easier	   for	   civic	   leaders	   to	  meet	   the	   demands	   placed	   upon	   them.	   This	  was	   the	  experience	  of	  Nakuru	  councillor	  Gitu	  Kuria	  who	  was	  elected	   in	  1997	  and	  stepped	  down	  five	  years	  later.	  The	  introduction	  of	  LATF	  half	  way	  through	  his	  term	  in	  office	  did	  not	  make	  being	  in	  politics	  any	  easier	  for	  him:	  	  By	  being	  elected	  as	  a	  councillor,	  actually	  somebody	  has	  a	  lot	  of	  hectic	  time,	  I	  never	  knew	  that	  the	  public	  were	  so	  demanding,	  because	  when	  you	  are	  elected,	   the	  public	  are	  demanding	   their	   rights	  because	   they	  are	   tax	   payers,	   but	   what	   they	   are	   demanding	   from	   you	   after	   they	  elected	   is	   two	  different	   things.	  They	  come	  a	   lot,	   tell	   these	  problems	  “our	  children	  are	  being	  chased	  away	  from	  school”,	   “my	  child	  has	  no	  uniform”,	  “has	  no	  school	  fees”,	  “my	  wife	  is	  sick”,	  “my	  child	  is	  sick”,	  “I	  need	   to	   go	   to	   the	   hospital”,	   “I	   need	   medicine”;	   so	   they	   are	   too	  demanding.	  And	  by	  that	  time,	  you	  know,	  you	  are	  representing	  about	  fifty	   thousand	   people,	   all	   coming	   to	   you	   very	   early	   in	   the	  morning.	  You	   wake	   up	   and	   find	   them	   outside	   your	   house.	   Mama	   should	   be	  prepared	   because	  when	   you	   are	   a	   leader,	   she	  wakes	   up	   very	   early	  and	  makes	  a	  lot	  of	  tea,	  because	  every	  visitor	  has	  to	  have	  some…I	  said	  I	   would	   never	   go	   back	   into	   the	   field.	   I	   met	   the	   expectations	   of	   the	  people,	  but	  then	  you	  find	  that	  people	  are	  very	  petty.	  I	  have	  told	  you,	  and	   I	  will	   repeat,	   it’s	   not	   for	   a	   common	  man…Politics	   is	   not	   for	   the	  poor.21	  	  	  	  	   After	   five	   years	   on	   the	   council,	   Kuria	   decided	   that	   his	   ‘leadership	   skills’	  could	  be	  better	  used	  in	  other	  forums.	  His	  early	  exit	  from	  politics	  came	  at	  a	  moment	  of	  great	  change	  in	  Kenya.	  At	  the	  elections	  of	  2002,	  Daniel	  arap	  Moi	  stood	  down,	  in	  accordance	  with	  an	  agreement	  made	  with	  donors	   in	  1991	   to	  only	   serve	  a	   further	  two	  terms.	  The	  divisions	  that	  had	  prevented	  the	  opposition	  from	  unseating	  KANU	  in	   1992	   and	   1997	   were	   finally	   overcome.	   Two	   months	   before	   the	   December	  elections,	  the	  National	  Alliance	  Rainbow	  Coalition	  (NARC)	  formed	  through	  a	  merger	  of	   the	   National	   Alliance	   Party	   of	   Kenya	   and	   the	   Liberal	   Democratic	   Party,	   and	  selected	  Mwai	  Kibaki	   as	   the	  party’s	   candidate.	  Kibaki	  won	  with	  62	  percent	  of	   the	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  Ibid.	  	  21	  Gitu	  Kuria,	  interview,	  31	  March	  2013,	  Nakuru	  Town.	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vote,	  and	  in	  parliament,	  NARC	  candidates	  took	  125	  seats	  to	  KANU’s	  sixty-­‐four,	  with	  the	  remaining	  twenty-­‐one	  seats	  taken	  by	  five	  smaller	  parties.22	  	   The	  peaceful	  transfer	  of	  power	  from	  Moi	  to	  Kibaki	  was	  described	  at	  the	  time	  by	  Stephen	  Ndegwa	  as	  ‘the	  most	  significant	  political	  event’	  in	  Kenya’s	  history	  since	  independence.23	  During	   his	   inauguration	   speech,	   Kibaki	   promised	   to	   bring	   Kenya	  ‘out	  of	  the	  present	  wilderness	  and	  malaise	  onto	  the	  promised	  land’.24	  Elected	  on	  an	  anti-­‐corruption	   platform,	   he	   pledged	   to	   ‘bring	   back	   the	   culture	   of	   due	   process,	  accountability	   and	   transparency	   in	   public	   office’.25	  This	   apparent	   commitment	   to	  restoring	  Kenya’s	  bureaucratic	  norms	  also	  applied	   to	   local	  authorities.	  During	   the	  election	  campaign,	  Kibaki	  had	  promised	  to	  make	  local	  government	  office	  a	  place	  for	  ‘professionals’	  rather	  than	  ‘politicians’,	  recycling	  one	  of	  the	  persistent	  themes	  in	  the	  debate	  on	  local	  government.26	  The	  call	  for	  ‘professionals’	  to	  enter	  local	  government	  suggested	   that	   after	   several	   years	   in	   operation,	   the	   impacts	   of	   the	   reform	  programme	  had	  been	  marginal.	  Indeed	  the	  reputation	  of	  local	  authorities	  had	  little	  improved,	  as	  the	  article	  in	  the	  Daily	  Nation	  that	  this	  thesis	  began	  with,	  attests	  to.27	  Despite	   Kwamchetsi	   Makokha	   assessment,	   made	   in	   2001,	   that	   local	   authorities	  were	   ‘a	   study	   in	   failure’;	   abolishing	   local	   government	   was	   not	   in	   the	   NARC	  manifesto.28	  Instead,	   the	   party	   spoke	   of	   professionalising	   these	   institutions	   by	  ensuring	   that	   councillors	   were	   ‘qualified	   people	   with	   proven	   track	   records’	   who	  would	  be	  able	  to	  ‘streamline	  financial	  management	  and	  service	  delivery.’29	  	  	   To	   oversee	   this	   process,	   Kibaki	   appointed	   a	   former	   Mombasa	   councillor,	  Karisa	   Maitha,	   as	   Minister	   for	   Local	   Government.	   In	   the	   days	   after	   this	   was	  announced,	   Kinuthia	  Wamwangi	   -­‐	   a	   citizen	   of	   Thika	  who	  went	   on	   to	   become	   the	  head	  of	   the	  Transitional	  Authority	   responsible	   for	  overseeing	   the	   implementation	  of	   devolved	   government	   -­‐	   	   felt	   compelled	   to	  write	   a	   letter	   to	   the	  Daily	  Nation	   to	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  Anderson,	  ‘Briefing:	  Kenya’s	  elections	  2002	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  the	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  of	  a	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  African	  
Affairs,	  102:407	  (2003),	  pp.	  331-­‐342.	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  Stephen	  Ndegwa,	  'Kenya:	  Third	  time	  lucky?',	  Journal	  of	  Democracy,	  14:3	  (2003),	  pp.	  145–58.	  24	  Mwai	  Kibaki,	  ‘Kibaki	  and	  Moi	  speech	  excerpts’,	  BBC	  Monitoring:	  Media	  Reports,	  accessed	  online	  at:	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  Ndegwa,	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  Third	  time	  lucky?'.	  26	  Clay	  Muganda,	  'Party	  under	  obligation	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  Daily	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  Makokha,	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  July	  2001,	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  Ibid.	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  Ngumbao	  Kithi,	  'Race	  hots	  up	  in	  mayoral	  elections',	  Daily	  Nation,	  21	  January	  2003,	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warn	  the	  new	  minister	  ‘not	  to	  celebrate	  too	  early	  for	  his	  appointment	  because	  the	  task	   ahead	   is	   phenomenal.’ 30 	  At	   first	   it	   looked	   like	   Maitha	   might	   prove	   the	  naysayers	  wrong.	  He	  instantly	  became	  known	  as	  ‘Hurricane	  Maitha’	  for	  the	  ‘vigour	  and	  enthusiasm’	  he	  brought	  to	  the	  post.31	  The	  Daily	  Nation	  wrote	  in	  January	  that	  he	  ‘might	   be	   just	  what	   the	   doctor	   ordered’.32	  A	  month	   later	  The	  Standard	  noted	   that	  ‘every	  place	  he	  goes	  …	  Karisa	  Maitha	  leaves	  some	  shattered	  jobs	  and	  a	  few	  broken	  hearts’.33	  However,	  commentators	  quickly	  became	  concerned	  that	  the	  minister	  was	  not	  thinking	  about	  the	  ‘bigger	  picture’,	  targeting	  ‘individuals’	  when	  he	  should	  have	  developed	   ‘a	   strategy	   for	   institutional	   reform’.	  34	  By	  October,	   the	  minister’s	   initial	  flurry	  of	  activity	  was	  remembered	  bitterly:	  	  Early	   this	   year,	   Kenyans	   were	   upbeat	   that,	   finally,	   the	   new	  Government	  would	   shake	   up	   and	   turn	   around	   the	   local	   authorities	  that	   have	   long	  been	  known	   for	   sloth	   and	   sleaze…For	   a	  while,	   there	  was	   some	   semblance	   of	   order	   in	   the	   councils.	   They	   appeared	   to	   be	  putting	   their	   acts	   together	   and	   the	   public	   was	   beginning	   to	   see	   a	  change	   in	   service	   delivery.	   But	   that	   was	   short-­‐lived.	   Things	   soon	  went	  back	  to	  "normal".	  Garbage	  heaps	  have	  again	  become	  mountains,	  water	  taps	  are	  perpetually	  dry	  in	  many	  urban	  centres	  and	  roads	  are	  in	  a	  pathetic	  state.35	  	   A	   month	   before	   this	   damning	   appraisal	   was	   published,	   parliamentarians	  had	   held	   lengthy	   discussions	   on	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Local	   Government’s	   budget.	   The	  substance	   and	   tone	   of	   this	   debate	   reflected	   an	   on-­‐going	   shift	   in	   the	  way	   national	  politicians	   regarded	   local	   councillors.	   Their	   sympathetic	   portrayal	   of	   councillors	  continued	  to	  contrast	  with	  the	  litany	  of	  complaints	  and	  criticisms	  found	  in	  the	  press	  at	   the	   time.	   MPs	   appeared	   not	   to	   agree	   with	   the	   suggestion	   made	   by	   the	   Daily	  
Nation	   that	   councillors	  were	   simply	   ‘masquerading	   as	   grassroots	   leaders’;	   rather	  they	   took	   it	   in	   turns	   to	   argue	   to	   the	   contrary.36	  The	   Minister	   for	   Tourism	   and	  Information	  claimed	  he	  had	  realised	  since	  his	  election	  that	  ‘councillors	  are	  the	  ones	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Kinuthia	  Wamwangi	  (letter),	  'After	  the	  cabinet,	  the	  focus	  should	  turn	  to	  local	  authorities',	  
Daily	  Nation,	  9	  January	  2003,	  p.	  10.	  	  31	  'Slow	  down	  now,	  Mr	  Maitha',	  Daily	  Nation,	  23	  January	  2003,	  p.	  8.	  32	  Ibid.	  33	  'Hurricane	  Maitha	  is	  now	  wreaking	  havoc',	  The	  Standard,	  28	  February	  2003,	  accessed	  online	  at:	  http://allafrica.com/stories/200302280023.html.	  	  34	  'Slow	  down	  now,	  Mr	  Maitha'.	  'Reform	  local	  government',	  Daily	  Nation,	  11	  July	  2003,	  accessed	  online	  at:	  http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/-­‐/1192/263218/-­‐/qhrsdhz/-­‐/index.html.	  	  	  	  35	  'Probe	  other	  councils	  too',	  Daily	  Nation,	  30	  October	  2003,	  p.	  8.	  36	  Makokha,	  'These	  mayors	  should	  be	  our	  last'.	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who	  are	  constantly	  in	  touch	  with	  the	  Wananchi’.37	  This	   ‘realisation’	  was	  shared	  by	  the	  member	  for	  Kitutu	  Chache,	  Jimmy	  Angwenyi,	  who	  said:	  ‘In	  my	  constituency,	  my	  councillors	   are	   in	   touch	  with	  my	   people	  more	   than	   I	   am	   because	   I	   only	   go	   there	  over	   the	   weekend…Why	   can	   we	   not	   facilitate	   these	   people	   as	   they	   are	   also	  representatives	  of	  our	  people?	  They	  are	  representatives	  of	  the	  taxpayers.’38	  The	  call	  to	   ‘facilitate’	   councillors	   was	   a	   reference	   to	   their	   allowances.	   On	   this	   point,	   MPs	  were	   in	   agreement	   that	   councillors	  were	  not	   fairly	   compensated;	  Angwenyi	  went	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  councillors	  should	  be	  paid	  salaries	  instead	  of	  ‘allowances’.	  He	  saw	  this	   as	   important	   for	  MPs’	   own	   survival:	   ‘These	   councillors	   give	   us	   votes	   and	  we	  depend	  on	   them…	  right	  now	  we	   are	  dealing	  with	   a	  demoralised	   group	  of	   leaders	  who	  are	  very	  dangerous.39	  	  	   This	  bid	  to	  raise	  councillors’	  allowances	  was	  clearly,	  on	  one	  level,	  simply	  a	  self-­‐serving	  strategy	  designed	  to	  ensure	  further	  support	  from	  councillors.	  That	  MPs	  deemed	   this	   important	   suggests	   how	   much	   more	   significant	   and	   valuable	  councillors	   had	  become	   to	   elite	   politicians	   in	   the	  multi-­‐party	   era.	  Whereas	   in	   the	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  local	  government	  had	  been	  retained	  –	  albeit	  increasingly	  in	  shell	  form	   –	   as	   a	   symbol	   of	   the	   government’s	   steadfast	   commitment	   to	   a	   democratic	  model	  of	  government	  based	  on	  the	  British	   tradition,	  after	  1991,	   local	  government	  was	  retained	  for	  a	  very	  different	  reason;	  MPs	  needed	  councillors	  to	  get	  votes.	  The	  interest	  shown	  by	  MPs	  in	  councillors’	  allowances	  was	  perhaps,	  however,	  more	  than	  just	   a	   political	   calculation.	   Indeed,	   they	   welcomed	   the	   minister’s	   newfound	  understanding–	   as	   they	   saw	   it	   –	   of	   ‘the	   dilemma	   of	   councillors’.40	  This	   ‘dilemma’	  was	  best	  articulated	  by	  James	  Omingo	  the	  MP	  for	  South	  Mugirango:	  	  When	   I	  went	   home	   last	  weekend,	   I	  met	   one	   of	   the	   councillors	  who	  told	  me	  he	  would	  rather	  resign…	  He	  claimed	  to	  have	  sold	  all	  he	  had	  to	  be	  able	  to	  join	  the	  council	  yet	  he	  is	  living	  like	  a	  pauper.	  In	  fact,	  that	  is	   why	   most	   of	   them	   steal.	   That	   is	   why	   they	   may	   steal	   someone’s	  chicken,	  yet	  they	  are	  elected.	  How	  do	  you	  expect	  a	  whole	  (sic)	  council	  man	  who	   is	   called	   councillor	  not	   to	  attend	  a	   funeral	  which	   is	   in	  his	  neighbourhood	  just	  because	  he	  had	  not	  had	  his	  allowance	  paid	  in	  the	  last	  few	  months?41	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  Republic	  of	  Kenya,	  Official	  Report,	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  Ninth	  Parliament,	  Second	  Session,	  30	  September	  2003,	  pp.	  2626-­‐2657,	  p.	  2630.	  	  38	  Republic	  of	  Kenya,	  Official	  Report,	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  Ninth	  Parliament,	  Second	  Session,	  30	  September	  2003,	  pp.	  2626-­‐2657,	  p.	  2638.	  	  39	  Ibid.,	  p.	  2640.	  	  40	  Ibid.,	  p.	  2630.	  	  41	  Ibid.,	  p.	  2647.	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This	  sympathetic	  vignette	  hints	  at	  a	  number	  of	  moral	  dilemmas	  and	  contradictions	  facing	  councillors.	  Omingo	  described	  with	  disbelief	  the	  fact	  that	  someone	  who	  had	  sold	   everything	   ‘he	   had’	   to	   get	   ‘elected’	   could	   still	   end	   up	   ‘living	   like	   a	   pauper’.	  Furthermore,	   that	   they	   were	   ‘called	   councillor’	   –	   a	   title	   connoting	   status	   and	  leadership	  –	  and	  yet	  were	  forced	  to	  dodge	  public	  functions	  such	  as	  funerals	  where	  they	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  make	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  family	  of	  the	  deceased,	  was	  an	  aberration,	  unconscionable	  to	  this	  MP.	  It	  went	  against	  the	  moral	  and	  social	  order,	  which	  was	   underpinned	   by	   an	   expectation	   that	   election	  was	   an	   assured	   route	   to	  resources.	   Whilst	   Omingo	   was	   claiming	   to	   relay	   an	   individual	   councillor’s	  experiences,	   the	   implication	   was	   that	   it	   was	   a	   universal	   problem	   of	   life	   as	   a	  councillor,	  a	  life	  that	  was	  ultimately	  unsustainable	  and	  unrewarding.	  	   After	   three	   years	   in	   operation,	   LATF	   had	   neither	   transformed	   the	  experiences	   of	   councillors	   nor	   the	   institutions	   of	   councils	   themselves.	   Despite	  ‘Hurricane	   Maitha’s’	   early,	   ‘visible	   activities’,	   by	   the	   end	   of	   NARC’s	   first	   year	   in	  office,	   councillors	   felt	   betrayed.42	  The	   public	   were	   similarly	   disappointed,	   and	   in	  January	  2004,	   the	  Daily	  Nation	  conceded	  that	   ‘many	  Kenyans	  today	  have	  given	  up	  hope	   of	   ever	   having	   local	   authorities	   that	   perform’.43	  Journalist	  Morris	  Odhiambo	  went	   on	   to	   criticise	   the	   Constitution	   of	   Kenya	   Review	   Commission	   for	   failing	   to	  ‘effectively	  address	  the	  place	  of	   local	  authorities’	   in	  a	  devolved	  system.	  44	  The	  next	  section	  of	  this	  chapter	  looks	  in	  more	  detail	  at	  the	  process	  of	  constitutional	  review,	  and	   how	   this	   intersected	   with,	   and	   to	   an	   extent	   eclipsed	   the	   agenda	   of	   local	  government	  reform.	  	  
In	  pursuit	  of	  ‘real	  devolution’:	  Constitutional	  reform,	  1997-­‐2010	  Multi-­‐partyism	  failed	  to	  produce	  the	  kind	  of	  transformation	  in	  Kenyan	  politics	  that	  advocates	   had	   hoped	   for.45	  The	   entrenched	   power	   of	   KANU	   in	   the	   1990s	   further	  signalled	  to	  reformers	  the	  urgent	  need	  for	  constitutional	  review.	  A	  new	  constitution	  was	   seen	  by	  a	   range	  of	  different	   activists,	   civic	   and	  professional	  organisations,	   as	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  Njeru	  wa	  Mugane	  (letter),	  'Councillors	  deserve	  better	  pay',	  Daily	  Nation,	  4	  December	  2003,	  p.	  10.	  43	  Morris	  Odhiambo,	  'Clean	  up	  councils	  prudently,	  Hurricane',	  Daily	  Nation,	  14	  January	  2004,	  p.	  9.	  44	  Ibid.	  45	  Stephen	  Ndegwa,	  ‘The	  incomplete	  transition:	  The	  constitutional	  and	  electoral	  context	  in	  Kenya’,	  Africa	  Today,	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  (1998),	  pp.	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essential	   for	   the	   consolidation	   of	   democracy.46	  The	   constitution	   was	   viewed	   by	  critics	  to	  concentrate	  ‘largely	  unchecked	  power	  in	  the	  executive’,	  and	  in	  Nairobi,	  ‘at	  the	   expense	   of	   the	   regions’.47	  Campaigners	   continued	   to	   agitate	   for	   reform	   after	  1992,	  and	  in	  1997	  –	  with	  another	  election	  in	  sight	  –	  Moi	  seemingly	  compromised,	  establishing	   the	   Constitution	   of	   Kenya	   Review	   Commission	   (CKRC).	   The	   task	   of	  forming	   the	   commission,	   however,	   became	   highly	   contentious;	   KANU	   sought	   to	  control	  the	  process	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  opposition	  politicians,	  civil	  society,	  and	  other	  stakeholders.	  In	  protest,	  a	  parallel	  review	  was	  initiated	  by	  the	  National	  Convention	  Executive	   Council;	   an	   organisation	   composed	   of	   activists,	   religious	   leaders	   and	  politicians.	  After	  mediation	  by	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  government’s	  commission,	  Yash	  Ghai,	   the	   two	   processes	   officially	   merged	   in	   April	   2001.	   The	   CKRC	   held	   public	  hearings	   throughout	  much	   of	   2001	   and	   2002,	   and	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   this	   the	   CKRC	  prepared	  a	  draft	  constitution	  which	  was	  published	  in	  September	  2002.	  Included	  in	  the	   draft	   were	   proposals	   for	   new	   provincial	   and	   district	   councils,	   a	   bicameral	  legislature	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  post	  of	  prime	  minister.	  Before	  the	  draft	  could	  be	  voted	  on	  Moi	  dissolved	  parliament.	  	  	   On	  coming	  to	  power,	  Kibaki	  pledged	  a	  new	  constitution	  within	  one	  hundred	  days	  of	  NARC	  taking	  office.	  Five	  years,	  two	  drafts	  and	  one	  referendum	  later,	  Kenya’s	  constitution	   remained	   in	   place.48	  NARC’s	   ‘reforming	   zeal’	   quickly	   gave	   way	   to	  inertia,	  with	  some	  observers	  acidly	  noting	  that,	  once	  the	  opposition	  had	  taken	  office,	  the	   old	   constitution	   ‘did	   not	   seem	   so	   bad’.49	  The	   new	   government	   established	   a	  National	   Constitution	   Conference	   early	   in	   2003	  which	   sat	   on	   and	   off	   for	  much	   of	  2003/4.	   The	   convention	   –	   known	   ubiquitously	   as	   ‘Bomas’	   (the	   name	   of	   the	  conference	   centre),	   had	   over	   six	   hundred	   delegates,	   and	   was	  mandated	   to	   make	  revisions	  on	  the	  Ghai	  draft.	  The	  convention	  marked	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  reform	  process	  as	  set	  out	   in	  the	  Constitution	  of	  Kenya	  Review	  (Amendment)	  Act	  of	  2001.	  This	  followed	  the	  period	  of	  public	  consultation	  and	  drafting	  (2001/2)	  and	  was	  to	  be	  proceeded	  by	  the	  ratification	  by	  parliament	  of	  the	  constitution.50	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  constitution:	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  Ibid.,	  p.	  53.	  	  48	  Jill	  Cottrell	  and	  Yash	  Ghai,	  ‘Constitution	  making	  and	  democratization	  in	  Kenya	  (2000-­‐2005)’,	  Democratization,	  14:1	  (2007),	  pp.	  1–25.	  49	  Ibid.,	  p.	  14.	  50	  Alicia	  Bannon,	  ‘Designing	  a	  constitution-­‐drafting	  process:	  lessons	  from	  Kenya’,	  The	  Yale	  
Law	  Journal,	  116:8	  (2007),	  pp.	  1824–1872,	  p.	  1836-­‐7.	  	  	  
	  	  
229	  
	   Negotiations	   at	   Bomas	   were	   lengthy,	   with	   delegates	   disagreeing	   on	   three	  ‘contentious	   issues’:	   the	   future	   structure	   of	   the	   executive,	   devolution	   and	   kadhi	  courts. 51 	  The	   government	   ultimately	   walked	   out	   in	   protest	   at	   proposals	   for	  devolution	  and	  a	  strong	  prime	  minister	  elected	  by	  parliament.	  The	  High	  Court	  then	  ruled	   that	   the	   constitution	   would	   have	   to	   be	   put	   to	   a	   national	   referendum.	   The	  government	  insisted	  on	  having	  the	  opportunity	  to	  alter	  the	  Bomas	  Draft	  before	  the	  referendum.	  At	  a	  series	  of	  retreats	  held	   in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  2005,	  Kibaki’s	  allies	  set	  about	  amending	  the	  Bomas	  Draft,	  where	  they	  succeeded	  in	  weakening	  ‘many	  of	  its	  provisions.’52	  When	   the	   government	   presented	   its	   amended	   draft	   constitution	   -­‐	  known	  as	  the	  ‘Wako	  Draft’	  after	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  Amos	  Wako	  -­‐	  mid-­‐way	  through	  2005,	   the	   structure	   of	   devolution	   it	   contained	   was	   quite	   different	   to	   the	   Bomas	  original.53	  Firstly,	   the	  Wako	   draft	   did	   not	   propose	   to	   reinstate	   the	   senate,	   as	   the	  Bomas	  had.	  The	  absence	  of	  an	  upper	  house	  was	  seen	  as	  highly	  significant	  by	  many	  observers:	   ‘[d]evolution…has	   no	   real	   basis	   if	   there	   is	   no	   senate.	   It	   is	   the	   mere	  delegation	  of	  tasks	  rather	  than	  genuine	  devolution	  of	  decision-­‐making	  authority	  to	  lower	   levels	   of	   government.’54	  A	   second	  difference	   lay	   in	   the	   number	   of	   devolved	  tiers	   the	   two	   constitutions	   proposed.	   Whilst	   Bomas	   had	   advocated	   for	   regional,	  district	   and	   locational	   councils,	   the	   Wako	   draft	   detailed	   a	   system	   of	   district	  governments	   only.	   Regarding	   the	   functions	   of	   devolved	   bodies,	   the	   two	  constitutions	   listed	   a	   similar	   array	   of	   services	   and	   responsibilities	   for	   district	  governments:	   agriculture;	   health;	   cultural	   activities;	   pollution;	   transport;	   animal	  control	   and	   welfare;	   trade	   development	   and	   regulation;	   district	   planning	   and	  development;	  education	  (pre	  primary,	  primary	  and	  secondary);	  implementation	  of	  national	   policies	   on	   conservation	   and	   resources;	   public	   works	   and	   services;	   fire	  services.	   These	  were	   broadly	   the	   same	   functions	   that	   had	   been	   assigned	   to	   local	  authorities	   in	   1963.	   In	   addition	   both	   constitutions	   proposed	   to	   dissolve	   the	  provincial	   administration	   and	   have	   local	   authorities	   entirely	   replaced	   by	   the	  district	  government	  system.	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  of	  Kenya,	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  (Supplement	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  Preston	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  al.,	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   The	  other	  main	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  drafts	  was	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  executive	   outlined	   in	   each.	   The	   Bomas	   draft	   advocated	   a	   ‘split	   executive’,	   with	   a	  directly-­‐elected	   president	   and	   prime	   minister	   elected	   from	   within	   parliament,	  whereas	   in	   the	   Wako	   draft,	   the	   prime	   minister	   was	   to	   be	   nominated	   by	   the	  president.	   By	   the	   time	   the	   draft	   was	   put	   to	   a	   national	   referendum	   in	   November	  2005,	   NARC	   had	   split	   over	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   constitution.	   Now	   ‘effectively	   in	   the	  opposition’	   Raila	   Odinga’s	   party	   led	   the	   ‘No’	   campaign	   against	   the	   constitution.	  During	   the	  months	   leading	  up	   to	   the	   referendum,	  Kenyans	  were	  divided	   ‘both	  on	  the	  merits	   of	   the	  new	  constitution	   and	   the	  process	  by	  which	   it	   had	  been	   cobbled	  together.’55	  Ultimately	  the	  majority	  rejected	  the	  Wako	  Draft	  in	  November	  2005	  with	  57	  percent	  voting	  against	  the	  constitution.	  	  	   The	   success	   of	   the	   ‘No’	   campaign	   was	   partly	   the	   product	   of	   the	  organisational	   strength	   of	   Odinga’s	   ‘Orange’	   movement	   (orange	   being	   the	   ‘no’	  symbol	  on	  the	  voting	  card).	  The	  campaign	  tried	  to	  use	  the	  referendum	  as	  a	  vote	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  Kibaki’s	  government,	  confidence	  in	  which	  had	  dropped	  after	  a	  series	   of	   corruption	   scandals.56	  But	   more	   than	   this,	   the	   result	   of	   the	   referendum	  also	   reflected	  popular	  views	  on	   the	  Wako	  constitution	   itself,	   and	   the	  process	   that	  had	  produced	   it.57	  It	  was,	  Michael	  Chege	  argues,	   seen	  by	   the	  majority	  as	   ‘a	  Trojan	  horse	   for	   continued	   Kikuyu	   dominance.’58	  And	   opponents	   criticised	   it	   for	   being	  ‘bereft	   of	   the	  devolution	  provisions	   of	   the	  Bomas	  draft’.59	  Debate	   over	   devolution	  had	  dominated	  public	  discourse	  since	  the	  start	  of	  the	  constitutional	  review	  process.	  Reflecting	   in	  2008	  on	   the	  contours	  of	   this	  debate,	  Yash	  Ghai	  notes	   that	   there	  was	  ‘little	   common	   understanding	   of	  majimbo’.60	  Despite	   this	   he	   still	   asserts	   that	   ‘the	  overwhelmingly	  majority	  of	  Kenyans	  have	  endorsed	  devolution	  (even	  if	  they	  differ	  on	  the	  modalities).’61	  Ghai	  underplays	  the	  very	  varied	  understandings	  amongst	  the	  public	   and	   politicians	   of	   what	   devolution	   might	   entail,	   and	   yet	   insists	   that	   ‘the	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  A	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  Karuti	  Kanyinga	  and	  James	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  reforms	  in	  Kenya:	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  57	  Hornsby,	  Kenya:	  A	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  Independence,	  p.	  741.	  58	  Michael	  Chege,	  ‘Kenya:	  Back	  from	  the	  brink?’,	  Journal	  of	  Democracy,	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  (2008),	  pp.	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  p.	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  Yash	  Ghai,	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  p.	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demand	   for	   devolution	   was	   for	   positive	   reasons’.62	  This	   stood	   in	   contrast,	   he	  suggested,	   to	   the	  motivations	  behind	   the	  push	   for	   regionalism	   in	   the	  early	  1960s.	  Yet	  a	  close	  reading	  of	  the	  CKRC’s	  final	  report	  reveals	  a	  muddled	  picture	  of	  ‘what	  the	  people’	   said	   in	   public	   hearings,	   and	   how	   this	   informed	   the	   commission’s	  commentary	  and	   recommendations.63	  This	   is	  particularly	  evident	   in	   the	  way	   local	  government	   was	   treated	   in	   the	   report.	   The	   CKRC	   noted	   that	   ‘[t]here	   was	   wide	  support	  for	  local	  government,	  which	  people	  said	  should	  be	  strengthened	  to	  support	  the	   state	   in	   local	   administrative,	   management	   and	   development	   activities.’64	  Yet	  instead	  of	  advocating	  for	  a	  more	  aggressive	  programme	  of	  local	  government	  reform	  the	  report	  concluded	  that	  ‘that	  the	  way	  forward	  is	  to	  design	  a	  system	  of	  devolution	  which	  agrees	  with	  the	  reasons	  given	  for	  it	  by	  the	  people.	  These	  demands,	  expressed	  in	   terms	  of	  devolution,	   are	  as	  much	  criticisms	  of	   the	  present	  political	   system	  and	  how	   it	   has	   been	   used	   as	   amounting	   to	   a	   desire	   for	   a	   particular	   alternative	  structure.’65	  That	  the	  overriding	  sentiment	  expressed	  by	  the	  public	  in	  hearings	  was	  one	  of	  dissatisfaction	  with	   the	  contemporary	  political	   system	   is	  highly	  significant.	  As	  Stephanie	  Diepeveen	  explains,	  ‘what	  united	  wananchi	  across	  the	  districts	  …	  was	  not	   an	   image	   of	   the	   ideal	   system	   of	   government’,	   instead	   what	   emerged	   in	   the	  hearings	   was	   a	   ‘disillusioned	   public	   united	   in	   their	   dissatisfaction	   with	   their	  experiences	   of	   politics’.66	  This	   observation	   is	   crucial	   for	   understanding	  why	   local	  government	  had	  no	  place	  in	  the	  constitutional	  order	  of	  either	  the	  Bomas	  or	  Wako	  drafts.	   To	   policy-­‐makers	   and	   constitution-­‐writers,	   the	   overwhelming	   desire	  expressed	  by	  much	  of	  the	  public	  to	  break	  with	  the	  political	  system	  of	  the	  past,	  was	  such	  that	   the	  reform	  of	   local	  authorities	  was	  no	   longer	  an	  acceptable	  or	  adequate	  response	   to	   the	   problems	   of	   over	   centralisation	   and	   lack	   of	   local	   participation	   in	  decision-­‐making.	  It	  might	  provide	  a	  stop-­‐gap,	  as	  one	  MP	  implied	  in	  November	  2004,	  but	   ultimately	   such	   reform	   would	   only	   function	   as	   ‘preparation	   for	   the	   real	  devolution’	  which	  would	  come	  through	  replacing	  the	  constitution’.	  67	  For	  Ghai,	  ‘local	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government	  had	  lost	  its	  authority’	  and	  so	  the	  object	  of	  devolving	  ‘power	  to	  all	  local	  levels’	  necessitated	  new	  bodies	  and	  systems,	  with	  new	  names.68	  	  	   After	   the	  defeat	  of	   the	  Wako	  constitution,	   it	  was	  not	  clear	   if	  and	  when	   the	  review	  process	  would	  resume.	  The	  split	  in	  the	  NARC	  coalition	  continued	  up	  to	  the	  election	   of	   December	   2007	  when	   Odinga’s	   Orange	   Democratic	  Movement	   (ODM)	  challenged	  Kibaki’s	  Party	  of	  National	  Unity	  (PNU).69	  The	  disputed	  results	  and	  crisis	  that	   followed	   ensured	   that	   constitutional	   reform	   stayed	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   political	  debate.	  The	  mediation	  of	  the	  crisis	  by	  an	  AU	  Panel	  of	  Eminent	  African	  Personalities	  and	   former	   UN	   Secretary	   General	   Kofi	   Annan	   led	   to	   agreement	   on	   four	   agenda	  items	   dealing	   with:	   i)	   the	   immediate	   end	   to	   the	   crisis;	   ii)	   addressing	   the	  humanitarian	  situation;	  iii)	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  power	  sharing	  government;	  and	  iv)	   political,	   judicial	   and	   constitutional	   reform.70	  The	   latter	   was	   managed	   by	   a	  committee	  of	  experts,	  with	   the	  assistance	  of	  a	   reference	  group	  and	  parliamentary	  select	   committee.71	  Tasked	  with	   ‘harmonising…previous	   drafts’,	   the	   committee	   of	  experts	   set	   to	   work	   in	   December	   2008.72	  Less	   than	   two	   years	   later,	   and	   a	   new	  constitution	  had	  been	  drafted,	  reviewed	  by	  the	  government,	  presented	  to	  the	  public	  and	  voted	  on	  in	  a	  national	  referendum.	  The	  new	  constitution	  received	  huge	  public	  support	  with	  68	  percent	  voting	  in	  favour	  of	  its	  adoption.73	  	   Scholars	   offer	   different	   analyses	   to	   explain	   why	   the	   constitutional	   reform	  process	   was	   able	   to	   progress	   in	   2008-­‐10	   when	   past	   efforts	   had	   all	   stalled.	   For	  Karuti	  and	  Long,	  a	  key	  factors	  was	  that	  the	  process	  was	  controlled	  by	  experts	  and	  technocrats,	   rather	   than	  politicians.74	  Nelson	  Kasfir	   challenges	   this	   interpretation,	  noting	   that	   the	   committee	   of	   experts	   had	   to	   make	   significant	   decisions	   when	  ‘harmonising’	   the	   drafts,	   favouring	   the	  most	   reform-­‐oriented	   version,	   the	   Bomas	  draft.75	  Even	  so,	  politicians	  were	  not	  excluded	  from	  the	  process.	  The	  parliamentary	  select	   committee,	   formed	  of	  PNU	  and	  ODM	  members,	  made	   ‘sweeping	   changes	   to	  the	  revised	  harmonised	  draft’,	  which	  was	  eventually	  passed	  by	  parliament,	  within	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  Ghai,	  ‘Devolution:	  Restructuring	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  Kenyan	  state’,	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  215.	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  Nic	  Cheeseman,	  ‘The	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  2:2	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  pp.	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  and	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  of	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  Ibid.	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  Ibid.,	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  73	  Eric	  Kramon	  and	  Daniel	  Posner,	  ‘Kenya’s	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  constitution’,	  Journal	  of	  Democracy,	  22:2	  (2011),	  pp.	  89–103.	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  Ibid.	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the	   strict	   time-­‐frame	   set	   out	   in	   the	  National	   Accord	   and	  Reconciliation	  Act.76	  The	  fact	   that	   there	   was	   considerable	   public	   pressure	   for	   the	   process	   to	   reach	   a	  conclusion	   was	   certainly	   significant,	   as	   was	   the	   ‘grand	   compromise’	   reached	   by	  Raila	  and	  Kibaki	  to	  maintain	  a	  presidential	  system	  and	  introduce	  devolution.77	  	  	  	   The	   issue	   of	   devolution	   remained	   contentious	   during	   the	   review	   process.	  Raila’s	   ODM	   preferred	   a	   three	   tier	   structure	   along	   the	   lines	   of	   the	   Bomas	   Draft,	  whilst	   Kibaki’s	   PNU	   sought	   fewer	   sub-­‐national	   authorities.	   An	   agreement	   was	  reached	   on	   a	   two-­‐tier	   system	   with	   forty-­‐seven	   county	   governments	   contiguous	  with	   the	   pre-­‐1992	   district	   boundaries.78	  County	   governments	   consist	   of	   a	   county	  assembly	  and	  county	  executive.	  County	  assemblies	  have	  a	  speaker,	  members	  of	  the	  county	   assembly	   (MCAs)	   elected	   to	   represent	   a	  ward,	   and	   nominated	  MCAs.	   The	  county	  executive	  is	  made	  up	  of	  a	  directly	  elected	  governor	  and	  deputy,	  and	  a	  county	  executive	   committee,	   whose	   members	   are	   nominated	   by	   the	   governor,	   with	   the	  approval	   of	   the	   assembly.	   The	   constitution	   reintroduced	   the	   senate;	  members	   of	  which	  are	  directly	  represented	  and	  mandated	   to	  protect	  counties’	   interests	   in	   the	  upper	  house.	  The	  new	  system	  came	   into	   effect	   after	   the	   elections	  of	  March	  2013,	  when	  city,	  municipal	  and	  county	  councils	  were	  dissolved,	  and	  replaced	  by	  county	  governments.	  	  
Conclusion:	  ‘pathways	  to	  a	  new	  Kenya’?	  	  Observers	  in	  and	  outside	  of	  Kenya	  have	  celebrated	  the	  ‘remarkably	  ambitious	  and	  rigorous	  experiment	  in	  democratic	  decentralization’	  that	  the	  country	  has	  begun	  to	  undertake.79	  The	  scale	  of	  these	  ambitions	  was	  summed	  up	  by	  a	  World	  Bank	  report,	  subtitled	  ‘pathways	  to	  a	  new	  Kenya’:	  	  Kenya’s	   new	   constitution	   marks	   a	   critical	   juncture	   in	   the	   nation’s	  history.	  It	  is	  widely	  perceived,	  by	  Kenyans	  from	  all	  walks	  of	  life,	  as	  a	  new	  beginning…	  Its	  vision	  encompasses	  a	  dramatic	  transformation	  of	  the	   Kenyan	   state	   through	   new	   accountable	   and	   transparent	  institutions,	  inclusive	  approaches	  to	  government	  and	  a	  firm	  focus	  on	  equitable	   service	   delivery	   for	   all	   Kenyans	   through	   the	   newly	  established	  county	  governments.80	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  Ibid.,	  p.	  63.	  77	  Joel	  Barkan	  and	  Makau	  Mutua,	  ‘Turning	  the	  corner	  in	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Through	  the	  new	  constitution,	  Kenya	  was	  offered	  ‘a	  new	  beginning’;	  this	  narrative	  of	  a	  nation	  reborn	  has	  infused	  much	  of	  the	  academic	  and	  popular	  commentary	  on	  devolution.	   The	   notion	   that	   devolved	   government	   could	   and	   would	   ‘fix’	   Kenya’s	  broken	  politics	  and	  lead	  the	  country	  into	  a	  new	  era	  of	  ‘good	  governance’	  has	  come	  under	   remarkably	   little	   scrutiny	   from	   scholars	   of	   Kenya	   and	   experts	   on	  decentralisation.	   The	   constitution-­‐writers’	   ambitions	   for	   devolution	   were	   wide-­‐ranging,	   encompassing	   the	   hopes	   that	   it	   would	   ‘promote	   democratic	   and	  accountable	   exercise	   of	   power’;	   ‘foster	   national	   unity’;	   and	   ‘promote	   social	   and	  economic	  development’.81	  The	  rationale	  for	  such	  aspirations	  has	  been	  supported	  by	  enthusiastic	  observers,	   such	  as	  Kempe	  Hope,	  who	  states	  –	  without	   reservations	  –	  that	  devolved	  government	  will	  lead	  to	  enhanced	  citizen	  participation;	  better	  service	  delivery;	   a	   reduction	   of	   regional	   inequalities,	   instability	   and	   poverty;	   and	   lessen	  corruption. 82 	  Decentralisation	   is,	   he	   concludes	   ‘an	   unambiguously	   desirable	  phenomenon’.83	  Such	   enthusiasm	   stems	   from	   the	  diagnosis	   that	  most,	   if	   not	   all	   of	  Kenya’s	   governance	   problems	   are	   symptoms	   of	   the	   state’s	   historic	   over-­‐centralisation.84	  Corruption,	  tribalism	  and	  political	  violence	  are	  thereby	  seen	  as	  the	  outcomes	   of	  Kenya’s	   ‘imperial	   presidency’.	   By	   bringing	   government	   ‘closer	   to	   the	  people’,	   and	   ending	   the	   ‘winner	   takes	   all’	   approach	   to	   the	   presidency,	   it	   was	  assumed	   that	   the	   state	   would	   become	  more	   accountable	   and	   responsive	   to	   local	  needs	  and	  that	  the	  political	  culture	  of	  national	  elites	  would	  adjust	  accordingly.	  	  	   Long-­‐time	  observer	  of	  Kenyan	  politics,	  Tom	  Wolf,	  shares	  the	  enthusiasm	  of	  the	  World	   Bank.	   He	  writes	   that	   the	   new	   constitution	   ‘represents	   a	   radical	   break	  from	   the	   past	   in	   terms	   of	   significant	   improvements	   in	   all	   areas	   of	   governance.’85	  This	  assumption	   is	  explored	  in	  this	   final	  section,	  which	  applies	   Jean-­‐Pierre	  Olivier	  de	  Sardan’s	  concepts	  of	  ‘official	  norms’	  and	  ‘practical	  norms’	  to	  the	  study	  of	  the	  new	  county	   government	   system.	   Dissatisfied	  with	   the	   pervasive	   and	   often	   ambiguous	  application	  of	   the	   term	   ‘neo-­‐patrimonialism’	   in	   the	  study	  of	  African	  states,	  Olivier	  de	   Sardan	   proposes	   that	   the	   ‘gap’	   between	   -­‐	   and	   coexistence	   of	   -­‐	   a	   bureaucratic	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mode	  of	  governance	  and	  a	  (neo)-­‐patrimonial	  logic	  can	  be	  more	  precisely	  analysed	  and	   understood	   through	   examining	   the	   official	   and	   practical	   norms	   that	   govern	  actors	  and	  institutions	  of	  the	  state.	  Official	  norms,	  he	  writes,	  are	  ‘largely	  identical	  to	  those	  in	  force	  in	  the	  North’.86	  This	  study	  has	  considered	  the	  ‘official	  norms’	  of	  local	  government,	   referred	   to	   for	   the	   most	   part	   in	   this	   thesis,	   as	   the	   ‘colonial	   local	  government	  model’.	  The	  official	  norms	  of	  the	  new	  system	  of	  county	  governments	  –	  codified	  in	  the	  2010	  constitution	  and	  other	  pieces	  of	  legislation	  -­‐	  represent	  a	  major	  departure	   from	   those	   of	   the	   colonial	   local	   government	   model.	   In	   its	   design,	  devolution	   addresses	   many	   of	   the	   enduring	   criticisms	   of	   the	   former	   local	  government	  system.	  This	  exemplifies	  ‘the	  ways	  in	  which	  governance	  arrangements	  emerge,	   are	   articulated	   and	   transformed	   through	   social	   agency’,	   and	   most	  importantly,	  can	  become	  institutionalised.87	  However,	  this	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  accompanied	  by	   an	   associated	   shift	   in	   the	   ‘practical	   norms’	   of	   county	   governments.	   Practical	  norms,	   Olivier	   de	   Sardan	   explains,	   ‘are	   the	   various	   informal	   rules,	   tacit	   or	   latent,	  that	   underpin	   those	   practices	   of	   public	   actors	   which	   do	   not	   conform	   to	   formal	  professional	   and	   bureaucratic	   norms.’88	  Clear	   continuities	   are	   emerging	   between	  the	  practical	  norms	  of	  county	  governments	  and	  their	  local	  authority	  predecessors,	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  are	  considered	  in	  the	  conclusion.	  	  	  	   At	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  colonial	  local	  government	  model	  was	  an	  assumption	  that	  people	  would	  be	  more	  willing	  to	  pay	  taxes	  for	  local	  services	  that	  they	  could	  easily	  see	   and	  access.	  This	  belief	  was	   seemingly	   supported	  by	   the	   experience	  of	  African	  local	   councils	   before	   independence.	   From	   the	   mid-­‐1920s,	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	  Kenya’s	  native	  councils	  chose	  to	  raise	  the	  value	  of	  their	  local	  rate,	  year	  on	  year,	  to	  support	   local	   services,	   particularly	   education.	   Yet	   as	   independence	   drew	   nearer,	  this	   success	   in	   collecting	   taxes	   began	   to	   break	   down.	   The	   trend	   continued	   after	  1963,	  when	  –	   as	  was	   shown	   in	  Chapter	  Two	   -­‐	   local	   authorities	   struggled	   to	  meet	  their	   revenue	   raising	   targets.	   Kenya’s	   councillors	   had	   expected	   independence	   to	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  mode	  of	  governance’,	  in	  Thomas	  Bierschenk	  and	  Jean-­‐Pierre	  Olivier	  de	  Sardan	  (eds.),	  States	  at	  Work:	  Dynamics	  of	  African	  Bureaucracies	  (Leiden,	  2014),	  pp.	  399-­‐429,	  p.	  408.	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bring	   an	   end	   to	   taxation,	   and	   a	   rapid	   expansion	   in	   local	   services.	   Such	  ‘development’,	   it	   was	   assumed,	   could	   and	   should	   be	   funded	   by	   the	   central	  government.	   This	   general	   feeling	   was	   captured	   by	   Walter	   Hardacre	   during	   the	  commission	   of	   inquiry	   into	   local	   government	   After	   meeting	   with	   scores	   of	  delegations	   of	   councillors,	   and	   other	   stakeholders,	   Hardacre	   suggested	   ‘the	   idea	  that	   central	   government	   take	   over	   GPT,	   and	   finance	   local	   authorities	   by	   way	   of	  grants.’89	  This	  suggestion,	  made	  in	  1966,	  essentially	  sums	  up	  the	  intergovernmental	  fiscal	  arrangement	  contained	  in	  the	  new	  county	  government	  system.	  	  	  	   In	  the	  mid-­‐1960s,	  central	  government	  grants	  constituted	  around	  33	  percent	  of	   county	   councils’	   revenues,	   which	   were	   responsible	   for	   many	   of	   the	   same	  functions	   as	   county	   governments	   are	   today	   (with	   the	   significant	   exception	   of	  primary	  education,	  which	  has	  remained	  under	  central	  government	  control	  contrary	  to	   the	   proposals	   presented	   in	   the	   Bomas	   and	   Wako	   drafts).	   The	   constitution	  guarantees	   that	   county	   governments	   must	   be	   allocated	   at	   least	   15	   percent	   of	  national	  revenue.’90	  This	   figure	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	   forceful	  debate,	  with	  many	  voices	  calling	  for	  a	  greater	  share	  to	  be	  allocated	  to	  counties.91	  In	  2013/14,	  central	  government	  transfers	  constituted	  roughly	  80	  percent	  of	  county	  governments’	  total	  revenue. 92 	  By	   comparison,	   under	   the	   previous	   system,	   central	   government	  transfers	  represented	  roughly	  37	  percent	  of	  local	  authorities’	  revenues	  in	  2005/06.	  Own-­‐source	   revenue	   in	   2013/4	   was	   just	   20	   percent	   of	   county	   government’s	  budgets.	   It	   was	   prudent	   to	   estimate	   for	   a	   small	   share	   in	   counties’	   first	   year,	   but	  these	   low	   expectations	   appear	   to	   have	   continued.	   Kilifi	   County	   Government’s	  budget	   estimates	   for	   2015/16	   anticipate	   local	   revenue	   representing	   just	   15.3	  percent	   of	   the	   total,	  whilst	   the	   figure	   in	  Nakuru	   is	   only	  marginally	   higher	   at	   20.4	  percent,	  out	  of	  a	   total	  estimated	  annual	  revenue	  of	  KSH	  9.87	  billion,	  equivalent	  to	  £61.67	  million,	  for	  2014-­‐17.93	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  Malindi	  Hearings	  16-­‐17	  June	  1966,	  JA/7/10,	  KNA,	  Nairobi.	  	  90	  See	  Chapter	  12,	  Article	  201,	  The	  Constitution	  of	  Kenya,	  2010.	  	  91	  Ibid.	  	  92	  Republic	  of	  Kenya,	  Office	  of	  the	  Controller	  of	  the	  Budget:	  County	  Governments,	  Annual	  
Budget	  Implementation	  report,	  FY	  2013-­‐14,	  p.	  xii,	  accessed	  online	  at:	  http://cob.go.ke/publications.	  	  93	  County	  Government	  of	  Nakuru,	  County	  Treasury	  Medium	  Term	  Expenditure	  Framework	  Budget,	  Original	  Estimates	  2014/15-­‐2016/17,	  April	  2014,	  accessed	  online	  at:	  http://www.nakuru.go.ke/wp-­‐content/uploads/2014/05/Nakuru_PBB_Final_Budget_2014.pdf.	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   This	   arrangement,	  whereby	   the	   bulk	   of	   counties’	   funds	   come	   from	   central	  sources,	  but	  are	  managed	  by	  locally	  elected	  politicians	   is	  quite	  unusual	  within	  the	  range	  of	  contemporary	  and	  historic	  devolution	  experiences.94	  Indeed	  not	  only	  does	  it	  represent	  a	  significant	  reversal	  of	  the	  colonial	  local	  government	  model	  but	  it	  also	  runs	  counter	  to	  the	  logic	  of	  more	  recent	  decentralisation	  theory,	  advocates	  of	  which	  insist	   that	   collecting	   a	   substantial	   share	   of	   own	   revenue	   is	   crucial	   for	   fostering	  accountability	  and	  transparency	  at	  the	  local	  level.95	  Yet	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  county	   governments’	   revenue-­‐raising	   powers	   are	   actually	   quite	   limited	   and	   are	  essentially	  comparable	  to	  those	  of	  their	  local	  government	  predecessors.96	  In	  1963,	  the	   central	   government	   delayed	   transferring	   revenue-­‐raising	   powers	   to	   the	  regional	   authorities	   set	   up	   by	   the	   majimbo	   constitution;	   this	   move	   successfully	  weakened	   the	   regions	   and	   contributed	   to	   their	   eventual	   disbandment. 97 	  The	  Transfer	  of	  Functions	  Act	  passed	  in	  the	  final	  days	  of	  1969,	  restored	  all	  major	  taxing	  powers	  to	  the	  centre.	  Unwelcome	  competition	  from	  local	  authorities,	  was	  certainly	  one	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  led	  to	  the	  Act,	  but	  –	  put	  simply	  -­‐	  	  local	  authorities	  have	  never	  been	   very	   good	   at	   collecting	   revenue;	   the	   evidence	   so	   far,	   suggests	   that	   county	  governments	   are	   no	   better.	   In	   2013/14,	   county	   governments	   only	   raised	   48.5	  percent	  of	  the	  budgeted	  target	  for	  own-­‐source	  revenue,	  with	  some	  counties	  such	  as	  Kakamega	   performing	   far	   worse. 98 	  Kakamega	   only	   reached	   11.6	   percent	   of	  estimated	  revenue.99	  	   Reflecting	   on	   these	   trends,	   Nic	   Cheeseman,	   writing	   in	   the	   Daily	   Nation,	  unknowingly	   echoed	   the	   words	   of	   Wilfred	   Havelock.	   He	   concluded	   that	   county	  governments	   ‘will	  need	   to	  cut	   their	   cloth	  accordingly.’100	  Fifty	   seven	  years	  earlier,	  the	   Minister	   for	   Local	   Government	   had	   said	   the	   same	   when	   addressing	   the	  members	  of	  Nandi	  ADC.	  Yet	  Havelock’s	  insistence	  that	  ‘each	  council	  would	  have	  to	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  World	  Bank,	  Devolution	  without	  Disruption.	  	  	  95	  Roy	  Bahl	  and	  Richard	  Bird,	  ‘Subnational	  taxes	  in	  developing	  countries:	  The	  way	  forward’,	  
Public	  Budgeting	  &	  Finance,	  28:4	  (2008),	  pp.	  	  1-­‐25.	  For	  a	  critique	  of	  county	  government’s	  revenue	  raising	  powers	  see	  ‘Devolution	  without	  disruption’,	  pp.	  68-­‐88.	  	  	  96	  Jamie	  Boex	  and	  Roy	  Kelly,	  ‘Fiscal	  decentralization	  in	  Kenya:	  A	  small	  step	  or	  giant	  leap?	  (Washington,	  2011),	  p.	  1.	  97	  Gertzel,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Independent	  Kenya,	  p.	  33.	  	  	  98	  Republic	  of	  Kenya,	  Office	  of	  the	  Controller	  of	  the	  Budget,	  Annual	  Budget	  Implementation	  
Review	  Report	  FY	  2013/2014,	  August	  2014,	  p.	  3,	  accessed	  online	  at:	  http://cob.go.ke/publications/.	  	  99	  Ibid.,	  p.	  4.	  	  100	  Nic	  Cheeseman,	  ‘While	  devolution	  may	  work,	  is	  it	  sustainable?’,	  Daily	  Nation,	  8	  August	  2015,	  accessed	  online	  at:	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cut	  its	  coat	  according	  to	  its	  cloth’,	  was	  rejected	  at	  the	  time	  by	  his	  audience	  in	  Nandi.	  Their	   spokesman,	  Senior	  Chief	  Elijah	   told	   the	  minister	   that	   the	  government	  had	  a	  responsibility	  to	  support	  local	  authorities	  ‘once	  established’,	  ‘to	  the	  extent	  that	  was	  necessary	   for	   the	   provision	   of	   satisfactory	   services.’101	  The	   same	   argument	   was	  made	  by	  local	  authorities	  after	  independence.	  The	  councillors	  who	  were	  elected	  in	  1963	   had	   great	   expectations	   of	   what	   local	   government	   would	   do	   for	   them	   as	  individuals,	  and	  for	  the	  communities	  they	  represented.	  It	  was	  widely	  assumed	  that	  an	   African	   government	   would	   provide	   councillors	   with	   all	   that	   was	   needed	   to	  hasten	  the	  eradication	  of	  ‘poverty,	  ignorance	  and	  disease’	  in	  their	  wards,	  and	  speed	  up	   the	   supply	   of	   education	   to	   all.	   This	   was	   not	   the	   case.	   Instead,	   Kenyatta’s	  government	  preached	   that	   there	   could	  no	   ‘free	   things’;	   that	   councillors	  had	   to	  be	  fiscally	   responsible;	   and	   councils	  had	   to	   ‘cut	   their	   cloth	  accordingly’.	  This	   tension	  between	   the	   expectations	   and	   realities	   of	   uhuru	   provoked	   real	   debate	   over	   the	  model	  of	  government	  bequeathed	  to	  Kenya,	  and	  the	  policies	  pursued	  by	  the	  party	  in	  power.	   Instead	  of	   looking	  to	  the	  government	  to	  provide,	  Kenyatta	  told	  Kenyans	  they	  had	  to	  ‘pull	  together’	  and	  help	  themselves.	  Harambee	  was	  the	  preferred	  model	  and	   mechanism	   for	   grassroots	   development.	   Throughout	   much	   of	   his	   and	   Moi’s	  presidencies,	  harambee	  provided	  a	  system	  through	  which	  external	  resources	  could	  be	   used	   to	   fund	   infrastructure	   projects	   and	   services	  within	   constituencies.	   In	   the	  absence	   of	   well-­‐resourced	   and	   functioning	   local	   authorities,	   harambees	   enjoyed	  considerable	  popular	  support,	  and	  were	  used	  by	  elites	   to	  maintain	  their	  claims	  to	  authority.	   This	   system	   started	   to	   break	   down	   after	   1991,	   with	   the	   overt	  politicisation	   of	   harambees	   by	   the	   governing	   regime.	   The	   elected	   opposition,	  excluded	  from	  state	  spoils,	  found	  it	  much	  harder	  to	  deliver	  and	  perform	  the	  role	  of	  patron.	  Thus	  when	  NARC	  came	  to	  power	  in	  2002,	  abolishing	  harambees	  was	  one	  of	  its	  first	  acts	  in	  government.	  The	  Constituency	  Development	  Fund	  (CDF)	  which	  was	  brought	   in	   to	   replace	   harambee,	   legitimised	   the	   notion	   that	   the	   role	   of	   elected	  leaders	   extended	   beyond	   policy	   formation	   and	   government	   oversight.	   Indeed,	   it	  offered	  a	  way	   for	  MPs	   to	  be	   ‘simultaneously	  developmentalist-­‐interventionist	  and	  populist-­‐clientelist’,	   all	   the	   while	   whilst	   working	   within	   a	   bureaucratic,	   legal-­‐rational	  framework.102	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   By	  retracing	   this	  history	   it	   is	  possible	   to	  see	   the	   ‘official	  norms’	   laid	  out	   in	  the	  new	  constitution	  as	  the	  outcome	  of	  much	  more	  than	  the	  2007/08	  election	  crisis,	  and	   even	   more	   than	   the	   culmination	   of	   the	   past	   two	   decades	   of	   campaign	   for	  democratic	   reform.	  By	  committing	  at	   least	  15	  percent	  of	  national	   revenue	   to	  sub-­‐national	   authorities,	   the	   new	   dispensation	   affirms	   the	   long-­‐held	   belief	   amongst	  many	   in	   Kenya,	   that	   elected	   leaders	   should	   provide	   for	   their	   constituencies,	   and	  that	  ‘the	  government’	  should	  facilitate	  this.	  Popular	  pressure	  for	  more	  resources	  to	  be	  available	  to	  local	  communities	  has	  found	  form	  in	  the	  constitution.	  Yet	  even	  this	  apparent	  victory	  has	  not	  ended	  the	  call	  for	  more	  resources	  to	  be	  channelled	  to	  the	  ‘grassroots’.	   The	   main	   opposition	   coalition	   in	   parliament	   and	   the	   Council	   of	  Governors	  have	  both	  campaigned	  since	  2013	  to	  substantially	  increase	  the	  share	  of	  the	   national	   budget	   allocated	   to	   counties.	   In	  April	   2015,	   a	   draft	   bill	  was	   released	  which	   proposed	   to	   allocate	   45	   percent	   of	   national	   revenue	   to	   counties,	   and	   to	  reintroduce	  the	  CDF	  and	  create	  Ward	  Development	  Funds	   for	  MCAs.103	  The	  bid	   to	  introduce	   ward	   development	   funds	   is	   curious	   given	   that	   the	   creation	   of	   such	  discretionary	   spending	   funds	   for	  MCAs	   has	   already	   become	   part	   of	   the	   ‘practical	  norms’	   of	   county	   governments.104	  Many	   counties	   voted	   to	   allocate	   MCAs	   ‘ward	  development	   funds’	   in	   2013/14.	   Kakamega,	   ‘without	   prior	   budgetary	   provision’	  released	   KSH	   10	   million	   to	   each	   ward,	   roughly	   £63,000	   each,	   as	   a	   ward	  development	  fund.105	  	  	   Examining	   in	   greater	   depth	   the	   Auditor-­‐General’s	   report	   on	   Kakamega	  County	  Government’s	   first	  year	   in	  office	  reveals	  a	  number	  of	  other	  continuities	   in	  terms	  of	   the	  behaviour	  of	  MCAs.	  They	  are	  deploying	  many	  of	   the	   same	   strategies	  developed	  by	   councillors	   to	   extract	   greater	   resources	   and	  opportunities	   from	   the	  local	   state.	   For	   example,	  Kakamega’s	  MCAs	  over-­‐claimed	   their	   ‘sitting	  allowances’	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by	   approximately	   KSH	   65	   million	   (£410,000);	   much	   of	   which	   was	   paid	   for	  committee	   and	  assembly	  meetings	   that	   supposedly,	   though	  doubtfully,	   took	  place	  over	   weekends	   and	   public	   holidays.106	  An	   extreme	   case	   was	   the	   House	   Business	  Committee,	   which	   never	   met	   during	   the	   year,	   yet	   its	   twenty-­‐five	   members	   still	  claimed	   for	  a	  combined	  total	  of	  224	  sessions.107	  The	  Auditor	  General’s	  report	  also	  condemned	  the	  ‘extravagant,	  unaccounted	  for	  expenditure’	  on	  regional	  conferences	  and	   foreign	   tours,	   which	   MCAs	   claimed	   further	   allowances	   and	   expenses	   for.108	  Making	   ‘educational	   tours’	   to	   other	   councils	   became	   a	   common	  practice	   amongst	  local	   authorities	   in	   the	   1990s	   and	   2000s	   as	   participation	   in	   the	   trips	   entitled	  councillors	  to	  claim	  a	  daily	  allowance.	  This	  kind	  of	  opportunism,	  however,	  is	  harder	  to	   justify	   in	   light	  of	   the	   salaries	  MCAs	  now	  receive.	  Local	  political	  office	  has	  been	  reformulated	   into	   a	   ‘job’	   rather	   than	   a	   position	   of	   voluntary	   service.	   A	   normal	  member	  of	  a	  county	  assembly	  began	  their	  first	  term	  with	  a	  monthly	  salary	  of	  KSH	  79,200	   (£495).109	  In	  November	  2013,	   eight	  months	  after	   the	  election,	   the	  Salaries	  and	   Remuneration	   Commission	   increased	   their	   salaries	   and	   allowances	   after	  strikes	   had	   brought	   many	   county	   governments	   to	   a	   standstill.	   Under	   the	   new	  agreement,	  MCAs	  receive	  KSH	  180,000	  (£1,125),	  are	  entitled	  to	  mortgages	  valuing	  KSH	   3	  million,	   and	   –	   after	   fifty	   years	   of	   campaigning	   -­‐	   car	   loans	   of	   up	   to	   KSH	   2	  million.	  	  	   At	   an	   institutional	   level,	   there	   are	   also	   clear	   continuities	   in	   the	   practical	  norms	  of	  county	  councils	  and	  county	  governments.	  There	  have	  been	   innumerable	  reports	   of	   seemingly	   new	   political	   spats	   between	   governors,	   senators,	  MCAs	   and	  county	   assembly	   speakers,	   which	   feature	   daily	   in	   Kenya’s	   main	   newspapers.	   Yet	  how	  ‘new’	  these	  divisions	  are	  is	  debatable;	  contemporary	  tussles	  for	  resources	  and	  political	  authority	  resemble	  in	  nature	  those	  that	  characterised	  local	  government	  for	  decades.	   In	   the	   past	   these	   struggles	   were	   often	   fought	   between	   councillors	   and	  chief	   officers,	   who	   held	   executive	   power	   and	   were	   appointed	   by	   the	   central	  government.	   The	   ‘biggest	   headache’	   for	   clerks	   were	   the	   constant	   requests	   by	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councillors	  for	  the	  local	  authority	  to	  provide	  employment	  to	  their	  supporters.	  The	  local	  state’s	  role	  as	  ‘employment	  agency’	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  recycled.	  Of	  counties’	  total	   expenditure	   in	   2013/14,	   an	   average	   of	   45.7	   percent	  was	   spent	   on	   personal	  emoluments;	  over	  double	  the	  amount	  allocated	  to	  ‘development’	  expenditure.110	  	  	  	   The	  media	  has	  strongly	  criticised	  these	  emerging	  practical	  norms	  of	  county	  governments. 111 	  Incredulous	   at	   the	   ‘goodies’	   MCAs	   were	   trying	   to	   apportion	  themselves,	  Amnesty	  International’s	  East	  Africa	  director	  Muthoni	  Wanyeki	  called	  in	  September	  2014	  for	  a	  ‘tax	  boycott’.112	  To	  most	  observers,	  the	  dysfunction	  in	  county	  governments	   is	   a	   product	   of	   the	   actions	   and	   attitudes	   of	   MCAs.	   Thus	   the	   Daily	  
Nation	  wrote	   in	   March	   2015	   that	   it	   was	   ‘no	   longer	   in	   doubt’,	   that	   ‘MCAs	   are	   a	  general	  nuisance’.113	  The	  columnist	  asked	   ‘[w]hy	  do	  we	  need	  2,526	  MCAs	  yet	  they	  are	   just	   the	   same	   glorified	   councillors	   of	   yore?’.114	  The	   councillors	   of	   ‘yore’	   were	  also	   blamed	   for	   the	   failures	   of	   the	   former	   local	   government	   system.	   Throughout	  Kenya’s	  post-­‐colonial	  history,	  public	  rhetoric	  about	  councillors	  consistently	  focused	  on	   the	  personal	  deficiencies	  of	  councillors	  who	  were	  deemed	  by	   the	  press	   to	   lack	  the	  education,	  skills	  and	  moral	  character	  needed	  to	  hold	  public	  office.	  Lambasted	  as	  ‘little	  more	  than	  common	  criminals’,	   the	  academic	   literature	  tended	  to	  mirror	  this	  portrayal.115	  Southall	   and	   Wood	   conclude	   that	   councillors	   were	   ‘on	   the	   whole,	  poorly	   educated	   and	   materially	   motivated’,	   and	   they	   suggest	   that	   councillors’	  ‘ignorance	   and	   rapaciousness’	   made	   them	   incompatible	   with	   ‘any	   system	   of	  government’.116	  	   Previous	  chapters	  have	  challenged	  this	  depiction	  by	  exploring	  the	  multiple	  motivations	  that	  have	  driven	  different	  councillors,	  and	  their	  individual	  struggles	  to	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meet	   the	  demands	  of	   their	   constituents	  whilst	   ensuring	   their	   own	  moderate	   self-­‐advancement.	   The	   councillors	   discussed	   in	   this	   thesis	   were	   not	   motivated	   by	  ‘narrowly	  defined	  self-­‐interest’,	  as	  some	  theorists	  of	  neo-­‐patrimonialism	  assume.117	  Nor	  were	  they	  driven	  only	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  ‘serve’.	  The	  balance	  between	  ‘self-­‐interest’	  and	  ‘service’	  –	  along	  with	  other	  motivations	  –	  varied	  by	  individuals	  and	  over	  time.	  Since	   taking	   office,	   MCAs	   have	   been	   characterised	   in	   much	   the	   same	   way	   as	  councillors	   were.	   There	   is	   little	   recognition	   of	   the	   demands	   placed	   upon	   them,	  instead,	   they	   have	   been	   derided	   as	   the	   ‘weakest	   link’	   in	   the	   new	   dispensation.118	  Peter	   Aling’o	   has	   warned	   that	   ‘MCAs	   pose	   the	   biggest	   threat	   to	   Kenya’s	   ‘noble’	  constitutional	   devolution	   project’,	   advocating	   for	   urgent	   intervention	   ‘to	   ensure	  that	   the	   popular	   will	   of	   the	   people	   –	   devolution	   –	   is	   not	   subverted	   to	   serve	   the	  interests	  of	  a	  few	  political	  elites.119	  That	  Aling’o	  categorises	  MCAs	  as	  ‘political	  elites’	  is	   highly	   significant.	   It	   fits	  with	   a	   popular	   and	   academic	   narrative	  which	   ascribes	  ‘bad	  governance’	  to	  the	  self-­‐serving	  behaviour	  of	  elites.	  But	  MCAs	  are	  not	  ‘political	  elites’;	   they	   are	   embedded	   in	   their	   communities,	   elected	   to	   represent	   their	  neighbours	  and	  extended	  family.	  There	  is	  not	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  separation	  between	  them	   and	   their	   constituents	   as	   members	   of	   parliament	   enjoy.	   The	   difference	  between	  the	  two	  elected	  posts	  was	  also	  set	  out	  in	  electoral	  law;	  a	  candidate	  for	  the	  National	  Assembly	  must	  have	  a	  post-­‐secondary	  school	  qualification,	  whilst	  MCAs	  do	  not.	   In	   this	   way,	   they	   occupy	   a	   similar	   –	   if	   marginally	   better	   -­‐	   social	   space	   than	  councillors	  did	  before	  them,	  and	  thus	  are	  faced	  with	  many	  of	  the	  same	  ‘dilemmas’.	  	  	   Evidence	   of	   such	   enduring	   ‘dilemmas’	   can	   be	   found	   in	   a	   national	   poll	  conducted	   by	   Transparency	   International	   in	   June	   2014.	   It	   found	   that	   only	   21	  percent	   of	   those	   interviewed	   had	   had	   contact	  with	   their	  MCA	   in	   the	   first	   year	   of	  devolution.120	  In	   the	   context	   of	   the	   report,	   the	   implication	  was	   that	   low	   levels	   of	  contact	   indicated	   a	   failure	   of	   leaders	   to	   engage	   with	   citizens,	   and	   abide	   by	   the	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constitution’s	  requirements	  for	  ‘citizen	  participation’.	  But	  the	  report	  also	  notes	  that	  79	  percent	  of	  this	  contact	  occurred	  ‘at	  social	  gatherings	  such	  as	  burials,	  harambees,	  among	  other	  events’.121	  Recalling	  the	  tale	  told	  by	  MP	  Omingo	  earlier	  in	  this	  chapter	  about	  a	  councillor	  who	  could	  not	  ‘attend	  a	  funeral’	  because	  of	  the	  anticipated	  cost,	  its	   likely	   that	  MCAs	   -­‐	   like	  councillors	   -­‐	   find	   themselves	   facing	  enormous	  demands	  wherever	  they	  go.122	  As	  councillor	  Gitu	  Kuria	  remembered	  ‘each	  day	  you	  wake	  up,	  you	  get	  about	  fifteen	  persons	  outside	  your	  door!’123	  	  	   This	   is	   the	   ‘political	   reality	   in	  Kenya’	  David	  Ndii	  has	  argued;	   ‘development	  patronage	  and	  provision	  of	  welfare	  …	  have	   long	  been	  an	   integral	  part’	   of	   leaders’	  responsibilities,	   as	   seen	   from	   the	   vantage	   point	   of	   voters. 124 	  However,	   it	   is	  important	   to	   stress	   that	   such	   expectations	   are	   not	   static	   nor	   reflective	   of	   an	  essentially	   African	   social	   context,	   politics	   or	   ‘mentality’.	   As	   Ole	   Thierkildsen	  explains,	  not	  only	  are	  neo-­‐patrimonial	  features	  present	  in	  hierarchical	   institutions	  everywhere,	   but	   these	   features	   or	   practices	   are	   learnt	   within	   institutions	  themselves.	  Informal	  norms	  he	  emphasises	  ‘are	  largely	  produced	  within	  the	  [state]	  apparatuses	   themselves.	   It	   is	   less	   culture,	   than	   history	   and	   organisation	   that	  explains	   the	   characteristic	   features	   of	   African	   states.’125 	  In	   light	   of	   this,	   it	   is	  reasonable	   to	   reflect	   –	   as	   Agnes	   Cornell	   and	   Michelle	   D’Arcy	   have	   -­‐	   on	   whether	  devolution	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   produce	   a	   ‘new	   form	   of	   politics’	   in	   Kenya.126	  Although	   Cornell	   and	   D’Arcy	   offer	   little	   analysis	   of	   the	   existing	   ‘form	   of	   politics’	  beyond	  the	  familiar	  observation	  that	  ‘the	  centralisation	  of	  the	  state…[had]	  created	  the	  kind	  of	  politics	  that	   led	  to	  violence’,	   they	  tentatively	  conclude	  that	   ‘devolution	  has	  created	  opportunities	  for	  ambitious	  men	  from	  outside	  of	  the	  core	  national	  and	  local	  elites	  to	  win	  these	  new	  positions	  and	  put	  themselves	  in	  a	  powerful	  position	  to	  challenge	  old	  national	  elites.’127	  Behind	  this	  statement	  is	  an	  assumption	  that	  politics	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is	  made	  ‘from	  above’.	  Yet	  as	  this	  thesis	  has	  argued,	  political	  agency	  has	  never	  been	  the	   preserve	   of	   Kenya’s	   elite.	   The	   high	   expectations	   surrounding	   devolution	   are	  premised	  on	  the	  belief	  that	  if	  government	  is	  brought	  closer	  to	  the	  people,	  it	  would	  become	  less	  corrupt,	  more	  accountable,	  and	  deliver	  better	  development	  outcomes.	  The	  history	  of	   local	  authorities	  however,	  does	  not	  support	  this.	   In	   fact	   it	  has	  been	  shown	   that	   when	   government	   is	   ‘closer	   to	   the	   people’,	   the	   tensions	   between	  contrasting	   ideas	   of	   what	   the	   state	   should	   be	   and	   do	   become	  more	   pronounced.	  This	   tension	   has	   been	   examined	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   councillors,	   and	   through	   the	  story	   of	   local	   government	  more	   generally.	   The	   thesis	   has	   explored	  why	   different	  councillors	   ran	   for	   local	   office,	   and	  what	   this	   revealed	   about	   grassroots’	   views	   of	  ‘government’.	   All	   the	   councillors	   considered	   saw	   ‘local	   government’	   as	   offering	  them	   individual	   opportunities.	   The	   precise	   nature	   of	   these	   expectations	   varied	  between	   cases	   and	   over	   time.	   Some	   simply	   hoped	   that	   their	   allowances	   would	  enable	  them	  to	  pay	  their	  children’s	  school	  fees;	  others	  had	  grander	  ambitions;	  all	  it	  seemed	  longed	  for	  car	  loans.	  Most	  were	  disappointed	  by	  the	  realities	  of	  local	  office.	  This	   was	   not	   because	   opportunities	   were	   non-­‐existent;	   Nakuru’s	   councillors	   did	  acquire	   urban	   land	   and	   property;	   Kilifi	   and	   Kakamega’s	   also	   had	   some	   success	  obtaining	  plots	  and	  jobs	  for	  their	  supporters.	  The	  disappointments	  stemmed	  from	  the	   difficulties	   encountered	   balancing	   their	   own	   needs	   with	   those	   of	   their	  electorate.	  	  	  	   Councillors	  were	  judged	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  deliver	  tangible	  benefits	  to	  their	  communities.	   These	   benefits	   usually	   took	   the	   form	   of	   small-­‐scale	   infrastructure	  projects:	   a	  borehole,	   cattle-­‐dip,	  new	  school	   classroom	  or	  dispensary.	  After	   county	  councils	   lost	   their	   main	   source	   of	   funding	   in	   1970,	   even	   these	   seemingly	   minor	  projects	   were	   difficult	   to	   deliver	   through	   the	   bureaucratic	   channels	   of	   local	  government.	  Therefore	  the	  work	  of	  councillors	  shifted	  to	  the	  informal	  domain.	  This	  continued	   for	  much	  of	   the	  1970s	  and	  1980s,	  when	  councillors	  used	  harambees	  to	  earn,	   show,	   and	  maintain	   their	   local	   support	   and	   legitimacy.	   Yet	  harambees	  were	  not	   the	   only	   demands	   placed	   on	   councillors.	   They	   were	   also	   turned	   to	   by	   their	  constituents	   for	   all	   sorts	  of	  personal	  needs,	   such	  as	   school	   fees,	  medical	   bills	   and	  funeral	  costs.	  Living	  amongst	  their	  supporters,	  these	  requests	  were	  a	  constant	  part	  of	   life	   as	   a	   councillor.	   It	   was	   for	   this	   reason	   that	   some	   quit	   local	   office	   and	  remembered	  the	  experience	  bitterly.	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   The	   multiple	   expectations	   of	   councillors	   were	   not	   equalled	   by	   the	  opportunities	   available	   in	   councils.	   Their	   allowances	   never	   sufficed;	   hence	   the	  constant	   campaign	   for	   enhanced	   salaries.	   Previous	   chapters	   have	   examined	   the	  different	   strategies	   developed	  by	   councillors	   to	   extract	   greater	   opportunities;	   the	  practical	   norms	   of	   local	   authorities.	   Sometimes	   these	   depended	   on	   council	  institutions,	   for	   example	   to	   acquire	   the	   title	   deed	   to	   a	   plot	   of	   land,	   or	   go	   on	   an	  ‘educational	   tour’	   to	  another	  council	  and	  claim	  an	  allowance.	   In	  other	  cases	   these	  strategies	  were	  seemingly	  independent	  of	  local	  government.	  Councillors	  were	  part	  of	  complicated	  patronage	  networks	  that	  connected	  local	  and	  central	  politicians,	  and	  were	   used	   by	   the	   governing	   regime	   to	   maintain	   popular	   support	   through	   the	  distribution	   of	   state	   resources	   by	   regional	   and	   district	   bosses,	   or	   the	   president	  himself.	  Throughout	   the	  period	  of	   the	  one-­‐party	   state,	   to	  protect	   their	  position	  at	  the	  lowest-­‐rung	  of	  these	  networks,	  councillors	  had	  to	  be	  faithful	  members	  of	  KANU.	  Their	   loyalty	   to	   their	   political	   and	   administrative	   superiors	   was	   paramount.	   The	  non-­‐compliant	  were	   not	   only	   excluded	   from	   these	   clientelist	   networks,	   but	   often	  found	   themselves	   expelled	   from	   local	   government	   altogether,	   and	   any	   other	  positions	   of	   authority	   they	   held.	   This	   began	   to	   change	   after	   1991	   when	   politics	  everywhere	   became	   more	   competitive	   and	   expensive.	   The	   ‘gains	   and	   losses’	   of	  councillorship	   were	   amplified	   and	   the	   value	   of	   councillors	   to	   MPs	   increased.	  Councillors’	   demands	   for	   greater	   resources	   for	   the	   first	   time	   coincided	   with	   the	  interests	   of	   national	   politicians	   who	   needed	   councillors	   to	   campaign	   for	   and	  represent	   them	   all	   the	   time	   in	   their	   constituencies.	   This	   shift	   in	   the	   balance	   of	  power	  between	  national	  and	  local	  leaders	  was	  followed	  by	  the	  announcement	  of	  a	  local	  government	  reform	  programme	  which	  introduced	  a	  new	  system	  of	  grants	  for	  councils.	  The	  Local	  Authority	  Transfer	  Fund	  eased	  the	  ‘dilemma’	  of	  councillors,	  but	  it	   did	   not	   resolve	   it;	   many	   councillors	   still	   ‘went	   there	   walking,	   and	   left	   there	  walking’. 128 	  This	   was	   how	   Aggrey	   Atira,	   Kakamega	   councillor	   expressed	   the	  disappointments	   of	   life	   as	   a	   councillor;	   disappointments	   that	   did	   not	   tally	   with	  mainstream	  expectations	  of	  political	  office	  as	  an	  assured	  route	  to	  prosperity.	  	  	   By	   contrast,	   today’s	  members	  of	   county	  assemblies	   are	  not	   likely	   to	   ‘leave	  there	   walking’;	   neither	   literally	   nor	   figuratively.	   The	   salaries	   that	   councillors	  persistently	   expected	   have	   finally	   been	   granted.	   As	   this	   concluding	   chapter	   has	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